


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NAVAL BATTLES IN THE CENTURY

BY
REAR-ADMIRAL FRANCIS J. HIGGINSON, U.S.N.

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P R E F A C E.

THE history of naval warfare during the nineteenth century is not as replete with incidents or with great fleet actions as its predecessor, although its opening years witnessed the final scenes in that great Napoleonic drama which convulsed Europe from 1793 to 1815, and during which period the Sea Power of England rose to its greatest power and glory.

During the eighteenth century, by means of her navy, England laid the foundations of that great Colonial Empire which has brought to her in the present century both wealth and power. Many colonies, indeed, acquired during that period were surrendered after conquest, a doubtful policy which may perhaps never be repeated. The sailing period which began about 1571 at the time of the battle of Lepanto, and during which all this great work was accomplished, came gradually to its death about the middle of the nineteenth century, when it was supplanted by steam power. Thus the nineteenth century saw one of those revolutions in the methods of naval warfare which mark the beginning of a new epoch.

It seemed as if the magic wand of science had been waved over the face of the waters, transforming all that moved thereon into new and more powerful shapes. Navies were changed from wood to steel; from unarmoured to armoured, the motive power from sails to steam, and the guns from muzzle to breech-loading.

The changes of tactics and methods of naval warfare produced by the introduction of steam carry us back, singularly enough, in many respects to the starting points of all navies, the Galley Period. This period goes back, as far as we have any records, to 1400 B. C. and lasted to about 1571 and was then gradually succeeded by the Sail Period.

As far as Naval equipment goes the latter part of the nineteenth century may be regarded as a period of incubation and a preparation to take up the unknown tasks of the next century. It is true that several nations have tried this new naval weapon with destructive effect, sufficiently indeed to test its temper and indicate the future, but its greatest work involving large fleet actions at sea, remains yet to be accomplished. Thanks to Captain Mahan, who demonstrated to the world, in a luminous and masterly argument, the great importance of Sea Power, the interest in naval matters has never been so keen and so universal as it was at the close of the nineteenth century and the advent upon the ocean of nations with rapidly increasing navies renders it certain that in the twentieth century the influence of the Sea Power of the world is going to be, more than ever, a factor in the settlement of disputes.

In recounting the history of naval warfare in the nineteenth century the subject naturally divides itself into three divisions: First, Fleet actions at sea; Second, Single ship actions; Third, Engagements with batteries and passage of forts. The limits of this work do not admit of mentioning all the actions which have taken place under these heads, Great Britain alone having been engaged in more than one thousand naval engagements large and small during this century, and in the case of single ship actions, only those which have seemed to the author of pre-eminent importance have been selected for treatment. Between the actions of Copenhagen and Santiago, that is between 1801 and 1898, there were fought nineteen fleet engagements of more or less importance. Thirteen of these were fought in the first ten years of that period or during the Napoleonic wars and the remaining six since 1811. Notwithstanding however the comparative absence of naval conflicts during the greater part of the nineteenth century the influence of Sea Power has had a determining influence upon many of the land conflicts during that time, and the side which possessed the most powerful "fleet in being" has been, as a rule, successful. So will it always be.

FRANCIS J. HIGGINSON.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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PART ONE.

FLEET AND SQUADRON ACTIONS.

NAVAL BATTLES

IN THE CENTURY.

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BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN.

THE opening Fleet action of the nineteenth century took place at Copenhagen on April 2, 1801. Denmark had at that period been at peace for eighty years and had enjoyed a prosperous neutral commerce while the other nations of Europe had been plunged in war.

Denmark, together with Sweden, another neutral nation, had always been jealous of the right of search and the rules in regard to contraband of war as practised by Great Britain and had in particular taken exception to the searching of convoys, claiming that the certificate of the naval officer in charge of the convoy should be a sufficient guarantee of the innocent nature of the cargoes under his control and should be accepted as such by the English cruisers. England denied this contention on the ground that it was an evasion of her right of search and liable to abuse. Even the officer in charge of convoy might be deceived in regard to the nature of some of the cargoes. England claimed that material for ship building and naval stores, both products of the

Baltic, were contraband of war, as enabling France to maintain her Fleet in an effective condition.

The severity with which England exercised her belligerent rights of search soon produced a rupture, and on the 25th of July, 1800, boats of a British squadron, in attempting to search a Danish convoy, were fired upon by the "Freya," a Danish forty-gun frigate. An action ensued and the "Freya" and her convoy were captured and taken to the Downs. The English had two men killed and several wounded and the Danes two killed and five wounded.

A similar incident had occurred in the Mediterranean. An envoy was despatched by Great Britain to Copenhagen accompanied by a fleet of ten sail of the line and three fifty-gun vessels in order to settle the matter amicably if possible.

On the 29th of August a convention was mutually agreed upon by which the "Freya" and convoy were to be repaired at English expense and released, and that the right of the British cruisers to search convoys should be discussed in London at a future date: That the Danish ships should continue to sail under convoy in the Mediterranean on account of the Algerians, but should be searchable as formerly and that the convention should be ratified by the two courts in three weeks.

This convention furnished a *modus vivendi* by which peace between England and Denmark might have been maintained had not the incident been taken advantage of by Napoleon to combine the northern powers against England in a coalition similar to the armed neutrality of 1780.

France had at this time freed herself from her continental enemies and by the victories of Marengo (June 14, 1800) and Hohenlinden (December, 1800) had succeeded in forcing upon the allies the Peace of Luneville (February, 1801) so that Napoleon was now free to make those combinations against England by which he hoped to deprive her of her sea power. Whenever Napoleon captured or controlled a nation having a fleet his first endeavor was to combine that fleet with his own for the destruction of English sea power.

The victories of Cape St. Vincent and Camperdown in 1797 by which the Dutch fleet had been destroyed and the Spanish fleet crippled, forced Napoleon, in his search for sea power, to look to the Baltic powers. The only powers left in possession of naval forces were Russia, Sweden and Denmark. Their combined forces would amount to about forty sail of the line and if in the spring of 1801 this force, issuing from the Baltic, could be combined with those of France and Spain, Napoleon saw, or thought he saw, the command of the channel in his hands and the conquest of England assured. At any rate it was a game worth playing, and he set about it with his usual skill and diplomacy. He had in fact, little trouble in enlisting the sympathies of Sweden and Denmark, for they were only too ready to enter upon any scheme which would relieve them from the right of search.

Russia, the mainspring of the coalition, from being a friend and ally of Great Britain in 1799, had now become her enemy and the Czar Paul,

fearing England's opposition to his designs against Turkey and enraged over his failure to secure Malta, which had surrendered to a British fleet but which Paul claimed as his own, on the ground that he had been elected as Grand Master of the Order, became hostile to Great Britain and, on November 5, laid an embargo upon all the British shipping in Russian ports, amounting at this time to about 200 sail.

On December 16, 1800, a convention was signed between Russia and Sweden renewing the armed neutrality of 1780. Denmark and Prussia were also induced to join this confederacy. The command of the sea, which such a union threatened, was a matter of life or death to England and she armed herself to shatter the coalition, although no formal declaration of war was made on either side.

The nominal or paper force with which England found herself confronted was Russia 82, Denmark 23 and Sweden 18 sail of the line; besides, between them all, 89 frigates, corvettes and brigs and nearly twice the number of small craft. Russia had 31 sail of the line in the Baltic, divided between Petersburg, Archangel, Cronstadt and Revel. The Swedes had 11 sail of the line at Carlscrona in effective condition and the Danish fleet at Copenhagen consisted of 10 sail of the line ready for sea, exclusive of the same number in an unserviceable state.

To meet this force England despatched on the 12th of March, from Yarmouth Roads, a force consisting of 15, afterwards augmented to 18, sail of the line with as many frigates, sloops, bombs, fire-

ships and smaller vessels as made the whole number about 55 sail.

This naval force was accompanied by a military force under the command of Colonel Stewart, consisting of the 49th regiment under Colonel Isaac Brock, two companies of the rifle corps and a detachment of artillery. This expedition was under the command of Admiral Sir Hyde Parker in the "London," 98, and he had with him as second in command Vice-Admiral Nelson in the "St. George," 98. Nelson, around whom the whole interest of this expedition centres, was at that time 43 years of age and had been in 105 engagements. Three years before he had fought that glorious Battle of the Nile, which for dash and daring stands unrivalled and which should have placed him second to none in the British Navy. He had, however, received only the lowest grade in the peerage for that victory and his conduct at Naples and with Lady Hamilton seems to have created a prejudice against him, which, although entirely personal, yet seemed to weigh against him at the Admiralty, where he was rather under a cloud and hardly rated at his true value. Besides which, it was proposed to try negotiations with Denmark before actual hostilities commenced and Sir Hyde Parker was thought to possess more diplomatic skill and patience than the impetuous Nelson.

After encountering heavy gales and becoming much scattered, the fleet anchored in the Sound on March 21, and on the 24th the British Envoy sent to negotiate with the Danes, returned empty-handed and declared that the defences of Copenhagen had

been greatly strengthened and were growing more formidable every hour. The wind was fair and while Parker hesitated Nelson fretted and fumed, knowing full well the value of time in military operations and his mind tortured with the probable disastrous consequence of delay. In this crisis Nelson poured forth his impatience in a letter to his commander-in-chief, which for earnest enthusiasm and elevated patriotism stands unrivalled in naval literature and stamps him as a consummate master of naval strategy.

“24th March, 1801.

“MY DEAR SIR HYDE—The conversation we had yesterday, has naturally, from its importance, been the subject of my thoughts, and the more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion; that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy: they will every day and every hour be stronger; we never shall be so good a match for them as at this moment. The only consideration in my mind is, how to get at them with the least risk to our ships. By Mr. Vansittart’s account, the Danes have taken every means in their power to prevent our getting in to attack Copenhagen by the passage of the Sound. Cronenburg has been strengthened, the Crown Islands fortified, on the outermost of which are twenty guns, pointing mostly downwards, and only eight hundred yards from very formidable batteries placed under the Citadel, supported by five sail of the line, seven floating batteries of fifty guns each, besides small craft, gunboats, etc., etc.; and

that the Revel Squadron of twelve or fourteen sail of the line are soon expected, as also five sail of Swedes. It would appear by what you have told me of your instructions, that the government took for granted you would find no difficulty in getting off Copenhagen, and in the event of a failure of negotiation, you might instantly attack; and that there would be scarcely a doubt but the Danish Fleet would be destroyed, and the Capital made so hot that Denmark would listen to reason and its true interest. By Mr. Vansittart's account, their state of preparation exceeds what he conceives our government thought possible, and the Danish government is hostile to us in the greatest possible degree. Therefore here you are, with almost the safety, certainly with the honour, of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell to the lot of any British officer. On your decision depends whether our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she shall rear her head higher than ever; again do I repeat, never did our Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this. How best to honour our Country and abate the pride of her enemies by defeating their schemes, must be the subject of your deepest consideration as Commander-in-Chief; and if what I have to offer you can be the least useful in forming your decision, you are most heartily welcome.

“I shall begin with supposing you are determined to enter by the Passage of the Sound, as there are those who think, if you leave that passage open, that the Danish Fleet may sail from Copenhagen, and join the Dutch or French. I own, I have no fears on

that subject; for it is not likely that while their Capital is menaced with an attack, 9,000 of her best men should be sent out of the Kingdom. I suppose that some damage may arise amongst our masts and yards; yet perhaps there will not be one of them but that could be made serviceable again. You are now about Cronenburg: if the wind is fair, and you determine to attack the ships and Crown Islands, you must expect the natural issue of such a battle—ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost; for the wind which carries you in, will most probably not bring out a crippled ship. This mode I call taking the bull by the horns. It, however, will not prevent the Revel Ships, or Swedes, from joining the Danes; and to prevent this from taking effect, is, in my humble opinion, a measure absolutely necessary—and still to attack Copenhagen. Two modes are in my view: one to pass Cronenburg, taking the risk of damage, and to pass up the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King's Channel, to attack their Floating batteries, etc., etc., as we find it convenient. It must have the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes and Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen. I am also pretty certain that a passage could be found to the northward of Saltholm for all our ships; perhaps it might be necessary to warp a short distance in the very narrow part. Should this mode of attack be ineligible, the passage of the Belt, I have no doubt, would be accomplished in four or five days, and then the attack by Draco could be carried

into effect, and the junction of the Russians prevented, with every probability of success against the Danish floating batteries. What effect a bombardment might have, I am not called upon to give an opinion; but think the way would be cleared for the trial. Supposing us through the Belt with the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with the Fleet, or detach ten ships of three and two decks, with one bomb and two fire-ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be thought bold, but I am of the opinion the boldest measures are the safest; and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed with judgment. In supporting you, my dear Sir Hyde, through the arduous and important task you have undertaken, no exertion of head or heart shall be wanting from your most obedient and faithful servant,

“NELSON and BRONTE.”

How satisfactory it must have been to Parker, his diplomacy having failed, to find by his side the greatest naval genius of the age, full of resources and ready and anxious to undertake charge of the active operations. It is easier for a man to do a thing himself than to make others do it, and if Nelson, to use his own expression, “took the bull by the horns,” as he certainly did in this letter, it was because the time had come for him to assert his mastership in order to rescue the expedition from a

failure. Once before, at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, his genius had flashed forth and at the risk of disapproval and disgrace he had given to his commander-in-chief a victory and a peerage. With the Russian fleet at Revel, the Swedish fleet at Carlscrona and the Danish fleet at Copenhagen, Nelson saw with the clear vision of military instinct that to cut off the Russian and Swedish fleets from joining the Danes, who occupied the strongest position in the Baltic, was the first thing to do to insure success.

The passage into the Baltic from the Kattegat can be made by large ships by means of two passages around the Island of Zealand. The eastern passage, called the Sound, is between Zealand and Sweden and at its northern entrance is only three miles wide. At this narrow strait is situated the city of Elsinore, the most flourishing town in Denmark except Copenhagen. On the Swedish coast opposite is the old city of Helsingburg. On the Danish side at the edge of the peninsular promontory on the nearest point of land to the Swedish coast stands Cronenburg Castle, a magnificent pile at once a palace, a fortress and a prison, with its spires, towers, battlements and batteries.

The other passage in the Baltic is called the Great Belt and runs on the western side of the Island of Zealand. It is more intricate than the Sound and abounds in rocks and shoals and strong currents and requires very skilful pilotage. The passage could be accomplished in from three to four days.

Parker had asked the officer in command of Cronenburg Castle if he would fire upon the fleet should

it pass through the Narrows and upon receiving an affirmative reply he turned his attention to the Great Belt passage, preferring its dangers and delays to the guns of the Castle. Nelson did not oppose this, saying, "I don't care a d—n by which passage we go so that we fight them."

On the 26th of March the fleet weighed and stood for a few hours in the direction of the Great Belt and then, influenced by Captain Otway of the "London," Sir Hyde's flagship, who represented the great difficulty of the Great Belt passage, Admiral Parker changed his mind and returned towards the Sound.

The fleet anchored on the 26th six miles from Cronenburg and here three more precious days were lost by head winds and calms. Something however had been saved by escaping the passage by the Great Belt and the fleet was now only 26 miles from its objective point and with the first fair wind the Sound could be passed. In this interval of waiting Nelson carefully completed his plan of attack, which having been approved, he shifted his flag from the "St. George" to the "Elephant," 74, commanded by Captain Foley who with superb daring and judgment led the fleet inside the French line at the Battle of the Nile.

At last on the 30th the wind blew fair to the northward and with a fine sailing breeze the fleet swept through the Narrows, passing by Cronenburg Castle with Nelson leading in the van division, Parker in the centre and Rear-Admiral Graves in the rear. The Danish batteries opened fire but their

shot fell short. Seven of the bomb vessels bombarded the batteries during the passage of the fleet.

About noon the fleet anchored above the island of Huen, fifteen miles from Copenhagen. Here the Commander-in-Chief and Nelson, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Graves and Captain Domett, and the commanding officer of the troops, in the "Lark" lugger, reconnoitred the enemy's position. It was Nelson's first view of the work cut out for him, and he and the other officers seem to have been impressed with the difficulties of the undertaking and the strength of the Danish defences.

Indeed the Danish defences looked formidable and stretched for nearly four miles in front of the city. At the northern end were two batteries built on artificial islands called the Cronen Batteries and mounting sixty-eight guns, 25- and 36-pounders, with furnaces for heating shot. Eighteen vessels, comprising hulks and full-rigged ships extended in a line south of these forts. The entrance to the harbour was protected by a chain, and batteries on shore commanded the harbour channel. At the entrance to the harbour were two 74-gun ships, a 40-gun frigate, two brigs and some zebecs. On Amag Island, south of the line of floating defence, were several gun and mortar batteries. All the buoys had been removed, which rendered the approach more difficult. The Danes had done their best in the short time allowed them but their men were as yet undrilled.

On the 30th, after the reconnaissance, Admiral Parker called a council of war to consider the best

mode of procedure. As usual on such occasions, much argument was advanced to forego or delay the attack. But Lord Nelson's argument prevailed and he offered, with 10 sail of the line and all the small craft, to bring the affair to a successful conclusion. To his credit, be it said, Admiral Parker accepted the offer and added two 50-gun ships to the number asked for.

While the council was being held on board the "London" Nelson walked up and down the cabin, working the stump of his arm, as was his habit when excited or irritated, and combating with scorn any opinions which savoured in the least degree of alarm or doubt.

On the 31st he made another examination of the enemy's position and came to the conclusion to deliver the assault from the southward, which was the weakest point of the enemy's line. The night of the 31st was spent in rebuoying the outer channel passing between the middle ground and the low Island of Saltholm. This preliminary work, upon which the success of his operation depended, Nelson attended to personally and accompanied by Captain Brisbane he proceeded in a boat and under the cover of darkness to explore this channel and acquaint himself from personal observation with its dangers. He rebuoyed the channel and worked his way over the strong current and ensured the safety of his ships from the reefs and sand banks which abounded in the channel. This done, and feeling himself now entirely in the hands of his pilots, he made a signal on the morning of April 1 for the squadron under his

command to get under way. The wind was light and fair and led by Nelson in the "Amazon," his division threaded its way through the narrow channel. Simultaneously, the Commander-in-Chief's eight ships lifted their anchors and drifted into a position nearer the mouth of the harbour, where they remained during the subsequent action. Nelson had under his command the following ships:

| SHIP. | GUNS. | COMMANDING. |
|-------------------|-------|---|
| "Elephant"..... | 74. | Vice-Adm. (Blue) Lord Nelson. Captain, Thomas Foley. |
| "Defiance"..... | 74. | |
| "Edgar"..... | 74. | Rear-Adm. Thomas Graves. |
| "Monarch"..... | 74. | Captain, Richard Retalick. |
| "Bellona"..... | 74. | " George Murray. |
| "Ganges"..... | 74. | " James Robert Mosse. |
| "Russell"..... | 74. | " Sir Thos. Boulden Thompson. |
| "Agamemnon"..... | 64. | " Thomas Francis Fremantle. |
| "Ardent"..... | 64. | " William Cuming. |
| "Polyphemus"..... | 64. | " Robert Devereux Fancourt. |
| "Glatton"..... | 54. | " Thomas Bertie. |
| "Isis"..... | 50. | " John Lawford. |
| "Amazon"..... | 38. | " William Bligh. |
| "Deseree"..... | 40. | " James Walker. |
| "Blanche"..... | 36. | " Henry Riou. |
| "Alcmene"..... | 32. | " Henry Inman. |
| "Jamaica"..... | 26. | " Graham Eden Hamond. |
| | | " Samuel Sutton. |
| | | " Jonas Rose. |

SLOOPS.

| | | |
|----------------|--|---------------------------|
| "Arrow"..... | | " William Bolton. |
| "Dart"..... | | " John Ferris Devonshire. |
| "Cruiser"..... | | " James Brisbane. |
| "Harpy"..... | | " William Birchall. |

Together with seven bomb vessels and two fire-ships, there remained with Admiral Parker the following ships, viz:—

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | COMMANDING. |
|--------------------|-------|---------------------------------|
| | | Admiral (Blue) Sir Hyde Parker. |
| "London."... .. | 98. | Captain William Domett. |
| | | " Robert Waller Otway. |
| "St. George."..... | 98. | " Thos. Masterman Hardy. |
| "Defence."..... | 74. | " Lord Henry Paulet. |
| "Warrior."..... | 74. | " Charles Tyler. |
| "Saturn."..... | 74. | " Robert Lambert. |
| "Ramillies."..... | 74. | " Jas. Wm. Taylor Dixon. |
| "Reasonable."..... | 64. | " John Dilkes. |
| "Veteran."..... | 64. | " Arch. Collingwood Dickson. |

The ships under Nelson passed through the channel and barely rounding the Southern point anchored off Draco Point about eight p. m. just at dusk, being then distant about two miles from the southern extremity of the Danish line. The night of April 1 was again spent in exploring the channel towards the Danish position and placing buoys for the next day's advance. Throughout the night the English boats were stealthily creeping hither and thither, sounding and testing the buoys. In one of these boats was Captain Thomas Masterman Hardy, that fine specimen of a British sailor, of whom Nelson was so fond, and who gave to Nelson that kiss of peace as the hero lay dying in his arms at Trafalgar.

Hardy actually rowed to within the shadow of the leading Danish ship and took his soundings with a

pole so as not to be heard. Nelson himself, however, spent this eve before the battle entertaining his captains at dinner and drinking to a leading wind and success in battle. Among those present at this dinner were Captains Hardy, Foley, Fremantle and Riou, all men of celebrity in that hard fighting age. In high spirits as usual before a battle, Nelson communicated his own enthusiasm to his gallant band of captains, and they pledged themselves to victory and drank to their success with a devotion and enthusiasm which in itself was half the battle. This ability to command the affectionate love of his subordinates was one of Nelson's greatest traits.

After dinner all the captains, Riou excepted, retired to their respective ships, the signal to prepare for action having been given early in the evening. Lord Nelson and Captains Foley and Riou retired between nine and ten to the after cabin and drew up the orders for battle for the next day. Captain Hardy returned about eleven and made his report of the practicability of the channel, and the depth of water up to the enemy's line. At one o'clock the orders were completed and half a dozen clerks were set to work to copy them for issue. They completed their work at six A. M. Nelson, although much fatigued, slept but little during the night, calling out frequently from his cot to the clerks to hasten their work and receiving frequent reports regarding the wind. At seven in the morning, Nelson, who was already up and breakfasted, made signal for commanding officers to repair on board, and by eight they had all received their instructions.

In general, Nelson's plan of attack was to advance his ships in column up the King's Channel, and anchor by the stern in inverted order, parallel to the Danish line. All preparations were to be made to storm the Trekroner forts, should chance favour that desperate measure.

At eight o'clock he called for the pilots and found them timid and disinclined to assume the required responsibility. They were mostly men who had been mates in the Baltic traders, and unaccustomed to handling such deep-draft ships. The signal for action had been made, the wind was fair, not a moment to be lost. Nelson urged them to be steady, to be resolute and to decide, but they wanted the only ground for steadiness and decision in such cases: and Nelson began to regret that he had not trusted to Hardy's single report. He always afterwards spoke of this experience with bitterness. "I experienced in the Sound," said he, "the misery of having the honour of our country intrusted to a set of pilots who had no other thought than to keep the ships clear of danger and their silly heads clear of shot. Everybody knows that I must have suffered, and if any merit attaches to me it was for combating the dangers of the shallows in defiance of them." At last Mr. Briarly, master of the "Bellona," declared he was prepared to lead the fleet and his judgment was acceded to by the rest.

At half-past nine the signal was made to weigh in succession. The "Edgar" led the way in gallant style, between the shoals on one side and shots of the Danes on the other, with the impressive and ominous

silence of discipline. She advanced under topsails to her appointed station, and there, anchoring by the stern, opened a tremendous fire.

Then occurred one of those unforeseen accidents, which happen sometimes in action and test the resources, nerve and ready intuition of the Commander-in-Chief. No man was ever better fitted by nature than Nelson to meet such emergencies. The "Agamemnon" should have followed the "Edgar," but owing to the strong current was unable to weather the southern point of the Middle Ground, and Nelson saw with regret, his old ship, in which he had performed so many gallant deeds come to grief at the very commencement of the action, and his own force weakened by the absence of her battery. He immediately made signal to the "Polyphemus" to take her place, but although this was done with promptitude, the delay caused the "Edgar" to be unsupported for a short time under the fire of the enemy.

After the "Polyphemus" came the "Isis" and "Bellona" and the "Russell." The former took up her position without difficulty, but the "Bellona" stood too close to the Middle Ground and ran ashore, and the "Russell" following the "Bellona," grounded in like manner. Nelson, following in the "Elephant," not knowing the "Bellona" and "Russell" were aground, and thinking they had gone too far to starboard for him to pass to the eastward of them safely made a signal to them to close in towards the Danish line, but as soon as he perceived that they were aground, with quick decis-

ion he put his helm to starboard, and passed to the westward of them. This prompt manœuvre undoubtedly saved the remaining ships from going on shore. The succeeding ships then came without accident into their appointed positions, and anchored by the stern one cable (600 feet) from the Danish line. Riou with his frigates took the vacant station at the head of the line against the Crown Batteries, a station to which three sail of the line had been originally assigned. Of twelve ships of the line one was entirely useless and two were aground where their guns could be only partially effective.

The battle commenced at 10:05 and at 10:30 the "Elephant" became engaged, and an hour later the action became general. Nelson kept the signal No. 16, "Engage the enemy more closely," under which he always fought, flying from the masthead of the "Elephant." It was a hard and fast stand-up fight, and whilst the British fire beat heavily against the Danish line, the fire of the latter did not slacken. The enemy's ships had no topmasts, and could with difficulty be made out through the smoke, which hung like a pall over the combatants. Riou ordered the fire of the "Amazon" to be suspended until the smoke cleared away, so as to see the position of the Danes. It was, however, his best protection, for as the curtain lifted and showed the Danes the yellow and black checkered sides of the British frigate a furious discharge of shot swept her deck and Riou was wounded. It was a question whether to retreat or sink at her anchors. At this moment Sir Hyde Parker's flagship was seen to be flying a signal of

recall. Sadly Riou gave the order to retreat, saying, "What will Nelson think of us?" The "Amazon's" stern came round towards the Trekroner Fort as she left her position; an appalling fire raked her, and death spared Riou the disgrace he so much feared.

Nelson, who had been much annoyed by the loss of a fourth part of his ships of the line, was no sooner in action with his squadron, receiving the fire of a thousand guns, than his countenance brightened and his conversation became joyous and animated, as if the roar of the artillery had, like music, driven away all care and annoyances. A shot struck the main-mast while Nelson was pacing the quarter-deck, knocking the splinters about. He remarked to one of his officers with a smile, "It is warm work and this day may be the last to any of us at any moment," and then stopping short at the gangway, added with emotion, "But mark you! I would not be elsewhere for thousands." The excitement and exultation of action were upon him, and even Merton was, for the moment, forgotten.

Meanwhile the battle raged furiously on both sides. The Danes fought with courage and desperation, as became their race and ancestry. The Prince Royal stationed himself in one of the batteries and issued his orders. The vessels became shambles, and yet, as fast as one crew was destroyed a fresh one from the shore would take its place.

All sorts and conditions of men reported for duty, but they were no match for the veteran sailors of England. These people were, apart from militia and artillery, mainly farmers, artisans and day

laborers; a scratch crew, with hardly a sailor in twenty. They never handled a gun until a few days before the battle, during which time the gun drill never ceased.

They fought surrounded by the dead and wounded and the decks washed in blood. A youth of seventeen, named Villemoes, particularly distinguished himself on this memorable day. He volunteered to take command of a raft consisting of beams nailed together and floored over to support the guns, and fitted with a breastwork. This raft carried 24 guns and 120 men. With this frail structure Villemoes pushed boldly out into the channel, and securing a position so close under the stern of the "Elephant" that the stern chasers could not be brought to bear upon him, and, subject to a heavy musketry fire from the marines, he fought his raft until the truce was announced with such skill and courage as to excite Nelson's warmest admiration.

Afterwards, during the negotiations, Nelson asked to be introduced to Villemoes and, shaking hands with the youth, told the Prince Royal that he ought to be made an admiral. "If, my Lord," replied the prince, "I am to make all my brave officers admirals, I would have no captains and lieutenants in my service."

The English vessels also suffered severely. The "Isis" found herself exposed to a destructive fire from the "Provesteen" and both the "Deseree" and "Polyphemus" had to come to her assistance. The "Bellona" lost seventy-four men, the "Isis" one hundred and ten, and the "Monarch" two hun-

dred and ten. She was exposed to the fire of Trekroner Fort and also to the fire of the "Holstein" and "Zealand," and her loss this day exceeded that of any single ship during the whole war.

About one o'clock, after the battle had raged furiously for about three hours, Parker, who with his six ships had vainly endeavoured to reach the northern end of the channel and co-operate with Nelson, but was unable to do so owing to the wind and strong current against him, became impressed with the idea that Nelson was in difficulty and that it behooved him as Commander-in-Chief to do something to extricate him.

The fire of the Danes seemed to be incessant and furious, and nothing seemed to be silenced. Apparently Nelson had met with some mishap and the Danish resistance was more prolonged than anticipated. Parker began to talk about making the signal to leave off action, and discussed the matter with his fleet captain and Captain Otway of the "London." The latter strongly opposed the idea and offered to go aboard the "Elephant" and ascertain how the battle was going and return and report. He shoved off accordingly, but before he reached Nelson the signal was made.

Nelson was at this time pacing his quarter-deck and in high spirits and full of enjoyment of the battle. He was dressed in a blue overcoat, with epaulets, and wore a plain cocked hat. On his breast were several orders. When the signal officer reported to him the signal for recall on board the

"London," he directed him to acknowledge but not to repeat it.

To acknowledge a signal is to hoist a flag, signifying that it is seen and understood. To repeat a signal is to hoist the same set of flags yourself, thus transmitting the order to your subordinates. It is customary for captains of ships to await the repetition of a signal from the Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of their own division before executing it.

As the signal officer was returning to the poop, Nelson called to him "Is No. 16 (close action) still hoisted?" The lieutenant replied that it was. "Mind, you keep it so," said Nelson. His irritation was now great, and as he walked the deck he worked the stump of his right arm. Suddenly addressing Colonel Stewart he exclaimed, "Do you know what is shown on board the Commander-in-Chief, No. 39?" "What does 39 mean?" enquired the colonel. "Why to leave off action," answered Nelson. "Leave off action," he repeated. "Now damn me if I do," and turning to Captain Foley who stood near he said, "You know, Foley, I have only one eye and have a right to be blind sometimes." Then raising his telescope to his sightless eye he continued with playful scorn, "I really do not see the signal."

Rear-Admiral Graves aboard the "Defiant," however, repeated the signal from the yard arm, but kept the signal for close action flying from his masthead. The squadron of frigates under Riou obeyed and hauled off, but none of the other vessels paid any attention to it.

Parker having satisfied his conscience, made no

further signal. It has been asserted that this was a prearranged signal between Parker and Nelson, which the latter could obey or not as he thought best. It does not appear, however, that this is by any means clearly established and from the manner of its reception and from Nelson having made the remark while proceeding to the flagship after the battle was over, "I have fought contrary to orders and I shall perhaps be hanged. Never mind, let them." It is not unreasonable to suppose that it was both a surprise and annoyance to him. Possibly Parker intended this signal to be discretionary, or he may have hoisted it as a saving clause in case of disaster, but Nelson's disregard of it was one of those supreme flashes of genius which often illumined the career of this wonderful man. In disobeying the order, he took, instantly and boldly, the only chance by which he could vindicate himself,—success.

About two P. M., an hour after the signal was made, the Danish fire began to slacken and by 2:30 had ceased from the greater part of the line. The batteries, however, continued to fire, rendering it difficult to take possession of the vessels which had struck, and an irregular fire was kept up by the vessels themselves as the English boats approached.

This arose partly from ignorance and the nature of the action, the crews being continually reinforced from shore, and the fresh ones being ordered to go aboard and fight the guns, did so without knowing or caring whether the flag had been struck. Many, indeed most of them, knew nothing of the laws of

war, and thought only of defending their country to the last extremity. But the irregular conduct on the part of the Danes caused the British ships to reopen fire and a useless and unnecessary slaughter ensued.

Nelson was indignant at the manner in which his boats were fired upon, and actuated by feelings of humanity towards the devoted Danes, determined, with great presence of mind, to send a flag of truce on shore in order to stop the carnage. Without leaving the deck he wrote upon the casing of the rudder-head, the following letter:

“ To the Brothers of Englishmen, the Danes :—

“ Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark, when no longer resisting, but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have defended them.

“ NELSON and BRONTE.”

Nelson wrote this letter himself and sealed it with his own seal, bearing his arms. The purser of the “ Elephant ” offered him a wafer, but he ordered a messenger and sent for some sealing wax. This messenger was killed and another was sent, who returned with the wax.

When asked why he was so particular at such a critical moment to procure wax he replied, “ Had I made use of the wafer it would still have been wet when presented to the Crown Prince ; he would have inferred that the letter was sent off in a hurry and

that we had very pressing reasons for being in a hurry." The wax told no tales.

This letter was sent on shore by Captain Thesiger who delivered it to the Crown Prince and it resulted, as Nelson had hoped, in a temporary cessation of the fire. The Crown Prince recognized as fully as Nelson that by the destruction of the floating defences the city of Copenhagen was at the mercy of the fleet and notwithstanding that the Crown batteries could still offer opposition and possibly injure Nelson's ships as they retired to the northward still they could not protect the city from a bombardment. Nelson, on the other hand, although he had fought his way to a commanding position from which his power to commit further and serious injury was self-evident, had before him the question of withdrawal past the Cronen batteries, which, depending as it did largely upon the wind, he was anxious to do with the favourable breeze then blowing. In answer to the letter sent on shore by Captain Thesiger, the Crown Prince sent his aide-de-camp to Nelson asking the particular object of sending a flag of truce. To this Nelson replied in writing:—"Lord Nelson's object in sending on shore a flag of truce is humanity! He, therefore, consents that hostilities shall cease till Lord Nelson can take his prisoners out of the prizes and he consents to land all the wounded Danes and to burn or remove his prizes."

The fire of the Danes then ceased and Lindholm, the aide-de-camp, was sent to Sir Hyde Parker's flagship four miles away, to settle the terms of an

armistice. Nelson, taking advantage of the cessation of fire, moved his ships out of the dangerous channel. The "Monarch" leading, got aground and was pushed over by the "Glatton" of lighter draft. The "Defiance" and "Elephant," however, grounded and remained under the now silent guns of the Trekroner Forts until night. Their position was an exceedingly dangerous one and shows the difficulties which Nelson would have encountered if the guns of the fort had been active. Nelson, as usual, had anticipated this danger and had arranged to storm the fort in boats from the fleet, but from this dangerous undertaking he was fortunately relieved.

The fleet was finally safely withdrawn and a truce of twenty-four hours was agreed upon, during which time negotiations for an armistice were to be conducted. Nelson was given charge of these negotiations and upon landing with Hardy and Fremantle was received by the populace of Copenhagen with mingled emotions of admiration and hatred. He was escorted through the town and dined with the Crown Prince. Negotiations continued until the 9th of April, when a treaty was agreed upon to continue in force for fourteen weeks. By its terms Denmark was to disarm and suspend her alliance with Russia and the British ships were at liberty to get supplies at all Danish ports. Thus the league of neutrals was dissolved and England saved from a grave danger and Napoleon's schemes for the conquest of England again frustrated by the might of her sea power.

The hands of Denmark being tied and the British

fleet free to act against the Swedes and the Russians, Sir Hyde Parker sailed with the fleet for the Baltic on April 12. He was, however, shortly afterwards relieved, and Nelson, remaining in command, reached Revel on May 12, only to find, however, that the Russian fleet had sailed. The Czar Paul had been assassinated on March 24 and his successor, Alexander I. on the 23rd of April, made overtures of peace and accepted terms recognizing most of England's belligerent rights.

On June 19 Nelson left the fleet and returned to England in the brig "Kite," landing at Yarmouth on July 1, 1801.

The Battle of Copenhagen has been called the brightest gem in Nelson's crown of glory, and it certainly called for more varied accomplishments than any other of his actions. The genius to conceive the correct plan of attack, falling upon the weakest part of the enemy's line, the skill of the navigator in placing his ships in an effective position, the brilliant courage of the attack and finally the wisdom and sagacity in seizing upon the right moment for proposing an armistice and bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion, all indicate a masterly genius and talents of the highest order.

It ought not also, in justice to Nelson, to be forgotten that this action, with all its difficulties, was carried forward to a successful and brilliant conclusion under the burden of a timid and reluctant superior, whose orders Nelson had, at the critical moment of the battle, actually to disobey in order to ensure success. There was, notwithstanding his

highly impulsive and sensitive temperament and natural repugnance to slow movements, no sulking in his cabin, but an ever ready spirit of suggestion and co-operation and eagerness to meet the enemy. So many reputations have been wrecked upon the rock of official relations with superiors that this example of loyalty and high devotion to duty may be studied with profit by all naval officers. (Mahan).

As a result of this battle the Danes lost eighteen ships and 600 or 800 men killed and wounded. The English loss was 943 men. Not a British ship was totally disabled.

CHAPTER II.

ALGESIRAS AND GUT OF GIBRALTAR.

IN order to strengthen the squadron at Cadiz, which Napoleon desired to maintain upon the flank of the British line of communications with Malta and their army in Egypt, Rear-Admiral Linois was given command of a small squadron at Toulon with orders to proceed to Cadiz and to unite his force with a squadron of Spanish ships which the Spanish government had recently lent to the French and which was then under the command of Rear-Admiral Dumanoir. The squadron under Rear-Admiral Linois, consisting of the "Indomptable," of 80 guns, the "Formidable," 80, the "Dessaix," 74, and the frigate "Muiron," 38, put to sea from Toulon on the 13th of June, 1801.

Linois arrived off Gibraltar on July 4, having, on July 3, captured the English 14-gun brig "Speedy," Captain Lord Cochrane. Cochrane, who afterwards became a distinguished officer of the British navy, was at this time a young man of twenty-six years of age and of eight years' standing in the service. He had been given by Lord Keith the command of the "Speedy" which was a mere

coasting brig of about 158 tons, carrying 84 men and 6 officers. In this brig, his first command, Cochrane had greatly harassed the Spanish coast and in a cruise of thirteen months had captured 50 Spanish vessels, 122 guns and 534 prisoners. Her armament consisted of 14 four-pounders, a species of gun a little larger than a blunderbuss. Cochrane used to declare that he could walk the quarterdeck with a whole broadside in his coat-tail pockets. When captured by the French squadron he was conveying a mail packet from Port Mahon to Gibraltar. Such was the reputation of the "Speedy" on the coast of Spain that Admiral Linois had special instructions to look out for her.

Captain Cochrane surrendered to the "Dessaix," Captain Pallière, by whom he was politely received and in compliment to his gallantry told to wear his sword, although a prisoner.

Upon learning that a British force superior to his own was blockading Cadiz, Rear-Admiral Linois did not deem it prudent to attempt to force his way through; but being unwilling to abandon the execution of his orders while there was a chance left, he, on July 4, brought his squadron to anchor under the batteries in the Bay of Algeiras, where he found assembled a formidable flotilla of fourteen Spanish gunboats. Algeiras is directly across the bay from Gibraltar and six miles distant, and the governor of Gibraltar immediately despatched a small vessel to inform Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, in command of the blockading fleet off Cadiz, of the arrival of the French fleet. Rear-Admiral Saumarez

had under his command at this time seven ships of the line and one frigate, viz. :

| | | |
|------------------|----|------------------------------------|
| "Cæsar"..... | 80 | } Rear-Admiral Sir James Saumarez. |
| "Pompée"..... | 74 | |
| "Spencer"..... | 74 | } " Charles Sterling. |
| "Venerable"..... | 74 | |
| "Superb"..... | 74 | } " Samuel Hood. |
| "Hannibal"..... | 74 | |
| "Audacious"..... | 74 | } " Solomon Ferris. |
| "Thames"..... | 32 | |
| | | } " William Lukin. |

The "Superb" was on detached service as lookout ship off San Lucar, to the westward. Upon receipt of the information regarding the French fleet at Algesiras on the morning of July 5, Admiral Saumarez decided to attack them at once, and sending the "Thames" frigate to the westward to recall the "Superb," he made sail for Algesiras with the "Cæsar" (flagship), "Venerable," "Pompée," "Audacious," "Hannibal" and "Spencer." At daylight on the sixth the squadron was off Tarifa with light airs from the westward, which soon freshened to a strong breeze. Captain Hood of the "Venerable," from his experience and knowledge of the anchorage, had been directed by the Admiral to lead the squadron, which he did in gallant style. In hauling up to the northward around Cabrita point Admiral Saumarez made signal to the "Venerable," asking if she could fetch the French ships, and being answered in the affirmative, made signal for close action.

Admiral Linois was taken by surprise, not expect-

ing an attack, and remembering the British attacks at the Nile and Copenhagen on vessels at anchor, he sought to warp his vessels closer in shore under the batteries. But in the haste and confusion of this manœuvre his ships were all run aground so as to present their sterns to the enemy, and it can hardly be doubted that had not the wind died away, the destruction of the ships would have been inevitable. As it turned out, however, finding his broadside guns useless, he sent a large portion of his men ashore to help man the batteries, and these bore the brunt of the action.

Lord Cochrane, who had for a British officer the extraordinary experience to witness this action from the deck of a French vessel, relates in his "Autobiography of a Seaman:" "At the time of their first appearance I was conversing with Captain Pallière in his cabin, when a lieutenant reported a British flag over Cabrita point, and soon after the top-gallant masts of a British squadron became visible. We at once adjourned to the poop, when the surprise of the French, at the sight of a more numerous squadron, became not unreasonably apparent; Captain Pallière asked me 'if I thought an attack would be made, or whether the British force would anchor off Gibraltar?' My reply was that an attack would certainly be made, and that before night both British and French ships would be at Gibraltar;' at the same time adding that when there, it would give me great pleasure to make him and his officers a return for the kindness I had experienced on board the 'Dessaix.'

“The French admiral, however, determined that his ships should not be carried across the bay if he could help it. Before the British squadron had rounded the point, the French got out boats, kedges and stream anchors, for the purpose of warping in shore, so as to prevent the approaching squadron from cutting them out; but the order was so hurriedly executed, that all three ships were hauled aground, with their sterns presented to the approaching British force; a position which could not have been taken by choice, for nothing could be more easy than to destroy the French ships, which, lying aground bow on, could only use their stern chasers.

“After having satisfied himself that an action with a superior force was inevitable, Captain Pallière remarked, ‘that it should not spoil our breakfast,’ in which he had invited me to join him. Before the meal was over, a round shot crashed through the stern of the ‘Dessaix,’ driving before it a shower of broken glass, the débris of a wine bin under the sofa.”

The Bay of Algesiras, in which the French ships lay aground, is an open roadstead, and is about two miles in extent from north to south. It is shallow and in several parts full of rocks. Its flanks north and south are protected by batteries, and a strong current sweeps across the entrance. Owing to this current it would be necessary in the absence of a working breeze for vessels to anchor in order to maintain their positions.

At 7:50 on the morning of the sixth of July, the “Venerable,” standing for the enemy with all

sail set, received the fire from the southern forts on the Island of Verde. She was followed by the "Pompée," "Audacious," "Cæsar," "Spencer" and "Hannibal," the "Pompée" and the "Audacious" being about a mile and a half astern of the "Venerable." At 8 o'clock the wind fell calm and at 8:20 the "Pompée" and "Audacious," catching a puff, passed the "Venerable" to windward. By 8:30 the action became general, the "Pompée," "Audacious" and "Venerable" at anchor with springs on their cables to keep their broadsides to the enemy. The "Pompée" had taken the lead from the "Venerable" and was the northern ship of the line, being anchored opposite the French flagship, the "Formidable." At 9 o'clock the "Cæsar" came into action, anchoring ahead of the "Audacious" and between her and the "Pompée." The "Hannibal" about the same time anchored ahead of the "Cæsar," a little on the starboard bow, and the "Spencer" brought up between the "Cæsar" and the "Hannibal."

The fire of the British squadron was for a time very effective, and there is little doubt that but for Linois' hasty retreat from his original position, his ships would have suffered severely. The fire of the five French batteries, however, directed by the gunners from the fleet, was disastrous. At 10 A. M. the "Hannibal" received orders to rake the "Formidable" and in the execution of this order, while attempting to pass inshore of her and not knowing that she was aground, the "Hannibal" ran ashore. At 10:26 the "Pompée" swung so as to be raked by

the "Formidable," and her position being no longer tenable, she was ordered to cut or slip her cable, and the boats of the squadron were sent to tow her out of action. At the same time the "Cæsar," "Audacious," "Venerable" and "Spencer" got underway but found it impossible to get near the enemy's ships with safety, owing to a calm and the strong current setting inshore. The "Hannibal" being aground under a battery called St. Iago and subjected to the broadsides of the French ships, besides being attacked by several gunboats, suffered severely without being able to reply. Still Captain Ferris made a gallant defence and only after his guns were dismounted, rigging destroyed, and 140 men killed or wounded, did he consent to strike his colours, which he did about 1:30.

Frustrated in all his efforts to succour the "Hannibal" or to approach near to the French vessels, and prevented by the absence of most of the boats of the squadron from storming the southern batteries with the marines, Saumarez at 1:30 discontinued the action and, leaving the "Hannibal" in the possession of the enemy, withdrew to Gibraltar, where he proceeded to refit his vessels to renew the attack.

The French and Spanish loss in this action amounted to 317 killed and 280 wounded. The French ships suffered severely and five Spanish gunboats were sunk and two materially damaged. The British lost 121 killed, 240 wounded and 14 missing.

The French were greatly elated over the result of this action. It was announced in the Paris theatres that three unaided French ships of the line had

beaten six British ships, and as the first news of the affair reached England through French sources, the effect there was depressing. Not conceiving it to be possible that Admiral Saumarez could refit his squadron in time to maintain the blockade of Cadiz, four ships of the line were despatched in haste to that port. There was indeed cause for anxiety, for with the French fleet at Cadiz unrestrained, there was no safety for the Mediterranean trade or the communications with Malta and Egypt, and Gibraltar itself might be blockaded.

Upon reaching Gibraltar, Saumarez immediately began to repair his fleet. The "Pompée" was given up as too much damaged to be repaired in time to be of service, and it was thought that the "Cæsar," also, would have to be left behind, as she required a new main mast besides many other important repairs. Saumarez contemplated transferring his flag to the "Audacious" and the crew of the "Cæsar" to the other vessels; but Captain Brenton begged the admiral to allow his crew to have their revenge in their own ship, and by exciting their enthusiasm and working night and day, succeeded in six days in getting his vessel ready for service again. It was a remarkably creditable performance and excited general admiration.

The work on the other vessels proceeded with equal rapidity, so that by the 12th of July, Saumarez, having been joined by the "Superb" and the "Thames," was again ready to meet the enemy with a force of five ships of the line, a frigate, a 14-gun sloop and a Portuguese frigate, the "Carlotta."

It was none too soon, as Rear-Admiral Linois, having sent to Cadiz for reinforcements and having hauled his ships together with the "Hannibal" off the shoals, was on the 10th joined by Rear-Admiral Moreno with five sail of the line, three frigates and a lugger, and on the next day by another line-of-battle ship, the "San Antoine," 74. This addition to his forces gave Linois a fleet of nine sail of the line, four frigates and a brig. Two of the Spanish ships, the "Real Carlos" and the "Hermenegildo" were three-deckers, armed with 112 guns each.

At daylight on the morning of the 12th the combined French and Spanish fleet commenced working out of Algeiras Bay with a light wind from the eastward, which obliged them to make several tacks, and it was one o'clock before the leading ship could clear Cabrita point, where they have to wait for the rear ships to join them. The "Hannibal" was unable to work out, and returned to her anchorage in the bay. On the morning of the 12th the "Cæsar" was still refitting and taking on board powder, shot and other stores, but at half past two o'clock she hauled away from the mole amid the deafening cheers and acclamations of the garrison and the whole assembled population, the band playing "Britons Strike Home."

Rear-Admiral Saumarez assembled his squadron off Europa point, watching the combined squadron five miles to leeward, and the dilatory actions of the latter gave the British captains time to "set up" and "stow away" and put a final touch to their hurried refitting. At length every ship having signalled her

readiness and the plan of action having been communicated to the captains, the admiral made signal to prepare to follow his movements. At eight o'clock the combined fleet bore up for the Straits, sailing in two lines abreast, the three French ships in the van and the six Spanish ships in the rear. On the right of the Spanish line were the two three-deckers, "Real Carlos" and "Hermenegildo." The Spanish and French admirals were, for concert of action, on board the "Sabina" frigate in advance of the two lines of ships.

Saumarez followed immediately in pursuit, and directed Captain Keats of the "Superb," a fast sailer, to press forward and engage the ship nearest to the Spanish shore. At 11 p. m., the "Superb" at 350 yards, opened fire upon the "Real Carlos," the starboard ship of the Spanish line, and from her position raked the whole line, so that some of her shot passed over the "Real Carlos" and fell among the other vessels that were in the line abreast of her, and these vessels in the darkness and confusion not being able to distinguish friend from foe, commenced firing into each other.

So vigorously and at so close quarters did the "Superb" attack the "Real Carlos," that in a quarter of an hour she was observed to be on fire, and Captain Keats quitted her and passed on to the next ahead, the "San Antoine," 74, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Le Roy, which vessel surrendered after an action of thirty minutes, during which her commander was wounded. The fire on board the "Real Carlos" had been nearly ex-

tinguished when the other great three-decker, the "Hermenegildo," mistaking her for a British ship, opened a furious cannonade upon her and in manœuvring fell foul of her. This rekindled the fire on board the "Real Carlos," which communicated itself to the "Hermenegildo," and these two enormous first rates lay for some time burning and cannonading each other, until they both blew up with a loss of about 1700 men. Thus the "Superb," unaided, had thrown the whole Spanish line into confusion caused the destruction of one three-decker and indirectly of another, of 112 guns and 1000 men each, and captured the French 74 gun-frigate, "San Antoine," thus putting Saumarez's squadron upon an equality with the enemy.

When the "Superb" was engaging her first ship, the "Real Carlos," the "Cæsar" was out of sight about three miles astern. Captain Keats had been much chagrined at not being present at the attack on the French ships at Algesiras, and now that he had an opportunity he displayed an ability and dash that cannot be better characterized than by the name of his own ship. The loss on board the "Superb" in her engagements was one lieutenant and 14 men wounded, which, considering the close quarters at which she was fought, and the number of guns opposed to her, indicates very poor gunnery on the part of the French and Spaniards.

Shortly after the "San Antoine" surrendered, the "Cæsar" and "Venerable" came up in succession and fired into her, not knowing she had "hailed down her flag." During the latter part of

the night the wind blew hard. The "Cæsar," "Venerable" and "Thames" stood on in chase of the enemy, while the "Superb," "Carlotta," "Calpi" and "Louisa" remained by the "San Antoine."

At daylight on the 13th the only ships in company with the "Cæsar" were the "Venerable" and the "Thames," ahead, and the "Spencer," far astern. The "Formidable," 80, was the only one of the combined fleet within reach. Being with jury-masts, with topgallant-masts for topmasts, and during the night having carried away the foretop-mast, she had been unable to keep up with the rest of the fleet, and being out of signal distance, Captain Troude, her commander, had hauled up for Cadiz on the north-east course, hugging the Spanish shore.

The "Cæsar" and her consorts made all possible speed in an endeavour to overhaul the "Formidable," but, the wind falling, only the "Venerable" and the "Thames" succeeded in getting into action with her. At five o'clock the "Venerable" opened fire, which was replied to with great gallantry by the "Formidable." The two vessels gradually drifted to within pistol shot of each other and at 5:30 A. M. the "Venerable" lost her mizzenmast and at 6:45 her mainmast. Becoming unmanageable she drifted away from the "Formidable" and was driven by the strength of the current upon the rocky shoals off San Pedro, about 12 miles to the southward of Cadiz. At 7:50 her mainmast also fell over the side.

During the action between the "Venerable" and "Formidable" the "Thames" raked the latter vessel, but so vigorous was the defence of the "Form-

idable" that she drove off both of her antagonists and escaped into Cadiz with a loss, according to the captain's official report, of twenty killed or severely wounded. The "Venerable" had 18 killed and 87 wounded. The "Thames" did not have a man hurt. The "Formidable," although the slowest vessel of the combined fleet, by taking a shorter route reached Cadiz at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 13th, while the rest of the fleet did not arrive until sunset.

Rear-Admiral Saumarez, finding that he could not prevent the combined fleet from entering port, devoted himself to hauling the dismasted "Venerable" off the shoal. At two p. m., with the assistance of the "Thames" and the boats from the "Cæsar" and "Spencer," she left the shoal and was taken in tow by the "Thames." The whole squadron then returned to Gibraltar.

The news of this victory was received in England with the greatest enthusiasm as it was thought that the squadron under Rear-Admiral Saumarez had been so materially damaged in the action at Algeiras as to be incapable of meeting the overwhelming force which had been sent to that place from Cadiz. Consequently, the news of his subsequent triumph over a superior force struck every person with astonishment and joy. Rear-Admiral Saumarez was created a Knight of the Bath with a pension of 1200 pounds per annum, and the first lieutenants of the "Cæsar," "Superb" and "Venerable" were promoted to be commanders. The whole squadron generously decided to admit the

crews of the "Pompée" and "Hannibal" to share in their prize money. The thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to Sir James and the captains, officers and crews of his squadron.

On this occasion Sir James had the honour of having the vote of thanks in the House of Lords proposed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl St. Vincent, and supported by Lord Nelson, having served under the former at the memorable battle of Cape St. Vincent, and under the latter, as second in command, at the battle of the Nile. It is indicative of the great esteem and appreciation in which Sir James was held by these two great naval captains that they should so generously bear testimony to his great merit, and as this brotherhood of spirit is in pleasant contrast to the bickerings that have arisen over other naval victories, the proceedings in the House of Lords are not without interest.

Earl St. Vincent said that "this gallant achievement surpassed anything he had met with in his reading or service; and when the news of it arrived, the whole Board, at which he had the honour to preside, were struck with astonishment to find that Sir James Saumarez, in so very short a time after the affair of Algesiras had been able, with a few ships only, and one of them disabled, especially his own, to come up with the enemy, and with unparalleled bravery, to attack them, and obtain a victory highly honourable to himself, and essentially conducive to the national glory."

In supporting the motion, Lord Nelson said "he was under particular obligations to that gallant

officer, Sir James Saumarez, who had been second in command to him in one of his most important and successful engagements; that in the action in Algeiras Bay, he was persuaded that Sir James would have achieved his object and carried the enemy's ships into Gibraltar, but for the failure of the wind, an accident which the admiral could not prevent, and which enabled the enemy to haul his ships so close in shore as to defeat his purpose. Nothing dismayed, however, Sir James made wonderful exertions to put his few ships into a condition to sail after the fleet of the enemy and to attack them, although their fleet consisted of ten ships and Sir James had but five, and his own ship disabled. The glorious results their lordships well knew. But he was not surprised at the matchless intrepidity and skill of his gallant friend when he considered the professional school in which he had been bred, viz.: the late Lord Howe, Lord Hood, Lord Bridport, and his noble friend the noble Earl who sat next to him. (Earl St. Vincent, feeling the full force of the compliment, made the noble and gallant lord a very low bow.) From such masters he could not but have learned everything that was courageous, spirited and magnanimous."

The Duke of Clarence then rose and said that "as a professional man he desired to express his entire concurrence with every syllable that had fallen from his two noble friends in commendation of the gallant Sir James Saumarez, and to declare the satisfaction he felt in the thanks of the House being voted to those brave officers, Captain Hood and

Captain Keats, for their distinguished conduct in the two engagements. They were both as deserving officers as any in His Majesty's service; but he could speak more particularly to the merit of Captain Keats, having served under him for four years and a half during a former war as midshipman in the same watch. He was persuaded whenever the country should be engaged in another war, Captain Keats would eminently distinguish himself." (Life of Lord de Saumarez.)

No doubt a good deal of this high praise was due to personal friendship, but a much larger part was due to appreciation of the fact that Sir James *never despaired* and by the most extraordinary exertions succeeded in snatching victory from the jaws of defeat.

No fault can be found with Sir James' strategy. Finding the enemy's force divided, he instantly fell upon the smaller detachment (in this case the right wing) with a superior force and his attack "on sight" without waiting for more favourable conditions of wind was, notwithstanding its failure, perfectly correct in principle, as was proved by the great confusion into which the enemy was thrown. It showed the true "Nelson touch" and was evidence of the "fighting pace" which the example of that great captain had set for the British Navy. That the attack, so correctly delivered, failed, and that Sir James was obliged to retreat, leaving the "Hannibal" in the hands of the enemy and with the "Pompée" disabled, was due to the absence of wind above and the presence of adverse currents below, ob-

stacles in those days entirely beyond human control. It was true, as Earl St. Vincent remarked when the first news of the defeat reached London through French sources: "We may have suffered a defeat, but I am sure we have not lost our honour."

To Rear-Admiral Linois great credit is also due for the promptness with which, in presence of a superior force, he removed his ships from an exposed position. Although the loss of his broadside fire, caused by running his ships aground with their sterns to the enemy, placed him at a most serious disadvantage, yet his error was in a measure atoned for by sending his men ashore to man the batteries, thereby maintaining from them a more destructive fire than in all probability they would otherwise have delivered. The conflict between ships and batteries remains to this day, when the motive power of vessels is removed from injury, an unequal contest, to the disadvantage of the former, and was still more so in the days of sails and spars when the motive power offered the largest target to the enemy's fire.

The loss of the "Hannibal" cannot, in justice, be credited to the French, as it was due entirely to her having grounded while endeavouring to pass inshore of the "Formidable." That daring Nelsonian maxim "room to swing, room to pass" did not in this case obtain, the "Formidable" herself being aground.

It must have been with feelings of deep mortification and apprehension that Sir James witnessed the junction of the enemy's forces at Algesiras on

July 10, the very consummation which it was his province, and had been his most earnest endeavour, to prevent. The untiring energy with which he put his crippled squadron in a condition to renew the action shows his ability as a commander and is an interesting evidence of the resourceful nature of the seamanship of that day.

In the attack upon the combined fleet, the advantage of speed, as important now as then, was shown by the way in which the "Superb" was able, single-handed, and favoured by the darkness, to carry destruction and confusion among the combined fleet. Captain Keats, who was afterwards knighted, was at the time of this action forty-four years of age. While serving as lieutenant in the "Prince George," Prince William Henry, afterwards King William IV. was a midshipman of his watch, and a strong friendship existed between them. When Nelson assumed command off Toulon on July 3, 1803, he said of Keats, whom up to that time he had never met: "I esteem his person alone as equal to one French 74, and the "Superb" and her captain as equal to two 74-gun ships."

Captain Keats cherished for Nelson the most ardent admiration, and in 1806, previous to the action fought under Rear-Admiral Sir John Duckworth with the French, off San Domingo, he suspended the portrait of Nelson from the mizzen stay, that his crew might fight under the eye of their beloved chief, and in hopes, no doubt, that his spirit would descend upon the "Superb" and guide her to victory. During the action the portrait was uninjured, but was

covered, as was Captain Keats himself, with the blood and brains of a boatswain's mate who was killed near it. Thus did the legacy of Nelson's great example continue to animate the British Navy long after his death, and to this day has ever been an inspiration to noble deeds.

CHAPTER III.

TRAFALGAR.—PRELIMINARY STRATEGY.

THE campaign preceding the Battle of Trafalgar will ever remain one of the most interesting pages in Naval History. It was a mighty struggle between the powers of the land and of the sea, wherein the former were directed by one of the greatest military geniuses the world has ever seen.

To study it by the light of history and to watch the unwinding of that, at the time impenetrable web of naval strategy, which Napoleon endeavoured to weave around his opponent, is no less fascinating than instructive. "It was a dream slowly unravelled, which one saw begin, continue, touch for an instant the favourable crisis, and then end with a catastrophe." (Gravière.)

His combinations were daring and well laid, endowed as he was with the genius of war in the highest degree, and it has been truly said that the designs he formed and the efforts he made to invade England were equal to any in his marvellous career. In the opinion of Captain Mahan they were not without chances of success. Napoleon was, however,

in some respects ill-fitted for such an enterprise. He was, as ever, over-confident, and he did not possess the professional knowledge required to direct campaigns at sea. He counted on numbers alone, ignoring the *QUALITY* of his Naval forces. His control "stopped with the shore" and the only naval officer, Admiral Latouche Tréville, under whom his efforts stood any chance of success, died at the very commencement of his operations.

Standing at Boulogne, with a mighty army at his feet and a subdued Europe at his back, and holding the sea coast of Europe and its naval forces from the Texel to the Gulf of Taranto in his mailed grasp he gazed for three years in vain over the ocean for a glimpse of those whitening sails which were to waft him to victory and "the mastery of the world." His fleet never came. Between Napoleon and his ambition stood the sea power of England, whose "far-distant storm-beaten cliffs the 'Grande Armée' never looked upon." (Mahan.) His squadrons sailed and manœuvred and were destroyed far from his gaze, and when, at last, weary of waiting and with all his plans of invasion defeated, he turned his back upon that treacherous "floating floor" and, with all his pent-up energy, burst upon Europe like an avalanche, he showed, at Ulm and at Austerlitz, that, though impotent upon the ocean, he was still invincible upon the land.

Once before in history a mighty conqueror sat upon the shore in the midst of his victorious army and, with, perhaps, a more bitter experience than Napoleon's, witnessed before his eyes at Salamis the de-

struction of his sea power, and with it all his hopes for the "mastery of the world."

"A king sate on the rocky brow
Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis;
And ships, by thousands, lay below,
And men in nations;—all were his!
He counted them at break of day—
And when the sun set, where were they?"

Fortunate, perhaps, was it for the peace of the world that, in both cases, the sea bore upon its bosom a barrier to the subjugation of mankind.

The Peace of Amiens, on 27th March 1802, had left France the dominant power in Europe, with the Rhine and the Alps for her boundaries. She had surrounded herself with vassal republics which owed their existence to her military power, and from which she received not only allegiance but material assistance. Upon the ocean, however, she had not been so successful. The French fleet had indeed been driven from the seas, and the French flag from the Indian Ocean.

The English navy, which, at the beginning of the war in 1793, was in the number of war-ships only one-third greater than that of France, was in 1802 fully four times as large, and many more times as efficient. (Morris, p. 100). In this augmentation of the British navy, fifty line-of-battle ships, captured from the French, formed a considerable proportion. From 1793 to 1802, France and her allies, Holland, Spain and Denmark had lost eighty-five ships of the line, while England during the same period had lost but twenty, fifteen of which

had been destroyed by accident, and five, only, fallen into the hands of the enemy. (Gravière.)

Having determined upon an invasion of England, Napoleon collected at the four small ports of Etable, Boulogne, Vimereux and Ambleteuse about fifteen hundred small craft and seven hundred transports for the purpose of transporting his army with its impedimenta across the channel. The boats were designed to carry from sixty to one hundred soldiers, each, and were armed with from two to four cannon. Being of light draft they could run close along shore under the protection of batteries and out of reach of the English cruisers, and could be beached without harm. Every vessel of the flotilla had its detail of men or horses or artillery attached to it, and so complete were the arrangements and so constant the practice in embarking and disembarking and in loading the transports, that it is said the entire armament could be at sea in twenty-four hours after the order had been given to embark.

Napoleon's first effort to concentrate his fleet in the English channel was by a movement from the left of his line, at Toulon, along his front past Cadiz, Ferrol and Rochefort, but avoiding Brest, to Boulogne, the Toulon squadron gathering strength from each port as it proceeded. This operation was confided to Admiral Latouche Tréville, who was an officer of great ability, impetuous and persevering. The movement was to commence on January 15, 1804. After leaving Toulon with ten ships of the line, Admiral Latouche Tréville was to be joined by one ship from Cadiz and five from Rochefort and to

appear in the Channel with sixteen. Meanwhile, Admiral Ganteaume with twenty ships of the line, was to keep about the same number of British ships employed in blockading Brest.

For various political reasons, the execution of this movement was delayed till August, 1804, and was then finally abandoned upon the death, on August 20, of Admiral Latouche Tréville, the only really bold and able admiral which France at that time possessed, and an officer in whom Napoleon placed great confidence. Gravière seems to think this plan the best of all the plans made by Napoleon at this time, as being both more direct and simple; but it seems doubtful if the force was sufficient for the purpose, since any delay by adverse winds would have given time for the concentration of a sufficient force of British ships to defeat its object.

The success of such a combination depended upon the speed with which it could be executed, and during the sailing period, with movements dependent upon the winds, the time factor in naval movements was largely indefinite.

Admiral Latouche Tréville was succeeded in the command of the Toulon fleet by Vice-Admiral Villeneuve, an officer of forty-two years, who had had the good fortune to escape in his ship from the Battle of the Nile. This good fortune seems to have commended him to the favour of Napoleon who always demanded if an officer was lucky before trusting him with a difficult enterprise. Certainly, as far as luck goes, no officer was more endowed with it than Villeneuve, as his subsequent career showed, until, at last,

fortune, tired of showering her favours upon one so incapable, left him to his fate at Trafalgar. He was personally brave, and well acquainted with his duty and the necessities of his position, but inclined always to magnify both the resources of the enemy and his own deficiencies.

Napoleon, who had been crowned Emperor in May, 1804, now formed a second plan. Vice-Admiral Villeneuve at Toulon and Rear-Admiral Missiessy at Rochefort were to escape from the blockade and rendezvous in the West Indies, making a raid on the South American coast and even seizing St. Helena, thus drawing the English ships in pursuit away from the coast of France. They were then to return and, after releasing the squadron shut up in Ferrol, they were to cast anchor in Rochefort, threatening the position of Admiral Cornwallis at Brest. Meanwhile, profiting by the diversion made by Villeneuve and Missiessy, Admiral Ganteaume was to escape from Brest and after making a descent on Ireland and landing there a military force was to appear off Boulogne with twenty ships of the line and convoy the flotilla across the Channel.

Of these three separate movements, only one succeeded. Missiessy escaped from Rochefort on January 11, 1805, with a fleet of four ships of the line, three frigates, two brigs and thirty-five hundred troops, and after being detained in the Bay of Biscay by adverse winds and without discovery for thirteen days, he continued his voyage to the West Indies, arriving at Martinique on February 20. He captured the islands of Dominica, Nevis, and St. Kitts,

exacting in ransoms £27,000, and returned to Rochefort, May 20, without encountering any British squadron.

Villeneuve sailed from Toulon on January 15, 1805, with a strong north-west wind. He had under his command ten ships of the line and seven frigates. Nelson with eleven ships of the line was on the same day at anchor in Maddalena Bay on the north coast of Sardinia, two hundred miles from Toulon Harbour. During the night a gale arose from the south-south-west and so dispersed and damaged Villeneuve's fleet that he returned to Toulon to refit. After his return he wrote plaintively to Admiral Dacres, Minister of Marine: "The Toulon Squadron looked very well at anchor with the crews well dressed and going through their exercises, but when the storm came things were different. They were not exercised for storms." (Gravière.)

The third and most important movement, that of Ganteaume at Brest, failed entirely. No attempt was made by him to fulfil his mission. Thus Napoleon's second combination proved abortive.

Spain having on December 12, 1804, declared war against England, Napoleon had used all his influence and energy in repairing and equipping her fleet to assist him in his operations, and in March, 1805, he had at his disposal in different parts of France, Spain and Holland an available force of sixty-seven ships of the line, but separated in such small detachments and all so well guarded by the British blockading squadrons that its concentration was impossible. The largest squadrons were at Brest

(21), Ferrol (15 combined French and Spanish) and Toulon (11). The key to all Napoleon's combinations was to entice the British squadrons as far from France as possible and then to have his own fleet return and gain command of the Channel. But this was at the time only dimly discerned, if at all.

Villeneuve was not allowed to remain long in Toulon. Napoleon, ever ready, now formed his last and grandest combination. According to this plan Villeneuve was to leave Toulon with eleven ships of the line and, collecting one French and six Spanish ships at Cadiz, was to proceed to join Missiessy with his five ships in the West Indies thus forming a fleet of twenty-three battle-ships, the frigates not being counted. To this force was to be added the Brest fleet under Ganteaume, consisting of twenty-one ships, and the Ferrol fleet consisting of fifteen ships. If all the movements were successful, Napoleon would have concentrated in the West Indies a force of fifty-nine ships of the line, with which overpowering force Ganteaume was to return and appear before Boulogne. If this bold conception should be realized, there was every chance of success, and one can well imagine the keen enjoyment with which Napoleon in his camp at Boulogne worked out its details on paper.

The plan was indeed worthy of his great genius, and a seaman would not say that it was entirely impracticable, although he might perhaps with reason, considering the quality and want of sea practice in the combined fleet, challenge the probability of success. (Mahan.) This combination at

least followed the well established military maxim of not concentrating a force within the sphere of action of the enemy. It had been shown by experience that it was not possible to keep an enemy's fleet at all times imprisoned in a harbour. Nelson's system of blockade, which was criticised in his day, was designed not so much to keep the French fleet in, as to lure them out, but the weak point of his system was that after they got out it was difficult to find them. While he kept his battle-ships in good condition and repair by avoiding the exposure of actual blockade, Villeneuve was enabled to slip out of Toulon and of the Mediterranean, and gain a long start for the West Indies before Nelson was aware of his destination. In the present day, steam would give, perhaps, still more advantage to the blockaded force.

The opening move in the last combination was made by Admiral Villeneuve who escaped from Toulon on March 30, 1805, with eleven ships of the line and, eluding the observation of Nelson's frigates, reached Cadiz, April 9, and sailed, on April 10, for the West Indies, his force having been augmented by one French and two Spanish ships. He reached Martinique on May 14, where he was joined by four Spanish ships that had been left behind at Cadiz, and thus had under his command eighteen ships of the line. The junction, however, with Missiessy's five ships, never took place owing to his return to Rochefort. Thus an expected support was withdrawn and Napoleon's enterprise encountered its first failure.

Meanwhile on March 30, when Villeneuve

escaped from Toulon, Nelson was 275 miles away, off the Gulf of Palma at the southern end of Sardinia, where he had been since March 27 engaged in watering and provisioning his ships. The French fleet was discovered and recognized on the afternoon of the 31st by the two lookout frigates, "Phœbe" and "Active." Villeneuve was then steering south, intending to pass to the eastward of the Balearic Islands.

On the evening of the 31st, the "Phœbe" with a fair westerly breeze, started to carry the news to Nelson, leaving the "Active" to watch the French fleet. But the latter vessel lost sight of the enemy during the night of the 31st and the next day Villeneuve, receiving information from a passing vessel that Nelson was off the southern end of Sardinia, changed his course so as to pass to the westward of the Balearic Isles, between them and the coast of Spain. In consequence of this change of course, the information received by Nelson on April 4 from the captain of the "Phœbe" was misleading, and, judging from the reported southerly course of the French fleet, he was led to cover the approaches to Egypt by cruising between Sardinia and the coast of Africa and off the northern entrance of the Straits of Messina.

So, while Villeneuve, in the execution of a plan so vast as to be unfathomable to Nelson, was stealing rapidly out of the Mediterranean, the latter officer was jealously guarding the approaches to the East, and it was not until April 16 that he heard that Villeneuve's fleet had been seen nine days before 500

miles to the westward. The value of efficient scouting, as important upon the sea as upon the land, is illustrated by the fact that had the "Active" remained in touch with the French fleet twenty-four hours longer, she would have been able to report to Nelson Villeneuve's change of course to the westward, and so to give him a clearer view of the situation. The wily Emperor even caused a notice to be inserted in a Dutch paper that the French fleet had landed 6000 men in Egypt, and that the French admiral had made a feint of passing the Straits, but had returned along the African shore, thereby deceiving Nelson.

Upon the receipt of the news of Villeneuve's movements, Nelson hastened to the westward, full of conjecture as to the destination of the enemy and consumed with apprehension as to the results. Until he reached Lagos, Nelson was convinced that Villeneuve was bound for Ireland. The idea of his going to the West Indies never entered his mind. He had not fathomed Napoleon's design but was determined to follow Villeneuve's track wherever it might lead.

Nelson's passage westward was delayed by head winds, and it was not until April 30 that he reached the entrance to the Straits. On May 11, he sailed for Barbadoes with ten ships in pursuit of the eighteen of the enemy, which had now thirty-one days the start. He arrived in Barbadoes on June 4, and was there joined by two ships of Lord Cochrane's squadron, making his force twelve ships of the line.

On the same day Villeneuve, at Martinique, was

joined by Admiral Magon with two ships from Rochefort. Magon brought with him from Napoleon a modification of the original plan, based on the failure of Ganteaume to escape from Brest. According to these new orders, Villeneuve was to wait thirty-five days after Magon's arrival, and then, if Ganteaume did not appear, he was to sail direct for Ferrol where he would find fifteen French and Spanish ships which with his own and Magon's would make a total of thirty-five. With this force he was to raise the blockade of Brest, and, being joined by Ganteaume, the combined force of fifty-six sail of the line was to enter the Channel.

It seems now somewhat singular that, although at one time only one hundred miles apart, the distance separating Barbadoes from Martinique, no accurate knowledge was obtained by either Nelson or Villeneuve of the other's movements. Nelson was on the contrary so far deceived by what seemed reliable information, that he hastened off the day after his arrival at Barbadoes to protect Trinidad from a reputed attack by Villeneuve. In all probability, but for this fatal mistake, Villeneuve's fleet would never have returned to Europe intact, and the Battle of Trafalgar would never have been fought.

Villeneuve was at the same time proceeding north, and off Antigua, having captured fourteen merchant ships, he learned from his prisoners of Nelson's presence in the West Indies. Nelson was reported by these prisoners to have arrived with fourteen ships (instead of ten) and to these Villeneuve added in his imagination the five ships of Cochrane's squad-

ron, known to be in the West Indies. Thus he credited Nelson with a force of nineteen ships, to his twenty. He decided, in view of this large British force, that he could best execute Napoleon's designs by returning at once to Europe, and accordingly started on June 9 on his return voyage without waiting for the limit of time set for the arrival of Gantheaume. In this he no doubt acted wisely, as it was no part of Napoleon's programme to risk an action in the West Indies.

On the 8th of June, the day before Villeneuve sailed for Europe, Nelson, much disgusted, sailed north from Trinidad. On the 12th he was off Antigua and learned of the departure of the French fleet for Europe. That night he disembarked the troops taken on board at Barbadoes and on the 13th sailed for the Straits of Gibraltar which he imagined to be Villeneuve's destination. Before sailing, however, he sent the brig "Curieux," Captain Bettesworth, with dispatches to the Admiralty, to be delivered in person, and the dispatch of this vessel, a mere pawn in the great game which was being played, resulted in the first serious check given to Napoleon's designs. Nelson also sent word of Villeneuve's return to the commanding officers off Ferrol and the coast of France.

Thus Villeneuve and Nelson, after a game of hide and seek in the West Indies, were once more crossing the Atlantic on divergent courses, the former to the northward, steering for Ferrol; the latter more to the southward, steering for Cape St. Vincent and the Straits of Gibraltar.

Nelson did not even then fathom the designs of Napoleon, but considered Villeneuve's movements a mere raid for the purpose of burning convoys and laying waste or ransoming islands in the West Indies. He was much comforted by the knowledge that by his mere presence he had saved the British West Indian possessions as well as over two hundred sugar-laden ships, from the grasp of the enemy, besides driving the enemy back into the ever open arms of the British squadrons on the coast of Europe. When one considers the evil fortune that had pursued Nelson from the day in which Villeneuve escaped from Toulon, and the tireless energy and contagious enthusiasm with which he had overcome all obstacles, it cannot be doubted that Nelson's return voyage was made in a much more satisfactory mood than the outward. It is true, his most ardent wish, that for action, had been denied him, but he had nevertheless rendered abortive the designs of the enemy.

Villeneuve, pursuing his course to the northward of the Azores, was sighted by the "Curieux," on June 19, nine hundred miles north-north-east of Antigua. Captain Bettesworth, carrying a press of sail, hurried on to England, arriving in Plymouth on July 7. He delivered his important news in London on the evening of the 8th. On the 9th, orders were sent from Plymouth and Portsmouth to Cornwallis at Brest to concentrate the blockading squadrons off Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and directing the latter to cruise one hundred miles off Cape Finisterre to intercept Villeneuve and prevent his juncture with the Ferrol squadron. So rapidly

were these orders executed, owing to favourable winds, that Cornwallis received his orders on July 11, and on the 15th, eight days after the arrival of the "Curieux" at Plymouth, the five ships from Rochefort formed a junction with the two under Calder at Ferrol, and that officer proceeded with fifteen ships to the post assigned. The credit of this rapid combination, showing a strategic insight of the highest order, is due to Lord Barham, the then First Lord of the Admiralty.

The concentration was made none too soon, for on the 22nd, a dense fog suddenly lifting, there was revealed to Calder the presence of the French fleet and his own opportunity for immortal glory. He was unfortunately incapable of reaping the full benefit of the opportunity offered, and allowed outside considerations to interfere with the plain duty of the hour. In the partial engagement that ensued, two Spanish ships of the line were captured, when nightfall and the fog put an end to the action. The British loss was two hundred men, and this was principally borne by two ships. Five or six of Calder's ships were scarcely engaged at all.

On the morning of the 23rd, the fleets were seventeen miles apart, and Villeneuve, having the weather gage, bore down towards the British line; but the wind failing and night coming on, he hauled his wind until the next day. On the 24th the wind again changed, giving Calder the weather gage, with power to renew the action; but this he declined to do, being occupied with the care of his prizes, and apprehensive of the consequences should his fleet

be damaged and the squadron at Rochefort and Ferrol escape from port. "I could not hope," he said, "to succeed without incurring great danger; I had no friendly port to go to, and had the Ferrol and Rochefort squadrons come out I must have fallen an easy prey." In the presence of the enemy he was worrying himself over questions of strategy instead of those of tactics.

Thus was lost the golden opportunity provided by the wise foresight of Lord Barham—lost through the mental abstractions of a really capable officer.

On the 25th a gale arose, and the French and Spanish fleet was thrown into disorder and sustained injuries to sails and spars. There is no doubt that an energetic pursuit and attack by Calder would have resulted in the complete dispersion or capture of the combined fleet: Villeneuve, however, had as little liking for an action as Calder, and, forced by the winds, he put into Vigo on July 28. On the 31st he sailed for Ferrol, but was met at the entrance by orders not to enter the harbour. He therefore took his ships to Coruña, an adjacent harbour having with Ferrol a common entrance from the ocean. Twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels were now concentrated at Ferrol, and Ganteaume had twenty-one at Brest. Between these two forces was Cornwallis, off Brest, with thirty-five ships of the line.

Nelson reached Gibraltar on July 19 and his first inquiry was for Villeneuve; but no one could enlighten him. He went on shore for the first time in two years. After replenishing his fleet with provisions and water, Nelson, still in ignorance of Vil-

leneuve's movements, steered to the northward and on August 15 joined Cornwallis off Brest, when he heard for the first time all that had taken place since his departure from the West Indies on June 13. Leaving the remainder of his fleet with Cornwallis, Nelson with the "Victory" and "Superb" proceeded to Plymouth where he struck his flag and went ashore to enjoy a well earned rest.

On August 1, 1805, the net results of all Napoleon's final plan of operation, begun at Toulon on March 30, was the junction of the Toulon and Ferrol squadrons. Two out of three of his combinations had failed. The Rochefort squadron had failed to join Villeneuve and Ganteaume had failed to escape from Brest. He now had a force of twenty-nine ships at Ferrol, with a possible addition of five from Rochefort, and twenty-one at Brest. These forces, which, united, represented fifty-five ships of the line, were separated by only 350 miles, the distance between Ferrol and Brest. Between them lay Cornwallis with a force of thirty-five ships, being thus superior to either of the French fleets. Holding the interior position, he could, barring accidents, command the situation.

The chances were thus against the French, when by a serious tactical blunder Cornwallis threw away his advantage and placed it in the hands of the enemy. On August 17, hearing that Villeneuve had sailed from Coruña with twenty-seven ships, Cornwallis detached Calder with eighteen ships to meet him, keeping at Brest only sixteen. He thus in the presence of the enemy divided his

force and gave to Villeneuve the opportunity of defeating him in detail. Napoleon stigmatized this division of the British force as a glaring blunder, blaming Cornwallis for committing it and Villeneuve for not taking advantage of it.

Villeneuve did indeed sail from Coruña on August 13 with twenty-nine ships and made a weak effort to reach Brest; but the winds were strong and adverse, his fleet was damaged and he was falsely informed by a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-four sail was at hand. Losing sight of the great enterprise with which he was entrusted, his resolution broke down, and, turning southward, he took refuge on August 20 in Cadiz where he was promptly blockaded by twenty-six British ships under Collingwood. Gravière thus describes Villeneuve's character: "Villeneuve with anxious glances, was always anticipating disaster—a coward in head but not in heart."

Thus ended Napoleon's scheme for the invasion of England. It was grand beyond conception and worthy of a better fate; but when the concentration in the West Indies failed and Nelson, like a sleuth hound, got upon Villeneuve's track, driving him back to Europe, the chances of success were gone.

On August 22, two days after Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz, Napoleon, ignorant of his retreat and gazing with impatience at the horizon, wrote to him at Brest: "I hope that you have arrived at Brest. Sail! Do not lose a moment, and with our united squadrons enter the channel. England is ours." To Ganteaume at Brest on the same day he wrote: "Do

not allow Villeneuve to lose a single day in order that, profiting by my superiority of fifty ships of the line, you may put to sea at once and fulfil your mission. Sail, and come here. We will avenge six centuries of insult and shame."

When Napoleon heard of Villeneuve's arrival at Cadiz, he was furious with rage at the final failure of his plans for the invasion. Closing his spy-glass he exclaimed: "What a fleet! What sacrifices for nothing! What an admiral!" He prepared with his own hands seven specifications against Villeneuve wherein he had failed in his duty.

Nelson, who perhaps more than any other person had borne the anxieties and responsibilities of this trying period, was now enjoying a well merited rest at Merton in the society of those he loved best in the world and preparing for that last act in this mighty drama in which he was by his death and victory to emblazon the page of glory with his name and to enshrine it forever in the hearts of his countrymen.

CHAPTER IV.

TRAFALGAR.—THE BATTLE.

WHEN Napoleon, in consequence of Villeneuve's return to Cadiz, abandoned his idea of invading England and turned his attention to the continent, he at the same time sent orders to Villeneuve to leave Cadiz and co-operate with the French army in southern Italy. Baulked by fate in the "grandest scheme which ever emanated from his genius" (Gravière), Napoleon still desired to dominate the Straits of Gibraltar and the Mediterranean with his sea power. He thought it unlikely that England could immediately concentrate in front of Cadiz a force equal to his own.

The British Admiralty were indeed under great apprehension in regard to the further movements of Villeneuve's fleet, which had seemed to increase as if by magic with every move. It started from Toulon with eleven ships; returned from the West Indies with twenty; sailed from Coruña with twenty-nine, and was now at Cadiz with thirty-five. From August 13, 1805, when Villeneuve sailed from Coruña, until September 2, when Blackwood in the "Euryalus" brought the news that the missing

French fleet had turned up in Cadiz, England had experienced a fever of anxiety and apprehension. This was not in any way lessened by the knowledge of the fact that on August 17 Cornwallis had imperilled the defence of England by dividing his force in the face of the enemy, thus leaving it optional with the latter to fall upon the detachments in detail with an overpowering force, or, eluding both, to appear in the channel and convoy the great flotilla to the English coast.

Blackwood's news had relieved England from this particular anxiety, but there was still reason for deep concern as to the further movements of the French and Spanish fleet, since it was not to be supposed that Napoleon would allow so large a body of ships to remain idle in port. That blockades were not entirely effective had been repeatedly proven by experience. Indeed the Rochefort squadron seems to have left and entered that port almost with impunity. It was decided, therefore, in accordance with the usual strategic policy of England during the Napoleonic wars, to augment the blockading squadron off Cadiz as rapidly as possible.

When, therefore, Nelson, tearing himself away from the joys of Merton, followed Blackwood to London and offered his services to the Admiralty, he was received by Lord Barham with open arms. The British government had at last learned to treat Nelson with the distinction that his brilliant services so richly deserved. His name alone was held to be half the battle. "Choose," said Lord Barham, "the officers you would like to have under your orders."

“Choose them yourself, my Lord,” replied Nelson. “The same spirit animates the whole navy. You cannot go wrong.”

Nelson left England on September 14 and reached Cadiz on the 28th. He was received with enthusiasm by Collingwood and all the commanding officers. The next day, the 29th, was his forty-seventh birthday, and the welcomes and congratulations received by Nelson on this occasion gladdened his heart. He indeed possessed that attribute of true heroism, the ability to laugh and smile in the presence of danger, and to carry lightly great responsibilities.

Nelson invited all of the commanding officers to dine with him, half the first day and half the second. On the third day he dined alone with his life-long friend, Collingwood, now second in command of the fleet. These two men were distinctly opposite in temperament, Collingwood being rigid, conscientious and austere, carrying his official burdens with a serious mien; while Nelson was gay, light-hearted and enthusiastic, and enjoyed cultivating cordial relations with those around him. Each admired in the other those characteristics wanting in himself. Although Nelson had passed over Collingwood in the rapidity of his promotion, there was not the slightest jealousy between them, and the two heroes sat down to what was perhaps their last dinner together, rejoicing in the fact that they were once more to be associated in what promised to be a great combat.

Nelson discussed with Collingwood and his commanding officers his proposed plan of action, showing them, as it was called, the “Nelson touch,” and

preparing them beforehand with a knowledge of what was to be done, because on the day of battle signals were, in his eyes, of but little use.

Nelson's plan of battle was based upon the supposition that Villeneuve would receive the attack in one long line of battle, the "ancient order," as one writer calls it, extending in the present case, five or six miles from van to rear. The British fleet, which, including expected reinforcements, was estimated at forty ships of the line, was to be arranged in two lines of sixteen ships each, with a reserve squadron of eight fast sailing two-deckers which could be added, as occasion demanded, to either line. Collingwood, with sixteen ships, was to cut off the twelve rear ships of the enemy, and Nelson was to pierce the line near the centre. The van of the allied fleet was not to be attacked at all, and reliance was placed upon its probable inability to render any assistance to the centre and rear before these should be destroyed, or the not improbable chance of its avoiding action altogether. Nelson designed that his attacking squadrons should be one-fourth superior to the portion of the enemy's fleet cut off. The plan was simple and effective and would bring an overwhelming force to bear upon a part of the enemy's line.

In his order to the fleet Nelson states: "When I shall have made known my intentions to my second in command, the entire and absolute direction of his column will be left to him. It is for him to conduct the attack as he sees best; it is for him to follow up his advantages until he shall have taken or destroyed the ships he has cut off. *I will take care that the*

other enemy's ships do not interrupt him. As for the captains, if during the battle my signals cannot be seen or perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong, if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy."

While Nelson was discussing with his captains his plan of tactics for the approaching battle, Villeneuve in Cadiz was studying to receive Nelson's attack. He at first determined to keep twelve ships, under Admiral Gravina, as a squadron of reserve, on one side of his line of battle, and ready to support any portion of his line that should be in need of assistance. But the English fleet having increased in numbers, he decided to throw this reserve into the regular line, placing it in the van. Villeneuve seems to have anticipated correctly Nelson's plan of attack, predicting that the latter would refuse an artillery duel in parallel lines of battle, and would endeavour to cut through his line and surround his rear.

Villeneuve saw with reason that with the raw and untrained fleet under his command it would be impossible to execute unexpected combinations and rapid concentrations. Naval manœuvres are of too delicate a nature to be practicable for a fleet which has not been well drilled in their performance. They require a fine *coup d'œil* and a precision of movement that call for qualities such as the best officers do not always possess and even those who do may get rusty by a long stay in port. (Gravière.) Rather than try any doubtful experiments, Villeneuve therefore contented himself with the "ancient order," the single line of battle with which all were familiar.

Although this formation extended his fleet over the sea a distance of five or six miles, it gave each vessel the free use of her broadside, and by it he retained the power to double upon the enemy without confusion.

In his general order Villeneuve stated: "All the efforts of our ships should be directed to the support of those attacked and to closing around the Admiral.

. . . It is much more by his own courage and love of glory that each captain should be directed, than by the signals of the Admiral, who, being himself engaged and surrounded by smoke, may not have the power of making any. . . . *Every captain who is not under fire is out of his station, and a signal made to remind him will be a stain upon his honour.*"

Thus both Nelson and Villeneuve expressed in noble language the obligation devolving upon every captain to seek the enemy, whether with or without orders, the most important principle of naval tactics.

While waiting the appearance of the combined fleet, Nelson kept the main body of his own fleet at a distance of about fifty miles W. N. W. from Cadiz. Successive reinforcements had at last raised his force to thirty-three sail of the line and four frigates. The frigates and brigs, under Captain Blackwood in the "Euryalus," kept watch at the entrance of the harbour, and a chain of line-of-battle ships connected him by signal with Nelson. By this arrangement, Nelson, though far at sea and out of sight of the enemy, was kept informed night and day of the enemy's movements. Villeneuve had twice given Nelson the

slip at Toulon, and the latter was determined not to have a repetition of that experience. His post was sufficiently far to the westward of Cadiz to make him safe from the dangers of a lee shore in the case of westerly gales, and with easterly winds he could manœuvre for position.

Before the battle Nelson was obliged to send six of his ships under Admiral Louis to Gibraltar for water and provisions. He hoped they would return before Villeneuve came out, but in this he was disappointed.

Meanwhile, Villeneuve in Cadiz was having a hard time in preparing his vessels for sea. Provisions were scarce, desertions many, and the Spanish authorities on shore were lukewarm and disaffected. He was ably seconded, however, by Vice-Admiral Gravina, who commanded the Spanish division of the fleet.

Villeneuve had orders from Napoleon to attack without hesitation and bring on a decisive action "if he found the enemy in inferior force;" but having no confidence that Villeneuve would carry out his instructions, the Emperor privately despatched Vice-Admiral Rosily from Paris to supersede him. Rosily had orders, if he found the combined fleet still in Cadiz, to assume command and send Villeneuve to Paris "to account for his conduct."

When Rosily reached Madrid his carriage broke down, thus causing a delay in his journey, and Villeneuve, learning of his approach and of his orders, and being informed at the same time that Nelson had been obliged to weaken his fleet by detaching six ships to Gibraltar, sent hastily for

Admiral Gravina and, after consulting with him, made signal to the fleet to prepare for sea. Between the alternative of going home to answer Napoleon's charges of misconduct and going out to meet Nelson, he preferred the latter.

The movement of the combined fleet began at seven o'clock on the morning of October 19, and Nelson, forty miles away, was informed of it at half past nine, an example of efficient communication at sea which can hardly be excelled at the present time. Knowing that Villeneuve, should he enter the Straits of Gibraltar first, would have a chance to escape, Nelson at once left his cruising ground to the westward of Cadiz, and steered towards the Straits. On the morning of October 20th, he was a few leagues from Cape Spartel, lying to and waiting for the enemy.

Owing to a calm and a contrary current the vessels of the allied fleet came slowly out of port, so that by the evening of the 19th only eight had succeeded in getting through the harbour passages. During the night of the 19th the weather became overcast and seemed to threaten a southwest gale. It was a busy and a trying night for Blackwood and his scouts, who were now dealing with a moving foe, the duties of observation being thus made much more difficult. Throughout the night, guns and rockets were firing and blue lights were burning from the British scouts, telling Nelson of the movements of the enemy.

The morning of Sunday, the 20th of October, broke with a fresh wind from the S. S. W. and weather rough and rainy. By ten o'clock in the

morning the last ship of the combined fleet was out of Cadiz. There were in all thirty-three ships of the line, eighteen French and fifteen Spanish, and they stood to the northward to gain an offing. During the day and the night of the 20th, Nelson kept in touch with, but out of sight of, the enemy's fleet, fearing that they might, if hard pressed, again take refuge in Cadiz. He did not know that the presence in that port of Vice-Admiral Rosily made it more ruinous for Villeneuve to return than to remain and fight. At daylight on the morning of the 21st, the two hostile fleets were about ten miles apart, the allied fleet to leeward in line of battle on the starboard tack heading southwest, the British fleet to windward steering north-by-east with a light breeze from west-north-west. The centre of the allied fleet bore at this time east-by-south from the centre of the British fleet. (James.)

It was a *fête* day in Nelson's family on account of the distinguished part taken by his uncle nearly half a century previous in Captain Forrest's action in the West Indies. Nelson had often expressed a desire to celebrate this anniversary with a victory and was now well pleased with the prospect of gratifying his long felt desire.

At 6:40 A. M. Nelson formed his fleet into two columns and steered east. The northernmost column, consisting of eleven ships, was led by Nelson in the "Victory," and the southernmost column, consisting of fifteen ships, was led by Collingwood in the "Royal Sovereign." One ship, the "Africa," had separated during the night from the fleet and was not

in this formation. The two columns were about a mile apart. In answer to this formation of attack, Villeneuve at 8:30 made signal to his fleet to wear together and form line in close order on the port tack, heading to the north and east, thereby bringing Cadiz on his lee bow and about twenty miles distant. It was nearly ten o'clock before this manœuvre was completed, and owing to the light airs, the heavy swell and the inexperience of some of the captains it was very imperfectly performed. The result was that the line, instead of being straight, was rather crescent-shaped, the convexity to leeward, and the ships were in some cases to windward and in other cases to leeward of their proper stations, and were in places two and three deep.

The British ships, with studding-sails set, approached very slowly, their speed being only about three knots an hour. Modern naval warfare with its quick moving ships knows of no such breathing space before battle. It is now a sight and a dash and the commander-in-chief who hesitates is lost. The importance to a fleet of preparation, drill and instant control is now greater than ever.

During this slow approach Nelson walked the deck with Blackwood and Hardy, speculating on the result of the impending battle. Hardy said that under the circumstances he thought that fourteen ships would make a glorious victory. "No," replied Nelson, "I shall not be satisfied with less than twenty." The captains begged Nelson to remove the stars and decorations from his coat or to cover them so that they might not become a target for the enemy's marksmen.

“No,” replied Nelson, “in honour I gained them and in honour I will die with them.” Two of Nelson’s battleships were commanded by their first lieutenants, the captains having been ordered home as witnesses on Sir Robert Calder’s trial. Blackwood made a request to be given command of one of them; but Nelson declined to grant it, claiming that the first lieutenants who had worked hard and trained the ships’ companies were entitled to the honour of succeeding to the command.

The gap between the opposing fleets was fast closing when, at about 11:30, Nelson made his memorable signal, “England expects that every man will do his duty,” which was received throughout the fleet with enthusiasm and cheers. There is a lofty and concentrated patriotism about this last order, soon to be sealed with his blood, which thoroughly represents the elevation of feeling which animated Nelson when going into action and its brief eloquence and inspiring enthusiasm illumine to this day the dry page of history with the bright light of Nelson’s genius.

Collingwood, in the “Royal Sovereign,” was first in action and at 12:10 passed under the stern of the 112-gun ship, the “Santa Anna,” bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Alava. He delivered in passing a terrific raking fire, each gun double charged, which swept her decks and killed or wounded 400 of her crew. As Collingwood plunged into the enemy’s line and the “Royal Sovereign” became lost in the smoke of battle, Nelson, not yet engaged, said to Hardy, “See how that noble fellow, Collingwood,

takes his ship into action." Collingwood was at the same moment saying to his flag-captain: "What would not Nelson give to be here now." Some one remonstrated with Captain Rotheram of the "Royal Sovereign" because he wore his cocked hat into action. "O, let me alone," said he. "I always have fought in a cocked hat, and I always will."

At 12:20 the "Victory" arrived within gun-shot and Blackwood and the other frigate captains took leave of Nelson and returned to their ships. Blackwood in parting seized the Admiral's hand and said that he hoped soon to see him again, and in possession of twenty prizes. "God bless you, Blackwood," replied Nelson, "but I shall never speak to you again."

The "Victory" was under fire forty minutes before she pierced the allied line. Her mizzen topmast had been shot away, her wheel shattered and she had lost fifty men in killed and wounded. Yet in spite of the two hundred guns thundering against her, she bore majestically along as if propelled by fate, heading for Villeneuve's flag-ship, the "Bucentaure." Just ahead of the "Bucentaure" was the Spanish four-decker, the "Santissima Trinidad," of 130 guns, the largest vessel afloat at that time, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Cisneros. Close astern was the "Redoubtable," 74, while the "Neptune," 80, was close to leeward. This group of four ships was so closely united that Hardy found no opening for breaking through without running on board of one of them and informed Nelson of the fact. "Choose which you please," said Nelson, "I leave it to you,

we cannot help it." Hardy determined to run on board the "Redoutable." At 1 P. M., passing under the stern of the "Bucentaure" within pistol-shot, he gave her such a broadside that twenty of her guns were dismounted and her decks filled with killed and wounded ; then putting his helm to port he ran aboard the "Redoutable." Then ensued a most remarkable conflict between the English three-decker of 100 guns and the French two-decker of 74 guns. The crew of the "Redoutable" sustained the unequal contest without flinching, and the fire from the three tops, supplemented by hand grenades, played deadly havoc on the spar deck of the "Victory." At 1:30 Nelson, conspicuous by the decorations upon his uniform, was walking the quarter-deck with Hardy, when he was struck by a bullet from the "Redoutable's" mizzen top, about fifty yards away, and fell on his knees with his hand touching the deck. To Hardy, who ran to his assistance, he said, "They have done for me at last, Hardy ; my backbone is shot through." Hardy, in great grief, directed that he be carried below, covering his face with a handkerchief so that the crew might not be disheartened by the sight. Upon examination, the surgeon, Dr. Beatty, found that the ball had penetrated from the shoulder through the chest into the spine, and that the wound was mortal. His lower extremities were paralyzed, his breathing was difficult and he suffered intense pain. There lay the hero in dying agony far down in the dimly lighted interior of his ship, surrounded by the dead and dying, while the roar of the battle, the crash of broadsides, the cries

of the wounded and the cheers of the crew, sounded, as from an organ, a battle requiem to his departing soul. Did ever hero make entrance into Valhalla with a more appropriate accompaniment ?

The battle between the "Victory" and the "Redoubtable" continued to rage with unabated fury. Seeing the spar deck of the "Victory" nearly deserted, Captain Lucas of the "Redoubtable" attempted to board, and a midshipman and four sailors actually reached the "Victory's" deck by the aid of her spare anchor. Efforts were now made to lower the main yard of the "Redoubtable" so as to form a bridge for the boarders. At this moment, while the spar deck of the "Redoubtable" was crowded with the assembled boarders, the "Téméraire," 98, Captain Harvey, ranged up on the side opposite to the "Victory," and fired a withering broadside into the French ship. The slaughter was tremendous, two hundred of the heroic crew being killed or wounded by this one broadside. The "Téméraire" then closed with the "Redoubtable," and the French 74, thus locked in the deadly embrace of the two British ships, her main and mizzen masts gone, her hull riddled and her rudder destroyed, maintained for a short time the unequal contest. She had twenty guns dismounted and nearly all her officers slain, a truly desperate and gallant defence against overwhelming odds and reflecting great credit upon her commanding officer, Captain Lucas, who was fortunate enough to survive the slaughter on board his ship. At 1:55 she surrendered. Out of a crew of 522 men only 123

remained uninjured. They had fought a good fight and shown themselves not unworthy antagonists.

While the "Téméraire" was thus engaged alongside of the "Redoubtable" she was attacked by the "Fougueux," 74, which latter vessel ran on board of her, and so this battle presented the singular spectacle of four vessels, two French and two English, alongside of each other, in desperate conflict. The "fighting Téméraire" carried the "Fougueux" by boarding, after inflicting upon her a frightful loss with her broadside.

The other ships of Nelson's column slowly followed the "Téméraire" into action, engaging the nearest ships of the allied fleet as they came up. The "Neptune," "Conqueror," "Leviathan" and "Africa" surrounded the French and the Spanish flag-ships, the "Bucentaure" and the "Santissima Trinidad," pouring upon them a most destructive fire. In a short time both ships were dismasted. The "Bucentaure" surrendered to the "Conqueror" and the "Santissima Trinidad" dropped to leeward, a dismasted and helpless wreck. After the battle, at 5:30, a prize crew was put on board of her and she was taken in tow by the "Prince."

At 1:50, before the "Bucentaure's" mast fell, Villeneuve had made signal to the van to wear together and come to his assistance, and this signal had been understood and repeated by Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, in the "Formidable," who commanded the van. Owing to the lightness of the wind, this manœuvre was but slowly executed, and when at last the van came sailing down the line in two columns,

one to windward and one to leeward, the latter leading directly for the "Bucentaure," they found the rear ships of Nelson's column freshly arrived and ready to receive them. Three of the fourteen van ships were captured, the "Intrépide," "San Augustino" and "Neptune;" the remaining seven escaped. Four vessels followed Dumanoir to windward and were subsequently captured in the Bay of Biscay and three fled to leeward, joining Vice-Admiral Gravina in his flight to Cadiz. As Nelson had predicted, none of them interrupted Collingwood in his action with the allied rear.

The "Royal Sovereign," after delivering her port broadside close under the stern of the "Santa Anna" followed it immediately with her starboard broadside into the French 74, the "Fougueux," and then pulling her helm to starboard, ranged up on the starboard side of the "Santa Anna." While thus engaged the "Victory" was assailed bow and stern and on her starboard by four vessels of the allied fleet, which unequal contest continued for fifteen minutes before the "Belleisle," "Mars" and other vessels of Collingwood's column came to her assistance. After two hours' hard fighting the "Santa Anna" surrendered to the "Royal Sovereign." Both ships were unmanageable and lay helplessly wallowing in the wreckage of their masts and yards. The "Santa Anna" was completely dismasted. The "Royal Sovereign" lost her mainmast and her foremast and was so badly wounded as to be tottering and useless. Vice-Admiral Alava was mortally wounded. The "Royal Sovereign" lost 140 officers and men in killed and

wounded (James.) Collingwood's unsupported dash into the midst of the allied fleet was one of the most daring deeds in this mighty battle and well merited the admiration of Nelson and the rest of the fleet.

The "Belleisle" following the "Royal Sovereign" into action at 12:15 soon became isolated among the enemy's vessels and was entirely dismasted. Her port battery was completely masked by the wreck of her two masts and sails and she was subjected to the fire of the "Achille," "Aigle" and "Neptune." Notwithstanding, however, her shattered and helpless condition, she held out heroically, nailing an ensign to the stump of her mizzen mast, until the arrival of friends released her from her desperate situation. To the leading vessels of an end on attack such a fate was almost inevitable. She had, however, drawn the fire of the enemy from the approaching English vessels, and although during the *mêlée* which followed the arrival of the rest of the column, she floated helplessly upon the waters an interested but idle spectator, she had nobly borne her part in the fray.

The succeeding vessels of Collingwood's column arrived successively in action, engaging the vessels of the allied rear wherever found. It would be impossible here to follow the fortunes of each individual ship.

The action, which had commenced about noon, arrived at its height at 1:30 P. M. The brunt of the battle was borne by the leading half of each column. The "Dreadnaught," "Prince," "Defence," "Thunderer," "Swiftsure" and "Polyphemus," the rear

vessels of Collingwood's column, did not get into action until about 3 P. M., three hours after the "Royal Sovereign," by which time the enemy's fire had begun to slacken. They formed, however, an invaluable reserve and finished up what was left. By five o'clock the battle was over. At this time, of the 35 French and Spanish ships which in the morning had so proudly offered battle to the English fleet, eleven were escaping towards Cadiz, four were following Dumanoir to seaward, and seventeen had surrendered. The "Achille" had blown up after a gallant and desperate resistance: eight ships were wholly dismantled, and eight partially. In the English squadron the "Royal Sovereign," "Téméraire," "Belleisle," "Tonnant," "Colossus," "Belleophon," "Mars," "Africa" were unmanageable.

Nelson lingered until about 4:30, when he passed away, but not before he had learned from Hardy of his great victory and that not a single British ship had struck to the enemy. He died in the consciousness of "duty done and honour won," sealing with his blood a life of patriotic devotion to his country and leaving behind him the immutable legacy of his great example. Villeneuve survived the action uninjured and was taken a prisoner to England. He soon after committed suicide in mortification, it is said, of his defeat.

It would be impossible here to give a detailed and complete account of this most famous naval battle. Both sides fought with desperation; but while the British captains sought one enemy after another, as circumstances permitted, making every step count to

the utmost, many ships of the allied fleet were not engaged at all. About the centres of conflict, dismasted ships of both sides floated helpless on the waters, without the power of guidance, and the ocean was strewn with the wreckage of masts and spars.

The British loss in killed and wounded was (Beresford) 1542 and that of the allies, as near as obtainable, 6833. According to a corrected list from James' Naval History (Russell) the British fleet carried 2542 guns into action and the allied fleet 6042.

Upon Nelson's death the command devolved upon Collingwood, who during the night of the 21st and the following day, was engaged in rescuing the disabled ships of both fleets. During the battle the two fleets had drifted towards Trafalgar shoals, and at its close they were only about eight miles distant. A gale coming on, some of the disabled prizes were foundered, some went ashore and two were recaptured, so that at last only four of the prizes remained to be taken to England. A fortunate change in the wind from west to south-south-west saved a greater number from going ashore.

The remains of Nelson were taken to England in the "Victory" and conveyed, amid the tears of the nation, to his last resting place in St. Paul's Cathedral. The ocean never bore upon its bosom a greater genius nor the grave receive a more loving, manlier spirit. His victories made possible England's greatness, and his glory increases with the ages.

Trafalgar was by far the most important naval battle of the great Napoleonic wars. In his exulta-

tion over the victories at Ulm and Austerlitz, Napoleon spoke slightly of Trafalgar, calling it the "loss of a few vessels;" but he well knew that by this battle his power upon the ocean had received its death blow and that his dreams of empire "over the sea" were rendered forever hopeless of realization.

Like Lepanto, the battle of Trafalgar was an epoch making, or rather closing, event, and marks the culmination of over two centuries of naval warfare. From Drake to Nelson, from the Spanish Armada to Trafalgar (1588-1805), what a history! The sea powers of Holland and Spain annihilated and that of France so shattered as to be incapable, for a generation at least, of any serious effort. The skill and daring of her seamen and the genius of her admirals, had made England the undisputed mistress of the seas, and, under the mantle of her power she reaped, during the remainder of the 19th century, the rich reward of her long and desperate struggle. All honour to the brave seamen who sought and found upon the ocean the foundations of a nation's greatness. All shame upon the generation which allows those foundations to crumble away.

CHAPTER V.

ACTION BETWEEN SIR RICHARD STRACHAN AND REAR-ADMIRAL DUMANOIR.

AFTER the defeat of Trafalgar Napoleon gave up all hope of serious conflict upon the ocean and began to discourage maritime enterprises, and no more fleet actions took place, the French navy confining itself mainly to preying upon England's commerce.

Two squadron actions, however, remain to be noticed as coming within the Napoleonic period. The first may be called an off-shoot of Trafalgar. Rear-Admiral Dumanoir, who commanded the van at Trafalgar, after retreating from the action, was prevented from entering the Mediterranean by knowledge that a British squadron under Admiral Louis was cruising off the Straits of Gibraltar. Dumanoir had with him the "Formidable," 80, and three seventy-fours, the "Mont Blanc," "Scipion" and "Duguay Trouin." The entrance to the Mediterranean being barred, Dumanoir shaped his course to the northward, intending to enter a French port in the Bay of Biscay. The Rochefort squadron under Admiral Allemand had been at sea since the latter part of August and had done so much mischief to British trade that several squadrons had been sent in search of it. Among them was a force consisting of

five sail of the line and two frigates under Commodore Sir Richard Strachan.

On Nov. 2, 1805, being then not a great distance from Cape Finisterre, Dumanoir's squadron was discerned by Captain Baker of the frigate "Phoenix," 42. Captain Baker was proceeding under sealed orders to his station in the Mediterranean, but on sighting the French squadron he took the responsibility of opening his orders and finding that the execution of them could, without serious injury, be delayed, he devoted himself to observing the enemy. Being chased by the latter and the wind being north-west, Baker steered south, hoping to lead the enemy towards Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, which he knew to be cruising off Ferrol. At 3 P. M. on the 2nd, Baker discovered four sail of the line bearing south, and shortly after, Dumanoir making the same discovery, gave up the chase. Captain Baker, at 11 P. M. passed under the stern of the "Cæsar," Strachan's flagship, and informed him of the near presence of the French squadron. Strachan's squadron being much scattered at the time, Baker was ordered to steer to the south-south-east and hasten forward the missing ships, while Strachan, with the "Cæsar," 80, "Hero" and "Courageux," 74's, and "Eolus," 32, pressed forward in pursuit. This pursuit lasted from the night of November 2, until noon on November 4, when Dumanoir, seeing further flight useless, his rear ship the "Scipion" being already engaged with the English frigates, shortened sail and prepared for battle.

At 12:15 the "Cæsar" opened fire upon the

“Formidable,” and the “Hero” and “Courageux” engaged two warships of the French line, the “Mont Blanc” and “Scipion.” The leading ship of the French line was not at the time engaged, owing to the absence of the “Namur,” which vessel was still ten miles away in company with the “Revolutionaire,” 38, Captain Hotham. The French ships returned the fire of the British ships with spirit and a desperate action ensued. The “Duguay Trouin,” the leading French ship, luffed up gallantly for the purpose of raking the “Cæsar,” but the latter luffing at the same time avoided the danger. Either by accident or design the “Duguay Trouin” went about on the port tack, which caused her to pass between the French and British lines, and she received from the “Cæsar” and “Hero,” particularly from the latter, a heavy and destructive fire. Dumanoir then made signal to his squadron to tack in succession and follow the “Duguay Trouin.”

The “Namur” came into action at 2:45 P. M., attacking the “Formidable” upon her port quarter. The action continued until 3:35 P. M., when the French ships had all surrendered. The victory was, however, far from bloodless, the British loss being 135 men killed and wounded and the French, 730. Rear-Admiral Dumanoir was wounded in two places. The “Formidable” and “Mont Blanc” had only their foremasts left standing. In this action the British frigates took an active part, which was most unusual for vessels of their class. The “Phoenix,” after decoying the French squadron within sight of the British, engaged, together with the “Santa Mar-

garita," the rear ship of the French line, the "Scipion," in a spirited action, thereby retarding Dumanoir's movements and enabling Strachan to overtake him. During the action all the frigates participated, the "Santa Margarita" having to withdraw temporarily in consequence of a dangerous shot in her magazine, but the "Phœnix" and the "Revolutionaire" gave the finishing blow to the "Scipion."

The captured French vessels were taken to Plymouth and added to the British navy, the "Formidable" under the name of "Brave" and the "Duguay Trouin" under that of "Implacable;" the "Scipion" and "Mont Blanc" retained their names. Sir Richard Strachan, who had been promoted to the rank of rear-admiral before the news of his victory reached England and not in consequence of it, was rewarded with the Order of the Bath and received, together with his officers, the thanks of Parliament. Dumanoir upon his return to Paris was brought before a Court of Inquiry to answer for his conduct at Trafalgar and in his action with Commodore Strachan. The Court acquitted him of any misconduct at Trafalgar, finding that he had "manœuvred conformably to signals and the dictates of duty and honour," but found fault with him for not engaging Commodore Strachan with his four ships before the "Namur" could arrive upon the scene of action. Subsequently, however, a naval court-martial acquitted him of this charge.

CHAPTER VI.

SIR JOHN DUCKWORTH'S ACTION AT SAN DOMINGO.

ON December 13, 1805, a squadron of eleven sail of the line, four frigates and a corvette escaped from Brest. A brisk gale from the north-east and the absence of the blockading squadron, which had gone into port for provisions and refitting, enabled the escaping squadron to run off shore with a free wind and to soon place itself beyond the sphere of observation of the blockading fleet. Admiral Cornwallis knew nothing of the escape of this squadron, he being absent at the time, and the first news reached England on December 24, by way of a cartel from Gibraltar.

The French force, having cleared the coast, divided into two squadrons, and the two admirals in command proceeded to carry out their orders.

The first squadron under Vice-Admiral Leisseigues consisting of the

| SHIPS | GUNS | SHIPS | GUNS |
|---------------------|------|-------------------|------|
| 1. "Imperial"..... | 130 | 4. "Diomède"..... | 74 |
| 2. "Alexandre"..... | 80 | 5. "Jupitre"..... | 74 |
| 3. "Brave"..... | 74 | | |

and the frigates "Cornète," "Félicité" and corvette "Diligente" had orders to disembark the 1000

soldiers on board at San Domingo and then to cruise off Jamaica for two months and to proceed from there to the Banks of Newfoundland and finally, when provisions were exhausted, to return to Rochefort or Lorient. The second squadron under Rear-Admiral Willaumez and consisting of

| SHIPS | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|-----------------------|-------|---------------------|-------|
| 1. "Foudroyant."..... | 80 | 4. "Patriote."..... | 74 |
| 2. "Cassard."..... | 74 | 5. "Eole."..... | 74 |
| 3. "Impetueux."..... | 74 | 6. "Veteran."..... | 74 |

and the frigates "Valeureuse" and "Volontaire" and two brigs had orders to proceed to St. Helena and the Cape of Good Hope, at the discretion of the admiral and then steer for Martinique for supplies. After touching at Cayenne for information or orders, Admiral Willaumez was to cruise off Barbadoes, inflicting all the damage possible to British commerce and then return to Europe by way of St. Helena. After Trafalgar Napoleon took refuge at sea in these commerce destroying raids which were sometimes quite successful but had no vital influence upon the war and were necessarily demoralizing to the French personnel.

Upon hearing the news of the escape of the French squadron the British Admiralty dispatched two squadrons in pursuit, one under Vice-Admiral Warren consisting of

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|----------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| 1. "London."..... | 98 | 4. "Namur."..... | 74 |
| 2. "Ramillies."..... | 74 | 5. "Repulse."..... | 74 |
| 3. "Hero."..... | 74 | 6. "Courageux."..... | 74 |

the other under Rear-Admiral Strachan consisting of

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|------------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| 1. "St. George."... .. | 98 | 4. "Terrible"..... | 74 |
| 2. "Cæsar"..... | 80 | 5. "Triumph"..... | 74 |
| 3. "Centaur"..... | 74 | 6. "Bellona"..... | 74 |

These squadrons sailed about the middle of January, 1806, about a month after the escape of the French squadron. Sir John Warren was directed to proceed to the vicinity of Madeira and endeavour to ascertain the route of the French squadron, and, hearing nothing to the contrary, then to Barbadoes and Jamaica. If there were still no tidings of the French squadron he was to leave four sail of the line at Jamaica and with the other ships return to Spithead. Sir Richard Strachan was to proceed straight to the Island of St. Helena and not learning any news of the French squadron there to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope and join the expedition which had been sent to capture that place.

So there were at sea in January, 1806, among others, four squadrons, two French and two English, playing that game of naval strategy which had exercised the minds of British naval officers for centuries and which to-day under different conditions, but with unchanged principles, has been crystallised into the Kriegspiel or naval war-game and forms part of the curriculum at naval war colleges.

It is perhaps illustrative of the great uncertainty in naval warfare of locating a fleet once lost to sight, and leaving no trail behind, to note that both Sir Richard Strachan and Sir John Warren returned to England without having accomplished the object of their

search; and of the two French squadrons, that under Vice-Admiral Leisseigues was destroyed and captured in action, as we shall relate, and the other was dismasted and scattered in a gale, only three of its vessels, the "Cassard," "Patriote" and "Foudröyant," with Admiral Willaumez, returning to France.

Vice-Admiral Sir John Duckworth, while blockading off Cadiz in December, 1806, hearing that a French squadron had been sighted off Madeira, raised the blockade and proceeded in that direction in quest of the French squadron, which he conjectured to be the long-sought for Rochefort squadron under Rear-Admiral Allemand. Having failed to discover any signs of the enemy he was on his way back to Cadiz when he encountered the "Arethusa" frigate escorting a few merchant ships, which vessel had a few days previously been chased by the French squadron under Vice-Admiral Leisseigues. Continuing his course to the northward, Duckworth on the 24th of December came within sight of a French squadron not far from Madeira and immediately gave chase. It was not, however, the squadron under Vice-Admiral Leisseigues, but the one under Rear-Admiral Willaumez. Duckworth was, of course, ignorant of the existence of two French squadrons of a force similar to his own, but gave chase at once, the enemy retreating to the southward under a press of canvas, seeking to avoid an action.

During the 24th and 25th of December the enemy fled and were ardently pursued, and the pursuers, owing to the unequal sailing of the British fleet, became so strung out as to be beyond supporting

distance of the "Superb," Duckworth's flagship, which led the line. The British fleet consisted of

| SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. "Canopus"..... | 80 Rear-Admiral Louis |
| 2. "Superb"..... | 74 Vice-Admiral Duckworth |
| 3. "Spencer"..... | 74 |
| 4. "Donegal"..... | 74 |
| 5. "Powerful"..... | 74 |
| 6. "Agamemnon"..... | 64 |
| 7. "Acasta"..... | 40 |
| 8. "Amethyst"..... | 36 |

Finding it impossible to bring the French squadron into action, with a united fleet (it is said that the distance between the leading and rear ship of the British squadron was 45 miles) Duckworth, after a chase of thirty hours, gave up the pursuit, and having been carried within the northeast trades and being short of water, he stretched across to the West Indies, despatching the "Powerful" to the East Indies to reinforce the squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Pellew.

The squadron arrived at Barbadoes on January 12, and at Basse Terre Road, St. Christopher's, on the 19th. Here the squadron filled up with water and refitted and was joined by the "Northumberland," 74, bearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Alexander Cochrane and the "Atlas," 74. The squadron now consisted of seven sail of the line, one frigate and one sloop.

On February 1 the sloop "Kingfisher," Captain Cochrane, joined, with the intelligence of a French squadron having been seen steering towards the City of San Domingo. Sir John immediately started in

pursuit and on February 3, while lying to off St. Thomas was joined by the 14-gun brig "Epervier" under command of Lieutenant James Higginson. On the 5th, while off the east end of St. Domingo the 36-gun frigate "Magicienne," Captain Adam Mackenzie, joined the squadron. On the morning of February 6, Duckworth, his squadron formed in two lines, came upon the French squadron at anchor. They had encountered very heavy weather in crossing the Atlantic and had been dispersed by a storm. Admiral Leisseigues reached San Domingo on January 20, and the whole squadron was busy refitting when surprised by the appearance of the British squadron.

As soon, however, as the British fleet was sighted, the French ships slipped their cables and steered to the westward, the wind being light from north-north-west. The French line was formed with the "Alexandre" in the lead, followed by the "Imperial," 130, "Diomède," 74, "Jupitre," 74, "Brave," 74, with the frigates and sloops in a second line inshore.

Sir John Duckworth made signal to concentrate upon the "Imperial," "Diomède" and "Jupitre" and the wind shifting to northeast by east the action took place with the wind about a point on the starboard quarter, the ships running free and making about eight knots an hour. The three leading ships of the British line, the "Superb," "Northumberland" and "Spencer" gained rapidly upon the enemy. The fourth ship, the "Agamemnon," being a dull sailer, fell astern. At 10:10 A. M. the "Superb," bearing the flag of Sir John Duckworth and with

Keats, the hero of Saumarez's action and an intimate friend of Nelson's, in command, opened fire on the "Alexandre" with her starboard guns and a few minutes later the "Northumberland" engaged the "Imperial," and the "Spencer," the "Diomède." After the third broadside the "Alexandre" suddenly came by the wind on the port tack, luffing across the bows of the "Superb" and leaving the "Imperial" in close action with the "Superb" and "Northumberland." The "Alexandre" had no sooner separated from her consorts than she attempted to rejoin them again by passing through the British line between the "Northumberland" and "Spencer," but in this she was defeated by a raking fire from the "Spencer." The "Alexandre" was helpless and the "Spencer" hauling up upon her starboard side engaged her at close quarters until she surrendered at 11 A. M.

While the duel between the "Alexandre" and "Spencer" was taking place and these two vessels were working to the southward, the "Superb" and the "Northumberland" were hotly engaged with the "Imperial." The "Northumberland" having shot ahead, gallantly pushed between the "Superb" and the "Imperial" and for a long time received from the latter a tremendous fire. Finally the "Canopus," "Northumberland," "Superb" and "Atlas" all took part in the subjugation of this leviathan, and at 11:30 she hauled away towards the land then about a mile distant on her starboard bow. She was followed by the "Canopus," which continued to fire at her until at 11:40 she took the ground with such force that her three masts went

over the side. Shortly afterwards she fired a lee gun in token of surrender.

About the same time the mainmast of the "Northumberland" fell forward, doing great damage. The "Diomède," attacked by the "Spencer" and "Atlas" ran ashore near the "Imperial," her mast falling at the same time. The "Brave" and "Jupitre" surrendered to the "Donegal," the "Jupitre" being captured by boarding. Thus out of five French ships two were driven ashore and destroyed by fire and three were captured and towed to Jamaica.

The "Imperial" is described as the largest and finest ship of her day and was considered equal to two seventy-fours. She mounted 130 guns and carried about 1200 men. She was rated at about 3000 tons.

The British loss in this action was seventy-four killed and 264 wounded. The "Northumberland" and "Spencer" suffered the most. For some reason the naval historian James endeavours to belittle this action on account of the superiority of fire on the British side, seven to five, as if this was not the very essence of all warfare. We think great credit is due to Sir John Duckworth for his quickness in bringing the French squadron to action without giving those storm-tossed mariners a breathing-space or a chance to refit and pull themselves together after their tempestuous voyage across the ocean. The spectacle of three British admirals all battling with one French admiral is, as far as we know, unique and seems, indeed, an embarrassment of ranking officers.

The "Imperial" fought with spirit, as is shown

by her loss of 600 men in killed and wounded, and the beaching of the "Imperial" and "Diomède" and their subsequent destruction, bears a melancholy resemblance to what happened towards the end of the nineteenth century at Santiago, Cuba. For this action Rear-Admiral Cochrane was invested with the Order of the Bath, and Rear-Admiral Louis was created a Baronet, an honour which he lost at Trafalgar by being unfortunately absent at Gibraltar supplying his ships with water. Commander Cochrane, who carried despatches to England, was made a Post Captain and Parliament gave a vote of thanks to officers and men.

CHAPTER VII.

LORD GAMBIER'S ACTION IN AIX ROADS.

THE action between Lord Gambier and the French in Aix Roads at the entrance to Rochefort, France, on April 11, 1809, was a signal example of the use of fire-ships and explosion vessels against ships at anchor and protected by batteries and a heavy boom which is well worth a study and is a good illustration of that mode of naval warfare under situations and conditions which may still occur, although the methods employed to accomplish the same object have materially changed, the principal weapon now being the torpedo boat.

On the 21st of February, 1809, Rear-Admiral Willaumez made his escape from Brest with eight sail of the line and two frigates, Admiral Lord Gambier having been drawn off the blockade by the continued prevalence of westerly gales. Willaumez's ultimate destination was Martinique, to prevent that island from falling into the hands of the British, but he was first to collect the vessels at L'Orient and Rochefort. He reached Rochefort on February 24, an-

choring in Basque Roads, and on the 26th withdrew his squadron to Aix Roads under the protection of the batteries on Isle d'Aix. In this movement the "Jean-Bart," 74, grounded on the Palles Shoal and became a total wreck. Willaumez now had under his command ten ships of the line and five frigates, as follows :

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|-------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| "Ocean"..... | 120 | "Aquilon"..... | 74 |
| "Foudroyant"..... | 80 | "Tourville"..... | 74 |
| "Varsovie"..... | 80 | "Calcutta." (Storeship) | 50 |
| "Cassard"..... | 74 | "Indienne"..... | 40 |
| "Régulus"..... | 74 | "Hortense"..... | 40 |
| "Tonnerre"..... | 74 | "Pallas"..... | 40 |
| "Patriote"..... | 74 | "Elbe"..... | 40 |
| "Jemmappes"..... | 74 | | |

He was blockaded, from February 24 to March 7, by Rear-Admiral Stopford with eight ships of the line. On March 7, Admiral Lord Gambier arrived off Rochefort, and anchored in Basque Roads with the following squadron :

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|-------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| "Caledonia"..... | 120 | "Theseus"..... | 74 |
| "Cæsar"..... | 80 | "Valiant"..... | 74 |
| "Gibraltar"..... | 80 | "Illustrious"..... | 74 |
| "Hero"..... | 74 | "Bellona"..... | 74 |
| "Donegal"..... | 74 | "Revenge"..... | 74 |
| "Resolution"..... | 74 | | |

together with seven frigates and thirteen brigs. On March 16, Rear-Admiral Willaumez was ordered to Paris and was succeeded, on March 17, by Vice-Admiral Allemand, who hoisted his flag on board the "Ocean," 120 guns.

Rear-Admiral Willaumez was charged with allowing himself to be blockaded by an inferior force and

blamed for not attacking the British squadron under Rear-Admiral Stopford before it was joined by Lord Gambier.

Lord Gambier began at once to consider how to attack the French fleet at its anchorage and on March 11 sent a communication to the Admiralty suggesting the use of fire-ships but at the same time denouncing them as a "horrible mode of warfare" and the attempt "hazardous if not desperate." This letter was evidently intended to throw the responsibility of such an attack, and the onus of failure if any, upon the Admiralty. The Administration desired for political purposes a Naval victory and dreaded the effect in England of the escape of the French fleet from Rochefort and the injuries which might be inflicted upon the West Indian trade, and before the arrival of Lord Gambier's despatch the Board of Admiralty had been considering the project of an attack upon the French fleet in Aix Roads.

On March 19, there arrived at Plymouth from the Mediterranean, the frigate "Impérieuse," 38, commanded by Lord Cochrane, an officer of brilliant reputation, a desperate fighter and one who apparently needed only an opportunity to perform an action worthy of the great Nelson. Cochrane was well acquainted with Basque Roads and the surrounding waters, having reconnoitred and fought an action there while commanding the frigate "Pallas," in 1806, and to him Lord Mulgrave, the First Lord of the Admiralty, turned for counsel and advice upon the project of attacking the French fleet. Immediately upon anchoring Lord Cochrane was summoned

from Plymouth to London and the details of the proposed attack fully discussed with the First Lord. Lord Cochrane was so confident of success that Lord Mulgrave insisted upon his taking charge of the attack with the fire-ships, to which Lord Cochrane reluctantly consented, knowing, however, much better than the First Lord, how much jealousy and discontent his assignment would produce among the commanding officers of Lord Gambier's fleet, nearly all of whom were older and senior to himself. There is often, unfortunately, a disposition on the part of civil administrators of the military branches of a government, to disregard what military officers look upon as their birthright and which comprises the rights and privileges of their seniority, and which is in most cases arrived at only after a lifetime of hard work and devotion to duty both in peace and war. The result of such disregard, even if successful, is generally followed by long and bitter controversies, both in the service and in politics, which are not only detrimental to discipline but tarnish the glory of the victory won. As will be seen in this instance, Cochrane's appointment over the heads of his seniors resulted in two courts-martial and cost a brave and gallant rear-admiral his commission.

Having accepted the duty urged upon him by Lord Mulgrave, Lord Cochrane made haste to rejoin his ship, the "*Impérieuse*," bearing with him a letter from the Board of Admiralty in which Lord Gambier was informed that the Board had selected Lord Cochrane to conduct under his (Lord Gambier's) directions, the fire-ships to be employed in the pro-

posed attack upon the enemy's fleet. On April 3, 1809, Lord Cochrane anchored in Basque Roads and delivered his instructions to Lord Gambier. As Cochrane had predicted, there was an immediate explosion of indignation among the commanding officers both against himself and the admiral. Cochrane was at the time thirty-four years of age and had been in the Navy only sixteen years. Every captain in the fleet was his senior and they had been watching the French fleet for nearly a month without any measures of attack being taken, although both Admirals Stopford and Harvey, Captain Bedford and others had volunteered to conduct the enterprise. Now that a junior had been sent out from England to rob them of their laurels they naturally asked, "Why could we not have done this as well as Lord Cochrane?" and "Why did not Lord Gambier permit us to do this before?"

The prevailing discontent found vent in Admiral Eliab Harvey, who commanded so brilliantly the "Fighting *Téméraire*" at the battle of Trafalgar, who declared that "had Lord Nelson been there he would not have anchored in Basque Roads at all but would have dashed at the enemy at once" as he did in Aboukir Bay. Admiral Harvey went on board the flagship, the "Caledonia," with a list of the officers and men of the "Tonnant" who had volunteered to perform the duty entrusted to Lord Cochrane and when told by Lord Gambier that "the Lords of the Admiralty having fixed upon Lord Cochrane to perform the service, he (Lord Gambier) could not deviate from their Lordships' instructions," Admiral

Harvey broke out into a torrent of abuse, telling Lord Gambier "he never saw a man so unfit to command a fleet." For this act of insubordination Admiral Harvey was court-martialed and dismissed from the service but was subsequently reinstated in consideration of his conduct at Trafalgar. Perhaps under the circumstances his indignation may be pardoned, but his insubordination was certainly unjustifiable. It shows, however, that after Nelson's brilliant example none of his captains could descend to a lower grade of action without a struggle.

Lord Cochrane began immediately to prepare for his work, in which he received the cordial co-operation of Lord Gambier, the second in command, Rear-Admiral Stopford and the fleet captain, Sir Henry Neale. Eight of the largest transports accompanying the fleet, together with the "Mediator," frigate storeship, were fitted as fire-ships from the cargoes of three French coasting vessels laden with tar and resin which had recently been captured by the fleet. On the 6th the "Etna," bomb vessel, arrived from England and, on the 10th, 12 fire-ships and the transport "Cleveland," laden with Congreve rockets, the ingenious inventor of which came out in the "Etna." There were altogether twenty fire-ships and three explosion vessels. The latter were prepared under Cochrane's supervision and according to a plan of his own. A number of puncheons fastened together by cables tautened up by wedges were filled with gunpowder and moistened sand rammed down on top and between the puncheons so as to render the whole quite solid. On top of this mass of gunpowder

were placed three or four hundred shells with fuzes exposed and about a thousand hand grenades and rockets. Cochrane designed to send these explosive vessels in ahead of the fire-ships so as to create a panic among the enemy's vessels.

The French fleet was anchored between the Isle d'Aix and Boyard Shoal in two parallel indented lines, the ships in the inner line being opposite the intervals of those in the outer. The van ship in the outer line bore due south from the battery on the southern extremity of the Isle d'Aix, distant 640 yards. The lines were two hundred and fifty yards apart and seven hundred and forty yards long (James.) In front of the outer line lay three frigates, the "Pallas," "Hortense" and "Indienne." One hundred and ten yards in front of the frigates was moored a strong boom half a mile in length secured by heavy anchors and cables and completely covering the front of the fleet. Singularly enough the presence of this boom was not discovered before the attack was made. The French fleet sent their topgallant masts on deck, housed topmasts and unbent sails so as to expose as little inflammable material aloft as possible. The advanced frigates were left in sailing trim, and boats from the fleet to the number of 75 were divided into four divisions for the purpose of boarding and towing off fire-ships.

Everything being at last in readiness, the officers who had volunteered to command the fire-ships were assembled on board the "Caledonia" after nightfall on April 11 and given their final instructions. The night was very dark with a high but favourable wind

from the north-west, a rough sea and a strong flood tide. The "Impérieuse" was anchored on the edge of the Boyard Shoal with an explosion vessel in tow. On each side of the channel a small vessel was anchored, with a light screened from the enemy to keep the fire-ships off the shoals. The boats of the fleet were assembled alongside the "Cæsar," Rear-Admiral Stopford, to assist the crews of the fire-ships; and the frigates "Aigle," "Unicorn" and "Pallas" were anchored near the "Impérieuse" to receive the crews of the fire-ships upon their return and to protect the boats of the fleet. Three sloops and three brigs were to make a diversion on the east end of Isle d'Aix. The "Etna," bomb vessel, protected by the frigate "Indefatigable," 44, and brig "Foxhound," 18, was stationed as near to the Isle d'Aix as possible, in a north-west direction. The "Whitnew," schooner, and "King George" and "Nimrod," cutters fitted for throwing rockets, also took stations near the Boyard Shoal.

At half past eight Cochrane, accompanied by Lieutenant Bissel and a volunteer crew, embarked on board the largest powder-boat and advanced to the attack, the "Impérieuse" shortly afterwards making signal to the fire-ships to do likewise. It was so pitch dark that the French ships could not be observed, and being borne swiftly forward by a two-knot tide and strong wind, great judgment had to be used in estimating the distance and drift, before lighting the fuzes which had been constructed to burn fifteen minutes. Finally, having arrived at what he judged to be the proper distance, Cochrane directed the crew

of four men and Lieutenant Bissel to enter the gig, while he himself remained behind to light the fuzes. This being done, he jumped quickly into the boat and directed the men to pull for their lives, but, with their best efforts, against such a wind and tide they made but slow progress, and to his consternation, the fuzes instead of burning fifteen minutes, burnt only about half that time, when the powder boat at 9:30 blew up with a tremendous roar, sending forth a mountainous wave which, breaking against the sea and tide, nearly swamped his boat. Fortunately, however, they were so close that the rockets, shells and hand grenades from the exploding vessels went over their heads and fell in a circle beyond them. He finally reached the "Impérieuse" after a long pull and was much disgusted to find that the powder boat which he had left towing astern had been cut adrift to avoid a fire-ship which had been prematurely ignited and abandoned and had drifted so close to the "Impérieuse" that she was only saved by veering her cable. Lord Gambier states in his official report that the boom covering the French position was broken by Captain Wooldridge in the "Mediator," but there is very conflicting testimony upon this point.

Although Lord Cochrane did not know at the time he lighted the fuze in the powder boat that such a defence as a boom existed, he claims in his *Autobiography* to have destroyed it, basing the claim upon the testimony of the captain of the "Indienne," the nearest French frigate, which vessel was anchored only half a cable length (300 feet) from the boom.

The captain of the "Indienne" states that at 9:30

P. M. a vessel "floating against the boom" exploded. On the contrary Captain Wooldridge did personally pass over the position of the boom, and he officially claimed at the time to have broken it, whereas Cochrane's claim was made fifty years after the event.

Captain Wooldridge might very possibly have come in contact with the portions of the boom shattered by the explosion, and no doubt he supposed he had broken it, but his log does not mention it. A good deal of vehement and inconsistent assertion has been made over this point in the action, but the weight of evidence seems to rest on the side of the powder-vessel.

A second powder-boat is reported (James) as having exploded at the boom, but no details in regard to it are recorded. The third powder-boat which was cut adrift from the stern of the "Impérieuse" drifted on the shoals but did not explode.

Of the twenty fire-ships only four are said to have reached the French fleet. Many were fired and abandoned too far from the enemy and drifted out of their proper course. Cochrane was much annoyed at the "clumsy" way in which they were handled. But thanks to his wise forethought the French captain regarded every fire-ship as a powder-boat and liable to explode, and as the pitchy darkness began to be illuminated by the light of the fire-ships it must have appeared to an observer on the French fleet as if the whole rushing tide was bearing down upon him explosive vessels from all directions. From the British fleet nine miles to the windward they looked like a chain of ignited pyramids stretching across

the channel. The demoralization on the French fleet was great and some intercepted letters from a French officer on board the "Ocean," the French flag-ship of 120 guns, give a very graphic description of what took place inside the boom.

"A frigate fire-ship was directing her course toward the 'Ocean.' We veered out several fathoms of our north-west cable, but the vessel was still nearing us. The 'Régulus' had just cut her cables, and was endeavouring to get clear of a vessel which threatened to burn her. This movement of the 'Régulus' obliged us to cut our north-west cable. We set the mizzen top-sail to the mast to assist the ship; but, as soon as we brought up by our south-east anchor, three fire-vessels made towards us. What was to be done? We were obliged to cut this cable also, to avoid the Palles, the bank of rocks on which the 'Jean-Bart' was lost. At 10 o'clock we grounded; and immediately afterwards a fire-ship, in the height of her combustion, grappled us athwart our stern. For the ten minutes that she remained in this situation we employed every means in our power to prevent the fire from catching our ship. Our engines played upon and completely wetted the poop: with spars we hove off the fire-ship, and with axes we cut the lashings of her grapnels fastened to the ends of her yards; but the *chevaux de frise* on her sides held her firmly to us. In this deplorable situation we thought we must be burnt, as the flames from the fire-ship covered the whole of our poop. Two of our line-of-battle ships, the 'Tonnerre' and 'Patriote,' at this time fell on board of us. The first broke her

bowsprit in our starboard main rigging, and destroyed our main channels. Providence now aided us. Just as the fire-ship athwart our stern began to drive forward along our starboard side, the 'Tonnerre' separated herself from us. Unless this had happened, the fire-ship would have fallen into the angle formed by the two ships, and would infallibly have burnt them. The fire-vessel having drifted as far forward as to be under our bowsprit, we held her there some time, in order to afford time to the 'Tonnerre' and 'Patriote' to get out of her reach. While this fire-vessel was on board of us we let the cocks run in order to drown the magazine, but the flow of water was too slow for the purpose. We lost 50 men at least, through their zealous exertions to disengage the fire-ships: they fell into the sea and were drowned; but our boats saved a number of others. A short time after we had so fortunately escaped being burnt, another fire-vessel was making for our starboard quarter: we fired our broadside and cut away her mainmast. This fortunately occasioned her to wear, and she passed close alongside of us. All the remainder of the night we were surrounded by vessels on fire. Our guns were constantly firing, even on English boats towing some of the fire-vessels. The one that grappled us on the poop was towed by a boat, manned with fifteen or sixteen men: we fired on her and obliged her to let go the tow. In this disastrous night the 'Cassard' had five men killed and fifteen mortally wounded by a shot from one of the fire-ships." (James' Naval History, p. 109.)

At daylight Cochrane had the supreme satisfaction

of seeing thirteen out of the fifteen vessels of the French fleet, ashore, and by the fall of the tide (12 ft.) they were lying on their bilge with their bottoms completely exposed to shot and incapable of great resistance. The position of the French vessels aground is given by Captain Proteau of the "Indienne" as follows:—

"The 'Indienne' aground on Point Aiguille near the fort; the 'Pallas' off Barques; the 'Elbe' and 'Hortense' on the Fontenelle's; the 'Tourville,' 'Patriote' and 'Tonnerre' (as seen from the 'Indienne') in a line on Palles Shoal; the 'Calcutta,' 'Régulus' and 'Jemmappes' on the extremity of the Shoal; the 'Varsovie' and 'Aquilon' aground on Charenton; and the 'Océan,' three-decker, closer to the edge of the Palles." The "Cassard" and "Foudroyant" remained at anchor.

Having the French fleet at such a disadvantage, Cochrane became at once very anxious to complete the work of destruction, having, as he states, the words of Lord Mulgrave ringing in his ears: "The Admiralty is bent upon destroying that fleet before it can get out to the West Indies."

Cochrane began at 6 A. M. to make signals to Lord Gambier about the condition of the French fleet. The "Caledonia," with the rest of the fleet, was then at anchor twelve miles (James) from the grounded ships and at 6 A. M. Cochrane made signal, "Half the fleet can destroy the enemy: seven on shore;" at 7 A. M. "All the enemy's ships, except two are on shore;" at 9:30 "Enemy preparing to heave off." Indeed the French fleet had been carrying out

anchors and lightening ship ever since daylight, preparing to heave off at high water. The "Tonnerre" hove most of her guns overboard and cut away her mainmast.

At 10:45 A. M. on the 12th the fleet got under way and moved in to three miles (James) from the fort of Isle d'Aix and six miles from the grounded ships. Gambier stated that the dangers of navigation and the want of a fair wind both ways did not warrant him in risking his battleships in a closer approach. Upon this point the succeeding controversy and court-martial was based. As Cochrane expresses it in his *Autobiography*, Lord Gambier was overcome by the "shoal and current bugbear," but Gambier was supported in his opinion by many of his captains. The tide was now (9 A. M.) rising and would soon lift the stranded vessels off the shoals. Cochrane was in despair. His heart went down with the anchors of the fleet. He considered that it would be a disgrace to the British navy if the seven French ships on shore should be allowed to escape. The precious hours when with a rising tide the French ships were preparing to heave off the shoal, went slowly by with no movement from the fleet. Finally, about 1 P. M., instead of a line-of-battle ship, the little "Etna," bomb vessel, accompanied by three brigs passed the "Impérieuse." Cochrane then lifted the anchor of the "Impérieuse" off the bottom and allowed her to drift down with the tide, approaching the enemy stern first and keeping his sails furled so as not to excite the attention of the Admiral and be recalled by signal. He proceeded thus until 1:30, when he suddenly

made sail and at 2 P. M. brought up abreast of the "Calcutta," aground on Palles Shoal, which vessel the "Impérieuse" engaged with her broadside while firing her forecastle and bow guns at the "Aquilon" and "Ville de Varsovie," also aground.

During this manœuvre (at 1:44) Cochrane had signalled the commander-in-chief, "Am in want of assistance;" and as in the signal book this was coupled with the expression, "In distress," it was so reported to the admiral. Cochrane, however, misjudged his commander-in-chief, for Lord Gambier had been considering the subject of an attack upon the French fleet all the morning and discussing the situation with his second in command, Rear-Admiral Stopford, but had been unwilling to send in his ships until the ebb tide flowed so that they could drift out of danger if disabled.

The force detailed and ordered to hold itself in readiness for the attack consisted of two 74's, five frigates, six brigs and one bomb vessel, and was under the command of Captain Bligh of the "Valiant." This force got under way and commenced its forward movement at 2:30, and arrived in position to attack the French vessels on shore at 3:30 P. M. The force under Captain Bligh opened fire upon the "Calcutta," "Aquilon," "Ville de Varsovie" and "Tonnerre." Upon being informed by Lord Cochrane that the "Calcutta" had surrendered to him, they ceased firing upon that vessel although Captain Rodd of the "Indefatigable" testified at the subsequent court-martial when asked, "Had the 'Calcutta' or any of the line-of-battle

ships struck to the 'Impérieuse' before you anchored and commenced action?" replied, "Most assuredly not. Some broadsides were fired at the 'Calcutta' from the 'Indefatigable' and 'Valiant' when Lord Cochrane or some person from the 'Impérieuse' hailed us and said the 'Calcutta' had struck. I could only see her at intervals through the smoke." The "Aquilon" and "Varsovie" surrendered at 5:30 P. M. and the crew of the "Tonnerre" set her on fire and escaped in their boats.

After the surrender of the "Aquilon" and "Varsovie" Captain Bligh signalled to the admiral that there was still light enough to destroy five more ships that evening as they were aground and their crews seemed to be deserting them. The only answer was a signal for recall, and, unlike Nelson, Captain Bligh, although a brave man and a fighter, had no blind eye. It was Copenhagen over again, a timid admiral in the distance and a fighting junior in touch with the enemy. Owing to the state of the tide Bligh did not withdraw until daylight of the 13th. About 5 P. M. on the 12th of April, Lord Gambier had sent Rear-Admiral Stopford into Aix Roads with the "Cæsar" and "Theseus," ships of the line, together with three fire-ships and all of the boats of the fleet, with the intention of making a night attack upon the French vessels, and discretionary orders were given Admiral Stopford in regard to their use. Unfortunately, the wind shifted, blowing directly out of the river and with the ebb tide flowing, no use could be made of them during the night. At low water, the line-of-battle ships touched bot-

tom, which no doubt hastened their exit early on the morning of the 13th, leaving with Cochrane the frigate "Pallas," Captain Seymour, four brigs and the "Etna," bomb vessel.

And yet there is evidence to prove that during the night of the 12th of April, only a firm touch was needed to secure a great victory. The enemy was thoroughly demoralized. Admiral Gravière, writing about this action in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in 1858, says, referring to the night of April 12: "A veritable panic seems to have taken possession of the bravest captains during this horrible night and in the days following. Vessels which the enemy had not even attacked were abandoned by their crews and heroic men partook of the common weakness. The weakness of Lord Gambier, the courage and coolness of a few of our officers alone preserved the French fleet from total ruin."

Captain Hutchinson, who was a lieutenant on board the "Valiant," Captain Bligh, gives his reminiscences of the night of April 12, 1809, in a letter written to Lord Dundonald in 1860. He says he "can bear testimony to the indignation which pervaded the whole fleet in witnessing the total want of enterprise, and even common sense of duty, which then permitted so many of the enemy's ships to escape, when they were entirely at our mercy. . . .

"No doubt you would have observed that on the evening of the 12th the crews of the 'Océan' and two other enemy's line-of-battle ships near her, were evidently flying from them in a panic, numerous

boats from the shore assisting in conveying them from the ships.

“This was so apparent that our captain, Bligh, went in his gig, with two other captains, as soon as it was dark, to reconnoitre these ships, with a view to take possession of them with boats, if they were deserted.

“These captains returned, however, reporting that they had found them surrounded by boats, etc., and that, consequently, they could not be attacked. In the morning, however, no boats were near them, nor were any persons seen stirring on board them; and it was not till about ten o’clock, I think, that the crews, finding that we had not taken possession, took courage, ventured to return on board the ships, and immediately began to warp them out of our reach.

“But, my Lord, we heard soon after this disgraceful affair, by means of some French vessel which had been boarded or taken, that such was the case. . . .

“The report went further, and added one singular circumstance—that there was one man who did remain when all the remainder of the crews had quitted. This was a quartermaster on board the ‘Océan,’ who, indignant at the cowardly desertion of the ships, hid himself, when the crews were ordered to quit, and this was the salvation of that three-decker and the two other ships, in a very extraordinary way. A little midshipman belonging to one of our smaller vessels (I believe a brig) had been sent in a jolly-boat that night with a message to another ship, and, having delivered it, instead of returning

immediately to his own vessel, he proposed to his men to go and look at the French ships from which the crews had been seen to fly. The men of course were willing, and they approached cautiously very near to the three-decker (the night was very dark) before they could observe any stir on board or around her. They were then suddenly hailed by the quartermaster before-mentioned with a loud '*Qui vive!*' Of course the poor little midshipman took it for granted that the ship was occupied by more than that one man, and he hastily retreated, glad to escape capture himself; but had he known the truth, that little midshipman, with his jolly-boat and four men, might have taken possession of a three-decker and two seventy-fours!

“Of one thing I am very certain, that there was a universal conviction, that, but for the ingenious ruse adopted by your lordship of running in singly with the '*Impérieuse*,' and then making a signal of distress, or rather of want of assistance, nothing whatever would have been effected against the French fleet.”

Napoleon at St. Helena talking of this affair to O'Meara, stated, “The French admiral was an imbecile, but yours was just as bad. I assure you that if Cochrane had been supported he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not to have been alarmed at your *brulots*, but fear deprived them of their senses and they no longer knew how to act in their own defence.”

Admiral Sir Francis William ¹Austen, K. C. B.,

writing to Lord Dundonald in 1860 states, "I have lately been reading your book, the *Autobiography of a Seaman*, and cannot resist the desire I feel of stating how much pleasure I derived from its perusal.

. I must in conscience, declare that I do not think you were properly supported and that had you been so the result would have been very different. Much of what occurred I attribute to Lord Gambier's being influenced by persons about him who would have been ready to sacrifice the honour of their country to the gratification of personal dislike to yourself and the *annoyance they felt to a junior officer being employed in the service.*"

During the night of the 12th, about 3:30 A. M. Captain Bligh after removing the prisoners caused the "Aquilon" and "Varsovie" to be set on fire. During the 13th, Cochrane employed the "Etna," supported by the brigs, in bombarding the French ships. He was recalled by signal and by letter, but the letter was so ambiguous and contradictory that he remained at his post until the 14th when he was relieved by Captain Wolfe in the "Aigle," frigate. On the 15th Lord Cochrane sailed for England in the "Impérieuse" with Captain Sir Henry Neale as bearer of dispatches. No further injury was inflicted upon the French fleet. A desultory fire was kept up with the bomb vessels and brigs, as wind and weather permitted, until April 29, when, by lightening, the last vessel of the French fleet entered the Charente River. The "Indienne," 40, was abandoned and burned, it being found impossible to float her.

On the 29th Lord Gambier returned to England in obedience to orders. On May 29, he received the following letter from the First Lord of the Admiralty:

“ADMIRALTY, May 29, 1809.

“MY LORD,

“Having, in conversation, informed Captain Lord Cochrane that it was the intention of His Majesty's government to move the thanks of both Houses of Parliament to your lordship, and to the officers, seamen, and marines serving under your command in Basques Roads, Lord Cochrane declared to me that, in the event of such a measure being proposed in Parliament, he should feel himself bound by his public duty, to object to the thanks, *as far as they should apply to the Commander-in-Chief*. Under these circumstances, it has been deemed expedient to suspend the motion for the vote of thanks, and to call upon Lord Cochrane, by the Board of Admiralty, to state the ground on which he has intimated to the First Lord of the Admiralty his intention to oppose the vote of thanks, as far as respects your Lordship; that the Board of Admiralty may thereby be enabled to judge how far the grounds to be stated by Lord Cochrane may be of a nature to suspend the motion in Parliament, or to call for any further investigation by the Board, or in any other way.

“I have felt it due to your Lordship to give you the earliest information of this state of things, and to acquaint you that a letter will this day be written to Captain Lord Cochrane, in conformity to the above

resolution of the Board of Admiralty, a copy of which, together with the answer of Lord Cochrane, will be, without delay, communicated to your Lordship.

“ I have, etc.,

“ (Signed) MULGRAVE.”

In answer to the letter from the Admiralty, Lord Cochrane declined to prefer any definite charges against Lord Gambier, but referred the Board of Admiralty to the log and signal books of the fleet. Lord Gambier asked for a court-martial, which was held at Portsmouth from July 26, 1809, to August 4, the verdict being “ most honourably acquitted ; ” and on January 29, 1810, ten months after the action, the vote of thanks to Lord Gambier passed the House of Commons. Even then as Member from Westminster, Lord Cochrane moved for the production of the minutes of the court-martial. This motion was lost by 171 to 19. Thus ended this memorable controversy which was carried on at the time with violent acrimony, and the scandal of which tarnished the glory of a really gallant deed. Fifty years after the action, Lord Cochrane in his *Autobiography of a Seaman* renewed the whole discussion, and, in 1861, *A Life of Lord Gambier* reviewed the minutes of the court-martial, and answered the controversies reopened by Lord Cochrane in his *Autobiography*.

We cannot but regard this whole controversy as unwise and uncalled for, since the partial destruction of the French fleet and the complete demoralization of the remaining ships rendered it

perfectly innocuous for the purpose for which it was intended : viz. the relief of Martinique and destruction of the English commerce in the West Indies. There was certainly glory enough to go around and the handsome manner in which Lord Gambier received him and assisted him in the work with the fire-ships and the high praise bestowed upon him in Lord Gambier's first official dispatch of April 14, 1809, together with his own elevation to the Order of the Bath, ought, we think, to have prevented Lord Cochrane from attacking Lord Gambier from his seat in Parliament.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the difficulties of wind, shoal and current, which presented themselves on the morning of the 12th of April, 1809, and which seemed so insurmountable to Admiral Gambier and his advisers there is hardly a reasonable doubt but that the "Océan," "Jemmappes" and "Régulus," and possibly the "Cassard" and "Foudroyant," would either have been abandoned or destroyed if a vigorous attack had been made between 11 and 12 A. M. on the morning of April 12th. British seamen had before performed tasks fully as difficult and with the panic and demoralization which existed in the French fleet there was a good chance of success. Even as it was, if Admiral Stopford had used with energy the small vessels, boats, and fire-ships with which he was provided on the night of the 12th, several abandoned French ships might have been destroyed. Perhaps an error was committed in not including in the plan of action the capture of the Isle d'Aix, thereby eliminating all danger from its batteries.

That the French were apprehensive that this would be done is shown in an intercepted letter from a French naval officer, which says, "We were in continual apprehension lest the enemy should attack the Isle d'Aix. It was strong only upon the part which protects the fleet." . . . The zone of fire between Isle d'Aix and Isle d'Olleron through which vessels had to pass in order to reach the French fleet would thus have been partially destroyed, and the occupation of the Island would have rendered the anchorage in Aix Roads free from danger.

CHAPTER VIII.

SCHOMBERG'S ACTION OFF TAMATAVE.

ENGLAND'S wars with France forced her to put forth her energies in remote corners of the globe. The necessity of having ships cruising about in all known waters was a debt both Powers had to pay for empire. While the battle of the Nile and the battle of Trafalgar are the most memorable of the engagements between the forces of the two great sea Powers, there were numerous hard fought fights about the distant Antilles and in the far Indian Ocean. One of the most noteworthy of these lesser engagements was that between three French frigates and an equal number of British ships of the same class, with the addition of a brig-sloop, off the coast of Madagascar.

Early in May, 1811, it was known to the British that the French frigates "Renommée," "Clorinde," and "Néréide" under the command of Commodore Roquebert were cruising off Madagascar. The British frigates "Phœbe," commanded by Captain Hillyar, the "Galatea," Captain W. Losack, and the brig-sloop "Racehorse," Lieutenant J. de Rippe went out to locate the enemy. On the 7th of May they were sighted and the "Galatea's" gig was hastily sent to Port Louis, where lay the good ship "Astrea" commanded by Captain C. N. Schomberg. The

three British ships went in pursuit of the French frigates, not with the intention of giving battle, but to keep the enemy in sight till the "Astrea" should join her strength with theirs. When daylight broke on the morning of the 8th, the two squadrons were only about six miles apart, and the French commodore recognizing the superiority of his vessels apparently determined to give battle. At eight o'clock in the morning with all sail set and under a stiff breeze the French frigates stood towards the British ships. But the "Astrea" was not yet in sight and the pursuers became the pursued and fled into the swift waters between Isle Ronde and Isle Serpent. As Commodore Roquebert was not familiar with this shore, and on account of the deep draught of his vessels, he gave up the chase and stood out to sea. On the following day the "Astrea" joined the squadron and the French commander seeing his ships outnumbered, giving up all thought of a sea fight, managed to shake off his pursuers and disappeared from view on the wide Indian Ocean. The "Astrea" then returned to Port Louis accompanied by the rest of the British fleet, while the French ships continued to cruise about off the coast.

Provisions ran short on the French frigates and, in order to replenish their store, on the 19th of May they surprised the little settlement of Tamatave. They had an easy victory but they were to wear their laurels for a very short time. On the following morning at daybreak the French vessels were anchored in fancied security off Foule Point, a few miles north of Tamatave, when they were suddenly

confronted by Captain Schomberg and his four British vessels. The British ships at sight of the enemy had all sail crowded on, cleared for action, and stood in towards the French vessels. Commodore Roquebert's vessels were good sailers and might have escaped, but at this critical moment two boats were absent from the fleet in Tamatave and the frigates waited for these and thus the English ships were able to come to close quarters and a stirring sea fight resulted. By noon a battle was inevitable and the French ships formed in line ahead; the "Clorinde" leading, the "Renommée" in the centre, and the "Néréide" astern. The British squadron adopted a similar formation; the "Astrea" leading, the "Phœbe" in the centre, and the "Galatea" astern. The line was reinforced by having the "Racehorse" take up a position to leeward and almost abreast of the "Phœbe." For several hours the fleets remained out of range; the sea was scarcely rippled and at times the sails hung lifeless at the masts, and again they would be filled with a light warm wind and the hopes of the sailors, eager for battle and prize money, rose. It was the middle of the afternoon before any of the vessels got within firing distance. The "Renommée" was the first to begin the cannonading and opened on the "Astrea." The British ship vigorously returned this fire and the "Phœbe" and "Galatea" soon joined in the fight. A light breeze was blowing when the battle began and the "Astrea" manœuvred to get her broadside to bear on the "Néréide." At the same time the "Renommée" and "Clorinde" came to close quarters with the

“Phœbe” and “Galatea.” While the “Astrea” and “Néréide” were engaging each other, the little “Racehorse” from a safe distance dropped an occasional shell into the hull of the big French frigate.

There came a lull in the fighting, however, almost at its commencement. The light wind that had been blowing fell, no doubt due to the disturbance made in the atmosphere by the heavy cannonading. The ocean became a dead calm and the vessels were unable to manœuvre but rocked helplessly on the swells, their sails flapping against their yards and masts. Due to the unsteady wind that had been blowing, the ships had been unable to maintain their line ahead formation and the “Phœbe” and “Galatea” were lying close together and almost abreast of each other. The “Renommée” and “Clorinde” were not yet under a heavy fire and their sailors manned boats and succeeded in towing them to a position astern of the two British frigates. From their point of vantage they were able to pour in a raking fire without themselves suffering much injury.

The combatants were now considerably separated; the “Astrea” and “Racehorse” were over a mile distant from their two companion ships, and as they had no wind they lay helpless on the wide waters, while the two big French frigates pounded the “Phœbe” and “Galatea.” The “Néréide” had now a position between the “Astrea” and the “Phœbe” and was relieved from the broadsides of the “Astrea.” The ships maintained their relative positions until after six o’clock, when, with the sinking sun, a light wind sprang up and the

"Phœbe" managed to draw away from the critical position in which she was placed and came to close quarters with the "Néréide." She then opened fire on the French ship which had already suffered considerably from the guns of the "Astrea," and so effectively did her gunners fight her guns that in less than half an hour the "Néréide's" guns were for the most part silent and preparations were made to board her, but the "Renommée" and "Clorinde" were being brought up with a favouring breeze and Captain Hillyar was forced to leave his beaten foe.

The two French frigates had raked the "Galatea" with a most telling fire. She was for a time at their mercy, and could only make a feeble response to their broadsides with her stern guns. Her captain, on account of the wind having completely fallen, was unable to get her broadsides to bear on the enemy. In his difficulty he determined to have her head towed round, but a shot had cut adrift the cutter from her stern. The jolly boat was manned, but it was instantly sunk under the heavy fire that swept about the "Galatea." Nothing daunted, the crew made a further effort to launch a third boat but a well-aimed ball foiled this attempt. The hardy British sailors were not to be beaten; they must either swing their broadside round or their ship would be pounded to pieces. They got sweeps out at the bow and their efforts were successful; slowly their good ship, battered and broken, her masts splintered and tottering to their fall, her sails riddled and her hull aleak, swung round and her broadsides were opened on the French frigate. However, in her battered

condition, she could not long have kept up the unequal fight. Fortunately by this time her companion ship the "Phœbe" was pouring a destructive fire into the "Néréide" and the commanders of the "Renommée" and "Clorinde" seeing the imminent danger in which that ship was placed, and observing how rapidly her guns were being silenced crowded on all sail and under the light south-east wind sped to her rescue. This fortunate circumstance relieved the "Galatea" and she staggered away towards the "Astrea" and "Racehorse." When she got within hailing distance, Captain Losack informed Captain Schomberg of his plight. It was unnecessary, for even while he spoke the fore-topmast of his ship came crashing down on the larboard bow and the mizzen-topmast on the mainyard. A round shot had shattered the foremast; the main-topmast although still standing was badly wounded, the rigging was cut in a dozen places, and the hull was so badly scarred on the water-line that the vessel had nearly four feet of water in the hold, and it was with difficulty that the men at the pumps were able to keep it from gaining on them. There was nothing for it but to withdraw her from the fight, and the two frigates and the brig were left to reckon with the three French ships. To have attempted to keep her longer in the action would have been a hindrance rather than a help.

By this time darkness had fallen over the ocean, but the battle was to continue despite the darkness. Captain Schomberg now decided to keep in close touch with the "Racehorse" and "Phœbe." He sighted the lights of the enemy in the west-north-west

and steered his ships towards them, ordering Lieutenant De Rippe to follow hard after him, and to have the "Racehorse" ready to give battle with the French frigates as soon as the "Phœbe" joined them.

Both fleets were now greatly weakened. The "Galatea" was out of the fight and so was the "Néréide." So destructive had been the "Phœbe's" fire that she was in even worse plight than the "Galatea." As we have seen the "Galatea's" spars and masts and hull were much damaged. Her stern had been battered to pieces by the raking broadsides, and her hull had been penetrated no fewer than fifty-six times. Her casualty list, as was to be expected, was large. She had one officer and thirteen seamen and marines killed, and two officers, two midshipmen and forty-one seamen and marines wounded. The "Néréide" had made an equally gallant fight; her captain, twenty-four seamen, soldiers, and marines were killed, and thirty-two were wounded; but there had been no thought of surrender, her crew had been prepared to sink with their ship. These two vessels definitely out of the fight, the remaining ships continued the action during the darkness. The British commander had still one vessel more than the French commodore, but in weight of metal and in the number of men the French were vastly superior.

A factor which so far had not shown itself in this fight now materially helped the British vessels—M. Saint Cricky, commander of the "Clorinde" seems to have lost heart and was guilty of cowardice. No

doubt the fate of the "Néréide" had greatly alarmed him. One of his crew fell overboard, and taking advantage of this incident he stopped to pick up the man and became separated from the "Renommée."

Commodore Roquebert bravely held his ship on her course and was soon engaged with the three British vessels. He made straight for the "Astrea" and at cable length distance the "Renommée's" broadsides poured in a terrific volley of round and grape shot while a hail of musket balls swept about the "Astrea." He made an effort to grapple with the English frigate, but Captain Schomberg wisely avoided the attempt,—a hand to hand fight, seeing that the "Renommée's" crew was more than a third greater than the "Astrea's," might have ended disastrously for the British.

In his anxiety to board the "Astrea" and end the battle Commodore Roquebert placed his ship in a most critical position. His vessel was now exposed to the broadsides of the "Astrea" and "Racehorse," while the "Phœbe" took up a position astern from which her gunners were able to rake the decks of the French ship. For almost an hour the "Renommée" gallantly withstood the fire of these three ships. Her commander was killed early in this final stage of the fight and First Lieutenant Louis Dufredot-Duplantz assumed command. He, too, was severely wounded and was urged to leave the decks, but refused, and continued to fight his ship in the darkness until her decks were slippery with blood and her hull and masts and rigging were rent with a hundred scars. The crew of the "Renommée" numbered four hun-

dred and seventy and of these ninety-three were killed or wounded, nearly one-fifth of all engaged. At length, through the night, signals of surrender were shown and the "Racehorse" was ordered to take possession; but as she swept in towards the towering sides of the now silent enemy, her fore-topmast fell by the board and her captain was unable to obey orders. Captain Schomberg then had a boat lowered and sent two officers and five men to the prize.

Meantime where was the "Clorinde?" She had dropped behind to rescue the sailor who had fallen overboard and made this an excuse to keep out of the fight. Indeed, during the entire day of this memorable engagement she had kept well out of action. Her commander now witnessed from a distance the terrible cannonading to which the "Renommée" was exposed and held his vessel aloof, offering no helping hand. When the firing ceased and he knew that his sister ship must have surrendered, he had all sail crowded on his ship and fled from the scene of the fight. The sails and rigging of the "Clorinde" were practically intact. Her hull had but few scars, and she had lost but one man killed and six wounded. Considering the severe handling the other vessels received and their losses, it is very evident from this list of casualties that the "Clorinde" was at no time during the day in the heat of battle.

As soon as the "Renommée" struck and had been taken possession of, the two British frigates turned to look for the "Clorinde" but she already had a good lead on them and as both vessels had endured a heavy fire and were materially injured thereby, they

were easily outsailed. But they continued the pursuit for several hours and it was not until two o'clock in the morning, when the "Clorinde" was nowhere to be seen, that they gave up the chase. They then returned to look after their prizes the "Renommée" and the "Néréide," and their own sadly crippled ship the "Galatea."

It had been a gallant fight, and both the frigates which had borne the brunt of it had suffered from many blows. But the casualty list was remarkably small. The "Astrea" had two seamen killed and one officer and fifteen men wounded, the "Phœbe" had seven men killed, one midshipman and twenty-three men wounded. Considering what a severe raking the "Phœbe" had received early in the fight the loss of life on board her was not heavy. She had withstood the broadsides of the "Néréide" and the stern guns of the "Renommée" in the final engagement. Masts, hull, bowsprit were all splintered and rent, and her rigging and sails were cut in many places. The little "Racehorse," whether due to having kept at a safe distance from the fight, or on account of the small target she presented, had but few scars and her crew escaped without loss of life.

Months afterwards when the news of this battle reached England, there was much rejoicing and Captain Schomberg was for a time a popular hero. The news was received in France with mingled feelings. M. Saint Cricqy was execrated for his cowardice and severely punished. He was dismissed from the service, degraded from the Legion of Honour, and imprisoned for a term of three years. But the names

of M. Commodore Roquebert and Lieutenant Louis Dufredot-Duplantz were held in deserved esteem. They had fought their ship with a bravery certainly without a superior in the annals of the French navy, and the picture of the "Renommée" doing battle with the three British ships inflamed the popular imagination. The commander and crew of the "Néréide," too, came in for their share of the praise. Though their ship's guns were silenced, though she had sustained heavy loss in killed and wounded, though her hull and masts were so battered that it was impossible for her to continue in the fight, she had not struck, and but for the timely arrival of the "Renommée" and "Clorinde" to drive away the "Phœbe" she would in all probability have sunk where she lay. Had it not been for the cowardly conduct of the commander of the "Clorinde" the vanquished in the sea fight off Tamatave would have had almost as great glory as the victors.

CHAPTER IX.

BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE.

THE battle of Lake Erie was one of the many naval actions fought during the War of 1812 between England and the United States. Most of these actions were between single ships upon the ocean, but upon the lakes which line the eastern part of the northern boundary of the United States, the conflict was between small improvised fleets. The success of the military operations along the northern boundary depended, for the most part, upon the command of the Lakes.

Owing to the interruption of navigation between Lakes Erie and Ontario by the Falls of Niagara, the operations upon the Lakes were necessarily divided into three independent centres: viz. Lake Champlain, Lake Ontario, and Lake Erie. During 1812 operations were mostly confined to Lake Ontario. The American Commodore Chauncey assumed command on Lake Ontario on October 6, 1812. On Lake Erie, which was entirely in command of the British, the Americans had no naval force in 1812, but Commander J. D. Elliott was sent by Commodore Chauncey in October, 1812, to Erie with orders to construct there two brigs of three hundred tons each.

While upon this duty Elliott, with great gallantry, captured with a boat expedition, two British brigs, the "Detroit" and the "Caledonia." The former had to be destroyed to prevent a recapture, but the "Caledonia" was safely brought within the American lines and formed the nucleus of the American force on Lake Erie. Meanwhile the building at Erie went on unmolested, the harbour being protected by a bar, which prevented the British from entering the port and served to give protection to the building operations of the Americans. It was not until near 1813 that the young naval officer who was to lead forth to victory this hastily constructed fleet, appeared upon the scene.

Meanwhile the undisputed command of Lake Erie rested with the British, who possessed a fleet of small vessels under the command of Commander Barclay, who was subordinate to Commodore Sir James Lucas Yeo, the senior British naval officer on the Lakes. Such was the situation when Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry appeared upon the scene.

Perry was at this time a young man of 27 years of age, having entered the navy in 1799 at the age of 13. His first cruise as midshipman was in a small frigate called the "General Greene," mounting 36 guns, commanded by his father, Christopher Raymond Perry. At the age of 17 he was promoted to be a lieutenant. He had made two cruises to the Mediterranean and had taken part in the operations of the American navy against the Barbary pirates. In 1809 he had been appointed to the command of the schooner "Revenge" of 14 guns and attached to the

command of Commodore John Rodgers. He was appointed Master Commandant in 1813.

He reached Sacketts Harbour on March 3, and Erie on March 27, performing the journey from Buffalo to Erie, about 100 miles, over the ice in a sleigh.

He found at Erie, in course of construction, two brigs and three schooners. To equip these vessels it was necessary to bring sails, cordage, guns, powder and stores from Pittsburg, a distance of 500 miles through a half settled country destitute of good roads. To this task Perry bent himself with unwearied zeal, visiting Pittsburg and giving minute instructions to workmen preparing articles which had been ordered, and with the manufacture of which they were totally unacquainted. Early in May the three schooners were launched, and the two brigs on the 24th. The latter were 141 feet long, 30 feet in beam and measured 500 tons. Their draft was 9 feet and they were pierced for 20 guns.

The timber was green, having been cut and sawed upon the spot ; the frames were of oak and chestnut, the decks of pine and the outside planking of oak. Under the cheering influence and intelligent supervision of the young commandant the equipment of these vessels was pushed forward with great rapidity.

In the latter part of May, hearing of a contemplated attack upon Fort George, the British post at the mouth of the Niagara, Perry threw himself at night into an open gunboat and through squalls and head winds pulled to Buffalo and reported to Chauncey as a volunteer, and during the attack, under show-

ers of musketry, was present at every point where he could be useful.

By the capture of Fort George the Americans were enabled to release from the naval station at Black Rock the vessels which had hitherto been confined there by the Canadian batteries. These consisted of the brig "Caledonia," which had been captured from the British in the previous year, three small schooners and a sloop, trading vessels purchased for the government and fitted up as gunboats. This welcome addition to his force Perry, with incredible labour and great skill and daring, succeeded in taking to Erie. The British naval force on Lake Erie tried to intercept this flotilla, but Perry passed them in the night unnoticed and entered the harbour of Erie on June 18, just as the British fleet appeared off the bar in pursuit.

Although the equipment of his little squadron went rapidly forward, the officers and men to man it were still wanting. He had but one hundred and twenty men fit for service and fifty sick. He wrote to Commodore Chauncey, "Give me men and I will acquire honour and glory both for you and myself or perish in an attempt;" and again, "Barclay has been bearding me for several days : I long to have at him : he shows no disposition to avoid the contest."

Captain Barclay, who commanded the British naval forces on Lake Erie was, although only thirty-two years of age, a veteran of Trafalgar. Subsequently he had lost an arm in conflict with a French frigate. He had kept a close watch and blockade of Erie, but the bar across the mouth of the harbour upon which

there was only six feet of water prevented him from entering, as it also prevented Perry from going out in Barclay's presence.

Towards the end of July Perry received reinforcements of men and officers, and he also enlisted as landsmen some men of the Pennsylvania militia, so that he gathered together a force of about three hundred officers and men, with which, although not sufficient to properly man his fleet, Perry determined to set sail and put all to the issue of battle before the British Squadron could be reinforced by their new and heavy ship the "Detroit," which had been launched at Malden on the 17th of June and might any day appear upon the Lake.

On August 1, the British Squadron disappeared and Perry took advantage of the occasion to get his vessels hurriedly over the bar. To accomplish this, two floats or camels, which had previously been constructed, were brought alongside the "Lawrence" and sunk to the water's edge. Stout spars were passed through the forward and after ports, their ends resting on the camels, and securely lashed to the frame of the vessels. The guns with their ammunition were hoisted out and placed in boats astern. The water in the scows being pumped out, her draft was lightened three feet, and in that condition, on August 4, with much labour the "Lawrence" was floated over the bar, being afloat by 8 A. M., and her guns quickly mounted. The "Niagara" followed the next day. For 48 hours Perry laboured incessantly, without sleep or rest. When the "Niagara" was safely over he wrote, "Thank God, the other

sloop-of-war is over. In a few hours I shall be after the enemy who is now making off." Barclay had indeed appeared during the critical operation bearing down with a leading wind, while the "Niagara" was still upon the bar, and Perry expected an encounter but Barclay declined to press the matter and finally sailed away. He had, in all probability, the command of the Lakes within his grasp, but for some reason he failed to take advantage of this golden opportunity.

Perry had at last, after many long, weary months, succeeded in passing his Rubicon. The axe and the hammer had done their part, what remained was for the sword.

Perry, with his half-equipped fleet, gave chase to Barclay, but without catching up with him. Returning to Erie on August 7, Perry completed his equipment and loaded his vessels with military stores for the army at Sandusky. On August 9, Master Commandant Jesse D. Elliott arrived at Erie with one hundred men and was assigned to the "Niagara."

On August 19, Perry opened communication with the army under General Harrison, at Sandusky, and after reconnoitring the British force at Malden and finding Barclay at anchor and declining to accept his offer of battle, Perry retired to his port of observation at Put-in-Bay.

General Harrison, who observed how Perry's little squadron was weakened by sickness and want of men, had permitted about one hundred volunteers from the army to join the fleet, and during the breathing space allowed him before the final battle which was to

decide the command of Lake Erie, Perry laboured industriously to bring the raw material of his crews into a state of efficiency. Barclay was wisely enough awaiting the completion of his new vessel, which was proudly named the "Detroit" in honour of the recent conquest of that place.

But this delay, while it worked to the advantage of the navy on both sides, was a serious inconvenience to the British army, which soon began to suffer from want of provisions, owing to the interruption of water communication between its primary base at Long Point and its secondary base at Malden. The distance by water from Long Point was one hundred and fifty miles and upon this line Perry stationed himself at Put-in-Bay, an anchorage in a chain of islands extending across Lake Erie north of Sandusky and thirty-four miles from Malden. As usual in such cases when military operations cross the water, the armies on each side awaited the result of the struggle for naval supremacy.

General Proctor desired to cross to the south side of Lake Erie and attack General Harrison and lay waste the surrounding country, while the latter desired to make a combined naval and military attack upon the British at Malden. The key of the situation lay in the command of the Lake.

On September 1, Perry made another excursion to Malden, and finding Barclay still at anchor, returned to Put-in-Bay.

Finally, on September 10, the British fleet was sighted to the westward, approaching with a leading but light wind from the south-west. Perry immedi-

ately got under way, but in order to obtain the weather gage, he had to beat out of the bay against a light breeze. As this operation consumed much time, Perry determined to wear and go to leeward of some islands which lay in the way. Upon the remonstrance being made that this would give the enemy the weather gage, he replied, "To windward or to leeward, they shall fight this day." Upon clearing the land, however, the wind shifted to south-east and at 10 A. M. Perry, holding the weather gage, bore down upon the enemy, then about three leagues distant. Before leaving Put-in-Bay Perry had given instructions in writing to each commanding officer, saying, "Engage each your designated enemy in close action at half-cable length" (one hundred yards). At parting he gave them, in the words of Nelson, his final injunction, "If you lay your enemy close alongside you cannot be out of your place."

The British squadron, having lost the weather gage, was now hove-to on the port tack, heading south-west, awaiting the approach of the Americans. The relative force of the two squadrons was as follows:

| | AMERICAN. | BRITISH. |
|-------------------------|-----------|----------|
| No. of vessels..... | 9 | 6 |
| No. of guns..... | 54 | 63 |
| No. of men..... | 532 | 440 |
| Weight of broadside.... | 936 lbs. | 459 lbs. |
| Long gun metal..... | 288 | 195 |

Perry had one hundred and sixteen men on the sick list, which would reduce his effective force to four hundred and sixteen, but it is impossible to

ascertain the exact number on each side. In spite of carrying nine fewer guns Perry had a superiority in weight of gun metal, particularly long gun metal, and he had three more vessels than Barclay. The American force was superior.

The vessels of the two fleets were arranged as follows:

| BRITISH. | | AMERICAN. | |
|----------------------------|-------|-------------------------|-------|
| | GUNS. | | GUNS. |
| 1. "Chippeway".....Sch. | 1 | 1. "Scorpion".....Sch. | 2 |
| 2. "Detroit".....Ship. | 19 | 2. "Ariel".....Sch. | 4 |
| 3. "Hunter".....Brig. | 10 | 3. "Lawrence"....Brig. | 20 |
| 4. "Qu'n Charlotte." Ship. | 17 | 4. "Caledonia"....Brig. | 3 |
| 5. "Lady Prevost." Sch. | 13 | 5. "Niagara".....Brig. | 20 |
| 6. "Little Belt"....Sloop. | 3 | 6. "Somers".....Sch. | 2 |
| | — | 7. "Porcupine"....Sch. | 1 |
| | 63 | 8. "Tigress".....Sch. | 1 |
| | | 9. "Trippe".....Sloop. | 1 |
| | | | — |
| | | | 54 |

Barclay carried his flag in the "Detroit" and Perry in the "Lawrence." Perry had prepared a flag on which were inscribed those brave words of Captain James Lawrence of the "Chesapeake," "Don't give up the ship," and this he had hoisted amid the cheers of the crew. However inspiring and beneficial the display of this motto may have been before the battle, there seems to have been some fatality attached to its exhibition, as, in the action which ensued, the "Lawrence" was the only vessel which surrendered to the British.

The British fleet compactly formed and under easy sail awaited the approach of the Americans. Both sides were eager for the conflict. As the American squadron approached the British line at

an angle of fifteen degrees, the three leading vessels, the "Scorpion," "Ariel" and "Lawrence" were the first engaged. The American line astern of the "Lawrence" was not well closed up, owing to the light breeze and to the unequal sailing qualities between the schooners and the larger vessels. In consequence, the leading vessels, particularly the "Lawrence," encountered the concentrated fire of the British line at a distance where the eighteen carronades of the "Lawrence" were ineffective. The "Detroit" carried nine long guns in the broadside to the "Lawrence's" two. But the four long 12's of the "Ariel" and the long 32 of the "Scorpion" rendered, at this stage of the battle, most effective service.

The "Detroit" opened fire on the "Lawrence" at 12:45, but it was not until 2:20 that the latter vessel had drifted down to close quarters at canister range. This fighting at the head of the line was fierce and bloody. The Americans in their excitement, overloaded their carronades, and as a consequence, that of the "Scorpion" upset down the hatchway in the middle of the action, and the sides of the "Detroit" were dotted with marks from shot which did not penetrate. One of the "Ariel's" long 12's also burst. On board the "Detroit," for want of matchlock, the guns had to be discharged by flashing pistols at the touchholes. The "Scorpion," "Ariel," "Lawrence," and "Caledonia," which latter vessel had pushed forward gallantly to support the "Lawrence," were opposed by the "Chippeway," "Detroit," "Queen Charlotte" and "Hunter." The

“Niagara” kept beyond carronade range and at this stage of the action rendered little assistance.

At the rear of the line, the fight went on at long range between the “Somers,” “Tigress,” “Porcupine” and “Trippe” on one side and the “Little Belt” and the “Lady Prevost” on the other. The “Lawrence,” however, during her slow approach had suffered so severely that when she arrived at close quarters, she was virtually disabled. Of the one hundred and three men who were fit for duty at the beginning of the action, eighty-three, or over four-fifths were either killed or wounded. Every brace and bowline was shot away and her hull was so shattered that her starboard bulwarks were beaten in and many of the enemy’s long shot passed through both sides. Every gun on the side engaged was dismounted.

For two hours the “Lawrence” had suffered the weight of this severe fire before her carronades became effective, and the water being smooth, great havoc had resulted, so that the wind increasing, and the British filing away, the two squadrons drew slowly ahead, the “Lawrence” necessarily falling astern, a helpless but glorious wreck, her guns gone, her decks covered with blood and her wardroom and cockpit veritable shambles.

A man with a less indomitable spirit than Perry might have struck his colours, instead of which, however, Perry having failed in his first attack sought to renew the action with what force was left to him, and the “Niagara,” as yet almost uninjured, coming up with a fresh breeze and passing about a

quarter of a mile to the windward of the "Lawrence" on her port beam, Perry, taking his little brother with him, jumped into a boat, and bidding the disabled "Lawrence" farewell at 2:30 hoisted his flag on board the "Niagara." As he stepped over the side and his quick eye glanced at the uninjured rigging and at the hale and ready crew which thronged her deck, his buoyant nature promised him a "harvest of glory."

Soon afterwards the colours of the "Lawrence" were hauled down, but she could not be taken possession of by the enemy before the action recommenced.

Upon arriving on board the "Niagara" Perry sent Elliott, her commander, in a boat to bring up the schooners in rear and at 2:45, the signal for close action was hoisted and as the answering flags were hoisted on board the American vessels, the order was received with cheers and obeyed with alacrity. The "Niagara" under foresail, topsails and topgallants, bore up to break Barclay's line. Thus commenced the second stage of the action, where Perry, after a most miraculous escape from death on board the "Lawrence" with undaunted spirit, was now leading his reserve force into action.

As for the British, notwithstanding their destruction of the "Lawrence," they had suffered so severely from the fire of the "Ariel," "Scorpion" and "Caledonia" that they had fought to a standstill and were in no condition to continue the action with a fresh force.

When at 2:50 Perry pierced the British line, he

passed between the "Lady Prevost," "Little Belt," and "Chippeway" upon the port hand, and the "Detroit," "Queen Charlotte" and "Hunter" upon the starboard, and he fired from each broadside as he passed. Barclay, in the "Detroit" anticipating this manœuvre, attempted to wear, so as to present his broadside to the "Niagara," but in so doing he ran foul of the "Queen Charlotte" and in this position, while helplessly exposed, was raked by Perry, who shortened sail as he came into position between the two wings of the British fleet. At the same time the "Somers," "Porcupine," "Tigress" and "Caledonia," which had closed up in the rear, kept up a destructive fire astern. Against such odds resistance was not long possible. The gallant and skilful, but unfortunate, Barclay, who had been carried below senseless with a wound in his thigh, was brought on deck only to receive a wound in his remaining arm.

The "Queen Charlotte" was the first to surrender, at 3 P. M., followed a few minutes later by the "Detroit" and the "Lady Prevost" and "Hunter." The "Chippeway" and "Little Belt" tried to escape, but were overtaken and captured by the "Scorpion" and "Trippe." Thus, after two hours and a quarter of hard fighting, the whole British squadron was captured and the command of the Lake rested with the Americans. At four, Perry sent the following despatch to General Harrison, who, as well as General Proctor, awaited the result with impatience: "Dear General:—We have met the enemy and they are ours: two ships, two brigs, one schooner and one sloop."

The loss of the British, as reported by Barclay, amounted to twenty-one killed and ninety-four wounded. Three of the killed and nine of the wounded were officers. The American loss was twenty-seven killed and ninety-six wounded. Of this loss, twenty-one were killed and sixty-one wounded in the "Lawrence" and twenty were wounded in the "Niagara," after she received Perry on board.

Perry received the surrender of the British ships on board the "Lawrence" which had rehoisted her colours. The British officers surrendered their swords amid the dead and wounded which crowded the deck of the "Lawrence" and somewhat subdued the exultation of triumph. Perry bade the officers retain their side-arms and added just and unaffected expressions of courtesy, mercy and solicitude for their wounded.

The dead were buried in Put-in-Bay and the wounded of both fleets were sent to Erie, where Barclay was seen with feeble steps, supported by Perry and Harrison, tottering from the landing place to his quarters. Indeed Perry, by the sweetness of disposition seems to have conquered the affections as well as the body of his antagonist and being both brave men, the most pleasant relations existed between them after the action.

Perry's whole conduct in this campaign, from the time he arrived at Erie on March 13, 1813, till his victory on September 10, shows him to have been an officer not only of great bravery and resource, but possessing a personal charm of manner which endeared him to his subordinates and inspired in

them a spirit of personal devotion which enabled them to bear cheerfully the greatest hardships. His keenly sensitive nature never interfered with his sweetness of manner, his fortitude, the soundness of his judgment, the promptitude of his decision. In a state of impassioned activity, his plans were wisely framed, were instantly modified as circumstances changed, and were executed with entire coolness and self-possession. The mastery of the lakes, the recovery of Detroit and the far West, the capture of the British army in the peninsula of Upper Canada, were the immediate fruits of his success. His name has been cherished in loving remembrance and increasing reverence by successive generations of Americans.

Judging from the skilful and able manner with which he carried the operations on Lake Erie to a successful conclusion, it is not unreasonable to suppose that upon a larger sphere of action, he would have shed additional lustre upon the American Flag. The National Congress voted thanks and a medal to both Perry and Elliott, and the same emblems to the nearest relatives of the officers slain in the action.

Several years after the battle a violent controversy sprang up between Perry and Elliott about the conduct of the latter during the action of September 10. It would be both unwise and uninteresting to rescue the details of this controversy from the oblivion into which they have sunk. Suffice it to say that Elliott's management of the "Niagara" remains as incomprehensible to-day as it did on the day of the action, and that to a majority of naval officers it looks like "culpable inefficiency" in the

presence of the enemy. Certainly nothing that Elliott could say or do after the battle could in any way dim the brightness of Perry's glory.

CHAPTER X.

THE BATTLE OF NAVARINO.

WHEN the Greeks revolted against their masters the Turks in the early part of the nineteenth century, Mehemet Ali, Vizier or Viceroy of Egypt, was practically independent and more powerful than the Sultan himself. In its hour of need Turkey called on this vassal to help put down the Greek rebellion. Mehemet Ali, believing that Greece would very soon be a part of his domains, willingly lent his aid, and with one hundred and fifty transports bearing twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, thirty-five frigates and a number of smaller war vessels his son Ibrahim Pasha was sent to the seat of the rebellion.

This invasion of Greece by the Egyptians reminded Europeans of the attempts made by Darius and Xerxes to destroy Western civilization, and many communities gave sympathy while many individuals such as Lord Byron rushed to the aid of Greece.

In the summer of 1824, Capitan Pasha attacked and laid waste Ipsara. He then attempted to transport a large army to Samos for the purpose of over-running that rich island, but he was met by a strong Greek fleet and in a battle which followed the

Greek seamen succeeded, with their fire-ships, in burning a number of his vessels. The Turks were thus driven back from before Samos and Capitan Pasha decided to join his forces with the Egyptian fleet before attempting anything further against the Greeks.

On August 26, the two fleets were united and in the beginning of October were met by Miaulis, who, with his seventy ships, inflicted a signal defeat upon the Turks and Egyptians. Capitan Pasha fled to Constantinople and Ibrahim Pasha gathered his ships together and advanced towards Candia. Once more he was met by the Greek fleet and suffered another severe defeat. His vessels became separated, a number of them were destroyed, eight of them made their way to Alexandria, where their commanders were cruelly tortured by Mehemet Ali for cowardice, and Ibrahim Pasha with what vessels he could gather about him fled to Rhodes. For a few weeks it seemed as if the Greeks would beat back the invaders and the nation took heart, but their joy was of short duration.

In the early part of 1825, the Egyptian leader reached Candia and in February, taking the Greeks by surprise, succeeded in making an entry into the harbour of Modon with his fleet and landed eight thousand troops. Another force was landed in March and with fifteen thousand men Ibrahim Pasha laid siege to Navarino. It held out for two months but was forced to surrender and the Egyptians were free to overrun the land, plundering, destroying, and slaying. Meanwhile Admiral Miaulis and Vice-

Admiral Sacturis, the former in the harbour of Modon and the latter at the entrance to the Dardanelles had won decided victories over the Egyptian and Turkish fleets; but they were futile victories, as Ibrahim was still able to reinforce his troops and to obtain abundant supplies for his army which was devastating the Morea. Missolonghi, made memorable by the death of Lord Byron, who, at the beginning of the Greek struggle for freedom, had, with his wealth, his dauntless courage and great energy, thrown in his lot with the Greeks, was besieged. For a year the heroic little city held out and when at length food could no longer be obtained the brave Greeks, true descendants of Spartan mothers, decided to make an effort to break through the Turkish line rather than yield.

That the spirit of Leonidas still survived is shown by the closing scene of this memorable siege. The inhabitants knew they would receive no quarter from the Turks, and those who had no hope of escape barricaded themselves in an old mill which was abundantly stored with gunpowder. Those who had taken shelter in the mill were for the most part old men, wounded soldiers, and women and children. They hoped to attract the Turks against their position, with the intention of firing the powder as soon as the devastators of their country swarmed into the mill. They would thus be saved from the brutal Turk by death, but in dying they would bring about the death of many of their enemies. Thirty barrels of gun-powder were likewise placed under one of the bastions and on this powder sat a wounded old

soldier with a lighted match in hand. He, too, was about to sacrifice his own life for Greece.

On the night of April 22, a large body of Greeks broke through the Turkish line and escaped. A second attempt was made, but the Turks were prepared for it, and it was frustrated, and as the inhabitants of Missolonghi fled back to the shelter of the walls they were pursued by a mob of murderous Turks who swarmed through the gates after them. At this moment the old Greek fired the mine: an explosion that shook the country for miles around followed, and when the smoke cleared away hundreds of mangled Turks lay about the bastion. The advance was checked for the moment, but when the Turks recovered from the shock of the explosion they once more began their work of destruction, and soon the whole city, save the old mill, was in their hands. To this apparently well defended position the enemy rushed, and when they had broken through the barricades and were putting its defenders to the sword, another explosion shook Missolonghi, and another band of heroes perished, but with them fell a multitude of their foes. The city was plundered and destroyed, three thousand of its inhabitants were slain and over three thousand were sold as slaves. Now over the whole of the Morea the conquering Turks swept, plundering, burning and killing. In the winter of 1826-27, a hundred thousand homeless and starving Greeks were seeking shelter in the swamps and mountains of their native land.

The siege of Athens had begun on August 17, 1826. During this stage foreign aid was pouring into

the country and the Greeks had high hopes of yet being able to thwart Turkey. A number of Englishmen, following the example of Lord Byron, had taken up the Greek cause, and one of them, Lord Cochrane, an experienced naval officer, was made High Admiral, while Sir Richard Church was appointed General-in-Chief of the army. In May, 1827, these two men endeavoured to defeat the Turkish force besieging Athens, but their effort was vain; they suffered severe reverse and early in June the Acropolis surrendered. The civilized world was now roused to an intense pitch of sympathy with Greece, —Switzerland, Germany, France, England and the United States sent aid. Money, food, clothing flowed into Greece and enabled the Greeks to continue the struggle. This sympathy and help should have been a warning to the Turks, but, whom the gods would destroy they first make mad, and so Ibrahim Pasha paid no heed to the attitude of the Western peoples, but went on with his work of destruction and carnage during the summer of 1827. After the fall of Athens he awaited reinforcements in the harbour Modon with the intention of leisurely completing the subjugation of Greece.

At first the European Powers were loath to interfere in Turkish affairs, but feeling ran so high that England, whose trade was receiving serious injury from the war, and Russia, who naturally detested the Turk, determined to interfere. In 1826 the Duke of Wellington was empowered to propose to the Russian Court measures for the pacification of Greece; and on April 4, 1827, a protocol was signed

by the Ministers of England and Russia. Three months later France joined in the movement, and on July 6 "these three Powers signed a treaty pledging themselves to an immediate and effective interference for the purpose of ending the war in Greece." By this treaty an armistice between the belligerents was demanded and a month was allowed for its acceptance. The contracting Powers on its acceptance were to mediate between Greece and Turkey making the following propositions:

Greece should be constituted a semi-independent principality having power to select its own rulers, who would be subject to the approval of the Divan, and Greece should moreover pay a definite tribute to the Turkish government.

It was expected that Turkey would reject these proposals, and it was agreed that in such case the contracting Powers would if possible without taking part in the war prevent further hostilities. The treaty was prematurely published while the French squadron was still at Milo and the Russians not yet near the scene of conflict.

Sir Edward Codrington, in command of the English fleet in the Levant in an order issued to his captains on September 8, admirably gives the situation at this stage of the proceedings. The order read as follows:

"You are aware that a treaty has been signed between England, France, and Russia for the pacification of Greece. A declaration of the decision of the Powers has been presented to the Porte, and a similar declaration has been presented to the Greeks.

The armistice proposed to each, in these declarations, has been acceded to by the Greeks, whilst it has been refused by the Turks. It becomes, therefore, the duty of the allied naval forces to enter, in the first place, on friendly relations with the Greeks; and, next, to intercept every supply of men, arms, etc., destined against Greece, and coming either from Turkey or Africa in general. The last measure is that which requires the greatest caution, and, above all, a complete understanding as to the operations of the allied naval forces. Most particular care is to be taken that the measures adopted against the Ottoman navy do not degenerate into hostilities. The formal intention of the Powers is to interfere as conciliators, and to establish, in fact, at sea the armistice which the Porte would not concede as a right. Every hostile proceeding would be at variance with the pacific ground which they have chosen to take, and the display of forces which they have assembled is destined to cause that wish to be respected; but they must not be put into use, unless the Turks persist in forcing the passages which they have intercepted. All possible means should be tried, in the first instance, to prevent the necessity of proceedings to extremities; but the prevention of supplies, as before mentioned, is to be enforced, if necessary, and when all other means are exhausted, by cannon shot. In giving you this instruction as to the duty which I am directed to perform, my intention is to make you acquainted thoroughly with the object of our government, that you may not be taken by surprise as to whatever measures I may find

it necessary to adopt. You will still look to me for further instructions as to the carrying any such measures into effect."

It will be seen from this that it was the intention of the English admiral to prevent Ibrahim Pasha from receiving supplies and reinforcements for his troops in the Morea. He knew that these were being sent and with several ships hastened to Navarino, but when he arrived off the harbour he discovered that he was too late, that already the reinforcements that the Egyptian commander had been expecting were in the harbour and that a goodly fleet of lately arrived vessels were safely riding at anchor.

His fleet was a ridiculously small one with which to intimidate the Turks and Egyptians, but he determined to blockade the enemy within the harbour until the rest of the English ships and the French and Russian squadrons should arrive. Meanwhile he sent in a message to Ibrahim Pasha telling him that he would not be permitted to continue his attacks on the defenceless inhabitants of the Morea.

Several days later part of the Turkish fleet in derision of these orders weighed anchor and sailed out of the narrow harbour. By their manœuvring it appeared to be their evident intention to offer battle to the British ships and Admiral Codrington promptly ordered his vessels cleared for action. A fight was imminent and the three British ships were manœuvring to gain a position that would help to neutralize the effect of the overwhelming number of the enemy. Suddenly on the distant horizon a fleet of swift-sailing ships was seen approaching. At first

the British seamen thought it might possibly be reinforcements for the enemy, but as they drew nearer the French flag was seen flying at the peak. At the right moment Admiral De Rigny had arrived on the scene. When the Turks saw that they were Frenchmen they promptly returned to the shelter of the bay.

Although the Russian vessels which were to co-operate with Admiral Codrington and Admiral De Rigny had not yet arrived at Navarino, the situation which had been somewhat awkward for the English admiral with his small force was now entirely changed. The representatives of the Powers were in a position to demand that the armistice decreed by the Treaty of London should be carried out. They held a lengthy interview with Ibrahim in which the wily Egyptian excused himself on the ground that he was but a servant of the Sultan and like themselves had merely to obey the commands of his master. He however agreed to suspend hostilities until the attitude of the Sultan with regard to the action of the Powers should be known to him. He likewise promised that his fleet should remain at anchor in the harbour of Navarino.

He had no intention of keeping his word and when the allies sailed away, leaving only two vessels on guard, he watched his opportunity to send out a portion of his fleet.

The French squadron was in need of stores and had gone to Milo to procure them. Admiral Codrington had sent a number of his vessels to Malta to refit and with several ships had himself proceeded to

Zante. While affairs were in this state, on October 2, a thunder storm came up and while it was raging Ibrahim sent out seven frigates, nine corvettes, two brigs, with nineteen transports on an expedition against Patras. When they appeared at the harbour entrance the "Dartmouth" at once sailed for Zante to inform Codrington of the situation, and the "Armide" stood away towards Milo and succeeded in overtaking the French Admiral before he had reached that port. When Admiral Codrington received the news of the action of the Turkish fleet he unhesitatingly made sail to intercept them and although he had with him only a frigate and two corvettes, in his good ship "Asia" of eighty guns he would have unhesitatingly faced the whole Turkish squadron. When he came up with the Turks he ordered them to return to Navarino and added that if a single gun was fired at a British ship he would destroy the entire Turkish force. There was a brief hesitation on the part of the enemy, but the "Asia" fired a warning gun and began to manœuvre for position. The Turkish commander, dreading her powerful armament, ordered his fleet to stand about and, cursing the infidel, made for the harbour. Another attempt was made by a somewhat similar fleet to put to sea but the French and British were in force before the harbour entrance, and it, too, was turned back.

Ibrahim was greatly irritated by the way his plans were thwarted, and, although he was prevented from proceeding to attack points along the coast of the Morea, he once more began his depredations on an

extensive scale and in a systematic manner against the inhabitants of the peninsula. He had thus broken all his promises, and it seemed that the only course left for the allies was to punish him. An effort was made to confer with Ibrahim, but he avoided all communication with the representatives of the Powers.

By October 15, the force brought together to bring him to terms was a strong one. The British ships which had gone to Malta to refit, the French vessels which had sailed for Cervi Bay for supplies, the Russian fleet under Admiral Heiden had united their forces with the vessels under Codrington and De Rigny off Zante. It was now thought that it would be an easy matter to bring Ibrahim to terms. Codrington with three ships had been able to turn back some forty vessels of the enemy, and it was never imagined that the Turks would have the temerity to face the combined fleets of the allies. It was thought that the cruelties practised against the Greeks would at once cease, and that this display of force would prevent the necessity of war and cause the Egyptian fleet to return to Egypt.

Ibrahim, however, had no intention of meekly obeying the orders of the admirals. He would not even heed their requests. He was no doubt acting under imperative orders from the Sultan in the stand he took, but he likewise believed that the disposition of his ships in the harbour of Navarino together with the strong forts at the entrance would enable him to destroy the entire fleet coming against him if he once got them within the bay.

As Sir Edward Codrington was senior in rank he had supreme command of the allied fleet. In order to bring matters to a head he held a conference with the other admirals to consider what steps it would be best to take to force Ibrahim to keep his word. He was anxious to avoid blows, but if they had to be given the sooner the better. At this conference they decided that Ibrahim had with malice aforethought broken his word and had, as if in defiance of the Treaty of London, been excessively cruel to the inhabitants of the Morea even while the allies were on the coast watching his movements. There were three courses they could pursue:

“1st. The continuing throughout the whole of the winter a blockade—difficult, expensive, and perhaps useless, since a storm might disperse the squadrons, and afford to Ibrahim the facility of conveying his destroying army to different parts of the Morea and the islands;

“2nd. The uniting the allied squadrons in Navarino itself, and securing by this permanent presence the inaction of the Ottoman fleets, but which mode alone leads to no termination, since the Porte persists in not changing its system;

“3rd. The proceeding to take a position with the squadrons in Navarino in order to renew to Ibrahim propositions which, entering into the spirit of the Treaty, were evidently to the advantage of the Porte itself.”

Naturally there was considerable jealousy between the French and Russian Admirals, but by infinite tact Sir Edward Codrington smoothed over all the

petty difficulties that such a situation is apt to create. At the final council of war held on the flag-ship "Asia" at this crisis, it was concluded that the best tactics to adopt would be to boldly enter the harbour of Navarino and when within force the recalcitrant Ibrahim to a conference.

The undertaking was a perilous one, as to get into position it would be necessary to pass close to the strongly guarded forts. An observer would have thought it impossible for the fleet to get into the harbour without suffering terrible loss, but Codrington, like Farragut afterwards on the Mississippi and at Mobile Bay, was ready to take a great chance to wind up an affair that might otherwise be protracted for months.

Navarino harbour is in the shape of a horse-shoe. It is about six miles in circumference, so that within it there is but little room for manœuvring large ships. A fight within such narrow quarters would at the best be a *mêlée*. The historic island of Sphacteria, which had seen such hard fighting in the ancient days of Kleon, stretched across its mouth, leaving but a narrow entrance of not over six hundred yards. At this entrance were two strong forts, one of these was on the mainland guarding the town of Navarino; the other was situated on the southern shore of Sphacteria. In the harbour and under the protection of these forts the Turkish fleet rode quietly at anchor. It was a powerful array of vessels, consisting of three line-of-battle ships, four double-banked frigates, thirteen frigates, thirty corvettes, twenty-eight brigs, six fire-brigs, five schooners, and

forty-one transports; one hundred and thirty ships in all, mounting 2,240 guns, made an imposing resisting force. To support this fleet the Turks had in the Morea an army of 35,000 men. It seemed almost foolhardy to boldly beard such a fleet and army in a well-protected position. This fleet, too, was not without skilful tacticians. On several of them were French adventurers and one of these mercenaries, Letellier, had drawn up the fleet in a formation by which it was hoped they would be able to destroy the allied fleets when once they were past the forts. Final arrangements were made for entering the harbour on the 19th, and Admiral Codrington on that day issued the following orders to his captains:

“It appears that the Egyptian ships in which the French officers are embarked are those most to the south-east. It is, therefore, my wish that His Excellency Rear-Admiral Chevalier de Rigny should place his squadron abreast of them. As the next in succession appears to be a ship of the line with a flag at the main, I propose placing the ‘Asia’ abreast of her, with the ‘Genoa’ and the ‘Albion’ next to the ‘Asia’; and I wish that His Excellency Rear-Admiral Count Heiden will have the goodness to place his squadron next in succession to the British ships of the line. The Russian frigates in this case can occupy the Turkish ship next in succession to the Russian ships of the line; the English frigates forming alongside such Turkish vessels as may be on the western side of the harbour abreast of the British ships of the line; and the French frigates forming in the same manner, so as to occupy the

Turkish frigates, etc., abreast of the French ships of the line. If time permits, before any hostility is committed by the Turkish fleet, the ships are to moor with springs on the ring of each anchor. No gun is to be fired from the combined fleet without a signal being made for that purpose, unless shot be fired from any of the Turkish ships, in which case the ships so firing are to be destroyed immediately. The corvettes and brigs are, under the direction of Captain Fellows, of the 'Dartmouth,' to remove the fire-vessels into such a position as will prevent their being able to injure any of the combined fleet. In case of a regular battle ensuing, and creating any of that confusion which must necessarily arise out of it, it is to be observed that, in the words of Lord Nelson, 'no captain can do very wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy.'"

The allied fleet about to brave the fire of the forts and the reception they might expect from the Turkish and Egyptian squadrons drawn up in battle array to meet them, while not being numerically strong presented a formidable array of vessels. The British fleet consisted of the

"Asia," 80 guns, flag-ship.

"Genoa," 74 guns, Commodore Bathurst.

"Albion," 74 guns, Captain Ormaney.

"Dartmouth," 46 guns, Captain T. Fellows.

"Glasgow," 50 guns, Hon. Capt. Maude.

"Cambrian," 48 guns, Captain Hamilton.

"Talbot," 28 guns, Hon. F. Spencer.

Corvette—"Rose."

Brigs—"Philomel," "Brisk," "Mosquito."

Cutter—"Hind."

FRENCH FLEET.

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|-----------------------------------|-------|----------------|-------|
| "Syrène"..... | 60 | "Scipion"..... | 80 |
| "Trident"..... | 80 | "Breslau"..... | 80 |
| "Armide"..... | 46 | | |
| Corvettes—"Alcyone" and "Daphne." | | | |

RUSSIAN FLEET.

| SHIPS. | GUNS. | SHIPS. | GUNS. |
|-----------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| "Azoff"..... | 80 | "Proveznoy"..... | 46 |
| "Gargoute"..... | 76 | "Constantine"..... | 46 |
| "Ezekiel"..... | 76 | "Elena"..... | 46 |
| "Newsky"..... | 76 | "Castor"..... | 48 |

The entrance of this fleet into the harbour and the preliminary movements to the battle of Navarino were reported in the following words by Sir Edward Codrington to his government:

"The Turkish ships were moored in the form of a crescent with springs on their cables, the larger ones presenting their broadsides towards the centre, the smaller ones in succession within them, filling up the intervals.

"The combined fleet was formed in the order of sailing in two columns, the British and French forming the weather or starboard line, and the Russians the lee line.

"The 'Asia' led in, followed by the 'Genoa' and 'Albion,' and anchored close alongside a ship of the line, bearing the flag of the Capitana Bey, another ship of the line, and a large double-banked frigate, each thus having her opponent in the front line of the Turkish fleet. The four ships to windward, part

of the Egyptian squadron, were allotted to the squadron of Rear-Admiral de Rigny; and those to leeward, in the bight of the crescent, were to mark the stations of the whole Russian squadron; the ships of the line closing those of the English line, and being followed up by their own frigates. The French frigate 'Armide' was directed to place herself alongside the outermost frigate, on the left hand entering the harbour; and the 'Cambrian,' 'Glasgow,' and 'Talbot,' next to her, and abreast of the 'Asia,' 'Genoa,' and 'Albion'; the 'Dartmouth,' the 'Mosquito,' the 'Rose,' the 'Brisk,' and the 'Philomel,' were to look after the six fire-ships at the entrance of the harbour."

The gunners stood by their guns momentarily expecting the forts to open upon them, but under the gentle breeze that was blowing, ship after ship, heeling lightly, swept past the ominous forts, with streamers flying, and came within sight of the formidable force drawn up in the form of a crescent apparently waiting to check their further progress or to give them battle. It was a beautiful day, a bright sun was shining from a cloudless deep blue sky; there was scarcely a ripple on the sea that was spread out about the ships like a garment of silk. The Turkish vessels were decked out as if to receive friends and each flew the crimson colours bearing a crescent and scimitar. On the distant hill-sides could be seen smoke bursting from the roofs of farm-houses; Ibrahim's troops were busy even at this critical moment despoiling the inhabitants. No gun was heard and in ominous silence the entire allied

fleets swept into the harbour and fronted the vessels that they were so soon to destroy. It was thought by many that Ibrahim had allowed them to pass in unmolested to make their utter destruction all the surer when they came into contact with his fleet. No effort had been made to prevent any ship from entering the harbour and many of the Turks thought that none would escape from it. But the silence continued, and the men on the allied fleet began to think that their vessels were to be allowed to take up their assigned positions without molestation. There was a feeling of relief on board all the ships, and on the "Asia" the band was assembling to play the vessels to anchor. Admiral Codrington's aim was to avoid coming to battle; his sole desire on entering the harbour was to bring Ibrahim, who was not with the fleet, to terms; and it looked as if he had succeeded and that negotiations might begin with Ibrahim without the necessity of a battle.

Just as the ships had cast anchor and the hands were aloft furling the sails, an incident occurred that precipitated a general engagement,—the last great naval battle in which a British fleet was to take part in the nineteenth century. The fire-ships on the flanks of the enemy's crescent were acting suspiciously and Lieutenant Fitzroy of the "Dartmouth" was sent with a message to request them to remove from their station. The Turks on one of the fire-ships imagined the boat was approaching with the intention of boarding, and poured a volley of musketry into her, killing Fitzroy and several seamen. The men on the "Dartmouth" seeing their officer fall

and fearing for the rest of their comrades in the boat, poured a fire of small-arms into the fire-ship. A broadside was simultaneously fired from one of the Egyptian ships and "La Syrène" received two cannon shot, one of which cut the cable of her anchor as it was ready to be let go. The other ships heard the firing and believing that a general attack was about to be made by the Turks joined in the fight and the cannonading became general.

The "Dartmouth" had drawn on herself a heavy fire; she had received a broadside from several of the Egyptians and in return had opened upon them. The flagship of De Rigny and the "Rose" went to her rescue. An attempt was made to board the fire-ship which had opened the battle and just as the boarding boats had reached her the crew of the Turkish ship blew up their vessel and many lives were lost. Broadside firing was now general and the beat of the drum could be heard on the different vessels calling the men to quarters.

The "Asia" had taken up a position alongside of the flagship of the Capitana Bey, Tahir Pasha, the Turkish Admiral. Close on her larboard quarter lay the flagship of Moharem Bey, the Egyptian Admiral. Codrington had been instructed to use no force if possible and even at this last moment he still desired to avert bloodshed. As these two powerful ships of the enemy withheld their fire, he did not open upon them, but his guns were double-shotted, and the gunners stood by them impatiently awaiting the inevitable moment when they would be ordered to join in the fight. Moharem Bey sent a message to

the British Admiral saying that he too had no wish to shed blood unnecessarily and had no intention of opening fire. Codrington replied by sending his pilot, Peter Mitchell, with instructions to say that he trusted that he would not have to resort to extreme measures.

Meanwhile the Capitana Bey's ship had opened fire upon the "Asia," but her broadsides made but little impression on the staunch British flagship. The fire was returned with interest and in a few minutes the Capitana Bey's ship drifted out of the fight, dismasted, a wreck and on fire.

Moharem Bey now seemed to have changed his mind and as the boat bearing the pilot with Admiral Codrington's message approached his ship, she was met with a fire that killed the pilot. The Egyptian flagship supported by a heavily armed frigate then opened fire upon the "Asia." But the "Asia" was ready for her, and was now hove upon her starboard spring and the sturdy gunners poured such a torrent of iron into the enemy from her larboard guns that the flagship was soon a helpless wreck and the frigate was in flames. So hot was the fire about the "Asia" and so dense the smoke of battle and the pall caused by the burning ships that for a time early in the fight it was thought that she had sunk; but when her high sides were recognized through the battle, and her flag seen gallantly flying at the peak with her enemies beaten from about her, she was hailed with shouts of rejoicing by the sailors on the other ships.

The battle was now at its height and raging with an appalling din; the roar of cannon, the crackle of

small arms, the tumbling of spars to the deck or the splash as they dropped into the bay, the crushing of oak-ribbed ships by the heavy shot from the carronades, the curses of men, the sharp commands of officers,—all created a pandemonium on the waters of the narrow bay. Over a hundred and fifty vessels in a position where fine manœuvring was impossible were contending in a life and death struggle. To make the battle picture complete the island of Sphacteria and the town of Navarino were hid by the smoke through which here and there could be seen leaping columns of flame as ship after ship was burned to the water's edge. Across the bay, swept with bullet and ball, swimmers could be seen making their way to the shore, endeavouring to escape from the *inferno* of the fight. The close quarters made the battle a most exciting one; ships cannonaded each other at pistol range and as the hot shot from the allies took effect on the hulls of the Turkish fleet, flames burst through their decks and their crews deliberately blew up their vessels as they deserted them. Masts, spars and beams from these explosions came tumbling down on the decks of friend and foe alike. Bodies were seen to be hurled high in air, and on several occasions gunners were blown through the ports of the doomed vessels. The British sailors at the commencement of the battle had stripped off their duck frocks, and, naked to the waist, with black silk handkerchiefs tied about their heads, they presented a picturesque appearance as they worked their guns with astounding rapidity or swept the decks of the enemy with small arms.

The Turks were not the only ones to suffer loss. The "Asia" had rid herself of her two powerful opponents in short order, but as they drifted clear of the fight her towering hull attracted the fire of a number of the enemy's vessels, and she received a heavy cannonading that raked her fore and aft. Her mizzen mast went by the board; she was scarred through her whole length; several of her guns were disabled, and Captain Bell of the marines was killed. In all during the fight of the day she lost nineteen men killed and fifty-seven wounded. The Admiral's son, Mr. A. J. Codrington, who was serving as a midshipman on board his father's vessel, was among the wounded.

The Admiral himself had many narrow escapes. At the beginning of the battle the Turkish Admiral Tahir Pasha observed the tall form of Sir Edward directing the fleet. His position on the quarter deck was a conspicuous one, and thinking that it would have a demoralizing effect on the enemy if their distinguished leader should be struck down Tahir Pasha had marksmen posted in the tops to shoot him down as Nelson had been slain on the deck of the "Victory." From the commencement of the battle he seemed to bear a charmed life; cannon shot and bullets played about him, but he remained unharmed; at one time, when the fire was heaviest, every man about him on the poop was struck down. A cannon shot swept by within an inch or two of his head; the bulwarks of his ship were crushed in by the fire, and splinters from the woodwork made rents in his clothing; a musket ball struck his watch in his pocket and

battered its case; but for his watch this bullet would probably have proved fatal.

The fire-ships of the enemy were early brought into action. They were ignited and sent adrift among the fleet of the allies and their leaping flames threatened more than one ship with destruction. One ran foul of the "Armide" and that ship was in perilous plight when Lieutenant Lyons of the "Rose" appeared on the scene through the smoke of battle and with a boat's crew courageously grappled the fire-ship and towed it free from the fleet. It was a gallant act but cost Lyons his life. When the British crew had cleared the "Armide" of the fire-ship they ran it alongside of a Turkish frigate and cut loose from it; and not a moment too soon, for the vessel loaded with explosives blew up with a mighty roar and set the frigate in flames. For a time it seemed as if the fire-ships would start a general conflagration in the fleet of the allies, but ship after ship was grappled and with lusty cheers towed out of harm's way and the crews of the allies with satisfaction watched them till they blew up and burned themselves out.

If the "Armide" was saved by a British ship she returned the compliment. Captain Hugon saw the "Talbot" desperately engaged by several of the enemy's larger ships. With great skill he brought his vessel to the inner Turkish line without for a moment masking the "Talbot's" fire. When he had an advantageous position he poured broadside after broadside into one of the frigates. In a short time the Turkish colours were run down and a French

crew took possession of the ship. He now did an act characteristic of his courteous nation. The frigate had surrendered to him, it is true, but the "Talbot" had begun the fight, and a great part of the victory was due to her skilful battle, so he ran up on the vanquished ship the colours of both France and England. At another stage in the fight the "Armide" found herself sorely pressed and Captain Davies of the "Rose" under a heavy fire came to the rescue. The English ship cast anchor within pistol shot of two of the enemy's boats and in a few minutes had silenced them and relieved the "Armide" from danger.

No vessel experienced harder fighting than the "Albion." A number of the enemy's vessels had swarmed about her in an effort to capture or destroy her. A seventy-four gun-ship and two sixty-four gun-ships took up a position at short range and deluged her with shot. She became entangled with the seventy-four gun-ship, and the Turks made an effort to board, but with cutlass and pistol and pike the boarders were driven back and before the enemy could free herself Lieutenant Drake with a part of the "Albion's" crew sprang on her decks and driving the Turks before them soon forced them to surrender. There were a number of Greek prisoners in the hold of the vessel and the British seamen at once began striking the manacles from them; but the ship was discovered to be on fire. The fire was near the magazine and the victors were forced to hurriedly abandon their prize. When the crew had returned to the "Albion," a midshipman cut the cables

holding the frigate and she drifted out of the fight with flames bursting from her hull and running up her masts and rigging. In a few minutes she blew up casting wreckage about her on all sides. The "Albion" was still surrounded by foes whom she could not shake off, but she kept up a hard fight until the sun went down, and then, with a favoring breeze, managed to free herself from the vessels bent on her destruction.

The "Genoa," the sister ship to the "Albion," likewise came under the concentrated fire of a number of ships. Commodore Bathurst exposed himself on her decks as boldly as did the Admiral on the "Asia." His ship was continually under fire, and he was the mark of the enemy's musket men. At the beginning of the action he was struck in the head by a splinter which knocked off his hat and made a deep wound in his face, but he bound up the wound and continued to direct the fight. A shot carried away the tails of his coat without injuring him, but at last a grape shot struck him in the side, passing through his body and burying itself in the bulwarks. This gallant officer fell to the deck with a mortal wound. He survived the fight for eleven hours and suffered more from the knowledge that many of his crew had been killed than from his wound. How bravely his men fought is evidenced by the number that fell on the "Genoa;" twenty-six were killed and thirty wounded. One-third of the British sailors slain at Navarino met their death on Commodore Bathurst's ship.

If the ships of the line and the frigates did well

the smaller vessels played an equally heroic part. No vessel in the allied fleet came in for more glory than the little cutter "Hind." Lieutenant John Robb was in command of her, and under him was a daring crew of thirty men. The "Hind" had been delayed at Zante and arrived before Navarino just after the allied fleet had passed the harbour entrance. She at once sailed in to join them and arrived on the scene of action just as the first shots were fired. She leaped into the struggle instantly, and laid herself close astern of an enemy's ship,—a big frigate at that. For nearly an hour she held her position keeping up a steady fire on the antagonist she had selected. All this time she was herself exposed to a heavy fire. At length her cable was cut by a cannon ball and she began to drift from her place of vantage. Her crew made haste to clear another anchor, but before it brought up the little vessel she had drifted between a large corvette and a brig. She promptly turned her guns on both these ships and very soon had the brig in flames and had the further satisfaction of seeing her blow up.

She continued her fight with the corvette, but before long her cable was again cut and the little cutter drifted in among the big frigates. She ran against one that towered high above her, and as she tried to clear this ship her main boom entered one of the enemy's port holes and she was caught fast. Lieutenant Robb to save the lives of his men ordered them below and bravely remained on deck himself to watch the progress of events. The Turks made ready to swarm on board, but he called his little band

on deck and drove them back. Other similar attempts were made to board, but in each case the Turks suffered great loss. Maddened at being thwarted by such a diminutive craft the enemy manned a boat and came alongside the "Hind" intending to force her commander to surrender, but Robb was ready for them. He had two carronades charged to the muzzle with grape and canister and reserving his fire till the boat was but a few feet away he blew it to pieces causing the death of nearly every one on board. Till the battle was over the "Hind" drifted hither and thither fighting courageously, and out of her crew of thirty she lost in killed and wounded fourteen. When she was examined after the battle it was discovered that twenty-three round shot had entered her hull.

The French and Russian ships fought with equal bravery; the "Armide" and "Syrène" doing particularly effective work. No ship in the allied fleet for a moment shirked the fight, but poured forth their broadsides till the batteries on shore and the ships in the harbour were silenced.

For four hours this hot battle lasted, and so fierce was the struggle that the combatants did not notice the sun going down; and so thick was the canopy of smoke that hung over the scene of conflict that darkness came on unheeded. No fiercer naval battle than Navarino was ever fought. The Turks had the greater number of ships, but the strength of the battleships of the allies and the skill of their trained and experienced sailors neutralized the effect of this. Despite the fact that they were outmatched from

the start, the Turks and Egyptians fought with that energy, desperation and recklessness characteristic of the Mohammedans. They stood by their vessels till they were wrapped in flames and they could be seen rushing from point to point about their decks and climbing into the rigging to escape death by fire. But there was no escape; and ship after ship blew up and blazed fiercely, making the bay a mass of charred wreckage illuminated by burning hulks. Eighty-one fighting ships of Turkey and Egypt went into the fight and at the end of the battle only one frigate, the "Leone," and fourteen smaller vessels were ever likely to again put to sea, and these were battered and torn and in most cases dismasted.

Navarino was a most significant engagement. It was the last great battle between fleets under the old conditions. The men fought on this occasion much as the sailors fought in the days of Elizabeth, and Commodore Bathurst and Lieutenant Robb managed their ships as did Sir Richard Grenville the "Revenge." In it, too, Russia, France, and England fought side by side, the first time that European nations battled together in humanity's cause. The prompt action of Admiral Codrington and his fellow commanders saved Greece from untold barbarities, from barbarities such as the Armenians suffered only a few brief years ago at the hands of the Turks and there were no strong men in the East to act in their behalf. Cabinets and Kings stood by and argued, while the sword and the fire-brand of the Sultan were at work. On this occasion, however, the seamen of the Powers had, while there was no declaration of

war against Turkey, done noble deeds in a noble cause. They had by their glorious victory utterly destroyed the navy of the Sultan and freed Greece from Turkish oppression. As a historian of the Greek Revolution has said: "But to Greece, to poor Greece, the news (of Navarino) was the reprieve of her death warrant, joy and exultation were in every heart, rejoicing was on every tongue, hope beamed on every countenance; and from Arta to Thermopylæ, from Pindus to Taygetus, Hellas felt that her chains were broken; she was freed forever from the yoke of Mussulman bondage."

And this work was done with comparatively small loss to the allies. On the British ships, which had borne the brunt of the fighting, only seventy-five were killed and one hundred and ninety-seven wounded. The Turks and Egyptians on the other hand lost in killed and wounded nearly six thousand.

The victory caused great rejoicing in Europe and particularly among the people of England. The government was not so well pleased, however, and practically censured Admiral Codrington for precipitating the engagement; but in the end his course of action was applauded and he was universally recognized as the last great naval commander of the old school. For his victory on this occasion he was advanced to the G. C. B. and the King of France conferred upon him the Grand Cross of the Military Order of St. Louis, while the Emperor of Russia bestowed on him the honour of wearing the second class of the Military Order of St. George.

CHAPTER XI.

THE BATTLE OF LISSA.

THE war between Prussia and Austria in 1866 was one of the natural fractures occurring after the arbitrary reconstruction of Europe by treaty upon the downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte. Italy joined Prussia in the contest to recover Venetia from Austria.

Italy's naval commander-in-chief was Admiral Count Pellion di Persano, an officer sixty years of age. His opponent was Rear-Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff, a younger man of thirty-eight. His fleet of seven ironclads, eight wooden vessels and about as many gunboats, was assembled at Pola; while the Italian fleet of twelve ironclads, twelve wooden vessels and as many smaller vessels was mobilized at Ancona. The Italians determined to deliver their attack upon the fortified island of Lissa.

The island of Lissa is of rectangular outline, some nine miles long and four broad, lying axially east and west; mountainous and well-wooded. At its west end a deep bight forms the roadstead of Comisa; at its northeast corner is the landlocked bay of San Georgio, at the head of which is the town of Lissa, and at the southeast corner is the little Port of

Manego. All three places were fortified and garrisoned.

Persano's plan was to bombard Port San Georgio with the major portion of his battle fleet, to reduce the forts at Comisa with a smaller division, so that a military force coming later might land there, and to actually land what expeditionary forces he had with him at Manego, under the guns of his frigates. The gunboats were sent to Lesina, the nearest town on the next island landward, to cut the cable to Lissa and destroy all craft which might convey information to the mainland. A scout was sent to cruise between the islands of Pelagosa and St. Andrea and another from the latter to Punta Planca on the mainland.

This disposition was effected about noon of 18th July; but the divisions at Comisa and Manego soon found the shore batteries too high to be reached by guns on shipboard, so the division commanders rejoined Persano with all their vessels early in the afternoon. This conduct, at least on the part of Vice-Admiral Albini, was unwarranted by the resistance encountered, and almost nonplussed the commander-in-chief. However, he accepted the situation as reported, directed Albini to prepare to put the landing force ashore at Porto Karober, about a mile west of San Georgio Bay, and then concentrated his whole attack upon the latter port. The onslaught was terrible, the outer works were soon silenced and the heavier ironclads then actually attempted to force an entrance, but the concentrated fire upon them from the inner forts was beyond endurance, and they withdrew. Persano still continued to hammer away

at the outer works till sundown, then drew off and anchored eight miles north of the harbour. The Italian gunners had had a fierce baptism of fire, and threw themselves down to rest. The Austrians spent the night working like beavers to repair damages.

At ten o'clock the gun-boat flotilla rejoined the flag, and its commander reported that he had cut the cable at Lesina about four o'clock in the afternoon, and that the last message over the wire to Lissa was to hold out till the arrival of the Austrian fleet.

Meanwhile Tegetthoff, as neglectful of scouting as Persano, learned only on the 10th by cable from Lissa and Isola Grossa that the Italian fleet had gotten to sea. As we have seen, he was then temporarily unprepared to seek it. During the ensuing week, however, numerous Austrian troops were transported from Dalmatia to Trieste without molestation, so it seemed probable to Tegetthoff that the Italians had retired again into inactivity.

At the end of this week of uncertainty, the wires from Lissa began to get hot with messages. On the 17th the "Esploratore's" reconnaissance was reported. On the 18th numerous dispatches announced nine or ten strange ships manœuvring and approaching Lissa. Tegetthoff could not believe this to be other than a demonstration to make him uncover Pola and the upper Adriatic, until the evening telegram came describing the bombardment of Lissa by the whole Italian fleet. Then, with exultation at his enemy's blundering strategy, he urgently telegraphed his military superior for per-

mission to depart for Lissa, sent all lighters back to Pola, arranged for coal to follow him, called his captains on board to explain his plans, then sent his ships out of Fasana Roads to form in the open sea, and himself alone awaited the coveted permission to proceed. It came early in the afternoon of the 19th, and at 1:30 P. M. the flagship "Ferdinand Max" joined the fleet in the offing amid the thundering cheers of the ships' companies massed in the rigging, and the strains of the Austrian National hymn.

While that compact, determined and enthusiastic, though inferior, force was speeding to Lissa on the 19th to the 20th of July, following the telegram which had promised its coming, we will turn once more to Persano and see what he was doing to meet it. Setting aside the reported coming of the Austrian fleet as an invention of the enemy to make him desist in his attack on Lissa, the Italian Admiral repeated on the 19th the strenuous efforts which closed his operations of the previous day, on almost the same lines (the chief difference being that he had received reinforcements which raised his landing force to 2700 men) and with precisely the same result. The Austrian forts again withstood the bombardment, and the Italian division commanders proved too timid to land the troops. At 8 P. M., the Italian fleet was again anchored eight miles north of Port San Georgio with both coal and ammunition getting low, with ships more or less damaged and with the gruesome, demoralising presence among the crews of many killed and wounded men.

Persano was greatly perplexed, and his subordi-

nates were dispirited and uneasy. The night grew dark and stormy; the wind coming out strong from the southeast, blowing up frequent squalls of rain, while even under the lee of the island, the sea grew rough. Rear-Admiral Vacca visited the flagship and urged a return to Ancona. Boggio, the deputy, was fatuously enthusiastic for persisting in the operations. Persano remained undecided until morning. Then, when the beams of the rising sun broke through the stormclouds and revealed a transport arriving with more marines for landing, the Admiral determined to make another desperate assault. Vice-Admiral Albini, with the wooden ships and gunboats, was sent again to Porto Karober to make preparations for landing, and the ironclads "Terribile" and "Varese" were started around to renew the attack on the forts at Comisa. Persano himself awaited some minor repairs to the engines of the "Portogallo" and "Castelfidardo," and the transfer of the wounded to a cartel bound for Ancona, before resuming, with his eight ironclads, the bombardment of San Georgio.

Suddenly, about eight o'clock, the "Esploratore" was discovered through the mist and spondrift to seaward, steaming in at utmost speed, flying the signal "Suspicious ships in sight!" Then a dense rain-squall swept down upon the dumbfounded Italians, leaving them to guess the direction of the oncoming Nemesis.

Confronted by a contingency which he had persistently refused to contemplate, and which he had not even discussed with his squadron commanders, the

Italian Admiral strove all too late to repair his unreadiness. A despatch boat was hastened after the two ironclads at Comisa; Albini was signalled to suspend the disembarkation of the landing force, and two gun-boats were detailed to take the "Portogallo" and "Castelfidardo" in tow. Persano then formed his ironclad division in line, heading W. N. W., and stood out through the misty gloom to fight a battle for which he had formed no plans. Happily his two disabled ironclads were soon able to cast off their tow-lines and take their places in the line under their own steam.

Meanwhile the Austrian scouts had sighted the "Esploratore" at 6:40 A. M., as well as heavy smoke to the southeast, but they, too, were almost immediately shrouded in rain-squalls. All night the Austrian ships had laboured against a heavy sea and head wind, making but five or six knots an hour, their gunports sealed and constantly submerged; nevertheless Tegetthoff stood resolutely on. Such weather rather favoured his plans, for he was counting on the ram rather than the gun. His fleet was disposed in three divisions, each arranged in double echelon, the ironclad division in the lead, the large wooden ships forming the centre division and the gun-boats the rear. The divisions were about half a mile apart, with a vessel between each, and one in advance of all, to transmit signals. Tegetthoff's general plan, which had been well discussed with his subordinates, was that the ironclads should break through the enemy's line, trying to ram as they did so, and then concentrate on one of the broken

portions; that the second division should attack the enemy's wooden ships, or any other detachment, at the discretion of Commodore Petz, and that the gunboat division should be subdivided into three groups to lend succour or reinforcement where most needed as the battle progressed. When the enemy was sighted, the Austrians were at breakfast, but so complete had been their preparations that the meal was not interrupted.

Striking was this contrast to Persano's pandemonium! When the latter made signals for battle and tried to drag his unready ships together the "Formidable," which had been badly hammered in Port San Georgio the day before, signalled she could not fight because her gunports were awash with their shutters shot away, and hastened, without awaiting permission, towards Ancona. Vice-Admiral Albini, although signalled to form his division of wooden vessels in rear of Persano's own, ignored the signal and remained with his ships huddled and inactive near the shore to the westward of Porto Karober. The gun-boats, in panicky confusion, strove to re-embark the landing forces.

With his eight available ironclads, the Italian Admiral stood slowly seaward for half an hour in line abreast, then formed column, heading northeastward. His column was made up of three subdivisions (probably a formation used in his tactical exercises of the previous week, and the only prearranged detail for battle); the van, consisting of the "Carignano," "Castelfidardo," and "Ancona," being commanded by Vacca; the centre, consisting of the "Italia," "Af-

fondatore," "Palestro" and "San Martino," being commanded by Captain Bruno of the "Italia;" and the rear, consisting of the "Portogallo" and "Marie Pia" (the "Varese" afterward joined) being commanded by Captain Ribotti of the "Portogallo." Persano's flagship was the "Italia." The distance between ships was probably double what is nowadays maintained, and the distance between the Italian subdivisions was still greater.

Steaming only fast enough to maintain his formation, Persano now awaited the enemy. The dense, misty drizzle still swept over his flag-bedecked ships, shutting out all view toward sea or land, but wind and sea were beginning to subside.

We have seen how, when threatened by the Austrians at Ancona on the 27th of June, Persano transferred his flag to a fast scout vessel. He seems to have been imbued with the military principle that a commander-in-chief should not be confined to the fighting line, but should be free to move to any point deemed best for directing the operations, but he seems never to have discussed this idea with any of his subordinates, but to have set it aside, as he did all ideas of fleet combat, whenever the enemy was not actually upon him. As he waited in the gloom of the blanketing, sultry drizzle of that warm July morning, the idea of betaking himself outside the line of battle, in order better to direct the operations, again came uppermost in his mind. "I perceived," he said afterward, "the convenience of taking up my position outside the line in an ironclad of great speed, to be able to dash into the heat of the battle, or

carefully to convey the necessary orders to the different parts of the squadron, and direct their movements according to necessity."

The principle upon which he was about to act is probably as applicable to a fleet action as to one on land, but the folly of applying it without the knowledge of his captains and squadron commanders, which should have impressed itself upon Persano by the consequences of his doing so on a former occasion, seems never to have occurred to him. Looking around for a ship in which to commit this unpardonable error, he chose the "Affondatore." She was new and fast, it is true, and possibly Persano had discovered from her great turning circle and peculiar battery characteristics that she was an unhomogeneous tactical unit in the line. Just this far, and no farther (had he been justified in leaving the line at all at such a critical moment) was Persano right in selecting the "Affondatore," but she had a fatal defect as a flagship which ought to have been patent at a glance. She had insignificant pole masts with only the most meagre appliances for signalling.

At ten o'clock the wind shifted to northwest, the weather cleared rapidly and the sun shone brightly down upon the theatre of combat, disclosing the Austrians, still some five miles distant, standing on in battle array. Looking about him, Persano must then have noted that Albini, with his wooden ships, had not stirred from the shores of Lissa, that the "Varese" and "Terrible" had not yet joined, and that the "Formidable" was hull down toward Ancona. Probably the feeling that he would have to

spur some of his subordinates into action now fixed his determination to leave the line of battle, there appearing to be just about time enough to do it before the enemy could close. Accordingly the "Affondatore" was signalled to come up, the "Italia" was stopped, and the Admiral, with his personal staff, passed in a launch from the latter to the former. The transfer took some little time, during which the van division, its commander ignorant of Persano's action, stood on, leaving an ever widening gap between van and centre, while the rear vessels, crowding upon the centre, slowed or stopped in confusion. So little time did Persano have to spare, that the launch in which he came to the "Affondatore" had to be abandoned and turned adrift. With flags flying from every masthead, the shifting of Persano's own, differing little in appearance from the national ensign, could scarcely be noticed, so that, with the enemy actually charging upon him, the Italian commander-in-chief crowned his blunders by obliterating himself from his fleet.

When the clearing weather disclosed the Italian fleet in column and right ahead of him, Tegetthoff sent his scouts to the rear and signalled for close order and full speed (probably eight knots). His opponent was in precisely the position and formation desired, so, when little more than a mile intervened between the two fleets, Tegetthoff made his historic signal:

"Ironclads will run against the enemy and sink him!"

This is recorded at 10:35 A. M. Almost

immediately afterward, while Persano was shifting his flag, Vacca's leading ship opened fire and the Austrians returned it. If he authorized this, Tegetthoff seriously blundered. He should have been careful that no smoke obscured his view at the moment he proposed to ram, and he should have reserved his fire so as to deliver his much practised concentrated broadsides when his ships passed through the Italian column. As it was, smoke obscured the widening gap in the latter, toward which it chanced the Austrians were heading, and Tegetthoff's formation was too inelastic to permit him to change quickly his general course. Thus the whole Austrian ironclad division passed harmlessly through the gap between the Italian van and centre, and Persano's act of folly inadvertently defeated his adversary's purpose in the first onslaught.

Still carrying out his original plan, Tegetthoff wheeled his ironclads to port in order to seek the Italian van, which was now cut off, and to interfere between it and the flanks of his own centre and rear divisions, but as he turned, he found himself confronted and threatened by the Italian centre, which had continued to advance. Again he rushed upon the Italian vessels, and in this second shock both the "Italia" and "Palestro" seem to have been rammed, but with such glancing blows that little damage was done.

Persano's presence on the "Affondatore" was, as we have seen, unsuspected; she herself, with her low freeboard, pole masts and eccentric movements, was seldom seen through the smoke, and no signals were

made from the "Italia." The three Italian subdivision commanders, therefore, without a common superior to unite them, fought separate actions in different parts of the field of battle. Vacca, noting what seemed to be an indiscriminate, smoke-enveloped *mêlée* in his rear, and believing, no doubt, that even without him, Persano was superior in ironclads to Tegetthoff, conceived that the work cut out for himself was to enfilade the Austrian divisions on their left flank and then to take them in their rear. In this he was wrong. He should have returned to the support of the Italian centre by the quickest evolution possible. His manœuvre only resulted in a long range, ineffectual gunnery action with the agile Austrian gun-boats, for Commodore Petz, with his wooden vessels, ran off to the southward to engage Albini, taking up a column formation as he did so. Petz, in doing this, came upon Ribotti's van division of ironclads, which had almost instinctively turned to port to meet the first Austrian onslaught, and thus was brought on the third separate engagement of that eventful day.

While Bruno was engaged in a desperate combat with Tegetthoff's seven ironclads, and Vacca, a league away to the northwest, was "tilting at windmills" among the evasive Austrian gun-boats, and Ribotti was fighting the Austrian wooden division of seven vessels a little apart to the southward, Persano, in the "Affondatore," had first passed through his own column between the "Italia" and "Palestro," then around the rear of the Austrian wooden division, and, keeping the helm astarboard to re-enter the

mêlée, presently found himself charging bows-on to Commodore Petz's flagship, the "Kaiser." Persano's nerve was not equal to the occasion, so he kept his helm over and sheered past his big wooden opponent, each ship pouring a broadside into the other. The "Kaiser" had a gun dismounted by a 300-lb. shell, fragments of which killed or wounded six men at her wheel and smashed all the appliances around it, while the "Affondatore's" deck and top hamper were pretty well cut up. When the smoke from this encounter lifted, the "Portogallo" was seen coming up on the "Kaiser's" port bow, and Commodore Petz, despite his wooden vessel, determined to ram. With a sheer to starboard and then a sharp turn to port, he was able to strike his adversary exactly abeam, but at an angle. The shock was a terrible one for the "Kaiser." Her bowsprit and stem were torn out, (the figurehead falling upon the "Portogallo's" quarterdeck), and her foremast went over the side with a crash, its tangle of rigging striking and crushing her funnel to the deck. She gave her adversary a clean shave on the port side, carrying away all anchors, boats, and port shutters, knocking overboard several field guns and displacing sixty feet of armour belt. In spite of her condition and of the Italian's gunfire, the "Kaiser" was able to pour in at least two concentrated broadsides at point blank range, which did such execution above and below the water-line that the "Portogallo" was content to drift away and lose herself in the smoke of combat.

The wreckage over the "Kaiser's" funnel was now on fire, when through the lifting smoke the

"Affondatore", probably having completed another circle to port, reappeared charging upon the Austrian's starboard beam. Petz directed his men to lie prone, and nerved himself to accept destruction calmly, but to his amazement, the "Affondatore's" helm was shifted and she sheered off to starboard, actually grazing as she passed. Persano stated afterward that the "Kaiser" seemed already a wreck and not worth the injury he might sustain in ramming her.

But trouble was still coming thick and fast upon the sorely tried "Kaiser." The "Maria Pia" had now appeared and was pouring a destructive shell fire at four cables distance. Petz began again to engage, but many of his guns were put out of action, a steam pipe was cut, and his upper deck swept clean, while the fire, spreading over the tangle of rigging which encumbered the port side, now enveloped that side of the ship itself. Steam was running low and the steering gear was damaged. The "Kaiser" was at last *hors de combat*. The other wooden vessels had also suffered severely. One was only kept afloat by her pumps, another was on fire, and still another had her guns' crews decimated. Petz withdrew his division from action and headed for Port San Giorgio. Thus, at about half past eleven, the Austrian wooden division was whipped, and, had Albini intercepted it as it sought harbour, it should have been annihilated.

Nevertheless the gallant Petz had done magnificent tactical work. He had held the Italian rear in check while Tegetthoff was crushing the centre. This

brings us to the real battle of the day, to which the other combats were only accessories.

In his second charge through the enemy's column, Tegetthoff found the three vessels of the Italian centre heading off to the northeast. After striking the "Italia" a glancing blow with the "Maximilian," which only sheered the former more to the westward, the Austrian Admiral seems to have backed and then tilted at the "Palestro," as she came up, striking her on her starboard quarter, but without momentum enough to do any serious injury, only bringing down the enemy's mizzenmast and gaff, the latter, however, with its magnificent flag, falling upon the "Maximilian's" forecastle, where it was captured by an intrepid Austrian quartermaster amid a hail of small arm bullets, and made fast to a stanchion to float there as a trophy throughout the remainder of the battle.

The seven Austrian ironclads now circled around their three opponents, pouring in their concentrated broadsides, and endeavouring to ram whenever an opportunity seemed to present itself. An ever-increasing pall of smoke hung over this vortex of strife, like that from a great conflagration, which even the rays of the sun could not penetrate, and in which ships became invisible at pistol range. The Austrian ships were painted black; the Italians' gray, so that a very simple signal from Tegetthoff gave his captains their cue in this *mêlée*:

"Ram everything gray!"

The beleaguered Italian centre was now assailed on front, flanks and rear. The "Palestro" was over-

whelmed by gunfire, and soon took fire from a bursting shell in her wardroom, the flames quickly getting beyond control. Rushing like a blazing spectre through the smoke, she escaped to the northward, pursued by the "Drache." The "San Martino" also fled to the southwest, pursued by the "Austria."

The "Italia" was now sought blindly through the smoke by her five remaining opponents. Her rudder was smashed by one of them grazing past, and Captain Bruno, bewildered and helpless, stopped his ship. Then, as the smoke lifted, he saw an enemy's ironclad dead ahead of him and the Austrian flagship heading for his port beam. Too bewildered to realize his own opportunity, he backed instead of going ahead. As the "Italia" gathered stern-board, the "Maximilian's" ram crushed into her abreast the foremast, not with a terrible shock, but with a blood-curdling gentleness which showed that armour and frames and decks were hopelessly collapsing. The "Italia" was careened far over to starboard by the impact, then, as the "Maximilian" withdrew her ram from the deadly wound, the great Italian ship rolled back almost on her port beam ends and sank, without righting, bow first beneath the waves, leaving the water strewn with struggling and drowning human beings.

This occurred at 11:20. Tegetthoff attempted to lower a boat, but now, when there was no longer an Italian centre to support, vessels of the van and rear divisions began to arrive upon the scene. Vacca had completed his long detour around the Austrian

gunboats, and Ribotti had awakened to the fact that in turning aside to fight Petz's wooden ships, he had left the Italian centre and van to fight a superior force. Of Vacca's ships, the "Ancona" was the first to close, and she attempted to ram the "Maximilian" as the latter was trying to rescue the "Italia's" crew, but missed by a very close shave. Some Austrian gun-boats now rushed in to succour the drowning Italians, but were driven off by gunfire from various ships, which seemed not to know their purpose.

Ribotti, in his final haste to succour the centre, came up alone in the "Portogallo," and the four Austrians which had been hunting the "Italia" in company with the "Maximilian" fell upon him. The "Ancona," after missing the "Maximilian," started to the "Portogallo's" assistance, but came into accidental collision, *en route*, with the "Varese," and remained entangled with her for some little time. It seems strange that Tegetthoff did not fall upon them with the "Maximilian" while they were in this predicament. One feels that here the Austrian Admiral lost a chance to make Lissa take rank with Trafalgar and himself with Nelson. Possibly he did not or could not see his opportunity, but had he seized it, he could surely have sunk the entangled ships, and this would have made him superior in numbers to his opponent. The opportunity was irrevocably lost, however, for at this juncture the Italian fleet came at last under the control of a directive mind.

Rear-Admiral Vacca, believing that Persano had gone down with the "Italia," made signal to form

column without reference to the order of ships, and he headed it to the westward. The Italian ironclads, being generally faster than the Austrian, gradually extricated themselves from the *mêlée* and obeyed the signal; not, however, before two others, the "Maria Pia" and "San Martino," had collided.

Meanwhile Persano, seeming to repent of his leniency toward the "Kaiser," followed her up in the "Affondatore" and again for the third time made a pretence at ramming her, but again sheered off at the last moment. The "Affondatore" was then assailed by the "Austria" (which, failing to overtake the "San Martino," had given up the chase) and the "Prinz Eugen." By them she was set on fire and otherwise so seriously mauled that when the Italian fleet reached Ancona, she was in a sinking condition.

Tegetthoff, at 12:20 P. M., signalled his ironclad division to form column on the flagship, and stood toward San Georgio, seeing which, the wooden division, having safely convoyed the disabled "Kaiser" into port, stood out in column to meet the commander-in-chief. When his fleet was thus re-assembled, the Austrian Admiral reformed it in three columns heading northeast, between the Italian ironclads and the land, his own ironclad column to seaward.

Meanwhile, as the smoke of close combat dissipated, Persano, gazing around upon the scene, saw Albini's division still malingering on the coast, his ironclads in column standing off to the westward and the Austrian ironclad and wooden divisions standing

toward each other near San Georgio. Persano hastened at full speed toward his malingering and his retiring divisions, making a multitude of hysterical signals to resume the engagement, then headed the "Affondatore" as if to interpose and prevent a junction between Petz and Tegetthoff, but to no purpose; only one wooden ship, the "Umberto," and one ironclad, the "Portogallo" followed him. Turning back, he steamed along his whole line flying the signal "The fleet will go individually in chase of the enemy," but not a ship responded. Then he learned by signals that the "Italia" was sunk, the "Palestro" doomed to destruction by fire, and the "San Martino" almost disabled. Joined now by his wooden vessels and by the "Terrible," which had malingered with them throughout the action, Persano headed his column and steamed westward. Tegetthoff, when he had completed his formation, commenced pursuit, but found his speed inferior. A few rounds from his guns showed him that the range was increasing beyond their effectiveness, so he hauled off and conducted his whole fleet towards San Georgio.

At half-past two, the blazing "Palestro," with one great outward burst of flames and smoke, was torn to fragments by an internal explosion and effaced from the sea. Her captain, believing the magazines to be safely flooded, had disregarded the boats sent to rescue his crew, and determined to fight the flames to the last, but they presently reached an overlooked supply of ready ammunition on the gun deck, and

ship and crew were blown skyward and fell scattered upon the waves.

Tegetthoff sent his vessels into port in the most orderly and methodical manner, remaining outside with his ironclads till sundown. Then, leaving two ironclads outside as watchdogs, he proceeded to land his dead and wounded and to repair damages. The Austrian loss was 38 killed and 138 wounded; the Italian 667 killed and 39 wounded. Excepting the "Kaiser," which was got ready again for battle in 48 hours, the material injury to the Austrian ships was four guns dismantled. The whole fleet was ready for sea at 3:30 next morning, but the enemy was nowhere in sight, having been in full retreat all night toward Ancona.

Thus Austria kicked off the enemy at her heels, but Prussia had her by the throat in a death grapple, and even as she got news of her victory at Lissa the battle of Blumenau had begun in sight of Vienna, and she felt compelled to sue for an armistice. Venetia was awarded to Italy, but in exchange for the naval prestige lost at Lissa it was dearly bought.

CHAPTER XII.

THE BATTLE OF YALU RIVER.

EARLY in 1894 an insurrection broke out in Southern Korea. In the first instance the rising was against the Roman Catholic missionaries, but later the insurgents attacked the forces of the King of Korea. The king evidently recognized China as his rightful suzerain, and appealed to that country for help. As a result of this appeal several thousand soldiers were sent to Korea to aid in suppressing the revolution. This act on the part of China was the cause of the war of 1894, in which the battle of Yalu River was the central incident.

For many years Korea was more or less of a bone of contention between China and Japan. Situated as it is, the Chinese very naturally looked upon it as a part of their country and held it tributary. The Japanese on the other hand maintained that "Korea was an independent country, which was first induced by Japan to open its doors to foreign intercourse and to take its place among the nations of the world." They further claimed that China had both openly and secretly interfered with the internal affairs of Korea. Nine years before a struggle had almost

taken place with regard to Korea, but was averted and a treaty signed containing the following important clause: "In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea, which may oblige the respective countries or either of them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood that they shall give each to the other previous notice in writing of their intentions so to do, and after the matter is settled they shall withdraw their troops and not further station them in the country."

The Chinese gave no notification to Japan of their intention of sending troops to help the King of Korea against his rebellious subjects, and, as this was a deliberate breach of the Treaty of 1884, Japan made preparations for war.

The first act of war took place on July 25. The Japanese discovered the Chinese transporting troops to Korea, and after a brief action between several of their swift sailing cruisers and the warships of China convoying the transport "Kowshing" in which the Chinese got the worst of it, the "Kowshing" was attacked though flying the British flag and officered by British sailors. She withstood the fire for but a short time and sank with a part of her crew and over a thousand of the troops she was transporting. The attack was in a way a most brutal one, for the "Kowshing" was utterly defenceless against the quick-firers of the "Naniwa." That the Japanese had not yet attained Western civilization was evidenced by their action in the destruction of the "Kowshing." As the doomed ship hopelessly settled down into the ocean under the fire from the broadside

guns, the gatlings and Nordenfelts and small quick-firers in the "Naniwa's" tops swept her decks, and even after she sank they continued to play upon the mass of humanity struggling in the water for their lives.

The sinking of the "Kowshing" has caused considerable controversy, but it can scarcely be said to have been an unjustifiable act as the Chinese were caught in a deliberate breach of the Treaty between the two Powers, and the crew of the "Kowshing" moreover refused to obey the orders of the "Naniwa." The British officers on board saw the folly of refusing to accede to the Japanese demands, but the crew threatened them with their lives, and they were helpless; fortunately a number of them escaped from the wreck through swimming.

When news of these events reached Japan war was formally declared. There were to be several fierce battles on land with great loss of life to the Chinese, but the most important meeting of the forces of the two Eastern nations was in the naval fight known as the Battle of the Yalu.

This battle was to be in a way the most important fight at sea since the time of Nelson. In it two strong fleets were engaged, and modern armour and guns received a thorough testing. Western ingenuity was to see the creatures of its brain tried for the first time in war by the semi-civilized nations of the East.

At first it seemed foolhardy on the part of Japan to precipitate a war with such a vast and populous country as China. In the crowded cities, the broad plains and on the mountain slopes there was a popula-

tion of over 300,000,000, while Japan's population did not number more than 41,000,000. The European nations thought that the little island kingdom would very soon be defeated by mere mass. No doubt this belief was strengthened by a knowledge of the fact that in the army and navy of China there were a number of distinguished European officers.

Several things, however, were greatly in favour of Japan. Ever since Perry caused that country to open her ports in 1854 to American commerce, western ideas and aims had possession of the most thoughtful of the inhabitants. Her army and navy were organized and equipped along European lines, and European inventions were welcomed in her cities and workshops. Japan had indeed become the Britain of the East. In China, on the other hand, there was a wall of prejudice against European ideas and European works, a wall much more difficult to surmount than the Great Wall. Her army and navy, too, were decidedly inferior to Japan's. The officers were brutal tyrants, and the rank and file were little better than cattle. Corruption was in every department and though China had big ships and great guns, they were not properly manned or equipped. Japan had no doubt when she entered upon this war as to what would be the final results. There was unity in the nation and, with her superior intelligence, she expected to make short work of the Chinese fleet then on the seas and the Chinese army in the Korea.

The Admiral of the Chinese fleet, Ju Chang Ting, had been a cavalry officer, and although a brave soldier was without experience at sea. His deficiency

in this respect, however, was made up for by the presence on board of his ships of skilled European naval officers. His chief-of-staff on the flag-ship was Von Hanneken and he was assisted by Messrs. Tyler, Nichols and Albrecht. On the "Chen Yuen" Captain McGiffin and Herr Heckmann had charge; Herr Hoffman was the advising mind on the "Tsi Yuen" and Mr. Purvis on the "Chih Yuen." Japan, on the other hand, depended upon herself for officers and instructors. Admiral Ito, one of the bravest and brainiest sailors of modern times, had the supreme command of the fleet of his country, and only Japanese officers were to be found on any of the ships. The little nation had learned in the few brief years in which she had taken her stand among the modern Powers to depend upon herself. In Europe the war was naturally watched with a good deal of interest. On account of the peculiar situation of Korea with regard to Japan it was known that the fleets of the belligerents would play a most important part, and the builders of ships and the makers of guns wondered whether guns or ships would be the victors in a modern naval battle. What the results would be it was hard to forecast, as the navies were of a very different character. The Japanese depended on swift-sailing cruisers, armed with quick-firers, while the Chinese hoped for victory from their heavily-armoured battleships.

The destruction of the "Kowshing" roused Admiral Ting's wrath and he was anxious to avenge what he considered a dastardly deed. Shortly after this affair occurred, the Japanese were landing troops

at Chemulpho, the port of Seoul, and Ting was anxious to proceed to that place with the fleet under his command, by adopting such a course he hoped to destroy both the cruisers and the transports there. A movement against Chemulpho would have been brilliant strategy and had his plan been carried out and succeeded Japan might have been defeated, at any rate the war would have been greatly protracted. But the Chinese authorities at Peking had not the confidence of the Chinese admiral, and he was ordered to cruise with his fleet between Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei and to remain on the defensive. He had under him a strong fleet and, had his bold plan been adopted, he might have succeeded, even with ships in which the ammunition was scanty and bad and the engines in wretched condition. As a result of the action of the authorities he was forced to wait until Admiral Ito should see fit to come to give him battle. Meanwhile the landing of Japanese troops went on unhindered and when the navy of Japan was ready to bring the Chinese navy to a general engagement the army was in a position to sweep the army of China before it.

Admiral Ting had under his immediate control the following ships: "Yang Wei," "Ping Yuen," "King Yuen," "Lai Yuen," "Chen Yuen," "Ting Yuen," "Chih Yuen," "Kwang Kai," "Tshao Yung," "Ching Yuen," "Kwang Ping," "Tsi Yuen." These vessels had a total of fifty-five heavy guns, three quick-firers, and one hundred and twenty machine guns. The two battleships, the "Chen Yuen" and the "Ting Yuen" were the hope

of China. They had each six heavy guns and twelve machine guns and had an armour belt of fourteen inches on the hull and twelve inches of armour on their turrets. All the ships were deficient in quick-firers.

Admiral Ito went out in search of the Chinese fleet with an equally strong navy made up of the following vessels: "Yoshino," "Takachico," "Naniwa Kan," "Akitsusu," "Matsushima," "Itsukushima," "Hasidate," "Chiyoda," "Fusoo," "Hiyei," "Saikio," "Akagi." These vessels carried sixty-nine heavy guns, one hundred and thirty-two quick-firers and eighty-eight machine guns. Three of these cruisers were almost as large as the Chinese battleships, but their great advantage lay in their superior speed. The "Yoshino" was the swiftest vessel in the fleet, and was credited with a speed of twenty-three knots, while the "Takachico" and the "Naniwa" were credited with eighteen knots. They were weak in armour, however, and at close range should easily have been beaten by the Chinese battleships.

Both admirals were eager for battle, but Admiral Ting was prevented from going in search of the Japanese fleet by the orders of Li Hung Chang. On Sunday, September 16, the two fleets had been engaged in landing troops in Korea; when the Japanese fleet got through with its work it steamed to the north-westward. Admiral Ito at this time could hardly have been expecting meeting the Chinese, for he was unaccompanied by torpedo boats, very necessary vessels in a modern fleet action.

On Monday morning, shortly before noon, the lookout on the Japanese fleet caught sight of a number of columns of smoke rising lazily from vessels lying off the mouth of the Yalu River. The Japanese ships had been steaming along at a leisurely rate, but their speed was increased and they soon came in sight of Admiral Ting's fleet. The Chinese admiral had already recognized the nationality of the approaching ships, and had at once ordered his vessels to weigh anchor. The signal "clear for action" was displayed on the flagship and the vessels in line abreast steamed slowly out to meet the enemy. This formation was adopted no doubt on account of the structure of the Chinese battleships. Their barbets with their heavy guns were *en echelon*, and it was thought that they could do their most effective work when firing directly ahead or astern, but the Chinese admiral made a serious mistake when he stationed his strong battleships in the centre of the line and left the wings weak. The swift-sailing Japanese cruisers would have no difficulty in turning his flank, rolling back his line and finally concentrating their fire on his two battleships.

Half an hour later the signal to clear for action was hoisted on the "Matsushima." The vessels were to advance against their enemy in line ahead in two squadrons, the van squadron consisting of the "Yoshino," "Takachico," "Naniwa Kan," "Akitusu," the main squadron consisting of the "Matsushima," "Itsukushima," "Hasidate," "Chiyoda," "Fusoo," "Hiyei," "Saikio," "Akagi." The fleet of the Chinese lay in the following order. On the

extreme right the "Yang Wei," and between her and the "Tsi Yuen," on the extreme left, the fleet was arranged in the following order: the "Tshao Yung," the "Ching Yuen," the "Lai Yuen," the "Chen Yuen," the "Ting Yuen," the "King Yuen," the "Chih Yuen," the "Kwang Kai." The "Ping Yuen" and "Kwang Ping" were not in the line of battle.

Before the action began Admiral Ting issued orders commanding sister ships or pairs of ships to keep together and support each other, all vessels as far as possible to fight bows on, and for all captains to follow the movements of the Admiral. Slowly the Chinese fleet drew towards the Japanese, but, as the vessels on the wing were slow-sailing craft, the formation was very soon more of a crescent than of line abreast. The approach of the two fleets to each other on a somewhat rough sea was a most picturesque one. The scene was very admirably described by Captain McGiffin who narrowly escaped death in the battle which followed.

"The twenty-two ships," he says, "trim and fresh-looking in their paint and their bright new bunting, and gay with fluttering signal flags, presented such a holiday aspect that one found difficulty in realizing that they were not there simply for a friendly meeting. But, looking closer on the "Chen Yuen," one could see beneath this gaiety much that was sinister. Dark-skinned men, with queues tightly coiled round their heads, and with arms bared to the elbow, clustered along the deck in groups at the guns, waiting impatiently to kill or be killed. Sand was sprinkled along the decks, and more was kept handy

against the time when they might become slippery. In the superstructures, and down out of sight in the bowels of the ship, were men at the shell whips and ammunition hoists and in the torpedo room. Here and there a man lay flat on the deck, with a charge of powder—fifty pounds or more—in his arms, waiting to spring up and pass it on when it should be wanted. The nerves of the men below decks were in extreme tension. On deck one could see the approaching enemy, but below nothing was known, save that any moment might begin the action, and bring in a shell through the side. Once the battle had begun they were all right; but at first the strain was intense. The fleets closed on each other rapidly. My crew was silent. The sub-lieutenant in the military foretop was taking sextant angles and announcing the range, and exhibiting an appropriate small signal flag. As each range was called the men at the guns would lower the sight bars, each gun captain, lanyard in hand, keeping his gun trained on the enemy. Through the ventilators could be heard the beats of the steam pumps; for all the lines of hose were joined up and spouting water, so that in case of fire, no time need be lost. ‘Six thousand metres!’—‘Five thousand, eight hundred!’—‘Five thousand six hundred!’—‘Five thousand five hundred!’—‘Five thousand four hundred!’—The crisis was rapidly approaching. Every man’s nerves were in a state of tension, which was greatly relieved when a huge cloud of white smoke, belching from the ‘Ting Yuen’s’ starboard barbette opened the ball.”

The “Yoshino” was leading the van under command of Admiral Tsuboi. The first shot was aimed

at her, but it fell short and merely sent up a threatening column of water in front of the flag-ship's bow. It had, however, a somewhat serious effect on the "Ting Yuen." When the mighty guns roared forth, the concussion was so great that every officer on the bridge was knocked down, and Admiral Ting was so badly injured that he had to be carried below and was in an unconscious state for two hours, but when he recovered he courageously returned on deck and fought his ship till dark. The firing of this gun on the "Ting Yuen" was taken as a signal by the rest of the fleet to begin action, and from a number of the ships guns were discharged at the approaching Japanese fleet, but they for the most part did no injury as their shot fell short. The Japanese fleet continued to advance in silence for some minutes. At length the "Yoshino" opened her forward battery of quick-firers on the Chinese battleships. The shells fell close to the mark and the decks were deluged with water. The fighting now became general, and as the ships came within comparatively short range of each other, quick-firers, Hotchkisses and Nordenfelts kept up a continuous rattle, while the big guns in the barbetstes and turrets thundered above the din of the smaller weapons.

The Japanese cruisers concentrated their fire on the battleships, but the armour on the belt and on the barbetstes resisted shell and shot alike. From the beginning, however, the advantage in this fight was with the Japanese. The splendid armament of quick-firers on their fleet began at once to tell in their favour. An occasional well-aimed shell from the

Chinese ships would find its mark, but a shower of shells from the broadside fire of the Japanese fleet burst about the Chinese ships, penetrating wherever they found an unarmoured part, and crashing through and tearing away the superstructures. The flying fragments of shell found many a victim and the sudden puffs of smoke told that the oiled and varnished woodwork on the decks and cabins had in many instances taken fire.

The van squadron sped on, making for the right wing and quickly swept round it, and attacked the Chinese fleet from the rear while the main squadron attacked them in front. Now the folly of Ting's formation was evident. His left wing was, for the time being, out of the fight and his weak right was thrown into confusion by this two-fold attack. Many of the Chinese guns were silenced on account of the vessels masking each other.

The main squadron followed rapidly in the wake of the van, but the swifter vessels out-stripped the slower ones, and the "Fusoo," the "Hiyei," the "Saikio" and "Akagi" for a time were under a heavy and destructive fire. The battleships made directly for the "Fusoo," but that ship managed to avoid their attack.

The "Hiyei" was now in a most critical position. She was in danger of being rammed or of being sunk. She was at comparatively short range and was exposed to a heavy fire, and her $4\frac{1}{2}$ -inch armour belt was but poor protection. Her captain had but little hope of passing uninjured along the front of the Chinese line. He saw but one chance of escape; if

he could but break through the line he might succeed in saving his ship. With commendable boldness under the circumstances he headed his vessel directly for the "Ping Yuen" and passed between the two battleships at a range of only seven hundred yards. There were nineteen killed and thirty-seven wounded on the "Hiyei" in the battle; the most of them fell while she was executing this manœuvre. The "Hiyei" was hit a number of times, but the formation of the Chinese fleet saved her. They could not bring every gun to bear on the daring craft, for as they were in line abreast they were in serious danger of firing into each other. Seeing that they were not likely to sink her with their guns, they tried torpedoes, but the aim was bad and she escaped and took up her position in line in the rear of the Chinese fleet. She had had a narrow escape, but her crew exulted in their daring adventure.

The "Akagi" likewise received severe punishment from the "Lai Yuen," "Chih Yuen" and "Kwang Kai." Her unarmoured hull was pierced many times, and she had her four principal officers killed. However, she succeeded in doing considerable damage to the enemy and her guns started a fierce conflagration on the "Lai Yuen." In the end she was forced to withdraw from the fight for a time.

Her sister boat the "Saikio" sped along the Chinese front under a heavy fire. She however succeeded in following the line around the Chinese right, but she suffered heavily and her steering gear was disabled. She found herself assailed by the "King Yuen" in front and the "Chih Yuen"

astern. She was in danger of being destroyed and no fewer than three torpedoes were aimed at her, but all missed.

According to some authorities the torpedoes were not so much aimed at the Japanese fleet as they were merely thrown from the Chinese vessels to get rid of them. These terrible weapons were proving a menace to the boats carrying them. The quick-firers were raining such a fierce shower of shells on the Chinese vessels that the crews dreaded that at any moment a torpedo might be exploded and the ship carrying it sunk. In the battle of Santiago the only torpedo that did any harm was the one in the bow of the "Vizcaya," and that was to herself. At any moment even the battleships might be sunk by their own torpedoes.

Admiral Ito saw the danger in which the rear vessels of the main squadron were placed and he signalled to the flying squadron to come to their assistance; this alone saved the "Saikio." However, she was forced to give up the fight.

It is now a difficult matter to follow this naval battle. The Japanese ships were handled with splendid skill but on the Chinese fleet all system was lost, and instead of presenting an effective formation, under the heavy and well-aimed fire of the Japanese cruisers they became a confused "mob of ships." The "Tshao Yung," and the "Yang Wei" had been exposed to a most destructive fire, as the Japanese swept round the right wing and they were soon definitely out of the battle. The woodwork on their decks took fire and it was impossible to get the fire under

control. At the same time the guns in their barbettes became silent as the crew was unable to bring up ammunition. There was nothing for it but to quit the fight; with flames bursting from their decks they sped shoreward. The "Saikio" seems to have recovered somewhat from the severe punishment she had received at the commencement of the battle, for she was able to chase them for a short distance and to give them a parting shot or two. But Chinese torpedo boats were threatening her and she gave up the chase.

About this time the "Tsi Yuen" on the left of the Chinese line, a vessel which had as yet received but slight punishment, left her position in the line. In her flight she collided with and sank her sister ship the "Yang Wei." With all steam on she fled for Port Arthur. Her commander had been guilty, on a previous occasion, of running away from battle at a critical moment and had been given another chance and this was the way he acquitted himself. His vessel safely reached port on the evening of this battle but he was afterwards tried for cowardice and executed. In justice to him, however, it may be said, that a European officer, who was on board his vessel, stated after the fight that he handled his ship with courage and skill and only fled when all hope was gone.

Three of the Japanese ships, the "Hiyei," the "Akagi," the "Saikio" were no longer in a condition for effective fighting. The "Akagi" had her steam pipe shattered and her supply of ammunition cut off for a time. Commander Sakamoto had been

killed early in the fight, but the other officers skilfully handled the little craft. Three of them were killed before the end of the action. She reached a position within four hundred yards of the enemy, and her upper works were badly riddled by the heavy fire directed against her. Her bridge was shattered by a shell which killed the officer who had taken charge after the death of Sakamoto, and her mainmast fell with a crash, but she still fought on. An hour after the death of her captain she was in the thick of the fight, and the Chinese vessels were closing about her. It was then that Admiral Ito signalled to the van squadron to return to the aid of the hard pressed ships in the rear of the main squadron. They very promptly obeyed his command and this alone saved her. She then steamed out of action and her crew went energetically to work to repair her and she valiantly returned to the battle just as it was closing.

The "Saikio" had been struck a number of times by shells from the big guns of the battleships. She had many scars and several large holes were made clean through her. Comparatively early in the fight she was forced to retire out of range to repair her steering gear. In the middle of the afternoon she bravely returned to the battle and once more received severe treatment; with her stern ablaze she was forced to permanently give up the struggle. Her escape from destruction borders on the miraculous. She was an unarmoured merchant ship, and she had been exposed to the heavy fire of armoured cruisers and of the two battleships, but the aim of the Chinese gunners was most inaccurate, and the "Saikio"

seems to have received no blows on the water-line. The most astonishing thing of all with regard to her was that not a single member of her crew was killed.

The little "Hiyei" which had so courageously broken through the Chinese line was in even worse condition than the "Akagi" or the "Saikio." Several well-aimed shells had burst on board her, killing and wounding a number of her crew and causing her mizzen mast to fall by the board. She was on fire in several places, and she, too, had to withdraw from the fight before the fire could be extinguished.

But the severest loss was on Admiral Ito's flagship the "Matsushima." This fine ship naturally attracted a good deal of attention from the Chinese vessels. When nearly two miles from their line she engaged the "Ping Yuen" and the two ships continued their duel for several hours. The "Matsushima" received some hard knocks but managed to silence the "Ping Yuen's" big gun. She then engaged the "Chen Yuen" and a shell from the Chinese battleship inflicted on her the most disastrous blow of the day. It dismounted a 4.7-inch gun and put the long 12-inch gun in the bows out of gear. It exploded a large heap of ammunition in the battery. This shell and the explosion combined killed or wounded over fifty men. A fire broke out and the crew had to put forth their energies to save the ship. This fire almost caused the destruction of the "Matsushima." It was immediately above the magazine and the gunner's mate and the seaman in charge saw, through the cracks in the deck, the glow of the flames. They stuck to their posts, however,

and stripping off their clothing stuffed them into the cracks and thus saved the ship with all on board. During the fight she had over one hundred officers and men killed or wounded. She could no longer remain in the action and Admiral Ito transferred his flag to the "Hasidate," and sent her with the other crippled ships to Kuré for repairs.

Although the Japanese had suffered these losses the inferiority of the Chinese vessels was much in evidence from the beginning of the fight. They had two fine battleships but the rest of their fleet proved weak under the fire of the quick-firers on the Japanese ships. All of their vessels, too, were badly equipped and were short of ammunition. To make matters worse their projectiles did not seem capable of piercing the armour on the cruisers opposed to them. The crews, too, were of a different breed from the tough little gunners of the enemy. On some of the ships which were raked by Japanese shell, they fled from their guns and hid in any place of safety they could find. There were exceptions, however, and one among them was Captain Tang of the "Chih Yuen." This courageous Chinaman valiantly opposed the big ships of the Japanese van. A shower of shell fell about his doomed vessel; the "Yoshino" giving her a terrible punishment with her quick-firers. His vessel's upperworks were riddled and her hull was pierced in many places, but he fought on, until at length a heavy shell struck her water-line and exploding made a wide rent. In a few minutes she went to the bottom with all on board.

On the whole at the commencement of the fight,

the Chinese fleet had suffered much more severely than the Japanese. The "Ting Yuen" had lost her fore military mast, she was several times in flames, and only the energy and courage of the European officers saved her. There seems to have been considerable exposed woodwork on both battleships, for the shells of the Japanese fleet had the "Chen Yuen" on fire no fewer than eight times. Captain McGiffin in his account of this battle to the *Pall Mall Gazette* admirably shows what battle means on a modern warship, and likewise the great perils to which officers and men are exposed in working their own guns.

"In helping to put out one of these fires," he writes, "I was wounded. The fire was forward, on the fore-castle, and there was such a fierce fire sweeping the deck between it and the fore-barbette, that the officer, whom I ordered to go and put it out, declared it to be impossible to get there alive; so I had to go myself. I called for volunteers, and got several splendid fellows—some of our best men unhappily, for nearly all were killed, but we got the fire under. The fire was on the port side, and as the starboard fore-barbette gun was firing across it, I sent orders that it was only to fire on the starboard side, but, as bad luck would have it, the man who received the order, the No. 1 of the gun, had his head shot off just after I had gone forward, and his successor did not know of it. As I stooped to pick up the hose, a shell, or a fragment, passed between my wrists grazing each. Shortly afterwards, I heard a loud explosion, and saw a brilliant light behind me, I was knocked

down, and lay unconscious for a while—how long I do not know. I believe it was the flame from the gun which I had ordered to fire only on the starboard side, but it may have been a shell exploding, though, if so, I ought to have been blown to pieces. Anyhow, I was pretty badly burnt, and when I came to, I sat up leaning on my elbow, and found myself looking almost down the tube of the great gun, pointing straight at me. I saw the end move a little to one side, then to the other, up a little, then down; and I waited for years—a fraction of a second, no doubt—for the gun to fire, for I knew that the gunner had taken aim. Then it suddenly occurred to me to make an effort. I rolled over on my side, and by great good fortune down a hatchway some eight feet or so, on to a heap of rubbish, which broke my fall; as I fell I heard the roar of the big gun.”

Captain McGiffin seems to have handled his ship with great skill and by his example and the example of the other European officers on board, kept the crew to their guns or on the alert to extinguish the fires that broke out on board.

The “King Yuen” received terrific punishment. The shells bursting on her set her on fire between decks and she was soon enveloped in flames and shrouded in rolling clouds of smoke. Her steering gear was injured and she drifted aimlessly about on the tossing waves. At length she was seen to list heavily, the sea rushed in in a mighty flood through a wide rent in her side, she turned completely over so that her keel showed, and then sank from sight dragging down with her two hundred and sixty-three

men out of a crew of two hundred and seventy. As she sank a loud explosion was heard and a rolling cloud of black smoke floated above where she disappeared from view. No doubt the fire that was devouring her had at this critical moment reached her magazine.

The "Saikio," although only a transformed merchantman, had done such effective work against the "Lai Yuen" that at the close of the fight that ship was little more than a shell, all the woodwork and inflammable material about her decks having been burned away.

The "Ching Yuen" and "Tshao Yung" and "Yang Wei" were all of them several times ablaze. In this first great sea fight under modern conditions it will be seen that fire played quite as important a part as shot or shell and the lack of judgment on the part of the Chinese authorities in leaving so much inflammable material exposed did not a little to weaken their chances in the battle. The crews were frequently called away from their guns to fight the flames, and besides the frequent fires did much to render some of the vessels unmanageable.

In the late afternoon the battleships collected the remnant of the fleet about them and prepared to fight to the end, and to those in command it must have seemed that the end could not be far distant. Their ammunition was not only bad but it was running short. Only a few projectiles were left for the heavy guns at five o'clock in the afternoon. The two battleships had been targets for the gunners on the Japanese fleet since the commencement of the fight

and had been struck over four hundred times but their heavy armour had saved them from destruction. Throughout the entire battle the Japanese vessels with one or two exceptions, which have already been noted, kept at long range, either afraid to approach on account of their frail structure or desiring by their distant and heavy fire to compel the battleships to surrender. The "Chen Yuen" and the "Ting Yuen" would have been magnificent prizes to have taken back to Japan. Had the Japanese cruisers, however, had the boldness to come to close range they might have sunk the ships either by their gun fire or by using their rams. The swift sailing cruisers should have had no difficulty in getting home a deadly blow on the slow-moving, and, in the case of the flagship at least, badly handled battleships. To the surprise of the Chinese ships still in the fight, Admiral Ito at half past five ordered his fleet to retire. The Japanese vessels left the scene of the battle of the day, at a time when it seemed that the whole of the force opposed to them must either become their prizes or be destroyed. The "Chen Yuen" had but three projectiles left for her heavy guns at the moment when the signal for retirement was displayed on the "Hasidate," and the "Ting Yuen" was in no better condition to continue the fight.

When the Japanese retired the Chinese battleships accompanied by the "Lai Yuen," "Ching Yuen," "Ping Yuen" and "Kwang Ping," two gunboats and two torpedo boats, sailed away in the direction of Wei-hai-wei. They were a sorry and battered

remnant of the gallant fleet that had weighed anchor in the morning with such confidence of success when they saw on the horizon the thick columns of smoke rising from the Japanese fleet. On the following day they reached Port Arthur where they were refitted only to receive further severe punishment and to fall into the hands of the Japanese a few months later.

Much surprise has been expressed at the action of Admiral Ito in giving up the fight at a moment when it seemed that his victory was about to be a most complete one. In his official report he makes the following explanation of his conduct:

“About 5:30 p. m. seeing that the ‘Ting Yuen’ and the ‘Chen Yuen’ had been joined by other ships, and that my van squadron was separated by a great distance from my main force, and considering that sunset was approaching, I discontinued the action, and recalled my main squadron by signal. As the enemy’s vessels proceeded on a southerly course, I assumed that they were making for Wei-hai-wei; and having re-assembled the fleet, I steamed upon what I supposed to be a parallel course to that of the foe, with the intention of renewing the engagement in the morning, for I deemed that a night action might be disadvantageous, owing to the possibility of the ships becoming separated in the darkness, and to the fact that the enemy had torpedo boats in company. I lost sight, however, of the Chinese, and at daylight saw no signs of the foe.”

The truth probably is that the long and hard battle which the crews had endured fighting the fires that broke out on their ships, as well as working the guns,

had worn out both officers and men. It may be, too, that Admiral Ito was a little nervous about continuing the battle in the darkness when torpedoes might be used to advantage. His reference in his report to the torpedo boats would almost make one think this. At Tamatave it was a comparatively easy matter to continue the battle through the night. The sailing ships were not so exacting in their demands on the activities of the crew as were the ironclads with boilers and engines and other machinery that required constant attention. A five hours' continuous battle is enough to exhaust the best crew afloat in a modern warship, and the condition of his men had probably as much to do with the retirement of Admiral Ito as his fears from his ships being scattered in the darkness or his dread of the torpedo boats.

It is hard to compute the losses in this battle. The Chinese suffered the most heavily and lost in killed and wounded almost a quarter of their entire force engaged. It has been computed that between six hundred and eight hundred were killed and drowned and eighty-eight wounded. According to the Japanese report their losses were light, considering the length of the battle and the heavy fire to which their ships were exposed. They, too, had about three thousand men engaged and of these ninety were killed or drowned and two hundred and four wounded. The "Matsushima" suffered the most heavily. She had two officers killed and three wounded and thirty-three men killed and seventy-one wounded; the "Hiyei" lost fifty-six officers and men, killed and wounded; the

"Itsukushima," one officer wounded and thirty men killed or wounded; the "Hasidate," two killed and ten wounded; the "Fusoo," fourteen killed or wounded; the "Yoshino," eleven; the "Saikio," eleven; the "Akagi," twenty-eight; the "Akitsusu," fifteen; the "Takachico," an officer and two men wounded; the "Naniwa," one man wounded; the "Chiyoda," although close to the "Matsushima" when she received her severest punishment, had no casualties to report.

Although the battle was in the end such an indecisive one it was big with importance as regards the progress of the war between China and Japan. Once more the nation that was able to control the sea was to be the victor, and the importance of a strong and efficient navy was again demonstrated. The battle of the Yalu gave the Japanese complete command of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Pechili and as a result Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei were shortly afterwards forced to surrender. At Wei-hai-wei five months later the Chinese fleet withstood the fire of the Japanese vessels for several days and then Admiral Ting surrendered his vessels that were left and the Len Forts to Admiral Ito conditionally. There was something pathetic in the close of Ting's life. He and Ito had been schoolboy friends and Ito generously offered him a safe conduct to Japan, but he courteously refused the offer, and, in disappointment at his failures, and, knowing that he would doubtless be executed for his defeat, committed suicide.

Two or three important lessons were taught the

naval world by the Battle of the Yalu. In the first place it was demonstrated that quick-firers on board of fast-speeding cruisers were of more service than big guns on slow-moving battleships. It was shown, too, that everything of an inflammable nature should be stripped from vessels before going into action. Spain was slow to learn this lesson and the neglect of it cost her dear at Manila and Santiago. It was seen, too, that torpedo boats were of little value in an action by day. There were no torpedo boats in the Chinese line when the battle began and although several approached during the action, before they could come within range to be of any effect they were beaten off by the fire of the Japanese cruisers. Torpedo tubes on board of warships were likewise found to be dangerous weapons. On several occasions the ships carrying them had very narrow escapes from being destroyed by having torpedoes on board struck by the enemy. Again, they seem to have been a very ineffective weapon; they were badly aimed, and as they floated about on the scene of the battle they became a grave menace to the vessels which discharged them. It is thought by some that one or more of the Chinese vessels may have been destroyed by coming in contact with their own torpedoes.

No great lesson in naval tactics was learned from the Yalu. The battleships engaged were of an obsolete type and from the very beginning of the fight the Chinese vessels on either wing kept no kind of order. They have very properly been said to have fought as "a mob of ships." It has been left for the twentieth century to show what modern warships and

modern guns can do when properly handled. From the efforts being put forth by Japan to increase her sea power and the war that continually threatens in the East over the Chinese situation, it may yet be that the first great trial of modern warships will take place in the far Pacific.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE BATTLE OF MANILA BAY.

WHEN war broke out between the United States and Spain, the United States Pacific squadron was in the harbour of Hong Kong. For some weeks it had been evident to the authorities in Washington that war could not be avoided and they had taken every precaution to have the fleet in the East, under Commodore George Dewey, ready for immediate action. In February the Commodore had been ordered to have his vessels kept "full of coal, the best that can be had;" and in the beginning of April he had been instructed to purchase two vessels for supplies, and had with great promptness secured the "Nanshan" and "Zafiro." On April 24, across the Pacific flashed the message from Secretary Long that "war has commenced between United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavours."

The fleet was in readiness, but for two days awaited the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States Consul, from Manila. In the meantime on account of the proclamation of neutrality, of the Governor of Hong Kong, the squadron, on April 25,

sailed for Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions. On April 27 Mr. Williams arrived and immediately the American vessels weighed anchor and steamed out of Mirs Bay into the waters of the Pacific.

When the people of the United States learned that George Dewey was speeding towards Manila they were expectant of victory, but never anticipated such a sudden and overwhelming one as he was to gain over the Spanish fleet.

Commodore Dewey was an experienced naval officer, trained in Annapolis Naval Academy, from which institution he graduated in 1854. He was of good old New England stock, and was born in Vermont in 1837. Six years after his graduation from Annapolis the Civil war broke out, and very naturally his sympathies were with the North. His first war service was under that heroic and skilful naval commander Admiral Farragut, and the young Vermonter did excellent work in helping to force the mouth of the Mississippi and in many of the numerous actions along the river. He narrowly escaped death at Port Hudson. In attempting to run his vessel past that strong position she came under a heavy fire and was torn and rent by shot and shell. He ran her ashore in a sinking condition, and, to prevent her falling into the hands of Confederates; set her on fire. During the closing years of the war he saw much fighting on the Atlantic coast, and ever proved himself a brave and resourceful officer. For his services he was made a Commodore in 1884 and was appointed to the command of the Pacific squad-

ron in 1898. It was generally conceded that it was a fortunate thing for the United States that a naval officer with Commodore Dewey's experience was, at this critical moment in his country's history, in command of the Pacific squadron.

Early in March Commodore Dewey realized that war could not be avoided and in anticipation began to concentrate his squadron at Hong Kong. While his ships lay at anchor in Mirs Bay he made them ready for battle, so that when war should be declared they could be cleared for action at a moment's notice.

On April 27, as he steamed oceanwards he had with him a fleet, which, while not possessing any vessels of great size having heavy guns, was a compact aggregation of well equipped and well manned warships, vastly superior to anything Spain could muster in opposition in the Pacific. It consisted of the following vessels:

“First-class protected cruisers. — ‘Olympia’ (flagship): Displacement, 5,800 tons; armament, 10 5-inch guns, 10 quick-firers. ‘Baltimore’: Displacement, 4,600 tons; armament, 4 8-inch guns and 6 6-inch guns, 12 small quick-firers.

“Second-class protected cruisers. — ‘Raleigh’: Displacement, 3,183 tons; armament, 1 6-inch quick-firer, 22 lighter quick-firers. ‘Boston’: Displacement, 3,187 tons; armament, 2 8-inch and 6 6-inch guns, 11 quick-firers.

“Gunboats.—‘Concord’: Displacement, 1,700 tons; armament, 6 6-inch guns, 7 quick-firers. ‘Petrel’: Displacement, 800 tons; armament, 4 6-inch guns, 5 quick-firers.

“Despatch-boat.—‘Hugh McCulloch.’

“Storeships.—‘Nanshan’ and ‘Zafiro’: Merchantmen, laden with coal, provisions, and ammunition.

“All the six United States fighting ships had a steel under-water deck to protect the engine space and vitals of the ship. Besides this armoured deck, the ‘Olympia’ had four to five-inch armour on her barbetstes and conning-towers, and four-inch steel shields to protect her secondary armament. The ‘Baltimore’ had no barbetstes, but had steel shields to her guns and an armoured conning-tower. The ‘Raleigh’ and ‘Concord’ had also armoured conning towers.”

The Spanish fleet was immensely inferior to the American squadron in everything excepting numbers, and were practically without the protection of armour. The vessels were relics of a bygone age, having been built for the most part in the early eighties. They were old and leaky, their engines and boilers were out of repair and they were generally in a state of neglect. In time of battle they could be nothing but death traps. An enumeration of the ships is sufficient to show their inferiority to the American fighting machines opposed to them.

The following were the vessels that were resting under the guns of Cavite when Commodore Dewey entered Manila Bay:*

“Small protected cruisers.—‘Isla de Cuba’ and ‘Isla de Luzon’: Displacement, 1,040 tons each; armament, 6 4½-inch guns and 6 quick-firing guns each.

* *Campaigns of the Nineties*: A. Hilliard Atteridge.

“Second-class cruiser.—‘Reina Cristina’: Displacement, 3,090 tons; armament, 6 6-inch guns, 2 lighter guns, 10 quick-firing guns.

“Third-class cruisers.—‘Castilla’: Displacement, 3,342 tons; armament, 4 6-inch guns and 6 lighter guns. ‘Don Antonio de Ulloa’: Displacement, 1,152 tons; armament, 4 4½-inch guns, and 4 quick-firing guns. ‘Velasco’: Displacement, 1,139 tons; armament, 3 6-inch guns and 2 lighter guns.

“Gunboats.—‘El Cano’: Displacement, 525 tons; armament, 3 4¼-inch guns and 1 quick-firing gun. ‘Marques del Duero’: Displacement, 500 tons; armament, 3 old muzzle-loaders. ‘Villalobos’; Displacement, 347 tons; armament, 2 small quick-firers.

“The ‘Castilla’ was an old wooden ship. Taking the six-inch gun, throwing a hundred-pound shell, as the typical heavy naval gun in a cruiser squadron, we see that while the American fleet had thirty-two guns of this or of higher calibres, the Spanish fleet had only thirteen. Dewey’s fleet carried sixty-eight quick-firing guns; his opponents had only twenty-three. But even this does not represent the full superiority of the American squadron in gun-power. All their guns were modern weapons from the Washington gun foundry, of longer range, higher striking power, and (thanks to their flat trajectory) far more accurate than the Spanish guns. These were of various types: There were Armstrongs, Krupps and Hontoria guns; so that to provide a proper variety of ammunition, and keep it sorted out in the arsenal, must have been a troublesome business.”

Admiral Don Patricio Montojo Pasaron was in command of the Spanish fleet. He was two years younger than Admiral Dewey, having been born at Ferrol in 1839. He had entered the navy when but sixteen years old; the two admirals had therefore seen service for about the same length of time. He had spent most of his life in the East, and had been in frequent engagements with the natives who were constantly rising against Spanish rule in the Philippines, and had run down not a few of the pirates who frequent the coasts of Asia. Although an able commander honours had come slowly to him, and it was not until 1893, after having seen thirty-eight years of service, that he reached the rank of captain. He had lost much of his early enthusiasm, and while waiting for the arrival of Dewey's fleet seems to have been without heart or hope. He knew the inevitable battle could have but one ending. His leaky tubs would be destroyed, and with Spanish bravery he was prepared to go down with them. His government had been so crassly careless of the needs of the Pacific fleet that he had ceased to take an interest in his command. He had frequently begged the authorities to strengthen his squadron, or at least to properly equip the vessels already in the East, but his appeals were unheeded. Usually men are wise after the fact, but there was much truth in his words to a correspondent shortly after the battle of Manila Bay. "I knew from the first," he said, "that my squadron would be completely destroyed. I knew the Americans had men-of-war, whereas my ships were incapable of fighting with any chance of success."

Admiral Montojo at first decided not to risk a battle in Manila Bay, but to take his fleet to Subic Bay, sixty-five miles from Manila, where he thought he would have a better chance of giving battle to the American squadron. When he reached this place he found that "the Subic fortifications offered no protection." He then brought his ships back to Manila Bay, hoping that in the shelter of Cavite he might be able to do some damage to the American ships before his own fleet was annihilated.

If the Admiral was so hopeless, the commander-in-chief of the forces in the Philippines, General Augustine, with characteristic Spanish enthusiasm deceived himself into believing that Spain would be victor in the impending struggle, and issued the following proclamation to the people of the Philippines:

"The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, and with their outrages against the laws of nations and international treaties.

"A squadron, manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honour, and liberty.

"The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of victories will give us one as complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause demands."

Meanwhile Commodore Dewey was on his way to Manila. He put to sea on Wednesday and under

ordinary circumstances would have reached his destination early on Saturday morning, but he had with him several slow-moving storeships, and these did not a little to retard the progress of his fleet. He had learned that the Spanish Admiral might possibly be in Subic Bay and so he paused in his journey and sent the "Boston" and "Concord" to reconnoitre that place, but as no trace of the Spaniards could be found, his fleet continued on its voyage to Manila.

On that day Admiral Montojo had returned to his old station; and his ships, in no state of preparation for battle, were idly resting under the guns of Cavite.

At nightfall on Saturday, April 30, the American fleet drew near the broad entrance to Manila Bay. They had been cleared for action two days previously and now the final preparations for battle were made.

The harbour the American warships were about to enter is one of the finest in the East. For thirty miles the bay stretches deep and broad into the island of Luzon. At its extreme end is the populous and rich city of Manila. At its widest part it is about twenty-five miles broad, while its entrance is twelve miles across. Its entrance, however, is broken by the rocky island of Corregidor. This island divides the waters at the mouth of the bay into two channels; the Southern one is about ten miles in width, and the Northern, two. On Corregidor and on the island of El Fraile close to the Southern shores batteries had been posted, but the sleepy Spaniards stationed there kept a very careless watch. The night was clear and bright with a thin rim of the moon showing,—a night

on which a watchful guard might have distinguished objects for a considerable distance without the aid of a search-light.

At half past eleven the fleet steamed slowly into the broad Southern channel, having little thought of receiving injury from the batteries on Corregidor and El Fraile. Much had been said about the mines that had been sunk at the harbour mouth, but Commodore Dewey had no fear of mines at this stage of the proceedings. He knew that the water in both channels was too deep to make successful mining possible.

The vessels entered the channel in column, the "Olympia" leading. She was followed by the "Baltimore," the "Raleigh," the "Petrel," the "Concord," the "Boston" and, at some little distance in the rear, the "McCulloch" and the transports. Silently through the night like phantom ships crept the long line, scarcely a sound arose from them. All lights were screened; a stern light was burning on each ship to let the one next in rear know the direction.

The crews stood about the decks watching the tall shadowy form of Corregidor, expecting to see the flash of the guns burst at any moment from that point of vantage. Despite the clearness of the night half of the squadron got past before they were observed, and it was not until the "Boston" was opposite Corregidor that a gun spoke from El Fraile battery. The "Raleigh," the "Concord," and the "Boston" returned the fire, sending a shower of shells into both positions, silencing several of the

guns. Soon the entire fleet was out of range of the batteries without having received any injury.

There was now no need to hurry to Manila. The battle the Commodore had planned could not begin until daybreak, and so the vessels moved stealthily forward with a scarcely perceptible motion. The men knew that when the morning broke there would be a battle, and having no fear of the result they laid down beside the guns and for the most part slept peacefully.

When the crews were aroused at daybreak, they found their vessels in sight of Manila, and about five miles from the shore, their bows in the direction of the city. It was Sunday morning, apparently the favorite morning for battles, and the waters of the bay were as smooth as glass.

There was to be no delay; the battle was to begin at once. The men in charge of the heavy shore batteries of Manila saw that the hostile vessels were within range and at a quarter past five opened fire upon the fleet. The shot flew wide of the mark, screaming over the decks of the squadron. The "Concord" replied to the batteries of Manila with two shots. But the firing on the city was not continued; Commodore Dewey had no wish to wantonly destroy property; he had come to Manila to annihilate or capture the Spanish fleet, and by so doing to force the Spaniards in the Philippines to ask for terms. But if possible he would avoid bombarding the streets of Manila. Nothing could be gained by destroying that fair city and slaughtering its inhabitants.

Everything on board the American vessels was in a thorough state of preparation for a battle, and had been so since dusk of the previous evening. How was it with the Spanish fleet? They knew that the enemy's vessels were near at hand, and yet had apparently made no efforts to get their ships in a condition to resist the attack. However, all of Admiral Montojo's vessels had steam up, and when the formidable American fleet appeared in front of them in the early dawn, with flags flying at the mast-heads and cleared for action, they did their best to at once get under weigh.

Outside of Cavite lay the "Reina Cristina," the "Castilla," the "Don Antonio de Ulloa," the "Velasco," the "Isla de Cuba," the "Isla de Luzon," and the "Mindinoa," while four gun-boats and the torpedo boats were within the shelter of the harbour. The fleet awaiting Admiral Dewey's squadron presented a formidable array of names, but nothing more. The wooden ship "Castilla," the most ancient in the fleet, having been launched in 1881, was now being used as a floating battery. This vessel was moored by the head and stern and well protected by sand lighters alongside. Her engines were in such a condition that they could not be worked and she was dismantled of a part of her armament, a number of her guns having been dismounted and sent to Corregidor to attack the fleet of Commodore Dewey as it passed. However, she presented her port broadside to the enemy and awaited destruction. The "Don Antonio de Ulloa" and the "Velasco" were likewise broken down, no doubt by

their voyage to Subic Bay, but they were patched up in time to take no mean part in the fight.

When the American ships came within comparatively close range Admiral Montojo made ready for a desperate fight. He slipped the springs and the cables on his vessels and started ahead with the engines and moved out to give battle. He was accompanied by such of his vessels as were able to follow. It was a brave act; all the more brave as the Spaniards believed that in the American squadron there were at least two battleships. The low-built "Boston" they thought to be one, and the "Olympia" was taken to be the "Oregon." Admiral Montojo must have known that if one such ship as the "Oregon" had come against him, she would have been sufficient to utterly destroy his fleet without receiving serious injury.

The Spanish vessels were drawn up in a line across the mouth of Cavite Bay with their left resting on Sangley Point, and here they waited till the enemy came within range.

It was a blazing hot morning, the Eastern sun was already torturing the men in turret and battery, and down in the stoke-holes the firemen were almost suffocated. The crews stood by their guns, and in the excitement of the moment almost forgot the heat.

On the forward bridge of the "Olympia" accompanied by several of his officers stood Admiral Dewey, calmly viewing the situation through his marine glasses. A shell might burst in this exposed position at any moment and kill or wound every man standing there, and in order that in such a case a

senior officer might still be in charge of the ship he sent Captain Gridley to the comparative safety of the conning-tower.

Slowly the American fleet moved towards Cavite at a speed of eight knots; suddenly a dull roar was heard in front of the "Olympia" and immense columns of water were hurled in air. Several submarine mines had been exploded, but the Spaniards had misjudged the position of the "Olympia" and had touched off their mines a moment too soon. There might be more in front, but it was no time to stop or slacken speed, and the pupil of Farragut led his fleet forward taking his chance of having his ship blown to pieces. If one ship did meet destruction the others would be sufficient to do the work Dewey had sailed from Mirs Bay to accomplish. However, all danger from mines had been removed, the two that were exploded in front of the "Olympia" were apparently the only ones sunk in the harbour.

Soon the guns from Cavite opened on the approaching vessels, but their range was bad and the shells almost dropped into the batteries in Manila. The Spanish fleet next opened their batteries and very soon a score of shells were singing overhead and falling in the water dangerously close to the approaching warships. Still the fleet advanced in silence, no sound rising from them save that caused by the pounding of their screws and the working of their machinery. Up in the fighting tops range-finders were at work, and, as the "Olympia" had no pilot on board familiar with the harbour of Manila, the leadsman in the chains was busy keeping the Admiral informed of the depth of water.

The suspense was almost unbearable. Suddenly a shell burst over the deck of the "Olympia." It was as though the signal to begin fighting had been given. The range was now 5,500 yards. Admiral Dewey went to the voice tube, leading to the conning tower and uttered the memorable words: "You may fire when ready, Gridley."

Gridley was ready. It was then nineteen minutes to six, and instantly from the eight-inch starboard gun in the forward turret a shell was hurled at the battery on Sangley Point. The battle then began in earnest and the other ships of the American navy opened fire as they moved in succession along the front of the Spanish position, and well-aimed projectiles went screaming towards the forts and the "Reina Cristina" and "Castilla."

The Spanish fire was now fairly accurate. They evidently had the range of the fleet and about the leading ships fell a number of bursting shells. The "Olympia" was exposed to the heaviest fire and her commander had several narrow escapes. One time-fuse shell came screaming with deadly accuracy directly towards the bridge, but fortunately when it was about one hundred feet from the vessel it burst, a fragment of it cutting the rigging immediately above the Admiral's head. Another shell struck the bridge grating, another passed directly under it, plowing its way through the deck, but without doing serious injury. At four thousand yards from the enemy the water was found to grow perceptibly shallower and Dewey changed his course, turning the "Olympia's" full broadside towards the Spanish

column. He then gave the command "open with all the guns;" and instantaneously heavy guns, quick-firers and automatic guns joined harmoniously in the chorus of war.

The Spanish fire was not without its effect. A shot passed through the "Baltimore;" but the luck of the Americans stood by them, and no one was injured. Another shell tore up the main deck, exploded a box of three-pounder ammunition, wounded eight men and put a 6-inch gun out of action. The "Boston" was subjected for a time to a particularly hot fire. A shell passed through the foremast immediately in front of her commander, another exploded in Ensign Doddridge's stateroom, setting the ship on fire; another ignited the port hammock netting, but both these fires were quickly extinguished by the well-drilled and energetic crew.

For an hour the fight continued, the attacking fleet moving up to Sangley Point, firing steadily with their port guns; then turning and going back slowly to the eastward using their starboard broadsides. Their fire was deadly, the Spanish vessels presenting a remarkably easy target. Shells were seen to explode on many of the vessels and soon their decks were strewn with the dead and dying. Guns were disabled and on several of the ships fires that the crews could not control broke out.

In the heat of the fight two diminutive launches were seen steaming out of the shelter of the inner harbour. They were torpedo boats, and had come out with the evident intention of attempting to torpedo the "Olympia." It was a forlorn hope, and

the brave fellows on board were speeding to inevitable destruction. The quick-firers were turned on the launches; one of them was rapidly shot to pieces while the other turned tail and made for the shore in a sinking condition.

Admiral Montojo saw that his fleet could not long survive this galling fire, and hoping to destroy at least one of the cruisers left his line of battle and moved out to shorter range; but the "Olympia" turned all her guns on the Spanish flagship, and torn and rent, with flames bursting from her decks, she soon fled back to the shelter of Sangley Point. She had received terrible punishment; in all she had been hit nearly a hundred times, and out of her crew of 370 officers and men 200 were dead or wounded. Her steering gear had been shattered by a shell and the main pipe of the condenser had been destroyed. One of the officers and the chief engineer were wounded. The boatswain and chief gunner were dead and Admiral Montojo himself had been struck by a fragment of a shell, but he courageously continued to direct the battle. Soon the flames shooting through the deck of his ship warned him that he must leave the "Reina Cristina."

The admiral then signalled to the "Isla de Cuba" that he would transfer his flag to her and in an open boat bravely passed to that ship. On this journey the water was lashed about him by exploding shells, and he and his staff were in imminent danger of their lives. He ordered Captain Cadarso of the "Reina Cristina" to abandon the ship. That gallant officer stood on the deck of the vessel till all were in the

boats; his son, a young lieutenant serving under him, was just in the act of calling to his father to come into his boat when a shell struck the captain and slew one of the bravest and most proficient sailors of Spain. It is worthy of note that in this battle Admiral Montojo and his son likewise fought side by side, and both were wounded.

Now that the "Reina Cristina" and "Castilla" were out of action, the fire of the American fleet was directed against the "Isla de Cuba" and the "Isla de Luzon," and as the vessels passed and re-passed along the line firing continuously and frequently from a range of only 2,000 yards, guns on the Spanish ships were put out of action and the smitten ships burst into flames. The Spanish fire rapidly grew weaker and at the same time the battery on Sangley Point was firing only at intervals; the supply of ammunition was running short. But from the long line that swept back and forth in front of Cavite out of a canopy of sulphurous smoke the continuous din of battle was sustained, and the shells rained unceasingly on the doomed vessels and forts. Still the Spaniards held out; they were at least able to give their lives for the honour of Spain.

In about half an hour after boarding the "Isla de Cuba," Admiral Montojo saw how impossible it would be to continue the fight, and so he ordered the "Isla de Cuba" to run for safety into Bakor Bay behind Cavite; and, as the other ships followed the flagship in, he ordered their commanders to resist to the death. He expected the American Admiral to lead his warships in to the attack, but to his surprise,

almost simultaneously with his flight to Bakor Bay, the enemy were seen to withdraw.

The Spaniards, who, owing to the clouds of smoke that hung about the American fleet, could not tell the effect of their shooting, flattered themselves that they had done so much injury to their foe that he was compelled to retire. As a result a telegram was sent to Spain which led the people of that country to believe for a few brief hours that their navy had gained a victory.

Admiral Dewey had withdrawn his squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition and to allow his men to breakfast. The crews were hungry and tired. They had gone into the battle after a night during which but few of them had had much rest and after breaking their fast with but a hurried cup of coffee.

With the cessation of hostilities the smoke of battle lifted and as ship after ship steamed past the "Olympia," their crews in the rigging and on the turrets loudly cheered their Admiral. In the distance the flaming hulks and stranded boats told them how effective their work had been.

At eleven o'clock the fleet was once more ready for action and in two lines steamed towards the scene of the early morning battle, while all along the shore and in front of Manila crowds assembled to witness the final struggle.

At a quarter past eleven the American ships were once more within range, and as the "Don Antonio de Ulloa" was still in evidence with the flag of Spain flying at her mast-head, she became the centre

of this second attack. She made an excellent target, and heavy shells crashed through her hull and swept her decks. She was soon found to be in a sinking condition, but her brave commander had no thought of surrender. His crew caught his spirit and heroically stood by their guns on the lower deck, working them until they sank with their ship.

Simultaneously Sangley Point and the arsenal and fort at Cavite came under fire. Meanwhile the "Raleigh," the "Concord" and the "Petrel" were ordered into the inner harbour to destroy the ships which had sought shelter there. In the shallow water the "Raleigh" and the "Concord" could effect but little, but the "Petrel" did excellent work. Montojo saw how useless it was to hold out longer and so he gave his last signal to his captains to scuttle and abandon their ships. The captains were not slow in obeying the order, and as the crews deserted the sinking vessels they took with them the breech pieces of the guns so that if they did fall into the hands of the enemy they would be valueless. The wounded were placed under guard in the villages about and the remnant of the crews marched to Manila.

In finishing up the Spanish navy the little "Petrel" steamed in to within a thousand yards and by accurate and rapid shooting with her quick-firers soon silenced everything in the harbour and even put the "quietus" on one of the shore batteries. Lieutenant Hughes with an armed boat-crew visited a number of the vessels that had escaped the flames and soon smoke and tongues of fire were rising from

the "Don Juan de Austria," the "Marques del Duero," the "Isla de Cuba," and the "Isla de Luzon."

It was now time to count the cost. The Americans had not lost a man in battle and only eight were wounded. On the night before the battle the chief engineer of the despatch boat "McCulloch" had died of acute apoplexy, but this was the only death reported on the American fleet. The vessels were practically uninjured; several of them had a few scars, especially the "Olympia," the "Boston" and the "Baltimore," but they had received no serious damage. Spain, on the other hand, had lost heavily; 400 men were killed or wounded, several of her commanders were dead, and every ship in the harbour was in flames or sunk. In the language of Captain Lamberton of the "Boston," the Spaniards had fought bravely under unequal conditions and had exposed their lives in vessels not fit for fighting.

When the battle was over the American vessels anchored off Manila for the night after a message had been sent to General Augustine that if the shore batteries opened fire the fleet would lay the city in ruins.

All night long as the ships swung at anchor the burning hulks lit up the sky, and occasionally the sleeping sailors were aroused by explosions which reminded them of the work they had done in the morning hours.

Cables were cut on May 2, and it was nearly a week before the full details of the action reached the United States. The dispatches were carried to Hong Kong by the "McCulloch," and the world was thus

made aware of one of the most remarkable actions in history. When the news of the victory reached America Admiral George Dewey became on the instant as great a national hero as Farragut or Grant, and was ranked with Rodney and Nelson.

On account of the conflicting stories with regard to the details of this battle it has been deemed wise to give the following official report which Admiral Dewey sent to the Government and which appeared in the *Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation*,—a report as remarkable for its modesty as it is for its fullness in regard to essentials:

“The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, immediately on the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies the squadron.

“Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30 and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.

“The ‘Boston’ and ‘Concord’ were sent to reconnoitre Port Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the ‘Boston’ and ‘Concord,’ but the Spanish fleet was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal it appears that it had been their intention to go there.

“Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at 11:30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire,

none of the shots taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire.

"The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 a. m., by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line across the mouth of Baker Bay, with their left in shoal water in Canacao Bay.

"The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,' 'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5:41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective.

"The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, counter-marching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the 'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship 'Reina Cristina' made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the 'Olympia' being concentrated

upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until she sank.

“ At 7:35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if necessary.

“ The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-half mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them.

“ At 11:16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12:30 p. m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted.

“ At 12:40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the ‘ Petrel ’ being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible.

“The Spanish lost the following vessels:

“Sunk—‘Reina Cristina,’ ‘Castilla,’ ‘Don Antonio de Ulloa.’

“Burnt—‘Don Juan de Austria,’ ‘Isla de Luzon,’ ‘Isla de Cuba,’ ‘General Lezo,’ ‘Marques del Duero,’ ‘El Correo,’ ‘Velasco,’ and ‘Isla de Mindanao’ (transport).

“Captured—‘Rapido’ and ‘Hercules’ (tugs) and several small launches.

“I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy’s killed and wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The ‘Reina Cristina’ alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

“I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle.”

From this account it will be observed that there is an absolute absence of self-glorification; no boasting, no exultation over a defeated enemy. The battle could not have terminated otherwise. With a superior force he had been ordered to capture or destroy the enemy’s fleet, and he had merely done his work thoroughly.

Admiral Montojo, in his official report to his government, has given the world a somewhat fuller account of the engagement. It is the statement of a

modest and heroic sailor who was, however, no tactician.

“At midnight,” he wrote, “gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at two on the morning of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search-lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Señor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy.

“This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the American squadron in the bay of Manila.

“The squadron being disposed for action, fires spread, and everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy’s arrival.

“All the vessels, having been painted dark gray colour, had taken down their masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly.

“At 4 a. m. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4:45 the ‘Austria’ signaled the enemy’s squadron, a few minutes after which they were recognised, with some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6,000 metres distant; the flagship ‘Olympia’ ahead, followed by the ‘Baltimore,’ ‘Raleigh,’ ‘Boston,’ ‘Concord,’ ‘Helena,’ ‘Petrel,’

and 'McCulloch' and the transports 'Zafiro' and 'Nanshan.'

"The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were noncombatant, amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns, 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average velocity of about 17 miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was represented by 10,011 tons, 11,200 horse-power, 76 guns (very short of rapid-fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of 12 miles.

"At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron.

"This battery had only two Ordonez guns of 15 centimetres mounted, and but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.

"In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5:15 I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started ahead with the engines, so as not to be involved by the enemy.

"The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fighting the 'Cristina,' my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant Jose Nunez took the

wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight.

“In the meanwhile another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crew’s bags, but this fire they were, fortunately, able to control. The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles.

“At half-past seven one shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzenmast head, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately.

“A fresh shell exploded in the officers’ cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand-steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode.

“Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smokestack and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action one master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun. While the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

“The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued

firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the gun's crews had been frequently called on to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action.

“The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke-pipe, and masts riddled with shot, and confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the ‘Cuba’ and ‘Luzon’ to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the ‘Duero’ and the arsenal.

“I abandoned the ‘Cristina,’ directing beforehand to secure her flag, and, accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser ‘Isla de Cuba.’ After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the rescue. The ‘Ulloa,’ which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell, which entered at the water-line, putting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those who were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated.

“The ‘Castilla,’ which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk and was abandoned by her crew, in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado.

The casualties on this ship were twenty-three killed and eighty wounded.

“The ‘Austria,’ very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the ‘Castilla.’ The ‘Luzon’ had three guns dismantled and was slightly damaged in the hull. The ‘Duero’ remained, with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimetres and one of the redoubts.

“At eight o’clock in the morning, the enemy’s squadron having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take position in the bottom of the roads at Bakor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered.

“At half past ten the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal, and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.

“There remained the last resource—to sink our vessels—and we accomplished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and the signal codes; after which I went, with my staff, to the convent of Santo Domingo de Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.

“The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seaman gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional ma-

chinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country, and to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships."

In this closing paragraph is given the true causes for the overwhelming defeat of the Spanish squadron—a superior fleet, manned by numerically strong and intelligent crews, and with their machinery in perfect condition, had won the day.

What were the results of this battle? It once more taught the nations the influence of Sea Power. Had Spain had but one good battleship of the "Oregon" class in the waters of the Pacific Ocean guarding her important positions there, she could easily have kept at bay or destroyed the whole of the fleet sent to annihilate her vessels. Of course had there been such a ship guarding the Philippines the United States would have sent an equally powerful vessel to give her battle. As it was the American cruisers had driven Spain from the Eastern seas, and it was only a matter of weeks till she, the oldest of the Powers, would be forced to surrender her possessions in the Philippines to the United States, the youngest among the great nations. The victory of Manila Bay gave to the people of the United States confidence in their ships, their guns, and the men behind the guns; and it inspired every sailor in the

Atlantic fleet with a desire to emulate Dewey and his men. So far as naval warfare is concerned, it was barren of results. It gave no new lesson that had not already been taught many times. It, however, emphasised the truth that money expended on a navy in time of peace is money well invested, and that the best way to economise in war is to be ready for war.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO.

THE thoroughness with which Admiral Dewey did his work in Manila Bay gave the people of the United States confidence in their navy. Still, it was generally recognized that the Pacific fleet of Spain was composed for the most part of her inferior ships, and as she was known to possess several thoroughly modern battleships it was expected that, in the waters about Cuba, a fight on more equal terms might take place.

During April a Spanish fleet collected at the Cape de Verde Islands, and as soon as war was declared the North American continent was in a state of expectancy. Would this fleet swoop down on some unprotected part of the coast? Would it endeavour to destroy the ships blockading Havana and enter that harbour, or would it concentrate itself in an attack on the battleship "Oregon" which was then speeding from San Francisco, and destroy that magnificent ship before its strength could be added to the blockading fleet? Conjectures as to the whereabouts of this fleet entertained newspaper readers for several weeks.

The preparations made by the Americans to meet the fleet under Admiral Cervera, which consisted of

four armoured cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers, were to station a squadron, under the command of Commodore Schley at Hampton Roads to guard the coast of the United States, and another at Key West, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sampson, to guard the naval base at that place and to maintain a blockade of the harbour of Havana ninety miles distant; two scouts were also sent to cruise to the westward of Martinique in order to give notice of Cervera's approach, provided his destination was the West Indies. The whereabouts of the Spanish squadron, which left Cape de Verde Islands on April 29, was not known until it was reported to the southward of Martinique on May 12. On the morning of that day, Sampson with two battleships, two monitors, and two small cruisers, had attacked San Juan, hoping to discover Cervera at that place. The two squadrons, at this time, were only about 400 miles apart.

Admiral Cervera, by means of the torpedo-boat destroyer "Terror," sent into Martinique for news and was enabled to hear of Sampson's presence at San Juan before Sampson heard anything of Cervera. Not finding the latter at San Juan, Sampson retraced his steps to the base at Key West to await further developments. Sampson's natural objective was the Spanish squadron; whereas, Cervera's objective was to secure a harbour where he could recoal and refit his squadron, and discharge his military stores. In this case, Cervera hearing of Sampson being at San Juan by means of the torpedo-boat destroyer, and feeling himself debarred from entry into that port

for the purpose of obtaining coal, continued his voyage to the westward to Curacao, where, he had been informed by his government, two colliers were to meet him. One thing which Cervera did not learn at Martinique was the knowledge of a telegram which had been sent to him on the 12th of April from Madrid to return with his squadron to Spain. He did not hear of this telegram until after reaching Santiago. The irony of this order, coming when compliance was impossible from want of coal, and, after all of Cervera's representations before leaving Spain of the folly of the expedition, must have struck him very forcibly. While Cervera pursued his course to Curaçao, Sampson was proceeding slowly to the westward towards Key West, his speed being much impeded by the monitors. His views of the situation and reasons for leaving San Juan, as it then appeared to him, are indicated in a dispatch to his government, as follows:—

“ It was soon seen that Admiral Cervera's squadron was not in the port. It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still north, and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was then open to entry

by such force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement towards Havana imperative. I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana."

Before reaching Key West, however, Sampson was intercepted on May 15 by a dispatch boat, by which he was informed not only of Cervera's arrival at Martinique, but also of his arrival at Curaçao on the 14th, and of the dispatch to Key West from Hampton Roads of the Flying Squadron, under Commodore Schley, on May 13. Thus he was apprised that the concentration which had been so impatiently awaited had already begun, and that the problem of bringing the Spanish squadron to action had assumed concrete shape. Leaving his slow-moving monitors to pursue their way, he hastened forward in his flagship, the "New York," to the base at Key West, where he arrived on the 18th. He found there the Flying Squadron, consisting of the "Brooklyn," flagship, "Massachusetts," and "Texas." This squadron was hastily coaled and dispatched at 9 a. m. of the 19th to Cienfuegos, and was followed 36 hours later by the "Iowa." One hour before the Flying Squadron left Key West, the Spanish squadron had completed its entry into Santiago.

While the destination of Cervera's squadron, after it had left Curaçao, was of course unknown, Admiral Sampson himself regarded Santiago de Cuba and San Juan as the most probable ports. He directed the "Yale" and "St. Paul" to cruise between Morant

Point, Jamaica, and St. Nicholas Mole. The "Harvard" was sent to the Mona Passage and on the north side of Porto Rico.

Information reached Washington that the Spanish squadron had munitions of war essential to the defense of Havana, and this led to the contention, in some minds, that Cienfuegos would be its ultimate destination. The disposition of the American forces—one squadron at Havana, under Sampson, and one squadron at Cienfuegos, under Commodore Schley—was, until further developments, thought to be the best cover that could be made against the Spanish squadron; leaving them San Juan and Santiago as the only two ports into which they could seek an entry. Upon the same day, May 18, on which the concentration of the American forces at Key West took place, the battleship "Oregon" reached Barbadoes on her long voyage from the Pacific. There had been naturally much anxiety in the United States about this vessel, and fears were entertained of an attempt to capture her by the Spanish squadron. Upon his arrival at Barbadoes, the only news of the situation which Captain Clark, her commanding officer, received was that the American squadron, under Sampson, had been defeated at San Juan, and that Cervera, with eighteen ships, was awaiting his arrival off Martinique. As a matter of fact, the Spanish squadron had passed to the westward six days previous to his arrival. It has since been ascertained that this anxiety, in regard to the safety of the "Oregon," was uncalled for, inasmuch as Cervera did not know of the presence of that vessel in the Atlantic, and be-

lieved her to be in the Pacific where he had last heard of her. The colliers, promised by his government to Cervera at Curaçao, did not appear, and he was enabled to obtain only 400 tons of coal for two of his vessels. For this purpose two vessels, the "Maria Teresa" and "Vizcaya," entered the harbour of Curaçao on the 18th, leaving the "Oquendo," "Colon," and the destroyers "Furor" and "Pluton" outside; the "Terror" had been left at Martinique for repairs. Every moment was now precious to Cervera as he had entered upon the scene of active operations where contact with the enemy's vessels might be at any moment expected, and his coal supply did not admit of extended cruising or a long chase. In default of a sufficient coal supply, there was nothing for him to do but make a dash for some Spanish port and take the chances of meeting the enemy. On the 15th, he left Curaçao at economical speed, on account of the "Colon," for Santiago de Cuba, timing the movement so as to arrive off that port at daylight on May 19. This was successfully accomplished, and the Spanish squadron was anchored inside of the harbour and screened from view by the hills at the entrance by 8 a. m. of the 19th. As no American vessel was off Santiago at the time of the entry of the Spanish squadron, although the "St. Louis" had been there the day previous, there was no eye-witness to its arrival, so for a few days there was much uncertainty as to the truth of the report, and it seems to have been discredited at first both by Sampson and Schley. Secret telegraphic communication had indeed been received at Washington on the 19th of May announcing

the arrival of the Spanish squadron, which had been transmitted to Admiral Sampson and by him to Commodore Schley. The golden opportunity of bringing Cervera's squadron to action before it reached a Spanish port was thus lost, and it only remained now for Sampson to see that Cervera did not escape from his harbour of refuge, gained after such a slow and crippled voyage of ten days through the West Indies unmolested by the enemy.

With plenty of coal, Cervera might have easily enticed Schley to Santiago, and, avoiding him or taking advantage of any laxity in the blockade, have reached Cienfuegos in safety. This possibility in the game, however, was denied to Cervera by the failure of his government to provide him with coal. Handicapped as he was, Captain Mahan believes he could have reached Cienfuegos twelve hours before the arrival of the Flying Squadron, but as the "Oquendo" had only 100 tons of coal in her bunkers upon her arrival at Santiago, the wisdom of a further run of 320 miles, with the chances of battle or chase thrown in, would have been hardly advisable. Upon the evening of May 24, the Flying Squadron, in obedience to orders, left Cienfuegos for Santiago, where it arrived on May 26, finding off that port three scouts, namely, the "Minneapolis," "Yale" and "St. Paul," all watching the entrance, but none of the commanding officers could state positively that the Spanish squadron was inside. Next day the "Harvard" joined the fleet with dispatches from St. Nicholas Mole. At this point Schley seems to have been seized with the idea that it was impossible to coal his

squadron off Santiago, and that a retreat to Key West would be necessary for that purpose. He announced his decision in this matter to the Navy Department at Washington in the following dispatch:—

“The receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged delivered by ‘Harvard’ off Santiago de Cuba; ‘Merrimac’ engines disabled; is heavy; am obliged to have towed to Key West. Have been unable absolutely to coal ‘Texas,’ ‘Marblehead,’ ‘Vixen,’ ‘Brooklyn’ from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leaving Key West. The ‘Brooklyn’ has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer all owing to southwesterly winds. ‘Harvard’ reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. ‘Minneapolis’ only coaled for Key West, also ‘Yale,’ which tows ‘Merrimac.’ Much to be regretted cannot obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan Passage. Cannot ascertain respecting enemy positive. Obligated to send ‘Eagle’—admitted no delay—to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons coal. Will leave ‘St. Paul,’ off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold. “SCHLEY.”

Upon the receipt of this dispatch at Washington, much consternation resulted, as it left an open door

for Cervera's escape. At his own request, Admiral Sampson was directed to proceed to Santiago and take charge of the blockade, arriving there with the "New York" and "Oregon" on June 1. Before his arrival, however, Commodore Schley had reconsidered his determination to withdraw to Key West, and, after proceeding to the westward for about 28 miles, he returned on the 28th of May and established the blockade. How well the anxiety, caused by Commodore Schley's withdrawal, was justified may be seen from an extract of an account of the movements of Admiral Cervera's squadron, published by Captain Palau, his chief of staff:

"On the morning of the 26th Schley's squadron appeared off Santiago and at night withdrew to the southwest to take shelter under the lee of the Island of Jamaica (?) from the storm prevailing. On that day the 'Infanta Maria Teresa' had 200 tons of coal in her bunkers, the 'Vizcaya' and 'Oquendo' 500, and the 'Colon' 700. The ships all had steam up and ready to go out, for Admiral Cervera, realizing that the blockade would begin the following day, had called a council of war of his captains to determine what was best to be done. The situation was as we have described it, being obliged to suppose that the hostile squadron was closely guarding the channel at Cape Cruz, that Sampson was coming down off the old channel with the 'New York' and 'Oregon,' agreeable to information to the government itself, and that Havana was sufficiently

blockaded against an attempt by our few dismantled ships. There was, therefore, no alternative but to go to San Juan and in 24 or 36 hours, which was the least time in which we could suppose the enemy would arrive, and in this space of time stow away as much as 1000 tons of coal in each of our cruisers. This fact being evident, all agreed that it would be impossible to coal at that place in the short space of time which the circumstances demanded. The problem was further complicated by there being a heavy swell at the mouth of the harbour, and the 'Colon,' whose draft aft was so excessive, would be sure to touch bottom in going out. Opinions were divided. Some that we should go out in any event, directing our course towards San Juan and if we should perish there it would be by the will of government, and if we succeeded in getting to sea with all or part of the squadron it would be safe. Others thought that as it would be quite possible and even probable that the 'Colon' would be lost at the mouth of the harbour, for which reason she must be the last to make the sortie, the squadron would be reduced to nothing. The public and official opinion which we thought so exaggerated, and, as a matter of fact, it was so in Spain, would not have considered the loss of the 'Colon' justifiable, and as we could not have gone out from San Juan either, it was thought better to remain in Santiago and await events. Two of those who had voted for the sortie declared on their honour and conscience that they were convinced the government at Madrid had determined that the squadron should be destroyed as early as possible in order to discover some means

of attaining peace at an early date, and that they had therefore voted for the sortie not because it was logical but *because we would receive a definite and military order to do so under still worse conditions*. Confronted by these terrible dilemmas, the Admiral ordered the mouth of the harbour to be sounded and having ascertained that there would be but eight feet of water under the keel of the 'Colon' in passing over the rocks of the bar, and, as the swell presupposed serious injury if not her total loss in going out; notwithstanding, I had been one of those who voted for the sortie, believing that our destruction was what the government desired, I think that Admiral Cervera was very wise in deciding to have the fires extinguished under eight boilers of each ship and remain at Santiago in expectation of whatever opportunity fortune might offer us, and such opportunity never presented itself, as it never does when the disproportion of force is so great and when all the fundamental principles of naval strategy have been disregarded."

On the day that this council was taking place in the cabin of the "Maria Teresa," Admiral Sampson with his squadron was off Matanzas, about 800 miles from Santiago. It will thus be seen but for the uncertainty of the "Colon" passing the bar, that during the absence of Commodore Schley, on the nights of the 26th and 27th, Cervera might have made his escape from Santiago; but in any case, the itinerary of his squadron was now limited to the two ports of Santiago and San Juan, in one of which it would

eventually have been destroyed. As a matter of fact, it is doubtful if the harbour of San Juan would have contained all four of the vessels, and furthermore it does not afford that protection from bombardment which was obtained at Santiago. All things considered, Santiago was perhaps, with the possible exception of Cienfuegos, the safest port for the Spanish squadron.

The collier "Restormel," from Curaçao, was captured on May 25 by the "St. Paul," while attempting to enter Santiago harbour with 2400 tons of coal for Cervera's squadron. This vessel had gone first to Porto Rico and from there to Curaçao, where she arrived two days after Cervera had departed. She reported that when she left Porto Rico there were two other colliers there with coal for the squadron.

On May 31, the day before the arrival of Sampson off Santiago, Commodore Schley with the "Massachusetts," "Iowa," and "New Orleans" made a reconnaissance towards the entrance of Santiago Harbour. The speed was set at ten knots and the three vessels in passing the entrance to the harbour opened fire on the forts and the "Colon," which was in plain sight, and the distance, according to Commodore Schley's official report, was about 7000 yards. Commodore Schley, in his report says:—

"The reconnaissance developed the fact that the Spanish vessels are in the harbour and that the fortifications are well provided with long-range guns of large caliber."

The problem of containing the Spanish squadron in the harbour of Santiago which now presented itself to Admiral Sampson, might either be accomplished by a rigid blockade or by an obstruction in the channel which would prevent all exit. The latter course was apparently the easiest of accomplishment and promised better and quicker results. With Cervera's squadron effectively bottled up in the harbour, the battleships would be immediately relieved from attendance and would be available for work elsewhere, including a possible demonstration against the Spanish coast, thereby frustrating any attempt to succor Manila; the blockade of the whole coast of Cuba would have been accomplished, as far as the means would allow, and the free movements of the army expeditions along the coast secured.

In order to obstruct the channel, Naval Constructor Hobson entered the harbour of Santiago with the collier "Merrimac" on the morning of June 3. He had been given permission by Admiral Sampson to prepare that vessel for this work, and had suspended two electrical torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each containing 78 pounds of gunpowder. He was accompanied by a crew of only seven men, although the Admiral was overwhelmed with volunteers for the work. It was the intention of Constructor Hobson to have sunk the "Merrimac" in the narrowest part of the channel, off Diamante Bank, but hardly had he entered the mouth of the harbour when all the rapid fire batteries of the submarine defences, those of the destroyers that were on guard, and the battery on Punta Gorda opened fire upon him. It

seemed a miracle that no one was killed or even wounded under this downpour of fire. Owing, however, to the rudder and anchors having been shot away and the drift of the tide, the "Merrimac" sank on one side of the channel without obstructing it. She was struck by two Whitehead torpedoes and one submarine mine.

(PALAU). The courage of Constructor Hobson, upon this occasion, was superb and he gave an example of exalted heroism which the United States Navy had not witnessed since the days of Cushing. He escaped from the ship with all his men, before she sank, upon a raft and was captured by the Spaniards. He and his men were kindly treated and afterwards exchanged, and the next day Admiral Cervera sent a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson and informed him that Hobson and his party were uninjured. It was indeed little less than a miracle that under such a hail-storm of fire, as was poured upon the "Merrimac" from all sides, that no one was hurt. The unfortunate failure, however, of this attempt forced Sampson to undertake a long and wearisome blockade, which continued until July 3. Sampson's plan of blockade was to station the larger vessels in a semi-circle, with a radius of six miles from the harbor entrance. The order for this blockade was issued on June 2, as follows:—

"The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows:—

“First squadron under personal command of the Commander-in-Chief: ‘New York,’ ‘Iowa,’ ‘Oregon,’ ‘New Orleans,’ ‘Mayflower,’ ‘Porter.’ Second squadron, Commodore Schley: ‘Brooklyn,’ ‘Massachusetts,’ ‘Texas,’ ‘Marblehead,’ ‘Vixen.’

“Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles from the Moro in the daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. IF THE ENEMY TRIES TO ESCAPE THE SHIPS MUST CLOSE AND ENGAGE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND ENDEAVOR TO SINK HIS VESSELS OR FORCE THEM TO RUN ASHORE IN THE CHANNEL. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

“In smooth weather the vessels will coal on stations. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.”

On June 7 the blockade of the larger ships was reinforced by picket launches close in shore patrolling the beach and by three gun-boats, the “Vixen,” “Suwanee,” and “Dolphin,” moving at night at a radius of two miles from the entrance. On June 8 the “Iowa,” “Oregon,” and “Massachusetts” were ordered to take turns of two hours each, during the dark hours of the night, in illuminating the en-

trance with searchlights, and the illuminating ship was supported by a second battleship so that fire could be opened on the entrance without disturbing the searchlights. On June 15, the distance of the blockading circle was lessened to a four mile radius from the harbour mouth, which distance continued until the end of the campaign. The steady glare of the searchlights, which never moved from the entrance night after night, tried the souls of the Spanish sailors and soldiers, who were so blinded that neither from the castle top nor from the harbour below could they see the huge shadows of the ships. More than that, the searchlights destroyed effectively, in the minds of Admiral Cervera and his commanding officers, all idea of attempting to escape at night, as they believed that with the blinding effect of the searchlights in their eyes, they would be unable to steer their ships out of the narrow channel.

On June 8, a secondary base was established by Captain McCalla with the "Marblehead" and "Yankee" under his command at Guantanamo, a good harbour about 40 miles to the eastward of Santiago, and on June 10 a battalion of marines was landed and occupied a fortified position. During the remainder of the operations, this place served as a secondary base for the use of the Navy, where colliers, supply, hospital ships, and transports could anchor in safety, and where the battleships of the blockading fleet could go for coal in smooth waters.

Several engagements took place between the blockading fleet and the batteries on the hills east and west of the harbour entrance, during one of which, on June

22, the "Texas" was struck by a shell from the Socapa Battery and had one man killed and eight wounded. While the batteries on either side of the harbour entrance were originally insignificant, mounting only a few brass cannon of obsolete pattern, they were being daily augmented and improved by men and guns from the squadron, and the bombardments engaged in were for the purpose of preventing this work going on. The batteries were for the time being silenced, but, the guns not being dismantled, they soon recovered their life and generally fired a shot in defiance as the fleet withdrew. Unknown to Admiral Sampson, much damage was done to the Spanish squadron assembled on the inside, close under the hills upon which the batteries were situated. After one of these actions, on June 6, Admiral Cervera telegraphed to Madrid as follows:—

"Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbour for three hours, being answered by batteries at mouth of harbour, among which are guns of 'Reina Mercedes.' Our casualties: killed, executive officer 'Reina-Mercedes' and five others (sailors); wounded, Ensign Molins and 11 others (sailors) and five bruised. Army has one dead; wounded, a colonel (of artillery), 4 officers and 17 privates. I do not know loss of enemy. 'Reina Mercedes' has suffered much. 'Vizcaya' received two shells, 'Furor' one shell in the bunker without serious injury. Works of defense have suffered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on coast."

During the blockade, at regular intervals during the night, the dynamite cruiser "Vesuvius" threw dynamite bombs, containing about 500 pounds of gun-cotton, into the harbour but as far as known they did no serious damage.

In order to ascertain more accurately the situation of the Spanish ships inside the harbour, which were invisible from his fleet, Admiral Sampson dispatched a young officer, Lieutenant Victor Blue, on June 11, to reconnoitre the harbour from the hills to the westward. Placing himself in the hands of the Cuban insurgents, Lieutenant Blue proceeded to a point inside the Spanish lines on a hilltop overlooking the harbour from the westward and about three miles distant from it. From this point he had an unobstructed view of the entire bay and of the vessels inside. He afterwards made a second trip, and Admiral Sampson, in speaking of this work said, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy:—

"I desire to recommend to your consideration the excellent conduct of Lieutenant Victor Blue, U. S. N., attached to the U. S. S. 'Suwanee,' who has on two occasions, at my request, undertaken to locate the positions of the Spanish fleet in the harbour of Santiago de Cuba. To accomplish this, it has been necessary to travel on one occasion over 73 miles, and on another a distance of 60 miles, mostly through territory occupied by the intrenchments of the Spanish army.

"I think the manner in which he has accomplished these tasks is deserving of promotion, and I respectfully recommend that he be advanced two numbers."

On June 22, an army expedition of 25,000 men, under Major General Shafter, landed at Daiquiri, about 13 miles east of Santiago, under cover of the fire of the vessels of the Navy and assisted by the insurgent troops on shore. The Spanish troops retreated to their intrenchments outside of Santiago, where on June 23 the city was invested by the invading army. On July 1, after a sanguinary assault on El Caney and San Juan, the outposts of the city were captured and General Shafter was in a position to demand its surrender, which he did on July 3. Meanwhile, as the investment by land as well as by sea was becoming closer and closer, the question of what to do with the Spanish squadron became more and more important. Many telegrams on this subject were exchanged between Admiral Cervera, Captain-General Blanco at Havana, and the government at Madrid. When Admiral Cervera first arrived at Santiago, he was independent of the Captain-General at Havana and acting under orders from the home government. The movements of his squadron were entirely under his own control and subject only to orders from Madrid.

He held at different times during his stay at Santiago, several consultations with his officers in regard to leaving that port. The consensus of opinion among the officers seems to have been in favor of sinking the ships in the harbour of Santiago when the city was obliged to surrender in preference to going out to what they considered almost certain destruction. This was not, however, the opinion of either the Minister of Marine at Madrid or of Captain-General

Blanco at Havana, who appeared to have held that the honour and dignity of Spain demanded a naval engagement at whatever cost.

On June 24 Admiral Cervera was placed under orders of the Captain-General by virtue of a telegram from the Minister of Marine at Madrid. In obedience to this order, Admiral Cervera placed himself under the orders of Captain-General Blanco by the following dispatch:—

“Minister of Marine commands me to place myself under orders of your excellency in conformity with regulations of royal order of November 13, 1872, which I do with the greatest pleasure. I believe it my duty to set forth conditions of squadron. Out of 3,000 rounds for 5.5-inch Hontoria guns, only 620 reliable, rest have been pronounced useless, and were not replaced by others for lack of stores when we left. Two 5.5-inch Hontoria guns of ‘Vizcaya’ and one of ‘Oquendo’ defective, and had been ordered to be changed for others. Majority of fuses not serviceable. We lack Bustamante torpedoes. ‘Colon’ is without heavy armament. ‘Vizcaya’ is badly fouled and has lost her speed. ‘Teresa’ does not have landing guns, and those of ‘Vizcaya’ and ‘Oquendo’ are unserviceable. We have little coal; provisions enough for month of July. Blockading fleet is four times superior; hence our sortie would be positively certain destruction.

“I have a number of men ashore reinforcing garrison, of which I consider myself a part. Believe it my duty to tell your excellency that on the 23rd I

addressed to Government the following telegram: 'The enemy took possession of Daiquiri yesterday. Will surely occupy Sibouney to-day, in spite of brilliant defense. The course of events is very painful, though not unexpected. Have disembarked crews of squadron to aid army. Yesterday five battalions went out from Manzanillo. If they arrived in time agony will be prolonged, but I doubt much whether they will save city. As it is absolutely impossible for squadron to escape under these circumstances intend to resist as long as possible and destroy ships as last extreme.' The foregoing telegram expresses my opinion as well as that of the captains of the ships. I await instructions from your excellency."

Blanco replies to this by telling Admiral Cervera:

"It is not a question of fighting, but of escaping from that prison in which the squadron is unfortunately shut in, and I do not believe it impossible, by taking advantage of favorable circumstances in dark night and bad weather, to elude enemy's vigilance and escape in whichever direction you deem best. Even in case you are discovered, fire is very uncertain at night, and although it may cause injuries it would mean nothing compared with safety of ships.

"You say that loss of Santiago is certain, in which case you would destroy ships, and this is an additional reason for attempting sortie, since it is preferable for the honour of arms to succumb in battle, where there may be many chances of safety. Moreover, the destruction of the ships is not certain, for

the same thing might happen that occurred at Havana last century when the English included in the capitulation the surrender of the squadron which was inclosed in the harbour.

“ If your cruisers are in some manner captured in Santiago Harbour, the effect on the whole world will be disastrous and the war may be considered terminated in favor of the enemy. The eyes of every nation are at present fixed on your squadron, on which the honour of our country depends, as I am sure your excellency realizes. The Government is of the same opinion, and to my mind there can be no doubt as to the solution of the dilemma, especially as I have great confidence in the success.”

After some further correspondence in regard to his withdrawing his sailors from the garrison on shore, Admiral Cervera was directed by the Captain-General on June 30 that “ in case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can.”

On July 1, Admiral Cervera called a council of officers to whom he communicated the instructions which he had received, and it was their opinion that—

“ They thought a case had arisen in which the Captain-General ordered a sortie, but it was impossible to effect it without a re-embarkation of the men now on shore for the defense of the city, being at present more than two-thirds of the total forces of the squad-

ron, and that at the same time the chief of the army corps, in an official communication, had stated that he could not do without their aid, being absolutely without reserves and forces with which to relieve the men on the extensive lines to be defended. As a result of the foregoing, it was the unanimous opinion that in order to co-operate in the most effective manner and with some prospect of success in the defense of the city, it would be necessary to obstruct the harbour entrance."

It is curious to note in these proceedings, how both the American and Spanish admirals, for totally different reasons, ardently desired that the narrow water channel connecting the two fleets should be effectively blocked, and also that the attempts made on each side to accomplish this object were both failures. Apparently, however, General Blanco considered that the city was doomed and he did not wish the squadron under Admiral Cervera to be included in the surrender. On July 2, he sent Admiral Cervera the following telegram, marked urgent:—

"In view of the exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your excellency will re-embark landing troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately."

In obedience to this order, Admiral Cervera re-embarked his men on the 2nd and prepared to leave the harbour on the morning of July 3. The instructions for the sortie were as follows:—

“ ‘Infanta Maria Teresa’ was to go out first, followed by the ‘Vizcaya,’ ‘Colon,’ ‘Oquendo,’ and destroyers ‘Pluton’ and ‘Furor.’ The ‘Teresa’ was to engage the nearest hostile ship and the vessels following were to take a westerly course at full speed, with the ‘Vizcaya’ at their head. The torpedo-boat destroyers were to keep out of the fire as much as possible, watching for a favorable opportunity, acting if it presented itself, and try to escape at their highest speed if the battle went against them.”

On that Sunday morning, July 3, 1898, the blockading fleet was floating idly in their stations all unconscious of the gathering storm which was about to burst upon them. In the circle around the entrance lay the battleships “Indiana,” “Oregon,” “Iowa,” “Texas,” and “Brooklyn”—the “Indiana” being on the east and the “Brooklyn” on the west. Two of the blockading fleet were absent; the flagship “New York,” a cruiser, having left her station that morning for the Army landing at Sibouney where Admiral Sampson had an appointment for a conference with General Shafter, and when the Spanish squadron appeared at 9:38 a. m., she was seven miles distant from the harbour entrance, and while she turned quickly and with ever-increasing speed to regain her station, such was the destructiveness of the American fire, that the Spanish vessels, except the “Colon,” were destroyed before she regained the scene of action. The “Massachusetts” had been ordered to Guantanamo for coal and had left her station, which was between the “Texas” and

“Iowa,” at 8:30 a. m., six hours previous to the sortie. As a consequence of these absentees, the “Indiana” had moved in nearer the shore, covering the position occupied by the “New York” and between the “Indiana” and shore there was the converted yacht “Gloucester.” On the west, the “Texas” had closed in towards the “Iowa,” covering the vacancy made by the “Massachusetts,” and the “Brooklyn” having drawn in from the western extremity of the semi-circle towards the place of the “Texas.” This movement of the “Brooklyn,” closing in towards the “Texas,” and leaving the western exit more open than usual had unconsciously disconcerted the plan of action as contemplated by Admiral Cervera. The “Brooklyn’s” station being ordinarily at the extremity of the semi-circle, to the westward of the entrance, Admiral Cervera had contemplated that he would find her directly in his path when starting to the westward and had intended to engage her while the rest of his squadron were to escape, but finding when he emerged from the harbour entrance that the “Brooklyn” was further to the southward, and that to direct the course of the “Teresa” towards her would have obliged her to cross the bows of all the intervening ships between the “Brooklyn” and the “Indiana” with the danger of being rammed or sustaining the combined fire of all the heavy guns of the fleet, he continued the course of his vessel to the westward, without attempting to cross the bows of the other blockading fleet. As the Spanish vessels emerged from the harbour they directed their first

broadsides towards the "Indiana," she being the nearest vessel on their port hand.

As the Spanish fleet steamed to the harbour mouth the tell-tale smoke warned the lookout on the "Iowa." The alarm was given and instantly the signal was run up, "the enemy is escaping." On the flagship the same signal was displayed, and simultaneously the Commodore ordered the fleet to "clear ship for action." The "Iowa" was the first vessel to speak, the voice of one of her six-pounders opened what was to be the last naval battle of the nineteenth century.

The crews of the blockading ships were in a state of wildest excitement. The hour for which they had been waiting for many weary weeks had arrived, and they rushed to their posts with astonishing alacrity and in five minutes every vessel was ready for battle. Out of the harbour mouth sped the graceful flagship of the Spanish fleet the "Infanta Maria Teresa." Admiral Cervera was in the forward conning tower standing beside his pilot, Miguel Lopez. After the "Maria Teresa" in swift succession came the "Vizcaya," the "Cristobal Colon" and the "Oquendo," and, at some distance in the rear, the two torpedo-boat destroyers, the "Pluton" and "Furor." All the vessels were gay with bunting, adorned as a sacrifice for the god of war.

Admiral Villaamil in command of the destroyers checked his vessels in order to get on a full head of steam, and there was therefore considerable distance between these two boats and the main fleet.

When the "Infanta Maria Teresa" cleared the harbour mouth Cervera ran up the signal to his

commanders, "I wish you a speedy victory." As soon as he had well cleared the narrow entrance he turned his ships proudly westward, and as he did so poured forth a broadside at the enemy. The battle was now on and for over three hours the shores of Cuba were to re-echo with the sounds of great guns. As ship after ship cleared the entrance they too joined in the fight and over them thundered the cannon from Socapa and Morro. But their shooting was inaccurate and in their first volleys did no injury. In less than a quarter of an hour after the prow of the flagship had appeared, the whole Spanish fleet was clear of Morro.

The vessels of the American squadron being motionless, the gathered headway and accumulated steam gave the Spanish vessels a tremendous advantage in rushing past them, but they were, of course, subjected to a heavy fire at distances varying from two to three miles, and, although this rush past to the westward was made with all the steam the Spanish vessels could carry, the fire of the American ships, even before they began to gather headway in pursuit of the flying Spaniards, was so accurate and so destructive that many of the latter received their death-wounds in the first fifteen minutes, and while the speed of the Spanish ships became every moment slower and slower, that of the American vessels became, during the same time, faster and faster. On the "Teresa," Admiral Cervera relates that one of the first projectiles burst an auxiliary steam pipe and gradually the steam escaped, which made them lose the speed upon which they had counted. About

the same time another shell burst one of the fire mains. In this critical condition a fire broke out in the cabin and after-deck, which spread with great rapidity to the centre of the ship, and he says,—“As we had no water, it made great headway, and we were powerless to fight it. I realized that the ship was doomed and cast about for a place where I could run her aground, without losing many lives, and continue the battle as long as possible.” Instructions were given to flood the magazines, but it was found impossible to do so or to venture into the passage, owing to the dense clouds of smoke and steam escaping. Admiral Cervera says: “I therefore steered for a small beach, west of Punta Cabrera, where we ran aground just as the engines stopped. In this painful situation, when explosions commenced to be heard in the magazines, I gave orders to lower the flag and flood the magazines.” Captain Concas was wounded early in the action and Admiral Cervera himself took command of the vessel.

The “*Maria Teresa*” was hit in all some twenty-nine times, principally by six-pounders, but it was the larger shells that did the destructive work and set her on fire. While she was receiving this punishment Admiral Cervera stood on the bridge earnestly watching the fight. He knew now that it could have but one ending—the destruction of his fleet. He was slightly wounded, but he heeded not his wound; he was no doubt hoping that one of the bursting shells would end his life, and that he might perish with his vessel. The “*Maria Teresa*” was now blazing in several places, and great clouds of

smoke were rising from her hull. The firemen were driven from the stoke-hole and the engineers from their engines, and the gallant ship drifted ashore a helpless wreck. Her crew threw themselves into the water endeavouring to escape to the shore by swimming. Even Admiral Cervera and his son had to follow their example.

The "Gloucester" did most effective work in the rescue, saving, among others, Admiral Cervera and his son. When the Admiral was taken on board the "Gloucester" Commander Wainwright met the chivalric old man with the words, "I congratulate you, sir, on having made as gallant a fight as ever was witnessed on the sea."

The "Vizcaya," the second vessel which came out, suffered equally from the fire of the American guns. Her captain relates, in his official report,—“In the high battery there were so many casualties that although there was but one gun left that could fire, there were not men enough to serve it. In the lower battery there were no men left either to serve the guns or to conduct the firing. It therefore became necessary to decrease the crew assigned to extinguishing the fires, that were constantly breaking out everywhere, and, as a result of this fact, in conjunction with the circumstances that the fire mains had become useless through hostile fire, the conflagration increased to such an extent that it was no longer possible to control it. It is safe to say that the number of victims in the batteries, two hours after the beginning of the battle, was between 70 and 80, most of them killed.” The "Vizcaya" continued her flight

for a distance of fifteen miles before she was forced, at 11:15 a. m., to run on shore, burning fiercely and with her magazines beginning to explode, on the shoals of Assaradores.

The "Vizcaya" as she struck presented a tragic picture. She had made a noble fight for her life, and her gallant captain had not turned her shoreward till she was one mass of flames. The ammunition which had been brought on deck for the guns was exploding with the heat, and her panic-stricken crew hoping to escape were throwing themselves into the sea.

While the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" sped on after the doomed "Cristobal Colon," the "Iowa" the "Hist" and the "Ericsson" bore down upon the stranded "Vizcaya" and the work of rescue began. It was a dangerous task. Ammunition was exploding on all sides; the rigging was falling on the deck, shells in the loaded guns occasionally burst as the flames enveloped the guns; the rescue boats, too, were in danger of being swamped by the turbulent surf. Fortunately, however, the work was done without mishap. Soon every living soul was removed from the burning hulk which two hours before had been the pride of the Spanish sailors.

Many heroes were on board of her and some of them rather than yield risked swimming through the roaring waters, risked death from the Cubans who lay in wait to shoot them down, and succeeded in making their way to Santiago where they reported for duty and fought till the surrender of the city.

Captain Eulate, broken-hearted at the loss of his

magnificent ship, was treated with the greatest courtesy by Captain Evans. As he reached the deck of the "Iowa," after his surrender, he was received by a guard of marines; and when he offered his sword to her commander, it was refused with the words: "You have surrendered to four ships each heavier than your own. You did not surrender to the 'Iowa' only, so her captain cannot take your sword." To the "Iowa," too, were conveyed a number of severely wounded Spaniards. Three of these brave fellows died shortly after being brought on board the American vessel. Their bodies were covered with the flag they had loved so well and fought so hopelessly for, and they were consigned to the deep with military honours.

Kings and cabinets stir up hate and make war, but the gallant conduct of soldiers and sailors to their vanquished foes does much to draw diverse peoples together and, strange as it may seem, in the hour of deadly battle the brotherhood of man is frequently most strongly emphasized. The treatment accorded to Admiral Cervera and Captain Eulate and the men who served under them did not a little to teach the Spanish people that in the heart of the American people there was no hatred of Spain; and the chivalric action of Admiral Cervera to Lieutenant Hobson and his brave comrades, and the gallant fight to the death of the "Pluton" and "Furor," the "Infanta Maria Teresa," the "Almirante Oquendo" and the "Vizcaya," gave the Americans a respect and admiration for Spanish valour that they had not previously known. They might differ in language and blood,

but in many ways they were one in spirit, and there was hope that time, the healer of all wounds, might yet see them friends.

The third ship to go out of the harbour was the "Oquendo," but by the time she appeared the American fleet had gathered headway and were at much closer range; her men were soon driven from the guns and she burst into flame. The greater part of the rapid fire battery was destroyed, several guns dismounted, and nearly all the personnel wounded or killed, among them the executive and third officers. The breech of a 5.5-inch gun burst, killing the crew and blinding the gunner. A shot entered the forward turret, between the gun and gun-port, killing the crew and breaking the tubing and apparatus for working the gun. The captain, seeing his ship on fire and his battery destroyed, beached his vessel near the "Maria Teresa."

As the "Almirante Oquendo" lay grinding in agony on the rocky shore, the "New York" and the "Ericsson" rushed by hoping to overtake the "Vizcaya" and "Cristobal Colon" before they surrendered. Rear-Admiral Sampson saw that the end was not far off, and that he had no need of his entire force to destroy or capture the remaining ships and so as he sped past the blazing wreck he ordered the "Indiana" to take up her old blockading position before Santiago.

As the rescue work went on it was discovered what a gallant fight the "Almirante Oquendo" had made. Her seven principal officers were killed and more than half of her strength were dead or wounded.

The "Teresa," "Oquendo," and "Vizcaya" having been driven ashore, the only remaining vessels of the Spanish squadron were the "Colon" and the two torpedo boats. The "Colon" gave the American vessels a long chase, having swept past the front of the squadron without receiving much damage, and, being a vessel of great speed, she ran for a distance of 48 miles, pursued by the "Brooklyn," "Texas," "Oregon" and "New York," her chance of escape resting in her superior speed. When the "Vizcaya" went ashore, the "Colon" was about six miles ahead of the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon," but her spurt was finished and the American vessels were gaining upon her. Behind the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" came the "Texas," "Vixen," and "New York." At 12:50 p. m., the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" opened fire, the "Oregon's" heavy shells striking beyond her. At 1:20 p. m., she gave up and ran ashore at Torquino, 48 miles from Santiago. The commanding officer in his report says:—

"At one o'clock, the pressure in the boilers began to go down, decreasing the revolutions from 85 to 80; the 'Oregon' commenced to gain on us and soon after opened fire with her heavy bow guns, which I could only answer with gun No. 2 of the battery, while the distance between us grew constantly shorter. Animated by the desire to take advantage to the last moment of any opportunity to fire that might present itself, and in order to avoid being captured, I decided to run ashore and lose the ship rather than sacrifice in vain the lives of all these men who, as your

excellency is aware, had fought with great heroism and coolness. I therefore shaped our course for the mouth of the Torquino River and ran aground on the beach at 2 p. m., at a speed of thirteen knots."

Captain Cook, of the "Brooklyn," went on board and received the surrender. (SAMPSON).

The two torpedo boats, which followed the larger vessels out of the harbour, encountered the fire of the fleet, and more particularly of the "Gloucester," under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, who, with steam at high pressure, ran for them at full speed, and, at close range, delivered such a deadly and accurate fire that within twenty minutes of the time they emerged from the harbour the careers of the "Pluton" and "Furor" were ended and two-thirds of their crews killed. The "Furor" was beached in the surf and the "Pluton" sunk in deep water a few minutes later. Captain Villaamil, who commanded both boats, was killed. These destroyers also suffered much injury from the secondary batteries of the battleships "Indiana," "Iowa," and "Texas," but, in the opinion of Admiral Sampson, their destruction was principally due to the "Gloucester," a small converted yacht vulnerable in all her parts, and the courage with which she plunged into the unequal contest reflected the highest credit upon Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright and all on board.

Thus four beautiful Spanish ships and two destroyers had gone to their death before the overwhelming fire of the American vessels, and, of the 2300 Spaniards who entered the conflict, 350 were

killed; 200 wounded; 150 escaped by swimming ashore; and 1600 surrendered as prisoners. The latter were taken to the United States, and, at the close of the war, returned to Spain. On the American side, one man was killed and one wounded, both on board the "Brooklyn."

From an American standpoint, the battle as fought has been styled "a captain's battle," as, in the absence of the commander-in-chief, each captain fought his ship under the general order of "close in and destroy the enemy." Admiral Sampson states, in his report, that "the method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same direction and formation, removed all tactical doubt or difficulty and made plain the duty of every American vessel to close in immediately, engage and pursue the enemy." This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading fleet which could not immediately work up to their best speed, but they suffered heavily in passing.

Captain Clark, of the "Oregon," in his report, says,—“As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through and escape to the westward, we went ahead at full speed with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your general order: 'If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavour to sink his ships or force them to run ashore.'”

Commodore Schley, who, after the departure of Rear-Admiral Sampson, remained as senior officer present, states in his official report to the commander-

in-chief,—“Signal was made to the western division as prescribed in your general order; there was a rapid and general movement inward by your squadron.” Speaking of the “Colon,” Commodore Schley states,—“A little later, after your arrival, the ‘Cristobal Colon,’ which had struck to the ‘Brooklyn,’ and ‘Oregon,’ was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command. . . . I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for us all.”

Captain Taylor, of the “Indiana,” Captain Clark, of the “Oregon,” Captain Evans, of the “Iowa,” Commodore Schley and Captain Cook, of the “Brooklyn,” and Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, of the “Gloucester,” all found the key-note of their action in the general order of battle as laid down by the commander-in-chief. These officers were all men between 50 and 60 years of age, except Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright who was 48.

Captains Evans and Taylor were brothers-in-law, and the former, like Admiral Cervera, had his son with him on board the “Iowa.” Captain Philip was next in rank to Commodore Schley. He was a man of deeply religious feeling, and when his men were inclined to cheer at the awful destruction which was evidently taking place on board the Spanish vessels, he said: “Don’t cheer, boys, those poor devils are dying,” a touch of human sympathy rarely found in the passion and excitement of battle, and which endeared

him in the hearts of his enemies as well as his countrymen. That the battle was short, sharp, and incisive was, of course, due to the accuracy of the American fire. Rear-Admiral Sampson says, in his report,—“The object of the blockade of Cervera’s squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the commodore in command of the second division, the captains of the ships, their officers and men.”

The destruction of this squadron annihilated Spain’s last hope for a successful issue or even continuation of the war. The fall of Santiago, which took place soon afterwards, was followed by negotiations for peace, and it may be truly said that when her sea power disappeared Spain was ready to end the war.

In this battle comparatively few hits were made by the American gunners. The United States fleet had in all 103 guns in action, and it has been calculated that but 123 projectiles struck the escaping vessels. Of these hits 29 were on the “Infanta Maria Teresa,” 57 on the “Almirante Oquendo,” 29 on the “Vizcaya,” and 8 on the “Cristobal Colon.” This latter vessel was not hit until after the others had been destroyed. The heavy guns seldom succeeded in hitting the mark, but when they did the destruction they caused was appalling. There were in all eight thirteen-inch guns in the pursuing fleet, but when the engineers examined the wrecks, it was discovered that only three hits by a thirteen-inch shell had been made, the six twelve-inch guns succeeded in making two hits, but it was these two shells that prac-

tically caused the destruction of the "Infanta Maria Teresa." It must be remembered, however, that the shells were hurled at rapidly moving targets, and moreover that the guns were aimed through clouds of smoke made by the terrific bombardment. In all some 6,500 shells were fired by the American ships.

After the sinking of the "Cristobal Colon" the vessels which had caused such destructive work returned to their blockading stations and rocked peacefully throughout the remainder of this beautiful Southern Sunday, now doubly quiet after the fierce cannonading of the morning hours.

To whom was the credit of this fight? To the captains, the firemen, the engineers, and the gunners. It was a captain's fight throughout. There was no manœuvring demanded; prompt action on the part of the individual commanders at the moment when the first of the Spaniards attempted to escape was what was needed, and no captain was found wanting. Again the engineers had their engines in perfect condition, and the firemen down in the torrid atmosphere of the stoke-holes worked like demons. The gunners, too, handled their guns with tremendous rapidity and their marksmanship, considering the conditions, was remarkably accurate. American seamen had once more proved themselves the best in the world and American machinery triumphed over the productions of the Old World. As Captain Eulate truly said, "it was a victory for machinery."

There was but little of value for naval warfare learned from this last fight of the century. The great lesson taught by the Battle of Yalu River was

repeated; there should be a minimum of inflammable matter on a warship; fire and not steel had destroyed three of the Spanish protected cruisers. Again it was seen from the loss of the "Pluton" and the "Furox" that the usefulness of destroyers in modern war had been greatly exaggerated. Their swift destruction largely by means of an unprotected yacht, coupled with the loss of several of the British destroyers at sea in the opening year of the twentieth century, caused the Powers to call a halt in the construction of these engines of war. The Spanish navy, however, was no fitting opponent for the splendid ships and crews of the United States, and what modern naval battle can be, will not be understood until fleets more evenly matched struggle for victory.

PART TWO.

SINGLE SHIP ACTIONS.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE "CONSTITUTION" AND THE "GUERRIERE."

WHEN war was declared by the United States against Great Britain, June 18, 1812, there was a ridiculous disproportion between the sea-strength of the two countries. Maclay gives the relative strength of the navies of the two powers in 1810, as follows:

| | SHIPS. | TONS. | GUNS. | MEN. |
|----------------|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| United States, | 17. | 15300. | 442. | 5025. |
| Great Britain, | 1048. | 860990. | 27,800. | 151,572. |

However it must be remembered that at that time England's strength was taxed to the uttermost by the Napoleonic wars, and her ships and sailors were for the most part needed in European waters; but she was able to send to the American continent a fleet vastly superior, in numbers at least, to the navy of the United States.

The broad stretch of the Atlantic between the two countries would at first seem to militate against Great Britain conducting a successful struggle against the United States on their own coasts, but it is neces-

sary to take into account that the strongly fortified town of Halifax in Nova Scotia gave the ships of England an excellent base from which to draw supplies and to which to take any prizes they succeeded in capturing. England went into the struggle with every confidence of being able to sweep the commerce of the United States from the high seas and to destroy in short order their war-ships or to tow them in triumph to Halifax. The commanders of her navy were, however, to meet with a surprise, and while there were no fleet actions in this war, save the battle of Lake Erie, in single ship actions such vessels as the "Constitution," the "United States" and the "Hornet" were to prove themselves at least the equal of the best ships afloat. Just two months after the declaration of war, Captain Hull of the "Constitution" was, in a sea fight with the "Guerrière," to win a victory that at once gained respect for the ships of America and recalled the exploits of John Paul Jones.

Before the time of her celebrated duel the "Constitution" had already won considerable renown. Early in July, Vice-Admiral Sawyer who was stationed at Halifax had sent Captain Broke to sea with a strong squadron of four ships consisting of the "Shannon," 38, Broke's flagship, the "Belvidère," 36, the "Africa," 64, and the "Æolus," 32. Shortly after putting to sea the "Guerrière," 38, was sent out to join the squadron. This formidable fleet sailed southward and captured a number of trading vessels besides one sixteen-gun brig, the "Nautilus."

Twelve days after leaving Halifax and while they

were cruising off the coast of New Jersey a United States frigate hove in sight. It was the "Constitution" under the command of Captain Hull. Hull mistook the British squadron for the squadron sent to sea under the command of Commodore Rogers and stood towards them. He prepared to hail the nearest vessel, but night fell before he was in touch with her. She was the "Guerrière," not yet a part of the main squadron. Hull supposed that this vessel was an enemy and cleared his ship for action, and he was not mistaken. When morning broke the men of the "Constitution" saw that they were in the presence of a British fleet. The situation was a critical one and the hope of escape small, but Captain Hull was going to make a game fight before he would surrender.

When the British fleet discovered that the "Constitution" was an enemy they started in pursuit, and began what was to prove one of the most celebrated naval fights of history. On the "Constitution" two guns, a twenty-four-pounder and an eighteen-pounder, were hoisted to the quarterdeck, and two others were run out of the cabin ports; and with these four stern chasers she prepared to make a good running fight.

Every device known to seamen was tried by the British commanders to bring their ships within fighting distance of the "Constitution," but so successfully did the Americans handle their vessel that, although a slow-moving craft, she managed to keep a good lead although on one occasion at least they were so near to her that their shots passed over her decks and it looked as if in a few hours she would be forced

to surrender; but by towing and kedging and by wetting the sails to hold the wind, and in the end by a splendid ruse when struck by a stiff breeze she managed to effect her escape, and sailed away in triumph. The chase had lasted three nights and two days and thoroughly tested the "Constitution" and her crew. The ship was a staunch craft if not a good sailer, and her crew was as courageous and well-disciplined as any crew afloat. She was in every way worthy to fight the first single ship action of the War of 1812.

Two weeks after her renowned escape from the British fleet, an escape which had given the people of the United States as much pleasure as if she had won a decisive victory, her Commander sailed from Boston without orders. He knew that the disappointed British ships had separated and were cruising about in the hope of yet capturing the "Constitution" and he had perfect confidence that if he met any of the ships singly he would stand a good chance in a fight. For several weeks the "Constitution" cruised about making a few important captures. On the 18th of August an American frigate, the "Decatur" was hailed. This vessel reported that she had just escaped from an English frigate, a large and powerful ship. On the following afternoon the "Constitution" came in touch with the "Guerrière" in latitude $41^{\circ} 42'$, longitude $55^{\circ} 48'$. Captain Dacres was looking out for a fight. He held the American commanders in poor esteem and believed the "Guerrière" quite capable of making short work of any American frigate. The "Guerrière" was, however,

no match for the "Constitution." The latter ship was considerably larger, had a superior crew, and a stronger armament. The historians of the naval duel between these two ships differ slightly in their account of the "Guerrière" but all agree that she was an inferior ship and was no match for the "Constitution," and to attempt battle was "an example of British arrogance." Henry Adams in his *History of the United States* gives a description of the two ships which is probably as near the truth as it is possible for the historian to arrive.

"The length of the 'Constitution,'" he writes, "was one hundred and seventy-three feet, that of the 'Guerrière' was one hundred and fifty-six; the extreme breadth of the 'Constitution' was forty-four feet, that of the 'Guerrière' was forty, or within a few inches in both cases. The 'Constitution' carried thirty-two long 24-pounders, the 'Guerrière' thirty long 18-pounders and two long 12-pounders. The 'Constitution' carried twenty 32-pound carronades, the 'Guerrière' 16. In every respect, and in the proportion of ten to seven the 'Constitution' was the better ship; her crew was more numerous in proportion of ten to six." Maclay in his *History of the Navy* gives the crew of the "Constitution" at four hundred and sixty-eight and that of the "Guerrière" at two hundred and sixty-three.

As the two frigates recognized each other both showed an unmistakable willingness to engage. There was a strong northwest wind blowing at the time, and the "Constitution" under a press of can-

was swept over the big Atlantic waves eager to reach the enemy. The "Guerrière" showed no disposition to avoid the fight. Captain Dacres, as the American ship approached, backed his maintopsail and ordered his ship to be cleared for action. As the "Constitution" came within reach the "Guerrière" opened the battle with a few sighting shots, and then broadsides were exchanged; but the range was great and the sea was so rough that they did no harm. For nearly an hour the two vessels manœuvred for position but each was so skilfully handled that no opportunity to get in a raking fire was given. As the afternoon slipped by the captains grew impatient and each saw that the other was willing to come to close action. The vessels now drew rapidly towards each other, and at six o'clock they were almost within hailing distance. The officers and men on the British ship could be distinguished from the deck of the "Constitution" and occasionally British shouts reached the ears of the American gunners.

So far the fire on both ships had been ineffective, but a change was soon to take place. As Captain Hull drew near the enemy he ordered his gunners to cease firing and preparations for a telling broadside were made. The guns were loaded with round-shot and grape and the gunners stood by awaiting the order to fire. Swiftly the ships drew near each other, the "Guerrière" occasionally hurling a broadside into the "Constitution," and now and then getting in an effective blow; but the "Constitution" remained silent, and not even when several of her men were killed or wounded was the command given to fire.

The two ships were now almost within pistol distance, indeed only fifty yards separated them. Captain Hull considered that the time had come to strike. The guns on his ship had been carefully brought to bear on the British vessel and when he gave the command to fire the gunners responded with alacrity. A deadly storm of iron crashed into the "Guerrière," and that one well directed broadside gave victory to the American ship. The hull of the British ship was rent in a score of places and her decks were strewn with the dead and dying. The guns continued to play furiously and in a few minutes the "Guerrière's" main yard was shot away. Her rigging was badly cut and several huge holes were made in her sides. The mizzen-mast was struck by a 24-pound shot and fell with a mighty crash making the ship unmanageable. The American gunners now got in several raking broadsides before the jib-boom of the "Guerrière" passed over the quarter-deck of the "Constitution."

Both crews expected a hand to hand fight and Captain Dacres, despite the fact that he had the smaller crew, was making preparations to board. All the men were ordered up from the guns, but the Americans were ready to receive them, and the British commander felt that for the present an attempt to board would prove unsuccessful. His men were willing, but on the deck of the "Constitution" was a much stronger force waiting with pike, pistol, and cutlass to repel boarders. However, Captain Dacres believed that unless he could carry the battle into the enemy's ship the fight would be lost, and so,

collecting his men on the fore-castle, gave them careful instructions with regard to boarding.

Meanwhile the two vessels rising and falling on the swells were grinding against each other. The bowsprit of the "Guerrière" still extended clear across the quarter-deck of the "Constitution." The top-men were all this time busy with their muskets and pistols and on both ships men were shot down under a deadly short range fire. The officers made conspicuous marks and the casualties among them were appalling. Lieutenant Morrison, endeavouring to lash the bowsprit of the "Guerrière" to the "Constitution" was shot through the body. William S. Bush, first lieutenant of the American ship, was killed and John C. Alwyn was severely wounded. Captain Hull himself had many narrow escapes. On the "Guerrière" several of the officers were killed or wounded, and among the latter was Captain Dacres.

While the vessels were thus close together the flag at the main-top-gallant mast-head of the "Constitution" was shot away and a sailor named John Hogan, though exposed to a hail of bullets from this short range pistol and musket fire, bravely climbed aloft and lashed the bit of bunting to the mast-head. But the sea was heavy and the ships rolled too much to make boarding an easy matter and so they lay in close contact, the "Guerrière" exposed to a raking fire and unable to bring a gun to bear.

The end could not now be far distant and the surrender of the "Guerrière" was momentarily expected, but before the end came she was to have another chance. The heaving swells at length sepa-

rated the ships and the "Guerrière," swinging loose from the rigging of the "Constitution," managed to bring her broadside to bear. The American ship had now a narrow escape from destruction for some of the wads from the English ship's guns set fire to the cabin and it was with difficulty that the fire was extinguished. The "Guerrière," however, was in ill-luck, for, as she drifted clear of her foe, her bowsprit struck the taffrail of the "Constitution." The rigging sustaining the foremast was slackened and the mast went by the board, nor was this the end of the calamity, for the mizzen-mast was drawn down with the fore-mast and the great ship lay an unmanageable hulk, wallowing in the trough of the waves.

There was nothing further to be feared from her and Captain Hull, dreading that at any moment some other English war-ship, attracted by the firing, might heave in sight, retired from the scene of conflict to repair damages, but in less than an hour returned to receive the reluctant surrender of the beaten ship at the hands of Captain Dacres.

It was difficult for the English captain to realize that he was beaten, and beaten by an American vessel, a vessel of the despised Colonial navy, a vessel he had for weeks been cruising about to capture, intending to tow her in triumph into Halifax. He desired to continue the fight but it was a vain wish. The "Constitution" could select her own position now and the lifeless roll of the "Guerrière" plunged her guns on the main-deck under water. Captain Dacres saw the folly of further resistance and went on board the "Constitution" and offered his sword to Captain

Hull but the latter courteously refused to receive it.

The battle over, the work of mercy began! The surgeon's mate was sent on board the "Guerrière" to assist in caring for the wounded, and all night long boats were busily plied, removing the prisoners from the wrecked ship. The "Guerrière" was aleak in many places, and the water was fast rising in her hold. In the afternoon of the day following the fight it was seen that her hull could not be saved, and so she was blown up and burned, and England was left to mourn one of her finest frigates. She had been beaten in a fight of only forty minutes with a total in killed and wounded of seventy-eight, while the casualties of the Americans amounted to only fourteen. The British press and public were dumbfounded at the calamity, and it was but the beginning of the series of naval defeats that showed that the young nation across the sea knew both how to sail their ships and how to fight them. After all it was not to be wondered at. The sailors on the American ships were for the most part of the Saxon breed and they were not bound by red tape or precedent and, what was of greater importance, they never underrated, except perhaps in the case of the "Chesapeake," the strength of the enemy.

The United States took great pride in the victory, and on Sunday, August 30, when the "Constitution" sailed into Boston the Puritan city gave itself up to rejoicing. The people of the United States needed this success at this moment; for simultaneously with the good tidings of this victory at sea came the "melancholy intelligence of the surrender

of General Hull and his whole army to the British general, Brock." The disgraceful surrender of General Hull was for a moment forgotten in the victory of his nephew, Captain Isaac Hull.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE "SHANNON" AND THE "CHESAPEAKE."

DURING the War of 1812 England suffered numerous reverses in single ship actions with the vessels of the United States. She had, however, one notable victory, and the defeat of the "Chesapeake" by the "Shannon" gave her poets and romancers a prolific theme. The fight between these two representative vessels of their respective nations was a gallant one, fiercely contested; and, while the result of the battle was at no time in doubt after the first broadsides were fired, luck, which had stood by the Americans in their former naval duels, was lacking, and the commander of the "Chesapeake" likewise seems to have completely underrated his opponent.

Captain Lawrence, who walked the quarter-deck of the "Chesapeake," had, ever since the destruction of the "Philadelphia" in the harbour of Tripoli, been looked upon as one of the heroes of the United States navy. In that magnificent deed of daring, which according to Nelson, was "the most bold and daring act of the age," he had played a prominent part. Much was expected of him after this adventure, and he had not disappointed his country. In

the years of peace that followed the war with Tripoli, he had been preparing himself for the inevitable struggle with the motherland. England's attitude on the high seas to the vessels of America made war at an early date a very probable thing, and the naval officers at the beginning of the nineteenth century all looked forward with pleasure to testing their swift-sailing and well-equipped frigates against the frigates of England.

When the War of 1812 broke out, Lawrence was prepared for it, and in his little ship "Hornet" was confident of being able to give a good account of himself. His field of operation in the early stages of the war was along the coast of South America, and he was not long in adding lustre to the renown he had already won. He offered battle to several British ships of equal and even heavier armament than his own, and in a short, swift struggle with the sloop-of-war "Peacock" of His Majesty's navy, had sunk that beautiful vessel in a fight of less than fifteen minutes. When the "Peacock" struck, his crew had shown such generosity to the men rescued from the sinking ship that the commander of the "Hornet" won the esteem and admiration of the British nation.

After his victory over the "Peacock," Lawrence sailed north and ran the "Hornet" into New York harbour where he was enthusiastically welcomed by his fellow-countrymen. He and his crew were praised and banqueted, and the authorities, in recognition of his good work, offered him the command of the "Constitution," on which splendid ship he had served as first lieutenant. There was not a better

ship at that time in the American navy than the "Constitution," and Lawrence was naturally elated by his promotion to her quarter-deck. Before he could take over his new command, however, he received counter-orders and found himself appointed to the frigate "Chesapeake," a vessel reputed to be the unluckiest in the American navy,—and with seamen, especially in the olden days, luck counted for much. It was from this ship that the British deserters had been taken by the "Leopard" in 1807 after she had received a destructive broadside to which she failed to reply. Since the opening of the war she had been cruising over the broad Atlantic without doing any effective work, and now on her return to Boston so disgusted had her crew become that they left her and it was impossible to enlist good men to take their places. As a result of this state of affairs she was manned at the time when Lawrence received command of her by an inefficient crew, unskilled and difficult to discipline. He would much have preferred keeping the "Hornet" which had been given to Captain Biddle, and wrote to that effect to the Secretary of the Navy. But he had to obey orders and reluctantly took command of the "Chesapeake" about the middle of May.

At this time Lawrence was only thirty-two years old, and was on the threshold of his career; although it is true he had had command of the "Vixen," the "Wasp," the "Argus," and the "Hornet." He was now given an opportunity of proving his strength in a large ship. He had gloomy forebodings when he was appointed to the "Chesapeake," and almost up

to the moment of sailing out to meet the "Shannon" hoped to be relieved from his command. The following letter written to Master-Commandant Biddle, May 27, 1813, leaves no doubt of the reluctance with which he took charge of the "Chesapeake":

"Dear Sir: In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart I neglected writing agreeably to promise, but as I have given over all hopes of seeing him, and the 'Chesapeake' is almost ready, I shall sail on Sunday (May 30th), provided I have a chance of getting out clear of the 'Shannon' and the 'Tenedos,' who are on the lookout. My intention is to pass out by Cape Sable then run out west (east?), until I get into the stream, then haul in for Cape Canso, and run for Cape Breton, where I expect the pleasure of seeing you. I think your best chance for getting out is through the Sound. In haste, yours sincerely,

"JAMES LAWRENCE."

Two days before this letter was written, a change had taken place in the situation outside of Boston harbour. The "Shannon" and the "Tenedos" had for some time been keeping a careful blockade of the port but despite their vigilance several vessels had succeeded in putting safely to sea. Captain Philip Bowes Vere Broke, who was in command of the "Shannon," was one of the most efficient officers of his time and as gallant and courteous a gentleman as he was a skilled seaman. The defeats that had been sustained by the British warships since the begin-

ning of the conflict greatly irritated him and he was anxious to restore England's old renown at sea by a striking victory. The English people, too, were greatly annoyed at the loss of some of their best ships. It is true the sinking or capture of half a dozen ships could affect the English navy but little; but it had the effect of lowering the prestige of England in the eyes of other European powers. Broke was aware that the people were looking to their naval commanders to do a deed that would bring glory to the nation.

The "Chesapeake" he knew to be within Boston harbour. She was, he thought, a vessel in size and equipment similar to his own, and he was, therefore, anxious to meet her in single combat. For that purpose he sent away the "Tenedos" and cruised about in the "Shannon" with anxious eyes directed towards the harbour's mouth, but for several days there was nothing to indicate that the "Chesapeake" was likely soon to put to sea.

As has already been stated Captain Broke was one of the most efficient captains in the English navy; and he had under him a crew of well-drilled and well-disciplined, hardy fighters. He had had command of the "Shannon" for over six years, and the great majority of his crew had been with him all that time. He took command of his ship on September 14, 1806, and, as M. de la Gravière says in his *Guerres Maritimes*, "Captain Broke had begun to prepare a glorious termination of the bloody affair," in the year in which he was appointed to the "Shannon." He knew his ship and he knew his men, and ship and

men knew him and trusted him, too. He realized how important was the man behind the gun, and when weather permitted the men were daily exercised in target practice. Even while cruising about off Boston harbour the sound of the guns of the British ship making ready for the great duel could be heard by those on shore. Broke's crew were equally well-drilled in the use of small arms and of broadsword and pike. He knew the character of the foe he would have to meet. The men on board the "Chesapeake" were for the most part of British descent and in a hand-to-hand contest would be very different foes from the French and Spaniards over whom the English seamen had been accustomed to gain such easy victories.

While the "Chesapeake" was in general appearance and equipment the equal of the "Shannon" the two vessels on the eve of battle showed a marked contrast. Lawrence, in the first place, did not know his ship; he had been on board of her for only a few days, and had not had an opportunity of learning the peculiarities of the vessel he was commanding. His crew, too, was a wretched one. When the "Chesapeake" arrived in Boston harbour after her long and unprofitable cruise the men were discharged and preferred to take service on other vessels to wasting their time on one in which there was apparently but little chance of either glory or prize-money. The men who now enlisted were many of them inexperienced as seamen or soldiers, and were not amenable to discipline. Under the circumstances it was clearly Lawrence's duty to bide his time until he had whipped

his crew into shape and grown familiar with his ship.

Broke was anxious for the fight and after sending away the "Tenedos" sent in a challenge to Lawrence by an American prisoner on the "Shannon." It has been generally stated by British and Canadian historians that it was in answer to this challenge that Lawrence went out in the "Chesapeake" to meet the "Shannon." The challenge, however, never reached him for before he could receive it orders arrived from Washington to put to sea at once. Under the circumstances Lawrence would have been wise if he had stolen out during the night and trusted to eluding the watchful British. Had he escaped to sea he might have done good work against the English and learned to know his ship and crew. Even if he thought his vessel capable of making an equal fight with the "Shannon" he should not have taken any risks. The loss of one ship to the small American navy would be a serious calamity. Had he received the challenge before he left the harbour he might have delayed putting to sea for some days as Broke, in his confidence, gave him the choice of time and place for the duel.

If the commander of the "Shannon" was confident of victory, Lawrence was equally so. His easy victories over English ships in South American waters and the seeming cowardice of their commanders and crews gave him a disrespect for British skill and courage. He thought that, even with the inefficient crew he had on board the "Chesapeake," his vessel would be more than a match for any British frigate of equal size and strength afloat.

On Sunday, the last day of May, the "Chesapeake" was ready for sea, but a heavy fog lay over the harbour and it was impossible to tell how many British ships were keeping up the blockade. June 1 broke beautiful and clear and in the early morning, as the American frigate lay in President's Roads, Second-Lieutenant George Budd climbed into the rigging and on the distant horizon caught sight of a large ship beating about, evidently without any definite harbour in view. She was alone, and he supposed her to be a British warship. Captain Lawrence was on shore at the time and Lieutenant Budd at once reported to him the presence of the stranger.

A single ship to blockade Boston harbour was a thing not to be thought of, and Lawrence hurried on board the "Chesapeake" to view the situation for himself. He climbed aloft, and was soon convinced that the vessel was a British frigate, no doubt, the "Shannon." Many of the crew were on shore but he had them hurried on board and final preparations were made to meet the Englishman. When everything was completed Lawrence wrote as follows to the Secretary of the Navy: "An English frigate is now in sight from my deck. I have sent a pilot-boat out to reconnoitre, and, should she prove to be alone, I am in hopes of giving a good account of her before night."

Shortly after the letter that contained this sentence, was sent ashore, the pilot-boat returned, having carefully examined the coast, and reported that the frigate was alone and that no other suspicious looking vessel was in sight. The anchor was then weighed,

the sails shaken out and under a press of canvas the "Chesapeake," about mid-day, swept seaward.

As Lawrence went on his way to battle he must have had gloomy forebodings. Every commander realizes how necessary good officers are to success in battle. Even a poor crew may, under the inspiration of courageous commanders on whose skill they can depend, do good work. Although the officers on board the "Chesapeake" were brave seamen they were sadly lacking in experience and Lawrence could not have the confidence in them that Broke had in his subordinates. Maclay in his history of the American navy gives the following account of the officers who were to assist Lawrence in his battle with the "Shannon:"

"The first lieutenant, Octavius Augustus Page, of Virginia, an officer of experience, was confined on shore with lung fever, from which he died three days afterward, aged twenty-eight. His place was filled by Third-Lieutenant Augustus C. Ludlow, who, though an officer of merit, was scarcely twenty-one years of age, and who was in a strange and new position—a position most important in a frigate so far as navigating the ship and handling the men were concerned, but especially important in breaking in and disciplining a crew. Second-Lieutenant Thompson was absent on account of his health, and Acting-Lieutenants Nicholson and Pearce also were absent for the same reason. George Budd, the only commissioned sea officer of experience in the ship, was made second-lieutenant. The places of third and fourth lieutenants were vacant, and were supplied

by Midshipmen William Cox and Edward J. Ballard, who now served in these capacities for the first time."

If the "Chesapeake" was inefficiently officered her crew was in even a more deplorable state. As has already been said she was considered an unlucky ship, and it had been almost impossible for Lawrence to obtain a complement of men. Many of those who shipped at the last moment were of the toughest class of sea-faring men and a number of them when brought on board were intoxicated; and were not sobered even by "the excitement and turmoil of battle."

As the "Chesapeake" left the harbour a flag with the motto "Free Trade and Sailors' Rights" was run aloft. Lawrence called the crew together and, as he had done on the eve of battle on board the "Hornet," addressed them with encouraging words, but he soon discovered he had not the "Hornet's" crew to deal with. He was interrupted in the middle of his speech with mutinous cries that unless prize-money, which was owing to some of them, was paid they would not obey orders. He had a difficult situation to grapple with, a mutinous crew about him and a brave and skilful enemy awaiting to give him battle, but he faced the situation manfully, issued prize cheques to the complainers and continued to endeavour to inspire officers and men with something of his own heroic spirit.

Things were very different onboard the "Shannon." In the early morning Broke, who supposed that his challenge must by this time have reached Lawrence,

climbed into the rigging to see if the "Chesapeake" was making any preparations to come out to meet the "Shannon," but she still swung idly at anchor with her sails furled. The beautiful June morning hours sped by and it was not until the "Shannon's" crew were piped to dinner that it became known that preparations were being made on board the "Chesapeake" to leave the harbour. When Broke saw the noble ship bending under a cloud of canvas to meet him, like Nelson at Trafalgar, he went to his cabin to pray for victory and to commit his life to the keeping of his God.

Captain Broke then returned to the deck of his ship to make final preparations for the fight. He assembled his crew and from the quarter-deck addressed them with encouraging words. How keenly he felt the reverses that England had suffered was evident from his speech to his men. He spoke with feeling of the loss of several of England's best ships to the American frigates, and told his crew that they had the blood of hundreds of their fellow countrymen to avenge. He called on them "to kill the men" of the "Chesapeake;" strange words these from a man who had just risen from prayer, but war brings out the contradictions of the human heart.

As the "Chesapeake" sailed towards the "Shannon," the people in the vicinity of Boston harbour became greatly excited, and a number of boats put out to witness what would doubtless be one of the greatest naval duels of history, and crowds took up places of vantage along the shore from which they could see the fight. A gentle westerly breeze was blowing, and

under a cloud of snowy canvas the "Chesapeake" swept gallantly over the rolling seas. The "Shannon," in the meantime, was leading the way out to sea for the purpose of selecting a good situation in which to manœuvre. All through the afternoon the two frigates remained under full sail, and it was not until half-past four that the "Chesapeake" fired a gun as a challenge to the "Shannon" to get ready for battle.

The frigates were still several miles apart, but the crews had an excellent opportunity on this bright June afternoon of studying the respective ships. So far as appearances were concerned it looked as if they were of equal size and speed and strength. The following is a fairly accurate description of the two vessels:*

"The two frigates were the same length within a few inches,—between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within a few inches. The 'Chesapeake' carried eighteen thirty-two pound carronades on the spar-deck; the 'Shannon' carried sixteen. Each carried twenty-eight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The 'Chesapeake' carried also two long twelve-pounders and a long eighteen-pounder, besides a twelve-pound carronade. The 'Shannon' carried four long nine-pounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound carronades. The 'Chesapeake's' only decided advantage was in the number of her crew, which consisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, (according to Maclay three hun-

* Henry Adams, *History of the United States*.

dred and forty only) while the 'Shannon' carried three hundred and thirty all told."

The "Shannon," however, had a decided superiority in her well-trained and well-disciplined crew and in her state of readiness for the fight. Broke, in his challenge, had explained fully the exact size of his ship and the number of guns and men she carried. Believing the "Chesapeake" had come out in answer to his challenge to give battle he had every man fully instructed in his duty and every gun loaded and in readiness to be fired as soon as they should bear upon the American ship. At five o'clock the vessels were very near each other and Lawrence ordered his royal-yards to be sent down. Broke kept those of the "Shannon" up as he expected that with the coming on of evening the light breeze would die away.

At ten minutes past five the drum called the crew of the "Shannon" to quarters, and they stood by their guns admiring the graceful frigate that approached them with an ensign flying at every mast. Lawrence manœuvred his ship with great skill and as the "Chesapeake" approached the "Shannon" it was evident that he feared a raking fire; but neither Broke nor Lawrence were anxious to take advantage of the other, and Broke had ordered that no gun should be fired while the "Chesapeake's" head was turned towards the "Shannon." A favorable wind gave Lawrence the choice of position and he might have run under the "Shannon's" stern and raked the English ship fore-and-aft but he, too, desired an equal fight and held on his course until at 5:45 the bow of the "Chesapeake" over-lapped the "Shan-

non's" quarter. When Broke saw that it was to be a yard-arm to yard-arm fight he gave orders to his gunners to fire when their guns bore on the second bow port of the "Chesapeake." "The 'Shannon's' after-most guns on the gun-deck were loaded with two round shot and a keg of one hundred and fifty musket balls; the next gun had one round shot and one double-headed shot, and so on alternately with every gun on the main-deck" (Allen).

The "Shannon" opened the battle with her stern-most gun, and so well was the heavily charged weapon directed that a hail of iron smashed into the "Chesapeake's" side and swept her decks with destruction and death. Still the American vessel gained on the British ship in ominous silence. Soon a second gun from the "Shannon" spoke out and again the "Chesapeake" staggered under the well-directed shot. Before another gun could be fired the "Chesapeake's" broadside was brought to bear and she began her reply to the English guns with a cannonade that was heard by the anxious watchers of the fight eighteen miles away at Boston light-house. This opening fire at close quarters was very destructive. Not only were the ships much rent, but many in both crews were killed or wounded and on the "Chesapeake" half of the officers were placed *hors de combat*. Lawrence himself received a severe gash in the leg, but, knowing how much his presence was needed on deck, refused to go below to have his wound dressed. For some minutes the two ships swept on side by side exchanging broadsides at close quarters, but the headway that the "Chesapeake" had as she

began the fight was rapidly carrying her past her antagonist. While her crew were manœuvring to prevent this a shot cut away her foretopsail tie and jib-sheet. At the same moment the wheelsman was struck dead and the "Chesapeake," without a guiding hand, came up into the wind and was taken aback.

This unhappy circumstance lost Lawrence the battle. From the moment the "Chesapeake" came up into the wind she was a beaten ship. Her larboard quarter was turned towards the "Shannon's" broadside. Only fifty yards separated the two ships and the "Chesapeake" was drifting still nearer her enemy. Her guns became silent as not one was in a position to bear on the "Shannon." The "Shannon's" broadside, on the other hand, now swept the "Chesapeake" with a deadly fire and round shot and double-headed shot crashed through her bulwarks and beat in her stern ports. The small-arms men in the tops took advantage of the confusion arising from the awkward position in which the "Chesapeake" was placed, and fired with deadly effect at any man showing himself in the after part of the ship and the list of killed and wounded grew apace.

Slowly the "Chesapeake" drifted towards the "Shannon" and Lawrence who saw the advantage his enemy had in position determined as soon as the two vessels struck to resort to boarding. He gave orders for the men to be in readiness, but the bugler could not be found and before the crew knew of their commander's desire the vessels had fouled,—the mizzen-channels of the "Chesapeake" locking with the "Shannon's" fore-rigging.

The boatswain of the English ship at the moment of contact seized a line and attempted to lash the two ships together, but he was mortally wounded in the effort. Captain Broke meanwhile had everything in readiness to board the "Chesapeake," and at the opportune moment called out, "Follow me who can!" and sprang on the "Chesapeake's" quarter-deck. About twenty of his crew leaped on board with him and thirty others followed quickly after. It was a valorous deed, but under other circumstances would probably have lost the British the victory; but at the moment Broke boarded Captain Lawrence was mortally wounded and forced to leave the deck. There was now a short sharp fight, the British having decidedly the advantage as they were led into the battle by efficient officers while the American crew could make but a "disorderly resistance," to use Broke's own words, as they were practically without officers,—Mr. Ludlow who was severely wounded being the only one on deck.

The situation now became critical for the British boarders. The "Chesapeake" broke from her lashings and swung across the "Shannon's" bow and the fifty men under Broke were left practically unsupported on the American deck. But about this time Lieutenant Budd, who had been on the gun-deck below and who at the commencement of the fight had come on deck to endeavour to rally the men and separate the frigates, was severely wounded. It was impossible to get the undisciplined crew to make a vigorous resistance to the English and soon the spar-deck was carried. It was when news of this reverse reached

Lawrence in the cockpit that he gave utterance to the memorable words, "Don't give up the ship!"

Before the battle commenced First-Lieutenant George Thomas L. Watt of the "Shannon," confident of victory, had placed a white ensign on the capstan in readiness, when the battle was won, to hoist over the enemy's colors. The American flag was now run down, but in hoisting it again by mistake the white ensign appeared beneath. The gunners of the "Shannon" thinking that the boarding party had failed began firing once more and Watt and a number of his comrades were slain.

This mishap gave the Americans still on deck hope, and although the cowardly crew between decks would not come to their assistance they made a valiant stand on the forecastle. A desperate fight ensued and they disputed every foot with the British. In the midst of the struggle Captain Broke received a blow from a cutlass that almost ended his life. He fell to the deck and continued to struggle with one of his enemies. One of his own crew came up at this instant and thinking his commander one of the "Chesapeake's" men was about to run him through with his bayonet when Broke's voice showed him the mistake he was making and death was turned aside. Without officers to guide them in the fight, with over half of the crew skulking in cowardly fear in the hold, the Americans on the forecastle could not but surrender and the ship was soon in the possession of the British.

The duel had lasted only fifteen minutes, but in that time the "Shannon" was struck thirty-nine

times and the "Chesapeake" fifty-seven. The fight had been an expensive one to both vessels; the "Chesapeake" had forty-seven killed and ninety-nine wounded, and the "Shannon" twenty-four killed and fifty-nine wounded. Both ships presented a horrible appearance after the battle. The scuppers were running with blood, wounded and dead men lay about the decks, and on gun-carriages, masts and bulwarks were ghastly evidences of the battle. When the moon arose the dead were collected and reverently consigned to the deep.

Captain Broke gave command of the "Chesapeake" to Lieutenant Wallis, who, by the way, died in England in 1892 at the venerable age of one hundred and one having attained the rank of admiral. With his prize Broke set sail for Halifax, but as winds were light and the "Chesapeake" in a somewhat crippled condition the two vessels did not reach that fortified port until the following Sunday morning. On the tedious journey, Lawrence, who suffered great bodily pain from his wound and greater mental pain from the loss of his ship, died. When the "Shannon" with her prize was sighted off Halifax harbour the news of the approach of the two frigates spread rapidly through the city. The churches were assembled, but even the sanctuaries could not keep out the glad tidings and very soon the different congregations were flocking to the wharfs. At first they were noisy in their demonstrations of joy; but, when it was learned that Lawrence, covered with his country's flag, was lying dead on board the "Chesapeake," a strange silence fell over the throng. His

treatment of the crew of the "Peacock" had won their respect, and they felt his death as keenly as if he had been one of their own citizens. He was buried with military honours, genuinely mourned by the men against whom he had fought.

Some weeks after this celebrated duel a party of his fellow-countrymen arrived in Halifax under a flag of truce and his body and the body of gallant young Lieutenant Ludlow, who had been buried with him, were taken to New York where they were followed to the grave by a mourning nation.

Broke's wound was a severer one than was at first suspected and his robust constitution never completely recovered from it. It was autumn before he was able to leave Halifax, but he was never again to see active service and spent the greater part of the remainder of his life in the quiet of his English home. He was the hero of the hour in Great Britain and the government made him a baronet and bestowed on him substantial financial reward.

When the news of the victory reached England the nation became delirious with joy. Up to the time of Broke's victory, the press, and the public men in Parliament had been lamenting the degenerate condition of the navy in England. A little over two weeks before the battle off Boston light-house, Earl Darnley had said in the House of Commons, with regard to the English navy: "The charm of its invincibility had now been broken; its consecrated standard no longer floated victorious on the main." At the same time the European powers were rejoicing at their ancient enemy's reverses, and England felt

bitterly the jibes that were hurled at her across the channel. But Broke's success had changed all this. The old renown returned in one sudden moment, and very naturally the victory of the "Shannon" was exaggerated by the thankful people. One eminent parliamentarian, in speaking of it in the House of Commons, said that it was "not to be surpassed by any engagement which graced the naval annals of Great Britain." The English public solaced themselves with the thought that the victories of Hull, Decatur and Bainbridge had been achieved against their frigates in vessels that were "ships of the line in disguise:" but when an English frigate met an American frigate of equal size and armament England could give a good account of herself. The rejoicing in England has a parallel in the twentieth century when after long months of reverses in South Africa, battles that would at other times have been considered minor affairs sent the English people wild with joy and gave the nation heart and hope.

In the United States the news of the loss of the "Chesapeake" was received with "universal incredulity." A gloom fell upon the people and they began to fear that the war would have an unhappy termination, and that one by one their ships would be swept from the seas. They could ill afford to lose the "Chesapeake" and the loss of her commander was a much greater blow than the loss of any ship could have been.

It is interesting to note that the wife of Captain Lawrence lived to a good old age, and that, at her residence at Newport, R. I., she was frequently

visited by Admiral Sir Provo Wallis, who as a young lieutenant of the British navy, had sailed the "Chesapeake," with the body of her husband on board, in triumph into Halifax harbour.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE "MONITOR" AND THE "MERRIMAC."

AT the outbreak of the Civil war in the United States, the North was much stronger than the South on the ocean. It had possession of all the warships of the United States, excepting a few that were sunk at Norfolk. Nominally the American Navy at this time consisted of ninety vessels, but of these only forty-two were in commission, and twenty-one were no longer fit for service. The Secretary of War under Buchanan, anticipating the struggle, and anxious to weaken the North had scattered the best ships to the ends of the earth. They were in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean, off the coast of Brazil, in the East Indies, at Pensacola, on the coast of Africa; only eleven vessels with one hundred and thirty-four guns were in American waters. These were all wooden ships,—the government having been slow to follow the example set by France of constructing ironclads, a species of vessel which had proved itself so effective at the operations against Kinburn during the Crimean war.

When President Lincoln issued a proclamation blockading the Southern ports, the Southerners were

at first able to laugh at it. With such an inadequate fleet, supplemented by river-steamers and ferry-boats, the swift-sailing blockade-runners could break through at will. The South was, however, much worse off than the North. They had, it is true, a number of exceptionally fine naval officers, trained in the National service, but they were utterly without ships, nor were they able to secure a fleet capable of coping with the warships of the North, and the hundreds of merchant vessels that were rapidly put into commission. So long as the North controlled the seas they need not hope for the victory. The busy and ingenious brains of their inventors went to work to design a craft that would be able to steam into the midst of a Northern fleet, and destroy it without itself suffering severe injury. If they could once get the mastery of the North on the ocean their cause would, they thought, without doubt be successful.

When the Norfolk navy yards were deserted by the National forces, the property there which might be of use to the South, was as far as possible destroyed. Among a number of vessels burned was the forty-gun frigate "Merrimac" of 3500 tons. The Confederates raised her on May 30, 1861, and found her engines in good condition and her strong wooden hull sound. It was decided to change her into an ironclad of an entirely new type. She was placed in the dry dock and her decks levelled to the water-line. On her strong hull, for a distance of one hundred and seventy feet amidships a casemate of great strength was constructed. It consisted of twenty inches of pine, covered with four inches of oak, and over this

were placed two layers of iron plating, each two inches thick. This casemate inclined at an angle of thirty-five degrees and met the roof seven feet above the deck. Attached to the bow of the "Merrimac" was a cast-iron ram projecting four feet from the cut-water. In the casemate were fourteen ports, five feet above the water-line. The armament of this formidable warship consisted of two rifled 6-inch guns, and six 9-inch Dahlgren guns, and two 7-inch rifled guns mounted on pivots forward and aft. Her hull could not be pierced, save by weapons of the heaviest kind when charged with adequate charges of powder. With her weapons and the short range at which she would be able to fight it was thought that she could easily sink the best ships afloat. She was christened the "Virginia" by the Confederates, but the old name "Merrimac" stuck, and by it she is known to history.

With their wretched constructing facilities, the Southerners were able to bring the "Merrimac" but slowly to completion, and it was not until March, 1862, that she was launched. She was then placed under the command of Captain Franklin Buchanan who had been a distinguished officer of the United States Navy. His second in command was Lieutenant Jones. The crew of the "Merrimac" was composed of volunteers drawn principally from the army about Richmond and Petersburg, and were far from being experienced seamen, but that mattered little on the "Merrimac," a boat without masts or sails or rigging.

While the South was putting forth these strenuous

efforts, what was the North doing? At a very early stage in the war it was recognised that ironclads would be a necessity, but it was not until three months after the South had concluded to make up for the deficiency in the number of their ships by making one at least as invulnerable as possible by armour, that the Admiralty called for designs for ironclad warships. It was then that the great inventor Ericsson, the greatest inventor of the nineteenth century, came forward with a design for a vessel which was an absolute innovation in naval warfare, and which was to revolutionize the navies of the world. As this vessel has been fully described in Sir Nathaniel Barnaby's *Naval Development in the Century* in this series, it will be unnecessary to give the details of the construction of the famous "Monitor." Ericsson had perfect faith in his new idea, and in August urged the advisability of such a ship on President Lincoln. But his vessel was so great an innovation that the Navy Board was slow to accept his design. His forecast of the capabilities of his "Monitor," when considered in the light of the battle which took place in Hampton Roads, is a remarkable one.

"The wrought iron ordnance of 12-inches calibre," he wrote, "planned by the writer already in 1840, practically established the fact that iron plates of four and a half inches thickness, could not resist projectiles from such heavy guns. Previous to the experiments at Sandy Hook, which you will remember were made in 1841, with the ordnance alluded to, I had determined theoretically, that six inches thickness would be required to protect ships against the

same, and that iron plates without wooden support unless made thicker, could not withstand continued firing. Accordingly the revolving turret of my proposed battery is made eight inches thick, in addition to which the outward curvature of the turret will on dynamic considerations materially assist the resisting capability of the iron. Apart from the great strength of the turret, it will be borne in mind that but few balls will strike so accurately in the centre of the turret as not to glance off by angular contact. The United States may thus be claimed to have been far ahead of the naval powers of Europe, who have just found out what we demonstrated twenty years ago.

“In respect to the impregnable nature of the battery proposed, I need not enter on a demonstration before one so experienced as yourself. It will be all sufficient merely to ask you to look carefully at the plan. It will, however, be proper for me to advert to the fact that the ironclad vessels of France and England are utterly unable to resist elongated shot fired from the 12-inch guns of the battery. The 4½-inch plates of ‘La Gloire’ or the ‘Warrior’ would crumple like brown paper under the force of such projectiles, and at close quarters every shot would crush in the enemy’s sides at the water-line. The opposing broadsides would be nothing more than the rattling of pebbles upon our cylindrical iron turret.”

At length the authorities were moved to accept Ericsson’s design and work was begun on the proposed vessel in October, 1861, and she was launched on January 30, 1862, and ready for sea February 15. Her trial trip was a most unsatisfactory one, and the press

and the authorities for the most part derided her as Ericsson's "Folly." But there were a select few who had faith in her. It was believed by the majority of people that when she got into a heavy sea she would sink; and her critics, judging from after events, were not far wrong in their opinion; her crew, too, would be suffocated for lack of ventilation, and after events, too, proved that there were grounds for such a belief; and further the concussion of the great guns would make the turret unendurable for the gunners. Her wretched crew would have the choice of three things, death by drowning, death by suffocation, or death from the concussion of their guns,—there would be no escape from this death trap.

She was completed and ready for sea not a moment too soon. The "Merrimac" had been launched and although as an experiment she was not much feared, from the beginning Ericsson was conscious that she would be a worthy antagonist of his little craft.

It was deemed foolhardy to go to sea in the "Monitor" but in times of war there are men ever ready, nay glad, to rush into the jaws of death, into the mouth of hell. Volunteers such as those who sacrificed themselves in the submarine boats during the Civil war, volunteers, such as those who risked death in the "Merrimac" at Santiago, can ever be found for a perilous undertaking, and a picked crew was soon on board the "Monitor."

The officers who had the courage to offer themselves for service on this untried freak were Lieut. John Lorimer Worden; Lieut. Samuel Dana Greene; Acting-Master, Louis N. Stodder; Acting-Master, J. N.

Webber ; Acting-Master's Mate, George Frederickson ; Acting-Assistant Surgeon, Daniel C. Logue ; Acting-Assistant Paymaster, William F. Keeler ; Chief Engineer, A. C. Stimers, inspector ; First-Assistant Engineer, Isaac Newton ; Second-Assistant Engineer, Albert B. Campbell ; Third-Assistant Engineer, Robinson W. Hands ; Fourth-Assistant Engineer, Mark Trueman Sunstrom ; Captain's Clerk, Daniel Toffey ; Quartermaster, Peter Williams ; Gunner's Mate, Joseph Crown ; and Boatswain's Mate, John Stocking.

At first it was decided to send the "Monitor" to the Gulf of Mexico, but her destination was changed, and she was directed to proceed to Hampton Roads. On March 6, she ventured out to sea in tow of the tug-boat "Seth Low" and under escort of the steamers "Curritick" and "Sachem," she set out for Hampton Roads, but scarcely was she out of sight of land before the authorities changed their minds and a despatch boat was sent out in search of her with orders directing her to proceed to Washington ; but fortunately for the cause of the North she could not be found. Similar orders were sent to Captain Marston at Hampton Roads, but when the "Merrimac" arrived at that historic point events had so shaped themselves that it would have been a fatal mistake for Captain Marston to have followed out his instructions with regard to the "Monitor."

Her journey to Hampton Roads was anything but a pleasant one. A storm arose and the little ship proved far from being seaworthy. For many hours the crew fought harder with the sea than they were to

fight with the Southern ironclad, and through the long night they faced death in more dreadful forms than from shot or shell. Worn out from toil and lack of rest, on the afternoon of the 8th they drew near to Hampton Roads. The sound of distant firing reached their ears; a battle was under way,—their little ship, this experiment in warfare, would soon be given an opportunity to bring them glory or the grave. When the pilot boarded their craft they heard from his lips a story of death and destruction that at once filled them with forebodings and with a burning desire for vengeance.

On the morning of March 8, the officers and men of the "Merrimac" prepared to go forth to face, practically single-handed, the whole Northern fleet. Their ship was an experiment, and how she would behave in battle could only be a matter of conjecture; that huge casemate under which they were to fight might prove the grave of every man on board. She was far from being a perfect boat, and the entire crew knew it. Her engines were defective, her steering gear was in wretched condition, and her rudder was exposed. Her hull was being patched up, even while she was proceeding to battle. For several days the Northern crew had been expecting that the strange "thing" that had been constructed at Norfolk would move down towards them, and early on this March morning they saw what looked to be "the roof of a barn with a huge chimney" accompanied by two gunboats slowly puffing down the winding river. The South expected much from her; she was their hope, and the soldiers in the forts, and the crowds of

sympathizers on the river banks cheered her on her way.

The fleet cleared for action, and the gunboat "Zouave" was sent out to reconnoitre. When she got within range, she fired several shots against the ungainly monster, but they struck harmlessly on the iron sides and fell hissing in the river. The "Merri-mac" scorned to open her ports and reply to the "Zouave's" fire ; she had bigger game in view, and slowly and ominously threaded her way down the channel. The "Zouave" was recalled and there was consternation in the Northern fleet, but the commanders of the warships hoped to drive off the enemy by the superior weight of their broadsides before she could do them much harm. Her sides were impregnable to the small guns of the "Zouave," but a few broadsides of heavy metal would soon hammer in that wide roof. There was an appalling silence along Hampton Roads as she drew near. At length she appeared in full view of the fleet, and the sailing-ship "Cumberland," 30 guns, the "Congress," 50 guns and the "St. Lawrence," 50 guns, and the steamers "Minnesota" and "Roanoke," each with 46 guns, prepared to receive her.

At a little after one o'clock the "Cumberland" and "Congress" sent broadsides against the "Merri-mac," but the metal made no impression upon her armoured hull. Still she remained grimly silent, and nearly an hour elapsed after her first appearance before her voice was heard ; then the anxious watchers on the Federal boats saw her bow port open, caught sight of the muzzle of a 7-inch gun gleaming

in the noonday light, and the next moment a shell burst with deadly effect on the decks of the "Cumberland" killing or wounding most of the crew of the after pivot gun. On she swept, unmindful of the shot and shell that clattered against her sides, or burst about her, until she was but two hundred yards distant from the "Congress;" then her port guns were run out and a fierce broadside swept the decks of the Northern ship with an appalling slaughter. The bulwarks of the wooden vessel were torn and smashed and shot and shell and the flying splinters turned the boat instantly into a shambles. Having thus ruthlessly proved to the Northern fleet how powerless they were to resist her fire, she turned and ran up stream towards the "Cumberland." She was about to try a new method of warfare, and she steered directly against the side of the vessel that towered above her. There was a sudden jarring of the Northern ship through her whole length, and then a rushing of water into the hold. The ram, for the first time in naval warfare, had done its work and done it well. A wide rent was made in the hull of the "Cumberland," but when the "Merrimac" reversed her engines and withdrew, she left her iron beak behind.

Captain Buchanan as he drew away from the ship he had just rammed demanded her surrender, but Lieutenant Morris made the reply, "Never! I'll sink alongside," and the "Cumberland's" crew gallantly and hopelessly fought on for nearly an hour, enduring the fire of the "Merrimac" and the gun-boats "Yorktown," "Jamestown" and "Teaser."

At length the Northern ship sank in deep water dragging her flag at the peak beneath, but at the fore, even after she settled to the bottom, the red flag of no quarter was still bravely flying. Her enemies in this fight truly said of her, "No ship had ever fought more gallantly."

The "Congress" which had already received such a foretaste of things to come, and which had been raked with 7-inch shell while the "Cumberland" was being destroyed, next received the entire attention of the destroyer. Her captain, Joseph Smith, saw what a hopeless contest was before him and fearing that the fate of the "Cumberland" would be the fate of the "Congress" ran her into the shallow waters of Newport News, where the "Merrimac," on account of her draught, could not follow the ram, and where his ship would receive some protection from the guns of the forts.

When the "Congress" ran aground, the "Merrimac" took up a position at between one hundred and fifty and two hundred yards distant and opened her full broadside, raking her from stem to stern. Early in the fight Lieutenant Smith was slain, but Lieutenant Pendergast, although only able to make a feeble reply with two stern guns, fought on. At length one of these was dismounted and the other had its muzzle knocked off. The "Congress," too, was on fire in several places and the crew controlled the flames with difficulty. She was moreover exposed to the guns of not only the "Merrimac" but of four gunboats as well. It would be a useless loss of life longer to continue the unequal contest, and

the colours of the North were run down and the white flag displayed. The Southern gunboats ran in to rescue the crew, but the gunners in the forts had not seen the white flag and swept the scene of action with a heavy fire, killing and wounding several of the enemy and of their own friends; among the wounded was the commander of the "Merrimac." On this, the Southern vessels once more opened on the doomed "Congress" with hot shot and she was soon a mass of flames. The "St. Lawrence" and the two Northern steamers had set out for the scene of destruction early in the battle, but all three had run aground.

Having finished with the "Cumberland" and the "Congress" the "Merrimac" leisurely turned to mete out a similar fate to the "Minnesota." But on account of the shallow water and the approaching darkness she was unable to get within close range or to continue to manœuvre in the narrow channel, and so after sending one shot through the "Minnesota's" bow to let her know what she might expect on the morrow, she withdrew to her anchorage.

In the battle of this fateful day, the National cause had suffered greatly. Two of the best ships of the North were destroyed, and two hundred and fifty gallant fellows were killed and many more wounded; and at what cost to the South? Two were killed and eight wounded on the "Merrimac" and thirteen killed or wounded on the gunboats, and the vessel that had caused so much death and destruction suffered only from a slight leak through the tearing away of her ram.

When news of this day's terrible work reached the North consternation was in every home and particularly in the seaport cities and towns. Stanton, the Minister of War, was the most alarmed individual in the country. He saw the whole course of the war changed in an instant. This new craft would destroy the vessels of the North one after another and take toll of the cities along the coast. He deemed it not unlikely that she was even then on her way to Washington, and that they would have a cannon ball or shell from one of her guns in the White House before they left the room in which the authorities were discussing the situation.

If the North was in consternation, the South was intoxicated with joy. They had been fighting a magnificent uphill fight and now that they had control of the seas,—and they believed they had—they would beat the North. Nothing but a miracle could, it was thought, save the ships and towns of the Federals; the "Merrimac" was alike impregnable to the broadsides of three-deckers or the fire of forts. The age of miracles, however, was not past. The brain of Ericsson had devised a craft that was going to be more than a match for the dreaded ironclad. Even while the "Merrimac" was retreating up the river to her anchorage at Sewell's Point, the "Monitor" was being cleared for action. It was the last volleys poured into the shattered "Congress" that had reached the ears of her crew between four and five o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th.

Slowly the little "Monitor" advanced through the darkness, her crew patching her up after her terrible

fight with the ocean, and getting her ready for her great battle of the morrow. When darkness fell the light of the burning "Congress" served as a beacon to guide her into Hampton Roads. The blazing warship presented a horrible but fascinating picture. The tongues of flame ran up her rigging and wrapped themselves about her masts and yards and leaped hungrily from her ports, while black columns of smoke rolled from her deep hull. Occasionally through the night loud explosions were heard as the fire reached loaded guns or shells. Under the glare the March night became as bright as day, and as the crew of the "Monitor" gazed upon the awe-inspiring spectacle, they wondered what the morrow would have in store for them. About midnight this strange craft crept into Hampton Roads and her odd appearance caused a good deal of speculation. The Southerners spoke of her contemptuously as "a cheese box on a raft," and "a tin can on a shingle," and the Federal crews wondered what so strangely shaped a thing would do on the morrow, and hoped for but little from her.

On his arrival Lieutenant Worden reported to Captain Marston of the "Roanoke" and the need was so great that Captain Marston decided to disobey the orders commanding him to send the "Monitor" to Washington.

All night long on board the little vessel preparations were made for battle, and when morning broke everything was in readiness for the fight. She had taken up her position close beside the "Minnesota" and her presence in no way lessened the dread of the

crew of that ship, and every man on board when the "Congress" blew up with a terrific explosion a little after one o'clock expected that the "Minnesota" would perish in a similar manner. The diminutive monstrosity anchored beside them, would, they thought, be of little avail with her two turret guns against a ship that had resisted the broadsides of the best vessels of the United States. Experienced sailors as they were, they had naturally not a little contempt for this unique craft without rigging, masts or sails.

At daylight on the morning of the 9th, the engineers on the "Merrimac" leisurely got steam up and preparations were made for a renewal of the destructive work of the preceding day,—a battle it could hardly be called. In the beautiful morning of early March she swung from her anchorage and proceeded down the river. As Captain Buchanan had been severely wounded, Lieutenant Jones had now chief command, and in courage and skill he was in no way inferior to the commander of the previous day.

The "Congress" and "Cumberland" were no more, and the "Minnesota" was to be the next victim. When the "Merrimac" was still a mile distant from its prey a shot from her 7-inch bow gun struck the counter of the Northern ship telling the crew what they might expect. The "Minnesota" replied with her stern guns, but the "Monitor" which lay dwarfed in the shadow of her high sides remained silent. When the "Merrimac" was within close range, the little low-built craft—an untried and unknown quantity—left her anchorage and proceeded to do battle with the high-built, well protected engine of

destruction, whose terrible power she was made to realize by the sunken "Cumberland" and the burnt "Congress."

Although but little could be hoped from such a diminutive craft by those who had witnessed the work of the previous day, still there was much expectation, and the shores were lined with onlookers, and the vessels' sides and rigging were crowded with men eager to see the commencement of the duel between these two strangely-built engines of war. Amazement and pity were in the hearts of the friends of the "Monitor" as she swung out to meet the vessel coming so deliberately to battle. Destruction would be hers in a few brief moments! So thought most of the spectators, and her own crew knew not what to think. Would her armour withstand the powerful guns of the "Merrimac" at close range, would her turret come up to the expectations of its creator, could she live if the cumbersome "Merrimac" should turn on her and, ramming, crush her by mere mass? Lieutenant Worden was probably the only one on board who had perfect confidence in his ship, and he placed her unhesitatingly alongside of the "Merrimac," believing that he could check the Southern boat in her career of destruction and possibly destroy her.

Lieutenant Jones saw this odd-shaped craft, boldly offering to do the "Merrimac" battle, and recognized that before he could either destroy the balance of the National fleet or proceed on his way to Washington, this boat would have to be dealt with.

When within pistol shot range of the "Merrimac" the "Monitor's" turret slowly revolved, the ports

were opened and the two 11-inch guns were brought to bear and immediately two 170-pound shot struck the sides of the "Merrimac." The Southern ship quivered under the blow, but her hull remained intact. The "Merrimac" now in turn fired a starboard broadside at the "Monitor," but the 200-pound shot made no impression on the decks or turret of Ericsson's experiment. The nineteen men in the narrow turret working the guns and revolving it, heard with delight the thunder of these first shells against their citadel. The armour had withstood the blow and the turret was uninjured. Again and again it revolved and again and again the Dahlgren guns smote the "Merrimac" but without doing injury. The crew of the "Merrimac" tried the effect of small arms on the ports of the "Monitor," but as quickly as the guns were fired the ports were turned from the enemy, —in fact frequently, through the defective working of the turret, the guns were fired while it was still in motion. Naturally at this close range and with such a huge target to practise on, the "Monitor" succeeded in making numerous hits, and had the guns only been properly charged in all probability the Northern gunners would have succeeded in piercing the "Merrimac." Orders had been issued by the War Department to use only fifteen pound charges. These orders were due to the explosion of the famous gun "Peacemaker," and but for them 50-pound charges might have been used in the guns, and in that case the battle would probably have had a different ending. In this first encounter, save for the narrow and cramped space in which they worked, the crew of

the "Monitor" suffered but little. True several of them were stunned through standing against the walls of the turret at the time of the impact of shells, and Acting-Master Stodder was somewhat seriously injured in this way, but all recovered from the shock.

The "Merrimac" although uninjured, saw that she was making no impression on her antagonist. The low build of the "Monitor," the small exposed surface, and the difficulty the "Merrimac" had in bringing her guns to bear on account of her small ports, made her shooting far from accurate even at this close range.

Lieutenant Worden, too, was dissatisfied with the progress of the fight. This knocking at each other's sides was unsatisfactory work, and he looked about for some vulnerable spot at which he might ram the "Merrimac." He discovered that the rudder was exposed, and if he could but break it the enemy might be at his mercy, and so he turned and rushed for the stern of the vessel and missed the rudder by but a few feet. As he passed the two turret guns sent shot against the "Merrimac's" stern and all but crushed it in. So severe was the shock that the crew of the vessel were thrown to the deck. Lieutenant Jones would probably have attempted thus early in the fight to ram the "Monitor" but as the iron beak of his ship had been lost on the previous day he was no doubt a little timid about hazarding ramming his opponent. He was convinced that the "Monitor" could do him but little harm, and as he was wasting much good ammunition in battle with her, he decided to withdraw from

the duel and take up the work he had set out in the morning to do, the destruction of the "Minnesota," the "Roanoke," and the "St. Lawrence."

He placed his vessel close to the "Minnesota" and sent a shell crashing through her hull amidships, setting her on fire, but the fire was quickly extinguished. Several other shots were hurled into the stranded vessel, and it looked as if the fate of the "Congress" was to be the fate of the "Minnesota," for her broadsides pounded helplessly on the "Merrimac's" casemate. But the little "Monitor" was not to be got rid of thus easily. She fearlessly slipped in between the combatants and forced the "Merrimac" to change her position and thus saved the "Minnesota." During the remainder of the day the "Minnesota" was never again in danger, and up to this time she had received no irreparable injuries.

The two ironclads once more began their duel in earnest. The "Merrimac's" guns kept up a continuous roar pouring broadside after broadside into the "Monitor." The Northern boat on the other hand fired more leisurely, as it was necessary for the turret to revolve between each discharge of the guns. As a consequence there was an interval of from seven to eight minutes between the shots.

Lieutenant Jones, seeing how impervious the "Monitor" was to the broadsides of his ship, now determined, despite the injuries his vessel had received on the previous day when ramming the "Cumberland," to try to run down his antagonist. At the first opportunity the "Merrimac" rushed at the "Monitor," but her slow speed enabled Lieutenant

Worden to elude the blow. A slanting one was struck, however, and she was carried forward on to the low deck of the "Monitor." Lieutenant Jones thought of boarding his opponent as a last resort, but before this could be accomplished the "Monitor" had slid from under the "Merrimac." At the moment of contact one of the "Monitor's" guns smote the forward casemate of the "Merrimac" a terrific blow. The iron armour was crushed in and the wooden backing was shattered, but the ball failed to penetrate. Had there but been an adequate charge of powder in the gun serious injury would have been done to the "Merrimac."

At length the supply of ammunition in the turret became exhausted, and it was necessary to withdraw from the battle for a time to replace it. The crew of her opponent thought that she had been seriously injured and had quit the fight. They were once more turning their attention to the stranded ships, but before they could put their thoughts into action the "Monitor" had returned to begin the fight again with renewed vigour.

The Southern crew had by this time learned how futile their blows were against the strongly armoured turret, and the guns were turned on the pilot house, a less conspicuous mark, but if they were only able to destroy it the ship would become unmanageable. In the pilot house were Lieutenant Worden, Howard the pilot, and Peter Williams, the quartermaster, and so small was the place that they had barely standing room. And now an incident occurred which almost proved a disaster.

Lieutenant Worden was watching the progress of the fight through a narrow sight hole, five-eighths of an inch wide, in the pilot house, when a shell burst immediately outside. He received painful injuries from the explosion and was for a time blinded. His face was torn and bruised and when Lieutenant Greene came forward to take charge of the ship both he and the wounded man believed that his injuries were fatal. In the excitement of the moment the "Monitor" drifted helplessly about. It was thought that the steering gear had been injured, but when Greene examined it he found that it was intact. He at once took charge of the ship and, while Worden lay in the cabin wondering in his agony what would be the end of this strange fight, conducted the vessel towards the "Merrimac." But the Southern ship had had enough. She could not get at the "Minnesota," and it was useless pounding at this thick-skinned fighting machine, that fearlessly ran immediately under her broadside fire. She turned to leave the conflict and Worden learned that she was in flight and that the "Minnesota" had been saved beyond a doubt. He despaired of his life but when he realized what a glorious and successful battle the little ship, in which he and his crew had hazarded so much, had fought, he heroically exclaimed "then I can die happy."

The "Merrimac" had given up in despair and sped up the Elizabeth River followed by several derisive shots from the "Monitor." The victor in the fight returned triumphantly to the side of the shot-shattered "Minnesota." Hope had succeeded despair

on the stranded vessel. All through the morning her crew had expected death; but they were saved, and the little vessel that had saved them had endured shot and shell for hours and apparently without the slightest injury. The crew of the "Minnesota" had had no faith in the oddly constructed ironclad when she slipped out to the battle in the morning, and they had not believed she could save their ship even when they saw how invulnerable she herself was to the enemy's fire. But now the dreaded foe had fled back to her quarters, and there lay their little saviour peacefully beside them, with scarce a mark of the battle upon her. Strangest of all was the fact that but for the accidental wounding of her brave commander, no one on board had been injured. Several men, it is true, were stunned by the impact of shells on the turret, but they had quickly recovered.

The men on the "Minnesota" and the remaining ships had been saved as by a miracle, and more—their country had been saved. Ericsson's genius had done what a fleet of ships could not do. Was it only Ericsson's genius? To another man was due much of the praise of this great victory,—for a victory it truly was though the "Merrimac" was neither captured nor destroyed. Lieutenant Worden's courage and faith and skill had saved his country. But for him the "Monitor" would in all probability have foundered at sea; but for him her crew would scarcely have had the courage to expose their untried boat so deliberately to the Southern guns at such close range,—and he now lay suffering, blinded, disfigured,

—but his name had become a household word in the North.

During this memorable fight the "Monitor" had received in all some twenty-two shots. One shell had crushed in the turret two inches, but this was the only serious mark she bore of the battle. To the broadsides that thundered against her she had replied with forty-one shots, and her 11-inch guns had succeeded in striking the "Merrimac" over twenty times. Apart from breaking in the top layer of iron plates, but little injury was done to her antagonist. The "Merrimac," however, was forced to go to the dock for repairs and with a new ram fitted, and with heavier armour on her hull and casemate and steel-pointed shells for her guns she came forth in search of the "Monitor" early in April, under command of Commodore Josiah Tatnall. The "Monitor," however, had done her work; she had saved the Northern fleet in Hampton Roads and she commanded the situation there. The authorities knew that the "Merrimac" had been greatly strengthened, and that it would not do to risk another duel with her, so the turret ship remained on the defensive.

The lives of these two ships were to be short. The Northern troops under General Wool were marching victoriously on Norfolk; the Confederates saw that it would be necessary to desert that important stronghold, and before doing so they set fire to the ships there, and the "Merrimac" was effectually destroyed by the explosion of her magazine.

The "Monitor" ventured to sea again in the autumn and once more she encountered a severe storm.

This time she did not live through it but foundered dragging down with her sixteen of her crew. But she had done a work during her brief existence of vaster importance than any warship that ever floated. She had saved a nation in its hour of peril, and she had revolutionized the navies of the world. Wooden ships had seen their day, and ironclads were to take their place. The new method of mounting guns was to become universal, and the turret and barbette were soon to be found in the ships of all the Powers.

CHAPTER XVIII.

BATTLE OF THE "ALABAMA" AND THE "KEARSARGE."

No phase of the Civil war presents a more unpleasant subject for study than the attempt by the South to drive the National flag from the ocean. The fleet commerce-destroyers of the Confederate States raced over all seas, and wherever a vessel was found flying the Northern banner, no matter what its occupation might be, if it were weak enough, it became a subject for plunder and destruction. The destruction of these merchantmen was for the most part a wanton piece of work which in no way benefited the Southern cause, and had about as much influence on the course of the war as the plundering and burning of some peaceful settler's hut in a remote plain or on some distant mountain side would have had. It had, however, a serious effect on the development of the merchant navy in America. The War of 1812 had done much to weaken the commercial influence of the United States although it proved that her ships and sailors were unequalled in the world, and the Civil war was, by the action of the South in commissioning these commerce-destroyers, to do still more. The blow struck by the Confederates against American commerce was one from which the United States has

never recovered. England, her commercial rival, fell natural heir to the trade that had formerly been carried in American bottoms.

The vessels engaged in this peculiar form of naval warfare were of two types,—small vessels, which did not venture far to sea but lay hid in the many harbours and inlets along the coast, ready to rush out on any unsuspecting vessel of the North that might be sighted: and sea-going ships of fair size, fleet vessels, with comparatively weak armament, which were only capable for the most part of attacking unarmed ships, and which depended on their speed more than on their guns to keep out of harm's way.

One of the first of these larger ships was the "Sumter" commanded by Captain Raphael Semmes, an experienced soldier of the Mexican war. The "Sumter" was not by any means a powerful vessel, having in all but five guns, four short 32-pounders and one 8-inch pivot-gun, but she operated over a wide range, capturing vessels in the West Indian waters and on the Atlantic. It was in her, however, that Semmes gained the training that was to make him such a celebrated commander when he stood on the quarter-deck of the "Alabama." For a time the "Sumter" had uninterrupted success, but she was at length cornered in Gibraltar harbour, and Semmes, seeing escape impossible, sold his good ship and thus avoided capture.

The "Florida," Captain Mafitt, was another celebrated cruiser which ran a distinguished career until Commander Collins in the "Wachusett" attacked her while she lay in neutral waters in Bahia in Brazil

and carried her north as a prize. He was afterwards ordered to take her back to Bahia, but her engineer sank her as she lay ready for her journey in Hampton Roads. The "Nashville," the "Georgia," the "Shenandoah," and the "Tallahassee" all did much to drive the Stars and Stripes from the great ocean routes. The "Tallahassee," on one occasion, caused a good deal of excitement in New York. She had boldly sailed to a point within sixty miles of the city when the war was at its height, and a rumour spread that she was about to make an attack on the Brooklyn Navy Yards. That such an important position could be threatened and alarmed by a single cruiser shows in what bad hands the naval department was during the early stages of the war. But the king of these commerce-destroyers was the "Alabama," and so famous did she become, both through her long career on the ocean and through her celebrated fight with the "Kearsarge," that the deeds of the other destroyers are for the most part forgotten in her renown.

The "Alabama" was an English-built boat—the two hundred and ninetieth vessel built by the famous ship-building firm of Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead (the head of the firm, by the way, a British member of Parliament). On this account she was sometimes known as No. 290. She was a staunch ship of a little over a thousand tons displacement with thirty-two feet beam, her length over all being two hundred and twenty feet. She had moderate speed, being able to sail eleven knots under steam and ten under sail. It was well known in England why she was being built, and yet everything possible was done to

enable her to get to sea. The American authorities made an effort to prevent her leaving port, but the British government was instrumental in aiding her to begin her career. The "Tuscarora" had been sent to watch her but when the "Alabama" went out for her trial trip this vessel was detained till the Confederate ship, then sailing the English flag, was beyond successful pursuit.

She first sailed to the Azores where she took in supplies and coal and where, early in August, Captain Raphael Semmes of the old "Sumter" and her crew joined her. The crew was largely composed of Englishmen, some of whom were experienced gunners who had learned the art of war in the Royal Navy. On August 24, 1862, she was placed in commission as a Southern cruiser, and the British flag under which she had put to sea was run down and in its place the flag of the Confederacy was thrown to the breeze.

She was in a way a formidable ship, for the days when sailing vessels made up the bulk of the ocean going boats. She could do her work either in calm weather or when buffeting stormy seas. Unlike modern steamships she was not compelled to run into port every few weeks to get a supply of coal, although she constantly aimed at having an abundant supply on board. Her propeller was so easily adjusted that it took but fifteen minutes to hoist it out of the water. It was said that in case of need, with her sails set and her engines at work, she could attain a speed of fifteen knots. Her armament, while not a peculiarly powerful one, was effective for the work she was des-

tined to do. On her forecastle on a pivot was mounted a 100-pounder Blakely rifled gun, and an 8-inch smooth-bore gun on a pivot aft looked astern. She had besides these a broadside of six 32-pounders: poor weapons, but effective against wooden hulls. She had an experienced crew of one hundred and twenty men and twenty-four officers, her commander was moreover a veteran in the work of harrying the commerce of the National government.

It was soon known that she was at sea and her name became a terror to the seamen of the North. From the day she was placed in commission till she sank into the ocean after her fight in front of Cherbourg harbour, Federal vessels in every part of the world kept a careful watch for her. Within three weeks after putting to sea she had captured, plundered and burned ten vessels and in less than two months had accounted for over twenty. Semmes conducted his operations with admirable tact, spending a couple of months in one section of the ocean until his whereabouts became known to the Federal government, and then just as a ship of war would arrive on the scene to run him down he would change his location to some remote part of the great commercial highways and begin his work once more.

In the early days of November Semmes had the boldness to sail to within two hundred miles of New York. When the presence of the "Alabama" became known along the coast of the North every seaport was in a state of great excitement. Several powerful war vessels scoured the waters in search of the dreaded ship, and on November 18, when the

"Alabama" ran into Martinique for a supply of coal from his tender, the "Agrippina," the United States sloop of war "San Jacinto" arrived on the scene and her crew anticipated ending the career of the "Alabama," but several days later the Confederate boat slipped out of the harbour unobserved and continued her renowned career.

Early in December she ran down her best prize, the mail steamer "Ariel" and spread consternation among the five hundred passengers who were on board; but her captain after removing some \$9,500 from the steamer and taking a bond of the ship for \$216,000 allowed her to proceed on her journey.

By this time Semmes had got the North thoroughly excited and had won for himself an unsavory reputation. He was called a coward for the subtle way in which he avoided contact with the ships of war sent out to capture him, and a pirate and freebooter for the manner in which he preyed upon harmless traders.

Captain Semmes opened the year 1863 with a rather clever bit of work. He learned that General Banks was proceeding with an expedition to Galveston for the purpose of blockading that Southern port. Semmes determined to risk running close to the place with the hope of capturing some of the Union transports. When he came within sight of the blockading squadron he found that it consisted of the "Brooklyn," the "Hatteras," the "Cayuga," the "Sciota," and several smaller vessels. The "Alabama" was sighted by the "Brooklyn," but the sloop of war had not steam enough up to investigate the new-comer,

and so the Commodore signalled to the "Hatteras" to run down to the stranger. The "Hatteras" was a side-wheeler, a slow vessel without either strength or speed. As she turned in the direction of the "Alabama" the Confederate boat changed her course and steamed seaward.

After a pursuit of about twenty miles the "Hatteras" arrived within hailing distance, and then her commander, Homer C. Blake, inquired the vessel's name. The reply came back "Her Britannic Majesty's ship 'Petrel.'" But even while the reply was being given the "Alabama" manœuvred so as to secure a position from which she might rake the "Hatteras," but Blake avoided the movement. All disguise was then thrown off and the ominous words came to the Union sailors' ears: "This is the Confederate State steamer 'Alabama,'"—and with the words the command was given to fire and a broadside crashed into the Union ship. Blake saw he had no chance in a battle at long range and so made an effort to come to close quarters, but with her superior speed the "Alabama" had no difficulty in evading the effort, and from a distance continued to pour shell into the side-wheeler. Very soon the "Hatteras" was in a sinking condition; a number of her crew were slain; her guns were silenced, and she was on fire in several places. Her commander was forced to surrender and the Confederate sailors then made haste to save her crew. In less than fifteen minutes after the action ceased, the "Hatteras" was at the bottom of the ocean.

The other vessels of the blockading fleet had seen

the flashes of the guns and heard the roar of the broadsides. They knew how weak a ship the "Hatteras" was and steamed towards the scene of action, but they were too late; the fight was over long before they reached the place of battle. All night long they searched in vain and when morning broke the wreckage of the "Hatteras" told them the fate of the ship, but the mysterious stranger was nowhere to be seen. She had done her work thoroughly; in a way the most creditable bit of work, excepting her brave battle with the "Kearsarge," that she performed during her career. After the battle Semmes sailed away for Port Royal in Jamaica where he left his prisoners.

Enough harm had been done in Northern waters for the time being, and besides it would now in all probability be made dangerously hot for this freedom of the ocean. The destruction of the "Hatteras" would, Semmes expected, rouse the Navy Department to unwonted effort. Semmes therefore sailed to the Southern seas to continue his destructive work.

In the Brazils he was guilty of a gross breach of the neutrality laws, and the Brazilian government has been blamed for permitting this but it is doubtful if it was strong enough to interfere. After spending his customary two months off the coast of Brazil he sailed for the Cape of Good Hope where he received an enthusiastic greeting from the British authorities. He was, however, to have a short sojourn here, for the "Vanderbilt" was on his track. To evade capture he sailed across the Indian Ocean and during his six months' sojourn in the Eastern seas, between the

Southern coast of China and the Cape of Good Hope, captured a number of rich prizes and succeeded in eluding the war vessels sent in pursuit of him.

He had now been nearly two years almost continuously at sea, and it may be that he and his crew began to long for a sojourn ashore. At any rate he sailed for Europe, and early in June reached the famous fortified harbour of Cherbourg. Mr. Dayton was at that time Minister to France from the United States, and when he learned of the arrival of the "Alabama" at once despatched the news to Captain John Ancrum Winslow who was at Flushing in Holland in command of the "Kearsarge."

Semmes was something of a hero in France. The career of his vessel was known, and a ship that had captured sixty-eight vessels and sunk one gun-boat in a period of about twenty months was naturally an object of curiosity. At the same time she was a splendid prize for a vessel of war, and when on June 12 Captain Winslow received word of her presence in Cherbourg he at once made preparations to hurry forth to give her battle before she could escape. Two days later the "Kearsarge" arrived off the great breakwater guarding the harbour of Cherbourg. It was not expected by the Union commander, judging from the past career of Captain Semmes, that he would be bold enough to give battle to so strong a ship as the "Kearsarge."

Semmes, however, had made up his mind to enjoy the experience of one first class sea-fight. He and his crew no doubt had every confidence that they would be victors. Their long career of success had made

them over-confident; besides the bitter things, deservedly so, that were said against them by the North, had greatly enraged them and they longed for the opportunity of proving that they were something more than "pirates" and "destroyers of helpless ships." Another incentive was the enthusiasm of the French for the "Alabama." The officers in Cherbourg wanted to see a fight and they did not a little to influence Semmes to send out a challenge to Winslow. He did this by means of a request to the "Kearsarge" not to leave her station outside of Cherbourg as he intended to come out to give battle as soon as some necessary preparations were completed.

There was comparatively little difference between the two warships. The "Kearsarge" had a slight advantage in tonnage; her guns, while not so numerous, were on the whole superior to the "Alabama's," and her crew was a trifle larger. The armament of the "Alabama" has already been given; that of the "Kearsarge" consisted of two 11-inch smooth bores, one 136-pound shell and one 150-pound shot, mounted forward and aft on pivots. She had besides four 32-pounders and a 30-pounder rifle and a 12-pounder Howitzer. In total weight of broadside metal the "Kearsarge" was about twenty per cent stronger than the "Alabama." The tendency to give due consideration to armour protection had influenced Captain Winslow. While at the Azores in the previous year he had arranged his spare cables over the side of his vessel amidships to protect the vitals of his ship. These chains he had covered with one-inch deal

boards, so that the "Kearsarge" had the decided advantage of fair armour protection. As this armour was struck several times during the fight it may have been the means of saving the Northern ship. But the main advantage the "Kearsarge" had was in the character of her crew. Semmes' men were little better than pirates, and, as they had done no fighting during their long two years' cruise, and as Semmes had not seen fit to waste powder and ball in gunnery practice, they were decidedly inferior gunners. On board the "Kearsarge" on the other hand, was a picked crew of the best men in the American navy and the gunners were experts, having had much practice. But there was no great disparagement between the two vessels and the people in the vicinity of Cherbourg expected a fight well worth watching; and they were not to be disappointed.

Sunday, the favourite day for battles, came round, and just as the crew of the "Kearsarge" had begun their morning service the "Alabama" was seen coming out of the harbour. Captain Winslow at once ordered the ship to be cleared for action and, slipping his cables, hurriedly steamed out of neutral waters.

The townspeople and the people in the countryside knew of the intention of the "Alabama" to go forth to do battle with the "Kearsarge," and every point of vantage along the shore had its sight-seers. It is said by some authorities that excursions were run from Paris to watch the battle, but this is no doubt a myth. The "Alabama" steamed out accompanied by the French ironclad "Coulon," which vessel steamed back to harbour as soon as the belligerents

were out of neutral waters. In the offing lay the English yacht "Deerhound"; her owner, it is said, anxious to give his children the experience of witnessing a duel at sea, steamed out to watch the fight.

Captain Winslow was determined that the battle should be to a finish. He strongly suspected that if Semmes found that the "Alabama" had no hope of victory that he would run into neutral waters and thus escape destruction or capture. To prevent such a thing happening the "Kearsarge" was run well out to sea, much to the disappointment of the spectators on the shore who feared that the battle would be too remote for interesting observation. For over seven miles the "Kearsarge" led the "Alabama" to the chosen fighting ground, and then her helm was put about and she ran straight towards the Confederate cruiser. Although the distance from the shore was considerable and the vessels not unlike each other in build, they were nevertheless easily distinguishable, as the "Kearsarge" was burning Newcastle coal, and the "Alabama" Welsh coal, and in the one case the smoke was thick and black, in the other, it streamed from the funnel in a thin gray cloud.

The excitement became intense both in the ships and on the shore, the moment that Winslow turned the "Kearsarge" about to begin the attack. It was a bold bit of work to head directly towards the broadside of the enemy, but the Northern commander was anxious to get within deadly firing distance as soon as possible; and although he was in imminent danger of having his ship raked, he took the chance of the first broadside from the "Alabama" being inaccurate.

At 10:57 when the vessels were still about a mile apart the roar of the 100-pounder Blakely on the forecastle of the "Alabama," rapidly followed by the voice of the broadside, told that the great sea duel had begun. The shooting was high, the projectiles cut through the rigging of the "Kearsarge" but left her hull intact. Two other broadsides followed in rapid succession, but still the hull of the Northern vessel remained unscathed. The crew of the "Alabama" were shooting with too great rapidity for accuracy. The vessels, however, were drawing too close to each other to allow Winslow to take further risk. The shells from the "Alabama" might chance to sweep the decks of the "Kearsarge" fore and aft with a destructive fire, and so when his vessel was about a thousand yards from the enemy her course was changed, and her starboard broadside was brought to bear on the "Alabama."

As soon as the ship was in a good position, the guns which were loaded with five-second shells were brought to bear slowly and deliberately on the enemy and a destructive broadside at once crashed into the "Alabama." It was now seen by the spectators that there was still another mark by which the two combatants could be distinguished. The powder of the "Alabama" was defective and from her guns rose great clouds of black smoke, and to the distant watchers came a dull report, but when the weapons of the "Kearsarge" spoke, their voice was clear and sharp and a light white smoke drifted away from their muzzles.

As the "Kearsarge" delivered her first broadside,

Winslow made a masterly effort to pass under the stern of the "Alabama" hoping to secure a raking position, but Semmes avoided the manœuvre, and kept his starboard broadside towards the starboard broadside of the "Kearsarge." Seven times the vessels circled round and round a common centre, continually pouring broadsides into each other. It was difficult for the spectators to see which ship was having the best of it, but on board of the "Kearsarge" there was no doubt which was going to win.

The shooting of the "Alabama" was fast and furious, but, for the most part, wild, and, due no doubt to the defective powder, the shot that did strike had not force enough to penetrate the strong hull of the "Kearsarge." The "Alabama" fired in all three hundred and seventy rounds, and but twenty of these struck her foe.

The firing was high and the rigging was occasionally cut; one shot struck the halyards of the "Kearsarge's" second ensign which had been hoisted to the mizzen-mast head, ready to be shaken to the breeze in case of victory, and it was unfurled before its time. The crew of the "Kearsarge" accepted this accident as a sign that the victory would soon be theirs, and cheered heartily as they looked up to the flag floating from their mizzen.

On one occasion during the battle the Northern ship was decidedly in luck. A hundred pound shell struck her square in the stern, but failed to explode. She trembled through her whole length, but no evil results followed; had it burst the fight might have had a different ending. Another shell penetrated the

bulwarks and, exploding, mortally wounded William Gowin, who lived long enough, however, to add his dying cheers to the cheers of his victorious comrades when the "Alabama" struck.

From both vessels splinters were flying; both as they circled nearer and nearer to each other (at the close of the fight they were but five hundred yards apart) were jarred from stem to stern by the crashing blows of shot and shell. But the "Alabama" was having decidedly the worst of it. At first she used shell, but when these failed to explode she tried to penetrate the water-line of the "Kearsarge" with solid shot, and at the close of the fight she was using shot and shell alternately. The "Kearsarge," on the other hand, was firing more deliberately and her practised gunners were making nearly every shot tell. She fired only one hundred and seventy-three shots during the engagement but these were thrown at her enemy with method and precision. The heavy 11-inch guns were aimed a little below the "Alabama's" water-line with the hope of sinking her, while the 32-pounders played on her decks. One shot from her 11-inch gun entered the port of the 8-inch mounted on the stern of the "Alabama," killing several of the gun crew. The "Kearsarge's" gunners seemed to like this target, for in rapid succession they sent in two more shells through the same port with similar effect.

About an hour after the fight began a shot struck the "Alabama's" gaff, carrying away her colours. The Northern crew thought for a moment that the Southern ship had struck and cheered lustily as they

ceased firing, but soon another flag was run up at the mizzen and the battle recommenced.

It was seen now that the fight could not last much longer ; the hits as the ships circled nearer each other, were more frequent, and it became evident that the "Alabama" was leaking badly. Several great gaps had been made in her starboard side and she was listing badly. But Semmes was not yet prepared to haul down his flag. He heeled his vessel as much as he could to port and made an effort to run into neutral waters. But Winslow anticipated his movement and ran across his bow and made ready to pour in a raking fire. A white flag was displayed and for a few brief moments the action ceased. Winslow saw that the "Alabama" was rapidly sinking, and he was making preparations to rescue her crew, when Semmes, despite the white flag, sent in a last despairing broadside. The "Kearsarge" from close range replied with a deadly fire, which promptly forced Semmes to make a formal surrender.

The end of the fight and the end of the "Alabama" had come. She was rapidly sinking by the stern and there was no time to lose. The wounded were placed in the boats and those who were uninjured were ordered to seize spars and boxes or whatever was at hand and save themselves by jumping into the sea. They got clear of the "Alabama" not a moment too soon, for before the two boats sent from the "Kearsarge" to pick up the crew reached the wreck, her bow rose high in air and stern first she sank with a hissing sound into the deep waters of the channel.

The yacht "Deerhound" sped in to the rescue, and

succeeded in picking up forty-two men and officers, including Semmes. As soon as she had them on board she fled at top speed to the English coast. Her action has been much debated. Winslow claimed that the prisoners should have been surrendered, as they were rescued at his request and with his permission, and the people of the North, for the most part, backed him up in his contention, but England claimed, on the other hand, that to hand them over as prisoners to the National government would have been a breach of the neutrality laws towards the Confederate States.

The "Kearsarge" picked up in all sixty-five of the crew. In the battle ten were killed and twenty wounded and ten more were drowned by the sinking of the ship. It was a glorious fight and one which was much appreciated throughout the North. Farragut, the hero of the Mississippi and Mobile Bay, envied Winslow this duel. He would rather have had the glory of destroying the "Alabama" than his immensely greater fame won by successfully passing the forts.

This duel emphasized the usefulness of the 11-inch gun. It was largely due to this superior weapon that the "Kearsarge" won such a decided victory. It emphasized, too, the need of constant training for sailors; the wild shooting of the "Alabama's" gunners was no doubt largely due to the lack of practice in the kind of warfare they experienced in this memorable fight. The seizing of whalers and freight-boats was but poor training for men who were forced to meet skilled gunners and expert sailors. It em-

phasized, too, the utility of armour. The chains over the sides of the "Kearsarge" may or may not have been of service to her, but had the "Alabama's" shooting been accurate and her powder of as fine a quality as the "Kearsarge's" in all probability, considering the close range at which the ships were fighting, she would have been penetrated amidships. As it was, she had on her armour several heavy dints from shot and shell.

So ended the "Alabama," and with her destruction the Northern traders, who had to go down into the deep to earn their bread, took heart.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE DUEL BETWEEN THE "METEOR" AND "BOUVET."

WHEN war broke out between France and Germany in 1870, it was at first thought by some that ships might play a considerable part in the struggle. France had an immense superiority at sea, and it was believed that she would very soon drive the insignificant fleet of her rival from the seas, and by blockading the Baltic and North Sea ports do much to hamper Germany in her movements on land by compelling her to keep a large army in readiness to resist invasion from these quarters. But France in creating her navy had not had Germany in mind. England was her rival as a sea power, and she had constructed her ships taking into consideration only the deep draught ships of the English navy or the bold coasts of England. A fleet action between France and Germany was out of the question; and as the heavy ironclads of France were not suited for attacking the German coasts with their shallow shores, the navies of the two Powers were to play practically no part in the struggle, save that France was able to drive German commerce from the sea, capturing in all some eighty vessels bearing the German flag.

Germany was wise, and refused to risk her ships in engagements, but kept them safe in the Jahde, in the Elbe, and in the Eider Canal, and at Wilhelmshaven, at Kiel, at Stralsund and at Dantzic. Several vessels were in Japanese waters when the war broke out, one was on the West African coast, and another, the "Meteor," was in the West Indies. There was much blockading of ships in ports by France but the only sea-fight that took place was an insignificant duel between the German gunboat "Meteor" and the French gunboat "Bouvet" off the harbour of Havana.

The "Bouvet" was lying in the harbour of Havana, her officers and men enjoying the hospitality of the city, when, on November 7, a gunboat bearing the German flag steamed in. She was a small vessel with a crew of only sixty-four officers and men. Her armament, too, was weak ; it consisted of one 15-centimetre and two 12-centimetre guns. The "Bouvet" was a larger boat, with a crew of eighty-five all told ; her armament, too, was considerably stronger than the "Meteor's." She carried one 16-centimetre gun and four 12-centimetre guns. The French captain and his crew rejoiced greatly at the sight of the "Meteor." They believed that with their superior strength in guns and men they would be able easily to capture or destroy the German vessel.

Scarcely had the "Meteor" cast anchor, before Captain Franquet of the "Bouvet" sent a challenge to her commander, and then shortly after daybreak on the following morning steamed slowly out past Castillo de la Punta and Castillo del Morro into the Gulf of Mexico and cruised about waiting the appear-

ing of his foe. The captain of the "Meteor" was nothing loath to accept the challenge. Although his ship was smaller and had a weaker armament than the "Bouvet" he did not despair of success in a duel. The "Meteor" was a staunch-built boat with a strong hull and her gunners were well trained.

Twenty-four hours after the "Bouvet" weighed anchor the German gunboat went out to meet her. As she steamed seaward she was accompanied by a Spanish warship, which the authorities in Havana sent out to see that the vessels did not fight in neutral waters. The "Bouvet" cleared for action on sight of the "Meteor" and stood well out to sea. Her captain as in the case of the captain of the "Kearsarge" was determined if the "Meteor" should be crippled that she would have no chance of escape.

It was almost the middle of the afternoon before the two gunboats got within effective range. When at a distance of twelve hundred yards from her foe, the "Meteor" opened the battle with a shot from her 15-centimetre gun. The "Bouvet" vigorously replied, and for over two hours this long range duel continued. As in the case of the "Kearsarge" and "Alabama" in their historic duel off Cherbourg harbour the two gunboats circled round each other many times, but did not succeed in making numerous hits. Two things militated against effective shooting. In the first place the vessels were small and, secondly, at the time of the fight a considerable sea was running. The captain of the "Bouvet" began to think that darkness would fall before he had accomplished anything and determined to try new tactics.

The stokers heaped coal on the fires, and when his vessel had attained her highest speed she was directed straight against the "Meteor's" broadside. If the French could not capture the German gunboat they thought they could at least sink her and so were boldly attempting to ram. The "Meteor" was skilfully handled, and although the "Bouvet" rushed upon her with a speed of eleven knots she adroitly avoided a direct blow and was struck at an angle. Her captain might have saved his vessel altogether from the blow, but he hoped to capture his opponent and had his men ready to board the French vessel as soon as she struck. The blow given was a glancing one, however, and the vessels were in contact for so brief a time that boarding was out of the question.

Although the "Meteor's" hull had received no injury from the collision with the "Bouvet" it was not so with her masts and rigging. The main mast and mizzen mast both came down with a crash and the rigging became entangled with the screw. The engines ceased working for a time, and it was with no small difficulty that the screw was released. While she lay in this comparatively helpless condition Captain Franquet determined to try the ram once more. The captain of the "Meteor," seeing the condition in which his ship was left after the first blow, was anxious to avoid a second. His guns were trained upon the rapidly approaching ship, and when she was almost upon her victim she was struck by a couple of projectiles. One of these crashed through her boiler and the cloud of steam that rose about her told the "Meteor's" crew the effect of the shot. It looked

for a moment, as though she would fall an easy victim to her opponent who at once prepared to take up a position from which she would be able to rake her and force her to surrender. But as the ships had circled round each other they had gradually drawn nearer the shore and were now only a short distance from neutral waters. The captain of the "Bouvet" at once ordered his crew to hoist all sail on his lifeless ship, and as there was a stiff north-east wind blowing she sped rapidly shoreward. The "Meteor" went in pursuit sending projectiles after her, but before she was able to come up to the crippled ship Captain Franquet had succeeded in gaining neutral waters and the Spanish captain, who had been an interested spectator of the duel, ordered the vessels to cease firing as they were then in Spanish waters.

Thus ended the only sea fight that took place between the ships of France and Germany in the Franco-German war, and the honours were with the German gunboat.

CHAPTER XX.

THE BATTLES OF THE "HUASCAR."

ONE of the most interesting warships of modern times was the Peruvian ironclad turret-ship "Huascar." She was not a remarkable vessel, either as a ship or a fighting machine, but the minor actions in which she took part drew the attention of the Powers to her and naval constructors and gun-makers learned lessons that were fraught with importance for the development of ships and guns. Her field of operation was along the war-tortured North-West coast of South America, where wars seem to be the life of the small republics settled on the slopes at the foot of the towering Andes.

The "Huascar" first came into prominence in 1877, when her crew mutinied, professedly to support Pierola, who claimed the presidency of Peru. She straightway became a sea rover, visiting the towns and villages along the coast and forcing the inhabitants to pay her tribute. Nor did she stop at this; like the pirate ships of the days of Captain Kidd, she took toll of the sea, and was not over careful as to the nationality of the vessels she boarded, although pretending only to interfere with the property of the

political opponents of her crew. On several occasions she had the boldness to interfere with vessels bearing the flag of England.

For the time at which the "Huascar" operated and considering the scene of her operations, she was a formidable warship. She was to some extent an experiment, having been constructed in 1865, when the building of ironclads was still in the initial stage. She was launched from the yards of Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead, the firm which had built the "Alabama" for the Southern States.

The latest achievements in naval architecture were embodied in her construction. In the first place, she was an armoured ship. Along her water-line was an armour belt of wrought iron, varying from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches in thickness. The turret, which had proved such a success in the Civil war, was the most striking thing about the "Huascar." It was situated amidships, and had a protection of $5\frac{1}{2}$ -inch plating. It revolved on a roller way,—the system of moving the turret developed by Captain Coles, who had the honour simultaneously with Ericsson of making the revolving turret an important factor in naval warfare. Her armament consisted of two 10-inch twelve-and-a-half-ton Armstrong muzzle-loaders, weapons without either accuracy or great penetrative power; these guns were in the turret. Besides these weapons she carried on her quarter-deck, two 40-pounders and one 12-pounder, all muzzle-loaders. These guns were without protection. She had one tripod mast and in the military top on this mast she carried a gatling gun which stood behind a strong bulwark of boiler iron.

She had a remarkably low freeboard, and this, together with her comparatively small size (she was only eighteen hundred tons displacement) made her a somewhat diminutive target. She was not a fast boat, having a speed of only eleven knots, but she was doing her work in waters where there were but few ships of great speed. Her crew numbered a little over two hundred men.

This formidable vessel cruised up and down the South American coast and became a menace to commerce; and although she flew the Peruvian flag, she was practically a pirate and was repudiated by the Peruvian government. When she interfered with British merchants and mail-ships, however, she had to be attended to, and Rear-Admiral de Horsey, who was in command of the British vessels in those waters, went in search of her with the "Shah" and the "Amethyst," and as a consequence an engagement occurred between the three ships, that, although without startling results, was of considerable interest, as it clearly demonstrated what type of vessel would have the best chance of escaping injury in a naval battle.

The "Shah" was a big ship of 6,250 tons and 7,840 horse power. She had a powerful armament of two 9-inch twelve-ton muzzle-loaders, and eight 64-pounders, and sixteen 7-inch guns, and in her tops she carried gatlings. Besides these pieces of ordnance she was armed with Whitehead torpedoes, a new weapon in warfare. But despite her modern equipment she was in reality an inferior vessel,—a retrogression in naval architecture, for her crew of 602

officers and men were cooped up in an unarmoured hull. Her companion boat, the "Amethyst," too, was unarmoured, and although she was a bigger boat and had a slightly larger crew than the "Huascar," the ironclad was to prove herself capable of repelling the attack of both ships.

They came upon the "Huascar" not far from the Peruvian town of Ylo and the wily captain ran his vessel into the shallow water immediately in front of the place. As the "Huascar" drew but fourteen feet to the "Shah's" twenty-seven the big English ship could not follow her in. Attempts were made to get the Peruvian ship to surrender, and when these failed the combat began at long range.

The "Huascar" kept her station in front of Ylo while the two British ships pounded her with shot and shell. She replied to this fire with one of her turret guns and one of the forty pounders, but the aim of her gunners was bad, and she failed to make hits. The "Shah" under ordinary circumstances would have made an easy target, but she steamed rapidly to and fro and effectually disconcerted the aim of the Peruvian gunners. The "Huascar" kept her position during the afternoon and on several occasions the British were forced to suspend hostilities as they were in danger of destroying property and life in the town of Ylo; and although the Peruvian vessel flew the flag of Peru the British quarrel was with the ship and not with the nation, which professed to be in no way responsible for her acts.

All through the afternoon the long range fight continued. The "Huascar" apparently determined to rest

practically passive, endeavouring to save her skin. Towards evening, however, she headed seaward, and made directly for the "Shah." It looked as if she meant to use her ram on the thin sides of the big cruiser. As she approached, the gatling in the "Shah's" fore-top opened upon her exposed deck, and when she came still nearer a Whitehead torpedo was launched at her. Thus in South American waters the first Whitehead torpedo ever used in actual warfare was sent against a warship. It lacked speed, however, and failed to reach the enemy. The "Huascar" then retreated to her safe station in front of Ylo and firing ceased till night fell.

When darkness came, the British commander determined to make an effort to destroy the enemy's ship and sent a boat in for the purpose of finishing her with a torpedo, but she was not to be found and a close search gave no signs of her. She had crept along the coast in the shallow waters, which her commander knew well, and escaped. Knowing that the British would continue the pursuit on the following day, and that, with her inferior speed, she was in the end doomed to capture or destruction, she surrendered to the Peruvian fleet and once more became a recognized warship of Peru.

The fight had been a most interesting one. It proved beyond a doubt that only armoured vessels equipped with armour piercing guns need hope to battle successfully with armoured vessels. Everything on the "Huascar" that could be riddled with shot was pierced and her upper works were smashed in many places; even her colours had been shot away,

but although her hull had been struck many times it was uninjured, save for the dints which enabled her crew to count the blows she had received. Two things had been proved beyond a doubt by this insignificant battle—a low freeboard and armour along the waterline and over the vitals of a ship made excellent protection from shot and shell. They saved the “Huascar;” but for these things she would have made a short resistance to the concentrated fire of the two British cruisers.

The “Huascar” was soon to receive a severer test, and was to be in several engagements which were to thoroughly try her. In the year following her battle with the “Shah” and the “Amethyst” a dispute arose between Chili and Peru with regard to the nitrate districts. Peru supported Bolivia in her refusal to grant the demands of Chili. As a result of Peru’s attitude, Chili, although unprepared for a struggle, declared war on both states on February 5, 1879.

As in so many of the great contests in history, Sea Power was to play the leading part, and in the end the country able to assert her supremacy at sea was to be the winner in the struggle.

Before war was declared it looked as though the Chilean fleet would from its greater strength be able to destroy the fleet of Peru. Two facts, however, militated against Chili: her vessels, although nominally superior in speed and in equipment, were at the time of the declaration of war so foul and their engines and boilers in such bad repair that the actual superiority at sea lay with Peru, and Chili had not

the facilities in her own country for cleaning and repairing her warships. Wilson in his *Ironclads in Action* gives the relative strength of the belligerents as follows:

"Bolivia possessed no fleet at all, and Peru had only six serviceable ships, besides some transports. Four of these were ironclads: the first, the 'Huascar,' has already been described. The second was the 'Independencia,' an armoured broadside vessel of about 3,500 tons. She was protected by four and a half inch iron armour, had been built in England at Millwall in 1865, and had recently received new boilers, as also had the 'Huascar.' Her battery consisted of two 150-pounder, twelve 70-pounder, and four 30-pounder muzzle-loading rifle guns; to which on the outbreak of the war were added, one 250-pounder (8-inch, 9-ton) gun, and one 150-pounder. The 'Manco Cabac' and 'Atahualpa' were monitors of the 'Passaic' type, built in the United States. Their armour was five inches thick on the sides, and ten inches on the single turret, which mounted two smooth-bore 15-inch 440-pounder guns. Their displacement was 2,100 tons; their low freeboard and wretched speed rendered them quite unfit for service at sea. The 'Union,' an unarmoured wooden corvette of 1500 tons, had received new boilers just before the war, and carried twelve 70-pounder muzzle-loaders. Lastly, there was the gunboat, 'Pilcomayo' of 600 tons and six guns, 70-pounders and 40-pounders.

"The Chilian fleet included two fairly modern and powerful ironclads, the 'Blanco Encalada' and

'Almirante Cochrane,' built in England from the designs of Sir E. J. Reed in 1874-5. They were central box-battery ships of 3500 tons, protected by armour eight inches thick on the battery and nine inches amidships on the belt, which completely encircled the ship. They were armed each with six 9-inch 12-ton guns, two of which fired right ahead, two right astern, and three on the broadside. Each also carried one 9-pounder, and one 7-pounder gun. All these weapons were rifle muzzle-loaders. The 'Blanco Encalada' had two 1-inch Nordenfelts and the 'Cochrane' one. Their crew was 300 men, and they carried 254 tons of coal, or sufficient for one week's work at a constant speed of 10 knots. Their upper yards, topmasts and bowsprits were landed at the outbreak of the war. The hulls of both ships were in a bad condition; the 'Blanco' was very foul, having never been docked since she came out, and the 'Cochrane' was not much better, as there was no dry dock on the Chilian coast where they could be cleaned, though ships require frequent docking in these warm latitudes. The trial speed of the two had been from twelve to thirteen knots; it is doubtful whether they could either of them exceed nine knots in 1879. The 'O'Higgins' and 'Chacabuco' were wooden sloops of 1100 tons, each armed with three 115-pounder, two 70-pounder, and four 40-pounder muzzle-loaders. Their boilers were in a very bad condition, and their speed was only eight or nine knots. They carried crews of 160 men. The 'Abtao' was a similar vessel, with a similar crew, but carried only three 115-pounders, and three 30-pounders as her armament.

The 'Esmeralda,' whose great deeds we shall have to chronicle, was the worst ship in the squadron; an old wooden vessel with boilers in the most shaky condition, and a speed of only six or seven knots. She was armed with fourteen 40-pounder muzzle-loaders. The 'Magallanes' was a gunboat of 775 tons, carrying one 115-pounder, one 68-pounder, and two 20-pounders. The 'Covadonga' was the small steamer captured from the Spaniards in 1866, of six knots speed, and armed with two 70-pounders. There were also several armed steamers which had been taken over from the Chilian Steamship Company."

At the beginning of the war the Peruvians attacked Chilian commerce and captured a number of vessels along the two thousand mile coast of their enemy. The first naval fight of the war occurred off Iquique, which the Chilian fleet had been blockading. A number of transports were sailing south from Callao to Arica, and to capture these Admiral Reboledo greatly weakened the blockade, withdrawing all his best ships. The Peruvians learned that only two comparatively weak vessels, the "Esmeralda" and "Covadonga," were left guarding the entrance to Iquique. The "Huascar," Captain Grau, and the "Independencia," Captain Moore, were promptly despatched to Iquique with orders to capture or destroy these two Chilian boats. As a result, on May 21, one of the most thrilling sea fights in naval history took place.

When the two Peruvian warships were sighted, Arturo Prat, the heroic young commander of the "Esmeralda," knew that he had to prepare for one

of two things,—surrender or a fight to the death. Both ships were much stronger and swifter than his and all escape was cut off. He hesitated not a moment; the order to clear the ships for action was at once given, and at eight o'clock in the morning the battle began. The "Huascar" as the stronger ship, concentrated her fire on the "Esmeralda," while the "Independencia" prepared to put the "Covadonga" out of action, and expected that a few rounds would do the work.

In the battle between the "Huascar" and the "Shah" as we have already seen, the "Huascar" saved herself to some extent by the position she took up in front of the town of Ylo. Prat, on this occasion, practised similar tactics, and ran in as close as possible to Iquique, in the hope that shot which would fail to hit him, might do damage to the town of the enemy. The position which the "Esmeralda" had taken up was thought to be mined, and Captain Grau was afraid to risk running into the shallow water to try to ram the wooden sides of the "Esmeralda."

The "Esmeralda" had now placed herself between two fires; the shore batteries opened upon her and the guns of the "Huascar" splashed the water about her. The "Huascar's" gunners, as in the fight with the "Shah" and the "Amethyst," seemed to be unable to find the mark, but the shore batteries made several hits, and three men were killed and an equal number wounded on board the "Esmeralda." The Peruvians now determined to try to board the Chilian ship, and for this purpose sent out

a flotilla of small boats from the shore, and Prat, fearing capture, moved out of the shallow water. His ship was in a poor condition for maintaining the battle. Naturally a slow boat, she was now, through the bursting of two of her boilers, able to speed only three knots. Still, the "Huascar" seemed to be unable to hit her. One shot alone from the big turret gun apparently did any damage. Meanwhile the gunners on board the "Esmeralda" were finding the target, but the protection on the turret and on the hull of the "Huascar" made her proof against the inferior guns of the Chilian ship, and the shot fell harmlessly against her sides.

When the fight had lasted for over two hours and the "Esmeralda" had been driven from the shallow water, Captain Grau decided to try the ram. The "Esmeralda" with her ridiculously low rate of speed should have been an easy victim, but at the first attempt, so skilfully was she manœuvred, or so carelessly was the "Huascar" handled, but a glancing blow was given which did only slight injury to the hull of the "Esmeralda."

At the moment of contact, Prat, quick to seize his opportunity, saw a desperate chance of victory in boldly boarding, and with the cry "Children, on board her!" leaped on the forecastle of the Peruvian warship. A sergeant of marines joined him and the crew crowded after, but before they could reach the "Huascar" the ships separated, and the two heroes were left on the enemy's deck. Prat prepared to die sword in hand, but before he could cut down any of his foes he was shot dead.

The fight now went on at close range. The big guns and the gatling gun on the "Huascar" swept the "Esmeralda" fore and aft, and many of her crew were killed or wounded. The decks became slippery with blood, but still there was no thought of surrender. The ships manœuvred rapidly; the "Huascar" in an effort to ram and the "Esmeralda" to avoid the blow. Once more a glancing blow was struck, and once more a gallant attempt to board was made, but only a handful of men succeeded in reaching the decks of the "Huascar."

The fight was a hopeless one, but the gunners stood bravely by their guns, and poured deadly broadsides into the Peruvian ship, and although the shot made but little impression on her hull, several did effective work on her exposed decks. One shot found its way into one of the turret ports, doing considerable execution, and another struck the tripod mast, which carried the gatling gun, such a blow that the crew of the "Huascar" feared that it would fall.

The Peruvians were beginning to be alarmed, they dreaded contact with the "Esmeralda." The boldness of the Chilians had taken the heart out of them, and if the "Esmeralda" had been able to grapple and keep her position alongside for ten minutes, she would in all probability have captured the ironclad. But she was at the end of her fight. A shell had shattered her rudder and she was unmanageable. The two collisions she had sustained and several shot on her water-line, had so injured her hull that she was rapidly filling and besides she had not sufficient ammunition left to continue the fight, but her gallant

crew had no thought of surrender. While she lay wallowing in the swells in this helpless condition the "Huascar" as though maddened by her determined resistance rushed upon her at full speed, and when she withdrew her ram after the blow, the wide rent made in the side of the Chilian ship caused her to sink immediately. But she went down with her colours flying defiantly at the masthead. Out of a crew of 200 but 62 were saved.

Meantime the little gunboat "Covadonga" had been doing even more effective work than the "Esmeralda." She, too, ran in close to the shore where the "Independencia" would have difficulty in following her. For a short time the fight continued at long range and then the "Covadonga" determined to make an attempt to escape. Her commander knew the coast well and ran south skirting the line of breakers that foamed close to the shore. The guns answered each other as the ships sped along the coast. As in the fight between the "Huascar" and the "Esmeralda," the Chilians displayed superior gunnery, and managed to dismount the bow pivot gun of the "Independencia" after it had succeeded in getting home but one shot. The vessels now drew near each other, so near that the small arms men were able to sweep each other's decks. Three times the Peruvian ship tried to ram the Chilian gunboat, but three times the "Covadonga" succeeded in evading the blow, and each time as the enemy passed close by her her small arms men succeeded in getting in telling volleys. When the third attempt was made, the little "Covadonga" was perilously near the dangerous

reefs, so near indeed that she touched lightly on their outer edge, but fortunately glided off into deeper water. Just as she struck, the "Independencia" rushed at her under a full head of steam, but once more missed her mark and while passing the stern of the "Covadonga" a shot struck down the man at the wheel, and as she was left at this critical moment without a guiding hand she ran on the hidden reef with terrific force.

The "Covadonga" now circled round and took up a safe position astern of the "Independencia" where the guns of the Peruvian boat could not play upon her. She then poured into the stranded and helpless ship, a succession of 70-pounder shell. The "Independencia" was soon on fire and ere long would have been a mass of flames when an end was put to the cannonading by the appearance of the "Huascar" on the horizon.

A few minutes after the "Independencia" stuck fast on the reef, the "Huascar" succeeded in ramming the "Esmeralda" for the third time and sent her to the bottom. She paused for a brief space to rescue the remnants of the crew of the vessel she had just destroyed, and then turned southward to see how it fared with her comrade in the fight. While she was still ten miles away the commander of the "Covadonga" recognized her, and knowing how foolhardy it would be to remain longer on the scene of his triumph, fled at her approach. The "Huascar" followed the gunboat for a time, but Captain Grau began to fear that he might come in contact with the Chilian ironclads, a thing which would probably have

ended disastrously, weakened as his ship was by the struggle with the "Esmeralda," and, therefore, ceased from the pursuit. He then returned to the wrecked "Independencia" and after rescuing her crew burnt the vessel to the water's edge so that she might be of no value to the enemy.

The war now dragged on for several months, the "Huascar" still doing much damage to Chilean commerce, and by her superior speed avoiding battle with the Chilean ironclads. Chile was at length aroused to make a strong effort to end the struggle. The "Cochrane" was sent to Valparaiso and had her machinery thoroughly cleaned and repaired and the accumulations of months were scraped from her bottom by divers. This consumed a good deal of time, but when it was completed she was able to steam a knot an hour faster than the "Huascar."

The war was now renewed in earnest, and the ships of Chile went out in two divisions in search of the "Huascar." The first division was commanded by Admiral Riveros and was composed of the "Blanco," "Covadonga" and the "Matthias Cousiño;" the second, of the "Cochrane," "Loa," and the "O'Higgins." For several days the vessels searched in vain, but at length, at daybreak on October 8, the "Huascar" was sighted by the "Blanco," and Admiral Riveros accompanied by the "Covadonga" went in pursuit, but the Peruvian ships quickly steamed away from these slow-sailing vessels.

After a time Rear-Admiral Grau with every confidence that danger for the present was passed went to his cabin to rest, but a little after seven o'clock he

was roused with the news that there was a suspicious looking craft in the North-East. At first this news caused Grau no uneasiness as, from previous experience, he believed the "Huascar" capable of outspeeding the "Cochrane" by at least one knot, but to his amazement he soon recognized that she had miraculously recovered the speed she was reputed to have when she was sent out to Chili. He put on all steam and tried to escape, but soon found that it was hopeless and cleared his ship for action, knowing full well that he would have to do battle not only with the "Cochrane," a stronger ship than his own, but with the "Blanco," too, for she was then only about five miles away, and steaming steadily towards the "Huascar."

There was a heavy sea running and the Peruvian ship was pitching and heaving considerably. Her gunners had proved themselves bad marksmen in the past, and this sea was to make them even more inaccurate in their shooting. Rear-Admiral Grau began the fight with his turret guns when the "Cochrane" was still two miles away, but it was not until his fourth shot that he succeeded in hitting the enemy with a shell, which, however, did not explode.

The "Cochrane" withheld her fire until only seven hundred yards separated the two ships, and then she poured in a broadside. Her fire told at once, and the end began with almost the first shot. The light armour on the turret was no protection against the "Cochrane's" guns at this short range, and a shell crashed through it, killing or wounding twelve men. The woodwork was set on fire and for a

time the turret guns were silent as the turret would not move on its roller way. At length, however, she managed to strike the "Cochrane" with several effective shells, and one all but succeeded in making its way through the six-inch armour on the Chilian's water-line.

The superiority of the build of the Chilian iron-clad for naval warfare now made itself evident. The "Huascar" on account of her high forecastle, and her construction aft of her turret, could fire her big guns neither directly ahead nor astern. The "Cochrane" was thus able, now that her speed was greater, to select a safe position where the "Huascar's" fire could not reach her. The "Cochrane's" tops, too, were higher than the top on the tripod mast of the "Huascar" and from these, at the close range at which the ships were fighting, the small arms men were able to silence the enemy's gatling guns, and likewise pick off any one exposing himself on the enemy's decks.

The tactics of the "Cochrane" during the early part of the fight were to keep astern of the "Huascar" and out of range of her turret guns. From this position she was able to hammer at her antagonist's hull, while the men in the tops and those directing the "Nordenfelt" on the bridge could sweep her decks.

Shortly after the fight began a 9-inch shell struck the "Huascar's" conning tower. Rear-Admiral Grau, who was within it directing the ship, was blown to pieces. The same shot killed Lieutenant Diego Ferré who was in charge of the steering wheel. This fatal shell likewise injured the steering gear and

the vessel fell away from her course. Another shell entered the turret, blowing off the head of Lieutenant Rodriguez and killing or wounding all within the narrow space. Death and destruction was in every part of the ship, and the crew knew that at length the career of the "Huascar" as a Peruvian warship had come to an end. The "Cochrane" expected every moment to see her foe strike her colours, but no doubt those in command of the "Huascar" remembered the gallant conduct of the "Esmeralda" and manfully endured the terrible punishment they were receiving.

The "Cochrane" at length thought that the time had come to finish the fight, and turned sharply and swiftly on her antagonist to use the ram. The "Huascar" escaped by a bare five yards, but as the "Cochrane" passed her stern she received a terrific broadside which disabled her steering gear and tore into her hull, scattering destruction and death. But Commander Aguirre still refused to surrender, and from the sighting hood of the turret directed his ship. He had difficulty in passing his orders, but as in the fight between the "Monitor" and "Merrimac" he succeeded by means of a string of men in having them passed aft. Again the "Cochrane" made an effort to ram, and once more the "Huascar," despite her battered condition, avoided the blow. But in passing the "Cochrane" succeeded in raking the ship with another broadside, and one shell entering the turret killed or wounded all there, and among the killed was Commander Aguirre.

As this movement was being executed the "Blanco"

which had been hurrying with her best speed towards the fight, arrived on the scene, and in her anxiety to take up a good position, almost collided with the "Cochrane."

The "Huascar's" commander now thought that he saw an opportunity of destroying one of the enemy, and made an effort to ram the new-comer, but the gunners on the "Blanco" swept the Peruvian's deck with a terrific fire and the list of dead and wounded grew apace. Down in the hot hold of the vessel the wounded lay waiting for the end and with them were many others who were driven in fear from the shot swept decks. But in that last hour heroes were made. A stray ball hit the "Huascar's" colours and tore them away. The Chilians thought she had struck and there was a pause in the fight; but a gun-loader seized another flag, went aft, and amid a hail of bullets shook it out to the breeze.

Lieutenant Garezon, now in command of the ship, was in despair. His vessel was on fire and the fire was with difficulty controlled. So many of her gunners had been killed that it was only at intervals that she could reply with a single gun to the concentrated fire of the two Chilian ships; but down in the stifling atmosphere beneath her decks, the engineers and firemen, the true heroes of modern naval battles, worked on, keeping her engines going, and the hopeless fight continued. She succeeded in avoiding several further attempts at ramming, but soon her funnel was choked and her fires were almost extinguished. She was rapidly becoming an inanimate body, exposed to the fire of three ships, for the sturdy little "Cova-

donga" had now appeared to add her guns to the fight. In a few minutes she would be absolutely at the mercy of the ram of either the "Cochrane" or the "Blanco."

At this stage of the fight, like Sir Richard Grenville of old, Lieutenant Garezon determined to scuttle his ship and perish with her rather than let her fall into the hands of the enemy. As the "Huascar" was an iron ship, he appealed, not to the master gunner to blow her up, but to the chief engineer to open the sea valves and let in the water. The engineer promptly made ready to obey, but the sailors as in the case of the "Revenge" were not so ready to die, and some of them waved towels in token of surrender, and, though the Peruvian flag was still flying, the Chilian ships humanely ceased firing and boarded the "Huascar" just in time to save her from sinking.

The battle had been a gallant one and the one hundred and forty prisoners, thirty-five of whom were Englishmen, were well treated by their conquerors. The stubbornness of their resistance had won the admiration of their enemies, and for the moment the destructive work of the "Huascar" through so many months was forgotten.

The fight between the "Cochrane" and the "Huascar" was the most important one of the entire struggle between Chili and Peru, for with it Peruvian power at sea ended, and with it the war practically closed.

PART THREE.

ENGAGEMENTS WITH BATTERIES
AND PASSAGE OF FORTS.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ATTACK ON THE TAKU FORTS.

THE student of England's wars during the nineteenth century cannot fail to note how systematically she has suffered defeat at the beginning of her campaigns. The reason for this is not far to seek. With the exception of her struggle with France in the opening years of the century her wars have been with Powers weaker than herself in the essentials of war and she has therefore greatly underrated them. She has not seemed able to learn by experience and in her last great contest, one of the most costly the world has seen, she went into the fight believing that with a small army she would be able to conclude the struggle in a few weeks. More men have perished in the three years' struggle in South Africa than were deemed necessary to bring the Republics to terms.

One of her most noteworthy reverses was that before the Taku Forts in 1859. In 1858 these forts had been captured without difficulty by the allied armies of France and England and Tien-Tsin was entered without much opposition. The Emperor at Peking, trembling for his safety, concluded the Treaty

of Tien-Tsin in 1858. This treaty, among other terms, permitted the appointment by Queen Victoria of a resident minister at Peking. The Emperor agreed to this but afterwards entreated that none might be sent. The French government likewise requested permission to send a resident to Peking, but the request was refused, and this prepared Emperor Napoleon to support the British in their demands on China.

Mr. Frederick Bruce, a man experienced in Chinese affairs, was appointed resident and in June reached Hong Kong. He proceeded to Shanghai, and was here met by two Imperial commissioners who advised him not to attempt to proceed to Peking. He was not to be dissuaded, and with the French envoy shortly afterwards proceeded on his way.

When the mouth of the river Pei-ho was reached, it was discovered that the fleet accompanying the envoys would have to force its way past forts that had been greatly strengthened since the operations of the previous year. Strong obstructions, too, were planted in the river and these would have to be removed before vessels of any but the lightest draught could pass the forts. Rear-Admiral Hope requested the Chinese to remove these obstructions, but the mendacious Chinese declared that they had not been planted to prevent the passage of the English but to keep out the pirates that swarmed along the Gulf of Pechili. They promised to remove them, but instead of doing so made them stronger. Admiral Hope then gave the Chinese three days to remove the obstructions and warned them that if they had not

disappeared at the expiration of that time he would remove them by force.

This would be no easy task; the shallows at the mouth of the Pei-ho would not permit the entrance of large vessels, and if the forts were to be captured it would have to be done by his fleet of small gunboats.

On the morning of June 23, as the obstructions were still in place, the British admiral advanced to the attack with the following gunboats: "Plover," "Banterer," "Forester," "Haughty," "Janus," "Kestrel," "Lee," "Opossum" and "Starling." Each of these ships mounted four guns. The "Nimrod" and "Cormorant" were slightly larger vessels, mounting six guns. These were all wooden steamers with crews of from forty to fifty officers and men. It was thought that with the assistance of reinforcements from the warships outside the bar over which they had slipped in the early morning, the gunboats would have little difficulty in silencing the forts.

On the following day Captain Willes was sent forward to reconnoitre the river, and if possible to remove the obstructions. He discovered that the obstacles were very complete and ingenious. The first barrier consisted of a row of iron spikes so planted, that any vessel attempting to force her way through would without doubt be pierced. A quarter of a mile farther up the river and immediately in front of the South Fort a second barrier was discovered. This consisted of a cable of cocoa fibre and two chain cables; these cables were supported every thirty feet

by floating booms. This barrier was mined and Willes daringly proceeded still farther up the river till he reached the third barrier, consisting of two rafts stretched out from either shore leaving only a narrow channel through which one ship could barely pass at a time. This channel was planted with stakes, similar to those discovered at the first barrier. After completing his investigations at this point Willes returned to the second barrier; the mine was fired and a gap made in the boom. The explosion of the mine caused the reconnoitring party to be discovered by the forts and several shots were sent after the retreating boats, but Willes and his men reached the gunboats without injury. When Captain Willes reported on the state of the river in front of the forts to Rear-Admiral Hope, it was decided to begin the bombardment of the forts with daylight.

Difficulties began at the outset. The channel approaching the forts was a narrow one, and it was high noon before the gunboats were anchored close to the first barrier and within range of the South Fort, which had preserved an ominous silence during their manœuvres. The black flags which floated here and there on the ramparts alone showed that they were occupied. The British fleet had not taken up its position without mishap; two of the gunboats, the "Banterer" and the "Starling," were stuck fast in the mud. To Captain Willes, who had spent the night in examining the river, was assigned the task of forcing the first barrier. The "Plover" and the "Opossum" were detailed for this duty. Admiral Hope was on board the "Plover" and waited close

to the barrier till Captain Willes succeeded in making a passage wide enough to let his ship through. This was not an easy task. The Chinese had so firmly imbedded the stakes in the river bottom, that it was almost the middle of the afternoon before the "Opossum" by means of her winches succeeded in making an opening large enough to let the gunboats pass through. The "Plover" and the "Opossum" then steamed forward to the second barrier in which a break had been made during the night, but this break had been repaired by the Chinese.

Scarcely had the ships passed the first line of stakes before one of the embrasures opened and a round shot was hurled from the fort at the advancing British vessels. This was a signal for a general fire, and now all along the face of the forts, at a distance of only six hundred yards, guns were run out and a destructive fire was directed against the English ships.

On the flag-ship the signal "engage the enemy" was at once displayed, and simultaneously she opened all her guns on the forts; three on the South fort, from which the heaviest fire was coming, and one against the North fort. The battle was now waged vigorously, all the ships replying to the fire of the enemy; the "Banterer" and "Starling," though still aground and only able to get their guns to bear with difficulty, joining in the fight. The British fleet put forth every effort to silence the guns of the South fort and from the close range at which they were firing, their gunners did most effective work. Guns were dismantled on the ramparts, shells burst

within the fort scattering death on all sides, but the Chinese fire did not abate, and the "Plover" and "Opossum" presented such an easy mark that they were hit many times. The "Plover" came under the heaviest fire and was soon riddled with round shot; her decks were swept by a hot and murderous fire, and thirty-one of those on board were killed or wounded. The admiral was wounded in the thigh but would not leave the deck; the commander of the ship was killed, and Captain McKenna of the admiral's staff shared a similar fate. Still the little ship fought on and the nine gallant fellows who were all that were left uninjured, continued to work her guns. In less than half an hour after the guns opened upon her she was so torn and shattered by the Chinese fire as to be unable to remain in the fight.

It was while she was receiving this heavy punishment, and while the whole water of the river about her was being lashed by a storm of shot hurled by the guns of the fort, that an incident which has done much to knit together the English people of the British Empire and the English speaking people of the United States occurred. Commodore Tatnall in command of a United States cruiser was lying off the mouth of Pei-hó when the engagement began. He soon saw the heavy loss the "Plover" was sustaining, and courageously entering a ship's boat was rowed to the English flag-ship through a terrific fire. He was in a most critical situation for the Chinese paid no attention to the Stars and Stripes which floated from the stern of his boat. The din of battle had fired his blood and he was eager to take

part in the action, but as a neutral he could not. However he offered to send in a steam launch to take off the wounded. It was on this occasion that he used those historical words, which have since been frequently uttered to so much purpose, "blood is thicker than water."

Although Commodore Tatnall did not take part in the fight, unless having the wounded conveyed from a ship in action in a neutral boat could be so construed, it was otherwise with his boat's crew. They were not so well up in the fine points of international law as their commander and while Tatnall was in conversation with Admiral Hope they took a hand in the battle. When the marks of the powder on their bronzed faces and arms told the commodore what they had been doing, he half in humour questioned them about their action. They made as their excuse that the crew of the English ship "were a little short-handed with the bow-gun, and we thought it no harm to give them a hand while we were waiting." There is no record of their having been punished for thus acting without orders.

The "Plover" was forced to retreat from before the forts to a safer position down the river, and Admiral Hope transferred his flag to the "Opossum." The fire of the forts was now directed with deadly effect against this ship. The "Lee" and the "Haughty" then came up to assist the "Opossum" in her attack on the forts.

Shortly after boarding the "Opossum" Admiral Hope had a narrow escape, he was knocked down by a round shot which cut the rigging of the

ship, and three of his ribs were broken; but, as in the case of the wound he received on the "Plover," he refused to quit the deck and pluckily conducted the action, and even, unable to walk, was taken in his barge to the other ships engaged to encourage their commanders and crews.

A shell set fire to the "Opossum"; but so many of her men had been killed or wounded that there were barely enough left to work the guns and the fire was allowed to burn itself out. However this ship soon had to follow the "Plover" to the first barrier, and the "Lee" and "Haughty" continued to bear the brunt of the heavy fire.

The guns of the forts despite the accurate British fire continued to find the mark and the "Lee" was struck several times below the water-line. Under the circumstances it seemed impossible to stop the leaks in her hull, but at this juncture Boatswain Wood volunteered to make the effort. To do this he had to dive under the hull, while the steamer's screw was in motion. It was a daring deed, as he was not only exposed to the heavy, close range fire of the enemy, but was also in danger of being swept under the revolving screw of the steamer he was trying to save. He failed in his undertaking although he succeeded in plugging several holes in the "Lee's" bottom. The ship was then forced to leave the fight and her commander Lieutenant Jones ran her into the soft mud of the river bank just in time to save her from sinking.

The Admiral was now on board the "Cormorant," the fourth ship on which he had hoisted his flag

since the fight began. He was completely exhausted from the pain of his wounds, and, though in a fainting condition, endeavoured to direct the movements of the fleet, but the doctors at length persuaded him to allow himself to be taken to the hospital ship. Captain Shadwell then took command of the fleet.

The "Kestrel" was sunk and five other gunboats were no longer able to continue in the fight. To the surprise of every one, at 6:30 the Chinese guns for the most part became silent, only an occasional shot being fired from the South fort.

At the commencement of the fight some six hundred marines and blue jackets from the frigates which could not pass the bar were in readiness at the mouth of the river, in steam launches, boats, and junks, to land and make an attempt to rush the South fort. When the fire slackened a conference was held on board the "Cormorant," and it was concluded that it was impossible to silence the fort by means of the guns on the fleet. An attempt to capture it through a landing party was then decided upon. By this time the ebb-tide had left so much of the mud flats exposed that the task of reaching the fort would indeed be a very difficult one.

Captain Shadwell commanded the attacking forces and under him were Captain Vansittart and Commanders Heath and Commerell. Colonel Lemon had charge of the marines and Major Forbes of a party of sappers with scaling ladders.

The boats neared the shore in silence; the North fort had ceased firing altogether and only a shot at long intervals from the South fort told that the move-

ments of the British crews were observed. Five hundred yards intervened between the spot where the boats anchored in the soft mud and the right bastion of the South fort, and through this the attacking party would have to wade at times waist deep in the mud. Just as they began to plunge toward the fort through weeds and across ditches filled with water left by the receding tide the embrasures once more opened, the guns were run out, and a wall of flame burst from the fort they were approaching. The gunboats attempted to cover the landing party by concentrating their fire on the fort, but the Chinese gunners paid little attention to them and boldly mounted the ramparts and with small arms swept the little force floundering in the thick mud. Captain Shadwell fell with a severe wound; Captain Vansittart had his leg broken by a ball; many were killed or wounded and the comrades of the wounded men could not leave them where they fell as they would have been suffocated by the mud. Three ditches had to be passed before the fort could be assailed. At the second ditch only one hundred and fifty men were left and before the third was reached another hundred had fallen. The gallant little remnant of the landing party in which there were no fewer than six officers made a desperate attempt to get within the walls of the fort. They placed their solitary scaling ladder against the ramparts, but out of ten men who mounted it three were killed and five wounded, the ladder came crashing to the ground and was broken by its fall. The last hope of getting within the fort was gone, and the

force was compelled to beat a hasty retreat to their boats.

Night had now fallen, but the Chinese soldiers within the fort had not ceased their cannonading. By means of blue lights, rockets and fire-balls they were enabled to direct their guns with a fair amount of accuracy against the retreating force.

This attack against a position which had proved itself so invulnerable to the fire of the fleet was a foolhardy one. Both in the afternoon fight and in the resistance to the landing party the Chinese had outwitted the British. The struggle throughout cost the assailants dear. The loss on the ships during the day was heavy, and the loss in the evening attack exceedingly so; of the landing party sixty-eight were killed and no fewer than three hundred wounded. As several of the boats had been sunk by the enemy's fire some of the men had to remain in the thick mud on the channel's brink. While they stood there sunk in some cases to their waists and necks, they were exposed to the heavy fire from the Southern fort; but there was no cowardice displayed and Commanders Heath and Commerell were the last to leave the shore. The gunboats then gave up the attempt to silence the forts and the grounded ships were blown up on the following day to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

Thus ended the operations against China for the year 1859, but in the following year General Sir Hope Grant, and General de Montauban taught the Chinese a lesson. The strong allied army of French and English troops stormed the Taku Forts, compelled

the Chinese to evacuate Tien-Tsin, advanced to Peking from which the Emperor fled and after deliberately burning the Emperor's summer palace forced the Chinese government to confirm the treaty of Tien-Tsin. The Convention of Peking (Oct. 1860) which arranged for the permanent representation of the powers of Europe in Peking itself was signed by the government.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY.

IN the army of the United States General Ulysses S. Grant looms large among the illustrious soldiers of his time, and of all time; with corresponding prominence Admiral David Glasgow Farragut appears among the world's sailors. He is easily the greatest naval commander that America has ever produced and ranks with such admirals as Nelson and Codrington.

The father of Admiral Farragut was a Spaniard, George Farragut, born in the island of Minorca, in 1755. He came to America in his twenty-first year at the time when the War of the Revolution was at its height. He settled in Carolina, married one Elizabeth Shine, and made a home in the primeval wilderness on the borders of Tennessee. His illustrious son was born near Knoxville, in 1801. Fortunately for the nation the Farraguts left this inland region and moved to Louisiana where George Farragut received an appointment as sailing-master in the navy of that time.

In Louisiana a friendship sprung up between the Porters and the Farraguts and David Porter, after-

wards Commander Porter, took a fancy to young Farragut and had the lad visit Washington with him, and here he placed him at school. At Washington while still a mere child Farragut was presented to Paul Hamilton of South Carolina, and was promised a midshipman's warrant when he was ten years old. His warrant was actually issued to him when he was but nine and a half years old, and a year later when Commander Porter was placed in command of the "Essex," Farragut joined the ship at Norfolk. The ship was placed in commission at once and young Farragut had in South American waters off the coast of Brazil, in the rough weather they experienced in rounding Cape Horn when the "Essex" was almost wrecked, and in the pursuit of British vessels in Chilian seas, numerous opportunities of proving the stuff he was made of, and he early showed daring and knowledge much beyond his years.

In 1814, he was to pass through a fight that must have gone far to fashion his character and make him the fearless commander he was to prove himself long years afterwards when, his hair white with age, he was able to expose himself in the rigging of his ship while passing the Southern forts. During a storm, and while the "Essex" lay close to the shores of Chili, two British ships, the "Phœbe" under the command of Captain Hillyar, who had so distinguished himself in the fight off Tamatave, and the "Cherub" took up a position out of reach of the "Essex's" carronades and mercilessly pounded Captain Porter's ship. For two and a half hours the "Essex" was played upon by the enemy's broad-

sides, and it was not until fifty-eight men were killed, sixty-six wounded and thirty-one missing, out of a crew of two hundred and fifty-five, that she surrendered.

In this fight, Farragut, although but thirteen years old, acquitted himself like a hero. He was not, however, to have further opportunity of distinguishing himself for many years. When peace was concluded with England, service in the navy of his country was dull and monotonous. The Mexican war was the only important break in this piping time of peace between the War of 1812 and the Civil war.

In 1847, Farragut obtained command of the sloop-of-war "Saratoga" and sailed for Mexico, but his ship was not to see action. Fourteen years later when the Civil war broke out Captain Farragut was unknown to the world or to the nation, quite as unknown as was the silent, morose clerk who waited on customers in a store in Galena, and yet in three years Grant and Farragut were to take rank with Wellington and Nelson. The great occasion needed great men on land and sea, and President Lincoln found in Grant and Farragut the soldier and sailor he needed. These three names—Lincoln, Grant and Farragut—will ever stand as the most important ones in the critical period when the Union was threatened.

When the Civil war broke out Grant was a comparatively young man, but when Sumter was fired upon and the Southern sailors were called upon to decide for which party they would fight, Farragut was sixty years old, but young enough to take a very determined stand and to forecast the situation suffi-

ciently well to warn his southern friends that "they would catch the devil before they got through with the business."

The backbone of the rebellion was along the Mississippi and while Grant was hammering away at the fortifications on the upper river the Assistant-Secretary of the Navy decided that it would be a wise move to force the forts at the mouth of this great water-way and win New Orleans. David Glasgow Farragut was chosen for the work, and on February 20, 1862, he arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi in his flagship the "Hartford." It is generally believed that Farragut had a strong antipathy to iron ships; be that as it may he saw the benefit of armour, and over the vitals of his vessel had chain cables placed as a protection, and about the engines and machinery bags of sand and ashes. He was a common-sense sailor from beginning to end, and in no way bound by authority or precedent. The readiness with which he could adapt himself to the circumstances under which he had to fight is very well shown in his forcing of the mouth of the Mississippi. On this occasion he caused his vessels to be daubed with the yellow mud of the river so that they might present a less easy mark. This was one of the first instances of the use of *khaki* in battle. As much of the fighting would probably occur at night he likewise had the decks and guns on his ship white-washed so that in the darkness the gun crews might, on the white background, the more easily find the implements they needed for the working of the guns.

To reach New Orleans it was necessary to pass

forts St. Philip and Jackson. From the 16th to the 20th of April Fort Jackson was bombarded, and then it was decided to attempt to pass the guns of the fort during the night. A boom barred the way, but the "Pinola" succeeded in making the passage through and, on the morning of the 24th, the fleet got under way.

The Confederate soldiers made determined efforts to destroy the "Hartford." Fire-rafts were sent against her, and one of them, pushed along the river by a tug, struck her sides. In an effort to avoid the danger in which she was placed, the "Hartford" grounded. In a moment tongues of fire were running up her sides and rigging and through her port-holes, at the same time she was immediately under the guns of Fort St. Philip, and for a brief space it looked as though nothing could save the flag-ship and her crew. In his despair Farragut cried out: "My God, is it to end in this way!" His sailors succeeded, however, in getting control of the fire, the engines were reversed and after strenuous efforts the "Hartford" slipped into deep water and successfully passed the forts, as did all the other ships of the fleet save the "Itasca," the "Winona," and the "Pinola." On the 25th of the month the National vessels anchored in safety off New Orleans. Considering the critical situation in which the "Hartford" had been placed, her loss was small—only one killed and nine wounded. In passing the forts at the mouth of the Mississippi the total loss on the fleet was thirty-seven killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded.

All through the year of 1862 this daring and skilful sailor had done excellent work along the Mississippi and particularly in the vicinity of Vicksburg; however, as his ships were much battered and their coal supply was running short, he was forced to return to New Orleans.

Early in the following year the strong defences of Port Hudson required his attention, and on March 14, he appeared before the place with a fleet of war-ships. To pass the batteries at this position was no easy matter, the narrow river and swift current both favoured the Confederates. Once this position was passed, however, his fleet would be able effectively to stop the transport of supplies from the South, and the blockade of Port Hudson would be an easy matter. Farragut was playing for a large stake and he took a big risk. Before attempting to pass the batteries he lashed his vessels together in pairs, the smaller vessels of the double column on the side remote from the Southern guns.

Before starting out on this venture he ordered his captains to "bear in mind that the object is to run the batteries with the least possible damage to our ships and thereby secure a sufficient force above for the purpose of rendering such assistance as may be required of us, to the army at Vicksburg, or, if not required, to our army at Baton Rouge."

The formation he adopted was a most effective one for his purpose. He was enabled by this double column to bring a heavy fire to bear upon the enemy, and he believed "that the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own

guns." Again if one of the ships should be disabled her consort might be able to tow her out of the fire. His plan succeeded, but not without heavy loss. Seven ships attempted to pass Port Hudson, only two succeeded; and the movement cost Farragut one hundred and seventeen in killed or wounded; but Port Hudson was closely blockaded and the Confederate army north of it would now have considerable difficulty in getting sufficient supplies.

Three months later, Vicksburg surrendered to Grant, and on July 9, Port Hudson followed its example, "and the Mississippi ran untroubled to the sea."

Farragut's work was not yet complete. The city of Mobile was still in the hands of the enemy, and it was supposed to be strong enough to resist any fleet that the North could send against it. Admiral Farragut's work at the forts at the mouth of the Mississippi and at Port Hudson had been an excellent training for the greatest achievement of his life, the taking of Mobile.

Mobile is situated thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico on a broad bay, which, however, is for the most part exceedingly shallow. "The principal entrance from the Gulf is between Mobile Point—along the narrow, sandy beach which projects from the south side of the bay—and Dauphin island, one of the chain which runs parallel to the coast of Mississippi and encloses Mississippi Sound" (Mahan). The entrance from Mississippi Sound is known as Grant's Pass. In the centre of this entrance stood Fort Powell with a line of batteries to it from either

shore, a channel being left for friendly vessels. The ship channel was closed by a line of piles and the narrow, deep water entrance lay under the guns of Fort Morgan. This fort had been strengthened in every possible way, and in it was a strong armament. Its guns were in three tiers and could sweep the decks and hulls of the enemy's ships with a storm of iron. Opposite Fort Morgan lay Fort Gaines armed with three ten-inch guns, twenty smaller smooth bores and a number of thirty-two pounders. To make the position invulnerable a double line of one hundred and eighty torpedoes had been strung across the channel, a passage three hundred feet wide being left for blockade runners.

Above the forts were a number of gunboats and a powerful ironclad ram, the "Tennessee," of the "Merrimac" type. It was thought by the Southerners that this boat would be able to treat the Northern fleet, much as the "Merrimac" had dealt with the ships in Hampton Roads before the arrival of the "Monitor;" but unfortunately for the South she had nearly all the faults of the "Merrimac." Her rudder-chains were exposed, her engines were poor, her speed was slow—a most serious defect in a ram—and her officers and men were far from being skilled seamen or gunners.

Farragut, whatever antipathy he may have had for ironclads, seemed now to have recognised the necessity of them. He asked for strong ironclads to assist in the passage of the forts and to do battle with the "Tennessee" after they were successfully passed. He was sent the "Tecumseh" and the "Manhattan,"

turret ships of 1034 tons, each carrying two fifteen-inch guns, the heaviest then in use on warships, and the "Winnebago" and the "Chickasaw," of 970 tons, each having four eleven-inch smooth bores. The turrets on the larger ships were protected by ten inches of plating and on the smaller by eight and a half. By August everything was ready and Farragut after a careful reconnaissance decided to attack at full tide on the following morning. He had under his command four monitors and fourteen wooden ships. Over the sides of the wooden ships, as in the case of the "Kearsarge," chains had been fastened to protect the boilers and machinery from the guns of Fort Morgan.

In his final disposition he ordered the ironclads to proceed in advance of the wooden ships in single file. As at Fort Hudson, he decided to pass the forts with his wooden ships in a double column, lashed together in pairs, the stronger and larger vessels towards the guns of Fort Morgan.

The wooden ships were arranged in the following order. The "Brooklyn" was in the lead and to her was lashed the "Octorora;" following her came Farragut's flag-ship, the "Hartford," lashed to the "Metacomet"; then came the "Richmond" and the "Port Royal"; then the "Lackawanna" and the "Seminole"; next the "Monongahela" and the "Kennebec"; then the "Ossipee" and the "Itasca"; the "Oneida" and the "Galena" came last.

Farragut realized that he had no easy task before him and his letter to his wife on the night before the

battle shows how keenly he felt the seriousness of the situation.

“FLAGSHIP ‘HARTFORD.’

“*Off Mobile*, August 4, 1864.

“MY DEAREST WIFE: I write and leave this letter for you. I am going into Mobile in the morning, if God is my leader, as I hope He is, and in Him I place my trust. If He thinks it is the proper place for me to die, I am ready to submit to His will in that as in all other things. My great mortification is that my vessels, the ironclads, were not ready to have gone in yesterday. The army landed last night, and are in full view of us this morning, and the ‘*Te-cumseh*’ has not yet arrived from Pensacola.

“God bless and preserve you, my darling, and my dear boy, if anything should happen to me; and may his blessing also rest upon your dear mother, and all your sisters and their children.

“Your devoted and affectionate husband, who never for one moment forgot his love, duty, or fidelity to you, his devoted and best of wives.

“D. G. FARRAGUT.”

In the morning all gloomy thoughts had been cast aside and at 5:30 A. M. the ships were formed in line ahead, and in less than two hours later they were approaching the forts. Shortly after 7 o'clock, Fort Morgan opened fire on the “*Brooklyn*,” which vessel was leading the column of wooden ships. The “*Brooklyn*” replied with her bow-chasers, and soon the whole line was answering the fierce cannonading

of the fort and of the Confederate vessels, which from their positions above were able to rake the approaching fleet.

To direct the fight, Farragut had climbed into the port main-rigging of the "Hartford," fearlessly exposing himself to the Confederate fire and as the battle grew in intensity, smoke from the guns and from the steamers blowing towards the shore hid the scene from view, and higher and still higher in the rigging, climbed the dauntless admiral. His officers feared for his safety and Captain Drayton sent a seaman aloft to lash him to the rigging.

Steadily the line advanced amid the shot and shell from the forts and from the Confederate fleet. All the Northern boats replied vigorously save the "Tecumseh." She was in the lead and her big guns had opened the fight with a couple of shells. Her captain then had them loaded with steel shot, and rushed his vessel forward unmindful of the shot and shell that fell harmlessly on the "Tecumseh's" iron skin. Craven, her captain, had, according to Farragut, set his heart upon the capture of the "Tennessee," and was reserving his vessel for her.

The critical moment was rapidly approaching. The ships were immediately opposite Fort Morgan, and getting in touch with the line of torpedoes. So close were they to the enemy's position that the commands of the Confederate officers to their gunners could be heard; but so well had the ships lived up to Farragut's motto that "the best protection against the enemy's fire is a well directed fire from our own guns," that so far, they had not suffered serious in-

jury; and it looked as though the passage of the batteries would be made in short order.

But there came a sudden turn in affairs. The slow moving monitors in the van were retarding the progress of the swifter wooden steamers. The "Tecumseh" was in the lead. When she drew near the buoy marking the edge of the torpedoes Captain Craven made the fatal mistake of thinking that it was impossible to follow the Admiral's instructions to go to the eastward of this guiding mark. While he was deliberating what course to pursue, he observed the "Tennessee" moving westward as if endeavoring to get out of range of his big guns. He thereupon ordered his pilot to steer to the left of the buoy and make straight for the Confederate ram.

Instantly the "Tecumseh" changed her course, headed to the west, and drew rapidly towards the fatal line of torpedoes. Her action retarded the progress of the other monitors, and the swifter sailing wooden vessels of the squadron gained rapidly upon them. Torpedoes were expected, and at this moment the look-out on the "Brooklyn," through the smoke ahead, saw what was thought to be signs of the presence of this destructive weapon of war; as a result the "Brooklyn's" engines were reversed and soon a mob of ships consisting of the two smaller monitors, the "Brooklyn" and the "Octorora," the "Hartford" and the "Metacomet," the "Richmond" and the "Port Royal" were massed beneath the guns of the forts, and the remaining pairs were rapidly advancing to add to the confusion. At the most critical moment in the situation Admiral Far-

ragut saw all his plans frustrated, and his fleet in danger of destruction.

At the same moment, from his position in the rigging his eyes were fixed on the "Tecumseh." He momentarily expected her destruction, and his expectations were to be realized. When she was but two hundred yards from the "Tennessee" there was a violent upheaval about her; she staggered from side to side, and then sank instantly by her bows. Her stern rose in the air and her screw spun rapidly round as it left the water. She disappeared from sight, drawing down with her nearly a hundred of her men. Her loss will forever be remembered by the gallant words of her captain who was in the pilot-house with the pilot when the torpedo exploded beneath her. Both men instinctively rushed to the narrow exit from the pilot-house and both hesitated as they thought of the other, but Craven with great self-sacrifice, said, "after you, pilot," and, as a result of his gallant action, sank with his ship.

The ships in the lead had now effectually blocked the passage immediately under the guns of Fort Morgan. Farragut signalled to the "Brooklyn" to order the monitors to go ahead and to steam forward herself, but for some reason no effort was made to obey the order. The fire from the forts grew in intensity as the target became larger and more stationary and the shot-swept decks of the Northern ships were covered with dead and dying. For a moment Farragut debated whether to advance or retire. According to Mahan: "In this extremity the devout spirit that ruled his life, and so constantly appears

in his correspondence, moved him to appeal to heaven for guidance and, he offered up his prayer, 'Oh, God, Who created man and gave him reason, direct me what to do. Shall I go on?' And it seemed, said the Admiral, as if an answering voice commanded, go on!"

Farragut's mind was made up; there would be no retreat. Signalling to the "Brooklyn" to go ahead, the "Hartford" backed clear of the vessels in her way and with full steam ahead sped past the "Brooklyn's" stern. As he passed, from the "Brooklyn," came the warning cry, torpedoes! This cry, coupled with the destruction of the "Tecumseh," must have made the men on the "Hartford" realize the awful risk their commander was taking. The open passage eastward of the buoy was effectually blocked, and it was now evident that the "Hartford" was about to cross the line of torpedoes west of the buoy, and of the point where the water was still agitated by the sinking of the "Tecumseh." The Admiral was taking the most daring chance of his life, and to the warning cry of "torpedoes," he replied with the words: "Damn the torpedoes! Four bells. Captain go ahead! Jouett full speed!"

The next moment the "Hartford" was on the line of torpedoes and those on board could hear them grating against her bottom, but fortunately they did not explode and in a few minutes this appalling danger was past.

The "Hartford" had now a new peril confronting her. By her rush across the line of torpedoes she had become separated from the rest of the fleet and

the three Confederate gunboats and the ironclad "Tennessee" were awaiting her. It looked for a time as if she might meet destruction from the guns on these gunboats or from the ram of the "Tennessee." The gunboats took up a position in front of her from which they were able, as they retreated, to pour in a raking fire which she could not return. While the "Hartford" was being thus tantalized, the "Tennessee" made an effort to destroy her by ramming, but a successful movement of the helm at the right moment averted destruction. The "Tennessee" then made an effort to sink her with her heavy guns, but the shots missed and for the time being the "Hartford" was out of danger.

After this brief conflict with the "Hartford" the "Tennessee" turned her attention to the line of advancing wooden ships. The heroic example of Admiral Farragut had put heart and hope into the captains of the vessels crowded under the guns of Fort Morgan. Fortunately the smoke of battle blowing shoreward had interfered with the aim of the gunners in the fort and the vessels had not suffered as much as might have been expected while in their critical position in front of the fort.

The ironclads first succeeded in passing the guns, and then the "Richmond," which had been doing most effective gunnery, managed to get clear of the "Brooklyn" and sped safely onward, and soon the "Brooklyn" herself was out of danger. The "Hartford" was now about a mile in advance and confronting them was the "Tennessee." This strong ship was evidently making for them with the inten-

tion of using her ram, and they poured broadsides into her, but the solid shot had about as much effect as the broadsides of the "Congress" and the "Cumberland" had had against the "Merrimac." The "Tennessee" reserved her fire and made an effort to ram the "Brooklyn," but her slow speed enabled the "Brooklyn" to avoid the blow. A similar attempt was made against the "Richmond," with similar results. She then passed along the entire line of wooden ships, exchanging shots with them, but doing little injury. The "Monongahela," which had lashed to her the "Kennebec," seeing the "Tennessee" in an awkward position across the stream, tried to ram the ironclad, but in this effort the "Monongahela" lost her own beak and failed to injure the "Tennessee."

The "Tennessee" continued to fire into the line as the ships swept past, and the "Monongahela," the "Kennebec," the "Ossipee" and the "Oneida" all felt the effect of her broadsides. It looked for a moment as if one of the ships at least would be destroyed. The "Oneida" had already received a shot in her boiler which retarded her progress. The "Winnebago" saw the perilous plight of the wooden ship and came to her rescue, hurling shot from her turret guns into the Southern ironclad. The "Tennessee" saw she could effect but little for the present and slipped under the shelter of the guns of Fort Morgan, apparently for the purpose of considering the situation. The whole line, which a few moments before, had seemed in such imminent danger, successfully passed the forts. That the fleet was

saved was due to the courage of Admiral Farragut. In this hazardous undertaking the "Tecumseh" was the only vessel lost. The deed had been worth the risk; the Confederate works were now under close blockade, and, as their land communications were cut off by Northern troops, the forts would be able to hold out for but a brief period.

The three Confederate gunboats now attracted the attention of Farragut, and it was not long before the "Gaines" was so badly injured that she was forced to retreat to the protection of Fort Morgan. The "Metacomet" went in pursuit of the "Selma," and, after a hot chase in which, for a time, the vessels were hidden from each other by a heavy rain squall, the Confederate ship struck to the "Metacomet." Meanwhile the third gunboat, the "Morgan," had escaped to the protection of the guns of the fort.

To make the day's work entirely successful the "Tennessee" had to be either captured or destroyed, but there was time enough for that and Farragut, out of consideration for his men, who had had three hours of hard fighting with their nerves at a tremendous strain, decided to have his crews go to breakfast. It would be time enough to consider what course to pursue after they had had a good meal; but he had, indeed, determined in his own mind to let the "Tennessee" rest for the present, and to attack her after dark with the three monitors.

The Northern sailors, after they had breakfasted and cleared up their ships, were lounging about the decks resting, when suddenly the "Tennessee" was seen puffing slowly towards them with the evident in-

tention of attacking, single-handed, the whole fleet of three monitors and fourteen wooden vessels. The broadsides of the Northern ships had had so little effect on her well-armoured casemate that Buchanan was over-confident and believed that in a battle at close quarters he would be able to destroy at least a number of the Northern ships.

Farragut was naturally surprised to see the boldness of the Southern ironclad, but was not unprepared for her, and signalled to his vessels to "attack the ram not only with your guns, but with bows at full speed." Slowly the foolhardy Southern ship approached the Northern vessels. The first boat with which she was to come in contact was the "Monongahela." An attempt was made by the latter vessel to ram the "Tennessee," but the blow merely jarred her and made no impression. For the moment the two ships lay side by side and their crews exchanged volleys from their small arms at close quarters. So near were these two vessels to each other that the sailors of the North and South shouted mutual abuse through the open ports, and it has been said that one of the Northern sailors struck an over-abusive Southerner with a bit of holystone on the head. About this time the "Tennessee" succeeded in placing a shot on board the "Lackawanna," which set the Northern vessel on fire.

But Buchanan, in attacking the Northern fleet, had one thought uppermost in his mind—to sink the "Hartford." He made straight for Farragut's ship. The two vessels rapidly approached each other, and it looked for a moment, as if they were about to col-

lide bows on. But the "Tennessee" swerved from her course and the vessels scraped each other to port as they passed. The blow, although a glancing one, was sufficiently severe to double up the anchor of the "Hartford," which was hanging from her bow. The "Hartford" sent in a broadside as the "Tennessee" glided past, but the shot bounded harmlessly from her ironclad casemate. The fire on the "Lackawanna" was by this time extinguished and she bravely attempted to ram the "Tennessee." The blow was badly aimed, and she collided with the "Hartford," smashing in the latter vessel's timbers. At first it was thought that the injury was so severe that the "Hartford" would be destroyed; and Admiral Farragut leaped into the bow chains to examine the hole made in the side of his ship. His men for a moment believed that he had been knocked overboard and the cry went up to "Save the Admiral;" but in a few moments he was back on deck directing her to proceed once more against the "Tennessee." The "Lackawanna" was in his way, and as he renewed the battle he signalled to her "for God's sake get out of our way and anchor."

The monitors now approached the scene of battle and began to hammer at the "Tennessee" with their big guns. For half an hour the solid shot from the "Manhattan," the "Winnebago" and the "Chickasaw" thundered against the ironclad's hull. The work of Captain George Perkins of the "Chickasaw" deserves special mention; the youngest commander in the fleet he proved himself in this fight a man of heroic mould. At first this fire seemed to

make but little impression, but the steady pounding was telling. The exposed steering-gear was shot away, one gun was disabled, and the funnel was broken off short. Buchanan felt the frame of his ship gradually weaken under this heavy cannonading and gave orders to have her steered for Fort Morgan. At this moment he was severely wounded, his leg being broken, and he was compelled to hand the command of his ship over to Captain Johnston. For twenty minutes the "Tennessee" kept up the fight. All hope of escape was cut off, and Johnston seeing the uselessness of continuing the battle, persuaded Buchanan to allow him to surrender. A white flag was displayed, but in the smoke of battle it was not seen, and the cannonading continued. Johnston in his anxiety to have the battle end exposed himself on the upper deck and waved a white flag in token of surrender. Just at this moment the "Ossipee" was attempting to ram the ironclad. Her commander caught sight of the white flag and the vessel's engines were reversed and the cannonading ceased.

The "Tennessee" was in a bad way, her hull was leaking and many of her iron plates were cracked, but she had suffered but few casualties, having only two men killed and nine wounded. The Northern casualties were much heavier than the Southern. On the "Hartford" alone twenty-five were killed and twenty-eight wounded. On the "Brooklyn" eleven were killed and forty-three wounded. Counting the men drowned on the "Tecumseh" the whole Northern loss was one hundred and forty-five killed, one hundred and seventy wounded and four prisoners.

The Southern loss was only twelve killed and twenty wounded, and one hundred and twenty-seven prisoners taken on the "Tennessee."

After a brief cannonading, Fort Powell surrendered and on the 7th of August Fort Gaines, on the 23rd, Fort Morgan, and all the main strongholds along the Gulf of Mexico were in the hands of the North.

The passage of these forts greatly added to Farragut's reputation. His bravery in exposing himself in the rigging, his daring in forcing the "Hartford" across the line of torpedoes after the destruction of the "Tecumseh," his courage in battling with the gunboats and the ironclad in his wooden ship, all made him both a popular and picturesque hero. He was now to have a much-needed rest from war, and later in life in a journey abroad received much honour, but none more gratifying to him than the whole-hearted way in which the inhabitants of Minorca laid their little island at his feet.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

IN 1881 it looked as though trouble was brewing for the Europeans settled in Egypt. Arabi Pasha was at that time war minister for the Khedive. Arabi was a man of great ambition and a magnetism that attracted all those of his nation with whom he came in contact. By vehement protestations of patriotism he gained a strong following and was soon recognised as the power behind the throne. Having made himself so strong that he was the real ruler, with the Khedive listlessly acquiescing in his actions, he began a very outspoken agitation against the Europeans residing in Egypt. As a result riots occurred in Alexandria in June 1882, and many Christians were slain. The British Consul was insulted and if a European showed himself in the streets of the city he was in danger of assassination. Thousands fled across the Mediterranean to Greece or to Italy, and Arabi, puffed up with success, thought himself able to hold Alexandria against the combined navies of Europe.

While Arabi was thus plotting he was making ready for resistance. He knew that sooner or later the English squadron lying in front of the forts would turn their guns on them. He therefore set

his engineers to work to throw up earth-works and generally strengthen the forts.

Off the harbour lay a British fleet of eight battle-ships and eleven gunboats under the command of Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour. The warships were the "Invincible," the "Inflexible," the "Sultan," the "Superb," the "Alexandra," the "Téméraire," the "Penelope," and the "Monarch."

The "Alexandra," was the flag-ship, but as she was a deep-draught vessel, too much so to approach near the shore, Admiral Seymour transferred his flag to the "Invincible."

By means of search-lights on the warships several hundred of Arabi's men were discovered throwing up earth-works and mounting guns in a position from which they could be brought to bear upon the British fleet. Admiral Seymour threatened bombardment unless all operations ceased. Arabi, with characteristic Eastern mendacity, denied that such work was being done; and the foreign Consuls endeavoured to defer bombardment by pointing out that in such case much valuable neutral property owned by Europeans would be destroyed.

The work of preparation to resist the attack by the British fleet went on till at length Admiral Seymour was constrained to send in an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin, on the south side of the harbour, for the purpose of disarmament. He sent in his ultimatum on July 10, giving the Egyptians two hours to comply with his demand.

At once an exodus began. The French, Italian,

and American warships steamed from the harbour and the large fleet of merchantmen about the place took up a position of safety out of reach of the guns of the ships or the forts.

The British warships were cleared for action and each vessel took up its appointed station. The "Superb," the "Sultan," and the "Alexandra" had positions assigned them in front of the Ras-el-Tin earth-works; the "Inflexible" in front of the break-water with her guns directed against the Lighthouse fort and the Oom-el-kubebe fort; the "Téméraire" immediately in front of the Mex fort. The "Invincible" and the "Penelope" were nearer the shore, with their guns directed against the Mex fort and the Mex earth-works. The "Monarch" likewise brought some of her guns to bear on the Mex fort, and she was placed in such a position that her stern guns bore on Fort Marsa; but she found no occasion to fire on the latter fort. The little "Condor" which was to prove the hero of this fight, had her station off Fort Marabout. From Fort Adjemi to Fort Silsileh, a distance of eight miles, every promontory or vulnerable part was studded with forts or earth-works. Along this line of fortifications there were mounted forty-four rifled guns, two hundred and twelve smooth bores, and thirty-eight mortars; but, for the most part, these were indifferent weapons, totally incapable of penetrating the armored battleships. The mortars which might have done serious damage to the fleet were not used to any extent and no hits were made by them.

When Farragut fought the battle of Mobile Bay

one of the gravest sources of danger to his fleet was the presence of submarine mines. The fleet before Alexandria had no such danger to fear. The trouble with Arabi had been anticipated, and the British fleet had kept such a strict watch that the Egyptians were not given an opportunity to mine the harbour. If Admiral Seymour had not been in front of Alexandria for weeks before the actual outbreak of hostilities the capture of the forts would not have been the easy task it was. When the forts fell into the hands of the English eighty-seven mines containing five hundred pounds of gun cotton, eighty-seven of two hundred and fifty pounds and five hundred of one hundred pounds were found. Knowing that no mines were placed in the harbour the English ships fearlessly changed their positions.

In a general order to his captains Admiral Seymour announced that the bombardment would begin at five in the morning of July 11. As there were no mines he was able to send several ships into the harbour, and so ordered a two-fold attack, which was to be conducted according to the following plans.

- “1. From the inside of the harbour, in which the ‘Invincible,’ ‘Monarch,’ and ‘Penelope’ will take part.
- “2. By the ‘Sultan,’ ‘Superb,’ ‘Téméraire,’ ‘Alexandra,’ and ‘Inflexible’ from outside the breakwater.
- “3. Action will commence by signal from me, when the ship nearest the newly-erected earth-work near Fort Ada will fire a shell into the earth-work.

“On the batteries opening on the offshore squadron in reply, every effort will be made by the ships to destroy the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin Peninsula, especially the Lighthouse Battery, bearing on the harbour. When this is accomplished the ‘Sultan,’ ‘Superb,’ and ‘Alexandra’ will move to the eastward and attack Fort Pharos, and if possible the Silsileh Battery.

“The ‘Inflexible’ will move down this afternoon to the position off the Corvette Pass, assigned to her yesterday, and be prepared to open fire on the guns in the Mex lines, in support of the inshore squadron, when signal is made.

“The ‘Téméraire,’ ‘Sultan,’ and ‘Alexandra’ will flank the works on Ras-el-Tin.

“The gun vessels and gunboats will remain outside and keep out of fire, until a favourable opportunity offers itself of moving into the attack on Mex.

“Ships must be guided in a great measure by the state of the weather, whether they anchor or remain under way. If they anchor, a wire hawser should be used as a spring.

“The men are to have breakfast at 4:30 a.m. and are to wear their working rig.

“The inshore squadron will be under my personal command; the offshore ships under that of Captain Hunt-Grubbe, C.B., of the ‘Sultan.’

“The ‘Helicon’ and the ‘Condor’ will act as repeating ships.

“Finally the object of this attack is the destruction of the earth-works and the dismantling of the batteries on the sea-fronts of Alexandria. It is pos-

sible that the work may not be accomplished under two or three days.

“Shell is to be expended with caution, notwithstanding that the ‘Humber,’ with a fair proportion of reserve ammunition, may be expected here on the 12th.

“Should the ‘Achilles’ arrive in time, she is to attack Fort Pharos, or place herself where the senior officer may direct.”

By six o'clock on the morning of the 11th, everything was in readiness and the crews, made strong by a good breakfast, stood at their guns, stripped to the waist. The morning was clear, only a light wind blew shoreward with scarcely force enough to ripple the waters. The gunners waited impatiently for the action to commence, and it was not until 6:30 o'clock that the order came to “load with common shell.” On every ship the work was done with a will and then there was another half hour of silence on the fleet, the only sounds being the noise made by the working of the engines keeping the vessels in position and the subdued tones of the men who were anxiously awaiting the action.

At length a signal was seen to flutter from the “Invincible,” it was to the “Alexandra,” outside the breakwater; she was ordered to fire a shell into Fort Ada. Instantly one of her big guns boomed out. The next moment the anxious crews on the British fleet saw at the foremast of the “Invincible” the signal for general action. The guns were in position and instantly from every ship a mighty roar was heard; flame and smoke leaped from their broadsides,

and the air hissed and shrieked as the big projectiles sped on their way to the Egyptian forts and earthworks. The ironclads trembled through their whole length under the heavy fire. In some cases men were thrown flat by the concussion, and so severe was it on the "Inflexible" when her four big eighty-one ton guns were fired that her boats were shattered. The orchestra of war was playing and the instruments were eighteen ton guns, twenty-five ton guns, and eighty-one ton guns; these formed the base; but through their roar pealed the treble of the Nordenfelts and Gatlings.

The Egyptians responded vigorously to the fire of the fleet. While the shooting of their gunners was on the whole inaccurate, shot and shell began to find the hulls of the warships; but their projectiles were unable to penetrate, and it was only when unarmoured parts were struck that they made any impression. Splinters flew about in showers, but the crews were safe behind the strong armour that was merely dented by the heaviest fire from the forts.

The shooting on some of the warships was remarkably accurate, the big projectiles from the slow-firing guns of the "Inflexible" finding the mark nearly every time. The guns in her fore turret kept up a slow fire against the Ras-el-Tin position, while those at her stern played upon Marabout or occasionally threw a shell into the Mex lines. The gunners had some difficulty in locating the positions they were firing upon as the light wind that was blowing shoreward clung to the Egyptian position and hid their forts from the view of the men on deck; but the

officers in the tops kept the gunners informed of the character of their shooting.

The "Invincible" did particularly accurate work with her guns which were directed against the Mex fort. In her maintop was Midshipman Hardy, who recorded the effect of every shot and gave the gunners excellent directions, his position was far from being a safe one, for the Egyptian gunners were firing high and their shell screamed through the rigging of the "Invincible;" but the young midshipman paid no attention to the projectiles that flew about him. His gaze was rivetted upon the batteries in front, and he watched with pleasure the earth and stones tumbling beneath the fire he was directing.

The honours of the fight were, however, to go, not to the big battleships, but to the little gunboat "Condor." In the early morning the big ship "Téméraire" grounded and the "Condor" was ordered to go to her assistance. Her crew feared that they were to have no active part in the bombardment on this day, and were disgusted at being detailed for tugboat work. In the orders the words the "gun vessels and gunboats will remain outside and keep out of fire until a favourable opportunity offers itself to move in to the attack" allowed the commanders considerable latitude. The fire from Marabout was dropping dangerously near the vessels inside the harbour and Lord Charles Beresford, in command of the "Condor," thought that a favourable opportunity had come for bringing his little gunboat into the engagement. He had but little fear of the gunnery of the Egyptians and determined to move his vessel within

close range of Marabout, and with his gatlings to endeavour to silence the guns there. When he had taken up a position where the nine-inch guns would with difficulty be brought to bear on the "Condor," he opened fire on the fort with his two small 64-pounders, 7-inch Woolwich guns and his machine guns.

At first the forts scorned to fire on such a diminutive mark as the "Condor," but soon her fire began to be so effective against the guns of Marabout that they were forced to turn their attention to her. Shells from their heavy guns began to sing over the little steamer and to fall about her, one or two striking her, but without doing serious damage. The position she had taken was a comparatively safe one, and to make his ship a less easy mark Lord Beresford dropped his anchors and warped her back and forward so that the Egyptian gunners were compelled to fire at a moving target. The "Condor's" work was proving so effective that it was deemed necessary to silence her, and the guns which, a short time before, had been turned on the warships in the harbour were directed against her. She kept up an excellent fight by herself for nearly an hour and Admiral Seymour, seeing how severely she was handling the enemy's gunners, thought that if the other gunboats went to her assistance the fort might quickly be silenced and so he signalled to the "Beacon," the "Bittern," the "Decoy," and the "Signet" to move in and assist Lord Beresford. They quickly responded, and following the example of the "Condor" took up a position close in shore and opened with their machine guns from their tops on the fort. This fire,

together with the heavy projectiles from the "Invincible," which with the "Penelope" and the "Monarch" was firing her broadsides into the Mex lines, caused the firing in Fort Marabout to grow weaker, and soon all the guns in that position were silent.

When the gunboats had completed their work, Admiral Seymour recalled them to their original positions in the fleet, and as they steamed past the warships the little "Condor" was everywhere received with enthusiastic cheering, and the Admiral himself honoured her with the signal "well done 'Condor.'"

All through the morning hours the bombardment had continued and with each broadside the Egyptian fire grew feebler, but still the gunners along the long line of fortifications, for the most part, stuck to their guns. Occasionally an officer, glass in hand, could be seen by the men in the tops boldly exposing himself on the ramparts of the forts, as he followed the movements of the ships, watching the effect of the fire of his men and directing the gunners.

Fort Marabout had been silenced about mid-day and Fort Mex and the Mex lines were then making but a faint response to the cannonading of the "Téméraire," the "Monarch," the "Invincible" and the "Penelope." At one o'clock the fire had so far ceased that several of the warships changed their positions, moved to the east, and turned their guns on the forts Ada and Pharos. About this stage in the bombardment the sharp-eyed sentries in the tops observed that the gunners in the lower batteries of Fort Mex had left their guns.

This fort was indeed in a bad way; the machine-gun fire had forced the gunners to retire within the citadel and a well-placed shot from the "Invincible" had fallen into a powder magazine which blew up with a terrific explosion, killing or wounding many Egyptians.

It was now decided to make it impossible for the enemy again to use the guns in the lower batteries and a landing party of twelve men was chosen to go ashore to blow up or spike the deserted weapons. In this landing party were Lieutenant Barton Bradford, in command, Flag-Lieutenant Hon. Mr. Lambton, Lieutenant Poore, Major Tulloch, and Mr. Hardy. Although there was but little wind blowing shoreward, a heavy swell was running, and as the little party neared the land they found that it was going to be no easy matter to reach the fortifications. While the launch was fighting with the recoiling waves they each moment expected a volley among them from the small arms in the fort, but the Egyptians had either fled further out of danger or were so paralyzed with fear that they were unable to pull a trigger. While the launch struggled with the surf Major Tulloch became impatient and leaping into the sea swam to the outworks. Soon the rest of the party landed and at once began the task of rendering the enemy's guns useless. In the muzzles of two 10-inch guns they exploded gun-cotton, while the smooth-bore guns were spiked. The work was done in silence, as none of the enemy attempted in any way to interfere with the heroic little party. When they had completed their task they re-embarked in the launch without having

suffered loss save that of the dinghy of the gunboat "Bittern," which was crushed in the surf.

It was then but half-past three in the afternoon and all of the Egyptian guns west of the break-water were silent, and the fleet was free to concentrate its fire on the forts within the harbour and on the earth-works and forts on the east.

Meantime some of these had been silenced, the "Sultan," the "Superb," and the "Alexandra" had steamed several times past the batteries situated between the Lighthouse fort and Fort Pharos, hurling at them effective broadsides. In their work against the Lighthouse position they had been assisted by the big guns of the "Inflexible," and before the morning was half over that fort was silent. The big ships were now free to direct their fire on the Ras-el-Tin position and on Forts Ada and Pharos. Their big guns were used at comparatively short range with deadly effect. The brickwork facing on Fort Pharos offered but a poor resisting medium to the projectiles that came against them with the thundering roar of a railway train. The 81-ton guns of the "Inflexible" did much destructive work and buildings were shattered and blown to pieces by their fire. Fort Ada was soon a wreck; one of the big shells struck it fair in front and a wide gap was made in the walls. As though this were not sufficient, almost simultaneously a shell from the "Superb" dropped into a powder magazine in the fort. There was a blinding flash, a dull, deafening roar, and a sudden cloud spread over the scene; and in the midst of this cloud were hurled aloft stones, beams, and the bodies of

men. It has been stated that fully two hundred men perished by this explosion. Fort Ada was soon silenced and at half-past four the guns in Fort Pharos ceased firing. There was silence along the shore, and the forts and earth-works from which Arabi Pashi had expected so much were in ruins. One feeble voice alone was heard from the Hospital Battery, where a 7-inch gun spoke at intervals.

The fire against Alexandria had ceased, save when a gun was levelled at any of the enemy who showed themselves in the ruined forts. At half-past five the "cease firing" was signalled from the flag-ship.

It is worthy of note that at the end of this day's steady cannonading the supply of ammunition was running perilously low on the ships. Some of them had only a few rounds left for their guns. Had they not succeeded in reducing Arabi's position on this first day the siege would have had to be delayed until they could get a fresh supply of ammunition.

The day's work over, the British fleet anchored in front of the forts, and while they awaited the morrow the crews repaired the slight damages they had sustained. On the following morning it was expected that they would have but little difficulty in driving Arabi's forces from Alexandria.

Comparatively little injury had been done to the English vessels. The "Alexandra" had received the greatest number of hits, and, although she was not seriously damaged, her hull had been struck twenty-six times, while her rigging was much cut and her forward funnel was broken in several places. It was on board the "Alexandra" that Gunner Israel

Harding won his Victoria Cross. A 10-inch round shell from a smooth-bore gun had lodged on the deck; a cry went up at the sight of the live shell, and those in the vicinity of it shrank back in dismay as they saw the ominously smoking fuse. Israel Harding rushed up at their cries, and, with great presence of mind, seized a bucket of water and threw it on the fuse. He then took hold of the shell in his naked hands and plunged it into a tub of water that was standing near by.

Despite the number of times the "Alexandra" had been hit she had but one man killed and three wounded. She had, indeed, been in more danger from her own guns than the enemy's. Three of her guns had been seriously injured by shells bursting in them.

The "Inflexible" had received a severe blow from a 10-inch rifle shell below the water-line. Sufficiently serious damage was done by this shell to compel the big ship to go into dock for repairs. She had one killed and two wounded, one of the latter mortally. In all, during the ten hours the ships had been under fire of the forts, only five men were killed and twenty-eight wounded. All the vessels save the "Téméraire" and the "Monarch" had been struck, but none had been forced to leave the battle. The little gunboats which had fought the guns of the forts at such close range had no casualties to report.

During the night search-lights flashed along the shore and a careful look-out was kept to prevent the Egyptians from re-building their forts. For the most part no attempt was made to re-construct the

shattered walls and earth-works. Fort Moncrieff alone appeared to have undergone any repairs.

At daybreak after the dead had been solemnly committed to the deep, preparations were made to renew the attack, but as a strong wind was blowing, it was some little time before the warships got into position to commence firing. At length the big guns on the "Inflexible" and the "Téméraire" opened fire on the fort, and three well-directed shells destroyed the work the Egyptians had done during the night. The enemy were not prepared to stand another heavy bombardment, and at once raised a white flag upon Ras-el-Tin. Lieutenant Lambton was sent on shore to receive the surrender of the forts, but the Governor seemed to have changed his mind and refused to give them up; however the fleet did not again commence firing, and it was not until four in the afternoon that another shell was hurled at Fort Pharos. As a white flag was immediately displayed the ships ceased firing for the day, and Admiral Seymour determined to enter Alexandria on the following morning. So ended the attack of the British fleet on the fortifications constructed by 'Arabi Pasha.

The official Egyptian account of the work of the warships varies somewhat from the English narrative. It makes amusing reading, but no less truthful than many of the reports that found their way into print during the siege of the Legations in China, and during the Spanish-American war and the Great Boer war. Wilson gives the following translation of it in his *Ironclads in Action*:

WAR NEWS.

“ On Tuesday, 25, Shaban, 1299, at 12 o'clock in the morning (July 11, 7 a. m.), the English opened fire on the forts of Alexandria, and we returned the fire.

“ At 10 a. m. an ironclad foundered off Fort Ada.

“ At noon two vessels were sunk between Fort Pharos and Fort Adjemi.

“ At 1:30 p. m. a wooden man-of-war of eight guns was sunk.

“ At 5 p. m. a large ironclad was struck by a shell from Fort Pharos, her battery was injured and a white flag was immediately hoisted by her, as a signal to cease firing at her, whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for ten hours without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts were destroyed but they were repaired during the night. The shot and shells discharged by the two sides amounted to about 6000, and this is the first time that so large a number of missiles have been discharged in so short a time.

“ At 11 a. m. on Wednesday the English ships again opened fire and were replied to by the forts, but after a short time the firing ceased on both sides and a deputation came from Admiral Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha which he could not accept.

“ No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy fire as did the Egyptians under the fire of twenty-eight ships during ten hours.

“ At 9 a. m. on Thursday an English man-of-war

was seen to put a small screw in place of a large one which she had been using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried away by a shot from the forts.

“On examining other ships it was observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides and that one had lost her funnel.”

On the morning of the 13th, the British found that all the forts had been abandoned and that after the abandonment of the forts the city had been given over to plunder and murder. During the two days before the British landed Arabi's soldiers had had a carnival of blood, and thousands of Christians perished in the streets.

Now that the forts had fallen and that the Europeans still left in the city were in danger of their lives, the American troops on the warships in the harbour joined with the British sailors in restoring order and soon the marauders were driven from the streets and the fires, which they had ignited and which were preying upon the city in many parts, were extinguished.

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